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,FOREWORD BY MARIO MONTI
Member of the Commisslon rn charge of competition policy
The year 2001 saw intense activity in all three areas of competition policy: antinust, merger conffol and State
aid. Several cases decided by the Commission aroused considerable public interest, either because of
particularly high fines or aid amounts or because of the size of mergers that eventually were not authorised, or
because of important settlements in antitrust cases linked to sports (footballer tansfers, Formula One). In the
merger field" activity continued to be very substantial, although the rate ofnotified concentrations resulting in a
prohibition decision remained very modest. The Commission adopted a Green paper on the review of the
mergerregulation with the aim of launching a debate on how to improve the cunent EU merger contol system.
Substantial progress was also made in the area of State aid policy. The Stockholm European Council
called on all Member States to demonstrate a downward trend in State aid and to redirect aid toward
horizontal objectives of common interest. The increased transparency resulting from the new State aid
register and State aid scoreboard will make it possible to monitor the progress achieved by Member
States. Major areas where we broke new ground include our proposals to end State guarantees for public
banks in Germany, the launching of a wide-ranging investigation into the effects of aid in the form of
fiscal measures, and our decisions on stranded costs in the electricity sector.
In the light of ftese developments, it is particularly important for me as Member of the European Commission
with special responsibility for competition to explain the benefits of competition policy and the relevant work
of the Commission. This annual report is a good opportunity to look back critically at what we have achieved,
to draw conclusions for future action and to veri$ whether our action is in line with our objective.
Our objective is to ensure that competition is undistorted, so as to permit wider consumer choice,
technological innovation and price competition. This is achieved if companies compete rather than
collude and if market power is not abused. When competitive conditions prevail, producers try to attract
customers by offering them lower prices, higher quality or better service than their competitors. In other
words: we undertake to work for the benefit of the European citizen. It can be seen from the examples
given in this report whether this objective is being attained.
The report will give a broad overview of how the Commission has performed its task of monitoring the
proper functioning of competition in the single market. Here, I should like to focus on two topics where
crucial progress was made in 2001: the fight against cartels, and international and multilateral
cooperation (including enlargement).
Cartels
Record amount offines
One of the things for which 2001 will doubtless be remembered is the unprecedented activity that took
place in the sphere of cartels. With 10 negative decisions against 65 enterprises, fines totalling over
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EUR 1 g00 million, nearly half of which intheVitamins case alone, and the largest individual fine ever
imposed (inthe carbonless paper case), the year will go down as a milestone in the commission's
struggle against cartels.
Since I took up my present duties in Septemb er 1999,I have stated on a number of occasions' clearly and
publicly, that i consider cartels to be a veritable cancer in an open, modern market economy' Unlike other
iorms of anticompetitive behaviour, they serve one purpose and one purpose alone: that of reducing or
eliminating competition. They bring no benefit to the economy and can therefore never be viewed
favourably from an economic standpoint. Their impact is entirely negative in that they lead to less choice
for consumers, higher costs and reduced competitiveness for industry, delays in firms making essential
adjustments and less innovation.
Such is the price to pay for a cartellised economy. And it is a high price as far as the European economy
is concemed. As the decisions taken this year show, cartels are numerous, affecting as they do many
sectors ranging from banking services to industrial products' and from afu transport to consumer goods'
They involve both small firmi and world leaders, and concern local markets and world markets alike'
Inc reas ed. enfo rc e me nt effo rt s
When I assumed office as competition commissioner, I was determined to step up the Commission's
efforts in the area of enforcement. I am convinced that the effectiveness of an anti-cartel policy depends
first and foremost on its capacity to dissuade managers from engaging in collusive behaviour. Such
dissuasion is effective only if there is a real chance of being punished and if the amount of the penalties is
sufficiently high compared with the profits to be eamed from a cartel'
This priority has been translated over the past two years into radical action in the case-handling sphere'
We have considerably strengthened the human and material resources of our unit specialising in the
handling of cartel cases and we shall continue to do so in 2002. We have shifted the focus of the other
antitrusioperational units of the Directorate-General for Competition towards the fight against cartels,
both as regards the detection and as regards the prosecution and punishment of cartels. We have
intensified our contacts with our opposite numbers in the Member States' competition authorities, and
with those further afield, especially in the United States and Canada, in order better to combat practices
that are becoming worldwide. And we have put in place management tools enabling more efficient and
more speedy management of cartel cases.
The resounding successes in 2001 are the first fruits of this action. I am very pleased with them. But they
are just a beginning.
The credibility of an anti-cartel policy, its power to dissuade and hence its effectiveness are built up over
time. The managers and directors of companies engaging in such practices must be in no doubt that we
shall leave them no respite, that they will be detected and that the penalties will be heavy. In a word, that
it is more dangerous than profitable to participate in a cartel and that their only chance of lessening the
financial consequences of their actions is to put a stop to them and come forward and talk to us under the
leniency progranlme.
Enlargement and comPetition
The year 2001 was also an important year for the accession negotiations on competition. These were
provisionally closed in early December with Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia. Negotiations are
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being pursued with Bulgaria, cyprus, the czech Republic, Hungary, Malta, slovakia, poland and
Romania. Even with the four candidate countries for which the competition chapter was provisionally
closed, continuous monitoring will apply. The provisional closure of the negotiations with four candidate
countries in 2001 reflects the important progress they have made in the adoption and implementation of
the Community's competition cc4urs.
In the coming months, the Commission will continue to assist the candidate countries in their
transformation process in the competition field. [n this context, I would like to emphasise the problem of
incompatible State aid measures in the candidate countries, in particular those aimed at attracting foreign
direct investment. Indeed, a lack of proper State aid discipline seems to be the major stumbling Utoct f-
those candidate countries for which the competition chapter has not yet been provisionally cloied. As we
need to preserve the integrity of the single market, the EU cannot accept any continuance of incompatible
State aid measures in the candidate countries after accession. This is ofcrucial importance, not least for
investors who seek legal security. In fact, the Commission is actively helping the candidate countries in
converting incompatible State aid into permissible aid arrangements before accession.
For their successful integration into the Union, the candidate countries also need a competition culture
where businesses have learnt to obey the rules and where consumers become increasingly aware of its
benefits. This is particularly important inasmuch as awareness of the important role played by
competition policy also leads to enhanced enforcement of the rules. Companies and private individuals
can do much to help to enforce the rules by bringing competition cases before the courts and complaints
before the competition authorities. I hope this will also increasingly happen in the candidate countries,
thus helping to ensure healthy competition on the markets and hence to complete those countries'
transition to well-functioning market economies.
The Commission's modernisation proposals in the antitrust area are precisely tailored to promoting the
growth of such a competition culture. Our reform is aimed at making antitrust enforcement even more
effective through the direct applicability of all elements of our antitrust rules by national courts and
authorities. Furthermore, particular emphasis is being put on the further deepening of the network
connecting the Commission and national competition authorities in the enforcement exercise. This is, of
course, also of great relevance from the point of view of the candidate countries. The potential target
dates of accession of the new Member States and the application of the antitrust reform essentially
coincide. As soon as the current candidate countries become Member States, their antitrust authorities
will become an integral part of the more decentralised, more active antitrust enforcement network. From
this perspective, the current pre-accession phase is particularly important. But in view of the progress
already made, and the regular contacts that have been established between the Commission and the
competition offices of the candidate countries, we should be confident about the future.
International and multilateral cooperation
In times of globalisation, intemational cooperation must not be limited to candidate countries. We have to
find means of linking together on a global level competition authorities, but also competition policy
concepts. In 2001, progress was made on two forms of multilateral cooperation where the Commission
had been at the forefront of the initiative.
WO: trade and competition policy
One relevant forum is the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Since 1996, we have pioneered the idea of
putting in place a multilateral agreement on trade and competition. The fourth WTO ministerial meeting,
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which took place in Doha (Qatar) from 9 to 14 November, adopted a declaration addressing the
.interaction bitween trade and competition policy'. The declaration is a significant development in our
efforts towards multilateral competition rules in the WTO since it recognises for the first time that there is
a valid case for the WTO to negotiate and conclude a multilateral agreement on trade and competition.
Until recently, the very principle of having such an agleement at the WTO was somewhat controversial'
The recognition of the importance of developing such a framework and its relevance to intemational
trade and development will contribute towards the introduction and more effective application of
domestic competition regimes and will be of considerable benefit to consumers worldwide. Moreover,
even if proponints of multilateral competition rules need to wait until the fifth WTO ministerial meeting
in order to enter the formal phase of negotiations on the multilateral agreement, there is now a clear
commitment to launching such negotiations on a certain date and the issue will fall within the single
undertaking. For all practical purposes, we have now entered a 'preparatory phase'during which we can
do much useful work to clarify with our partners from developing and developed countries the elements
needed in such an agreement. Furthermore, the EU proposals on the basic elements for such an
agreement were widely accepted in Doha. The declaration focuses indeed on the elements that the EU
has highlighted as items that need to be taken up first for clarification (core principles of competition
policy, such as transparency, non-discrimination and procedural fairness, commitment to outlawing
irardcore cartels, modalities for voluntary cooperation between antitrust authorities). Finally' the
declaration paves the way for more focused technical assistance and capacity building that will help
emerging and developing economies to better understand and appreciate the significance of these issues.
International competition netvvork
On a more informal level, the intemational competition network (ICN) was launched in October,
following intensive discussions initiated in the autumn of 2000. This is the flrst time competition
authorities worldwide have taken an autonomous initiative designed to enable them to share experience
and exchange views on competition issues deriving from an ever-increasing globalisation of the world
economy. The ICN will be a project-oriented, consensus-based, informal network of antitrust agencies
from developed and developing countries. It will address antitrust enforcement and policy issues of
common interest and formulate proposals for procedural and substantive convergence through a results-
oriented agenda and structure. It will also encourage the dissemination of antitrust experience and best
practice, promote the advocacy role of antitrust agencies and seek to facilitate international cooperation.
The ICN will concentrate on intemational antitrust issues that are difficult yet capable of resolution.
Initially, the ICN will work on two important issues in antitrust: the merger control process in the multi-
jurisdiitional context and the competition advocacy role of antitrust agencies. This agenda will later be
opened up to include issues of particular relevance to transition and developing economies.
At this point, I wish to express my gratitude towards the European Parliament and the Economic and
Social Committee. Both consistently support the Commission's competition policy. In 2001, they backed
our proposals for the modernisation of antitmst procedures, which I hope will finally be approved by the
Council in 2002.The feedback from the representatives of European citizens and of economic and social
interests is an extremely important check on our policy. Their support and constructive criticism help
guide our work.
The annual report usually affords a good opportunity for me to take part in both institutions in a broad
debate on a whole range of current competition policy issues. These debates are useful because they are
not confined to an assessment of past Commission activity but also touch upon the further development
of our policy. I look forward to continuing this exchange of views on the basis of this report.
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INTRODUCTION
1. Enforcement of the competition rules is one of the Commission's key tasks; it plays a central role
in the economic functioning of the single market. With the final phase of the introduction of the euro
starting on 1 January 2002 arrd enlargement of the European Union on an unprecedented scale, the
prospect of a modernisation of the rules on antitrust, mergers and State aid is essential if the Commission
is to be able to respond to the fast-changing economic environment. This will make it possible to focus on
such behaviour by market participants as most endangers an 'open market economy with ftee
competition', as sipulated in the Treaty.
2. In 2001, a series of cartel decisions highlighted the sustained effort by the Commission to tackle
flagrantly anticompetitive behaviour by undertakings in a wide range of sectors. These decisions provide
evidence of the direct impact of competition policy on consumer welfare, as do this year's decisions
concerning the car industry. In addition, opening up markets where a competitive environment is not yet
fully established, while at the same time guaranteeing a level playing freld and safeguarding the provision
of services of general interest, remained high on the Commission's agenda.
3. The Commission's action in the merger field is being carried on against a background of
globalisation and an increasing complexity ofcases. Multi-jurisdictional aspects raised by global mergers
increasingly require intensive international cooperation in different forums, such as the International
Competition Network (ICN), and under bilateral agreements. In order to ensure that the European merger
control system is properly equipped to deal with the challenges raised by these global mergers, as well as
the challenges that the enlargement of the European Union will bring, the Commission is undertaking a
thorough review of the EC merger regulation. A consultation document (Green Paper) covering
jurisdictional, procedural and substantive issues was published in December.
4. In the State aid field, major improvements in transparency were brought about in 2001, with the
adoption of the State aid scoreboard and the opening to the public of an online State aid register. The
Commission's policy of updating and modernising its State aid rules continued with the adoption of new
rules on State aid for risk capital and the start of three major new policy reviews concerning aid for
employment, for research and development and for large regional investment projects. As concems
monitoring and enforcement, particular attention was given to the def,nitive entry into force of the two
block exemption regulations governing aid for small and medium-sized enterprises and training aid, and
the regulation orrde minimis aid.
5. With the adoption of common positions on the competition chapter on 12 Decembeq the initial
phase of the enlargement activities in the State aid field came to an end. The association council decided
to provisionally close the competition chapter for four candidate countries.
6. The Commission has to pay close attention to the competition aspects of the forthcoming
enlargement and work with the applicant countries in order to make sure that the same rules will apply
with equal effectiveness tlroughout an enlarged Union.
7 . In 2001, the total number of new cases was I 036, comprising 284 antitrust cases (under Articles
81,82and86),335mergercases, and4l7 Stateaidcases(excludingcomplaints).Comparablefiguresfor
2000 were a total of 1 21 I new cases, comprising2gT antitrust cases, 345 merger cases, and 569 State aid
cases (r). The decrease in the overall number of new cases therefore represents an overall trend due to a
(r) The figure for State aid in 2000 was revised aftcr the 2000 Competition Repod was published.
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slight decrease in the field of antitrust, the first decrease in merger cases in several years and a significant
drop in the number of State aid cases.
8. The slight reduction in the number of new antitrust cases is conlirmation that the effects on
notifications in the past two years (sharp downward trend since 1999) of the issuing of guidelines on
horizontal and vertical agreements are being maintained. The number of complaints, which has fluctuated
widely over previous years, remained fairly stable this year (116 in 2001 against ll2 in 2000).
9. The total number of cases closed was I 204, comprising 378 antitrust cases, 346 merger cases,
and 480 State aid cases (excluding complaints). Comparable figures for 2000 were I 230 cases closed,
comprising 400 antitrust cases, 355 merger cases and 415 State aid cases (']). While the slight decline in
closed antitrust cases relates to the increased focus on (resource-intensive) cartel cases, the number of
cases closed (378) largely exceeds the number of new cases (284) and further reduces the backlog.
10. The slight slowdown in mergers and alliances coming under Commission scrutiny in 2001
appears to reflect the general worsening of economic conditions in the industrialised world and the
business community's changed perception of the success of recent M&A activity. For the first time since
1993, the number of mergers notified to the Commission fell, from 345 in 2000 to 335 in 2001, but the
level is still much higher than in 1999. In all, 340 formal decisions were taken during the year (against
345 in 2000). Whilst there was a pause in 2001 in the upward trend in the overall number of merger
notifications, merger cases are becoming increasingly complex and markets more concentrated. In
particular, the number of opened cases requiring in-depth investigation has increased more rapidly than
the overall number of cases (phase II decisions: 2001 up 77 Vc on 2000 and lO0 Vo on 1999).
11. In the field of State aid, the number of notifications was down by approximately 30 7a and new
cases of non-notified aid decreased by about 45 Vo comparcd with 2000, while requests for the review of
aid schemes increased nearly fivefold. The number of proceedings initiated, however, remained stable
(66 in 2001 against 67 in 2000). Negative final decisions increased slightly (31 in 2001 against 26 in
2000). Overall, the number of cases pending has also increased (from 584 in 2000 to 621 in 2001) due
to the number of complaints (r).
Box 1: Competition and the consumer 
- 
the rnain Commission decisions in 2fi)l
Commissioner Monti has repeatedly underlined the great importance the Commission attaches to
consumer aspects of competition law and pollcy. State aid policy, merger control and antitrust
enforcement all have their part to play in securing fm consumers the benefits deriving from the
application of EU competition rules.
Looking back on 2001, several of the antitrust decisionS taken in particular illustrate clearly how
the preservation of full competition works to the benefit of consumer interests. Any extra profits
generated by market operators by their limiting the.forces o[ competition, e.g. ttrough cartels, will
ultimately have to be paid for by the consumer, who would enjoy lower prices, better service and a
wider choice if competition worked properly. .
(') The figure for antitrust in 2000 was revised after the 2000 Competition Report was published(') The figure for 2000 was revised after the 2000 Competition Report was published.
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Bdtish Midhnd/Luft hansalSAS
On I March 2000, British Midland International, Lufthansa and SAS notified a joint venture
agreement under which they agreed to coordinate lheir services to and from London Heathrow and
Manchester International airDorts.
The Commission acknowledged that, in tenns of efficiency gains and competition, rhe agreement's
overall effect was positive in ttlat it led to a reofganisation and expmsion of the parties' existing
networks. However, the agreement provided dtar l-ufthansa was to b ganted the exclusive right to
operate flights on almost all routes between London and Frankfi:rt. The l-ondon-Franlf,trt market is
one of the busiest in Europe. The Commission concluded that British Midland's withdrawal from the
London-Franlfi.rt route represented an appreciable restriction of competition on this mrkct. It was
concemed that *tg aglieement might even have the 
"6sct 
6f sliminating competition altogetlrer. Only
Llfthansa and British Airways would have remairwd. sd LuftEnsa/British Midland wqrld have been
in a much bener position with regard to access to slots at both ends of the market. tn contrast British
Airways was hampercd in its efforts to increase its frequencies by a shortage of slots ar Franldrt.
With a view to addressing the Commission's competition concerns, the parties gave a commitrnent
to make slots avai.lable at Frtrrkfuft airport so as to allow a new entrant or an existing competitor.
in particular British Airways, to increase its frequencies on this route and compete on an equal
footing with Lufthansa. British Airways has since requested and obtained some of these slots.
As a result, customers will benefit from a wider choice of- air transport services to mofe
destinations. better connections, convenienl 5ghedrrling and seamless travel'
SA,S/DIaersk
On I8 July" the Connnission &cided o fire Scardinavian airlines SAS and MrenkAir EUR 39.375 mil-
lion and EUR | 3.125 million respectively for operating a secret market-sharing agreement.
The Commission had observed that Maersk Air had withdrawn from the Copenhagen-Stockholm
route. This led to the monopolisation by SAS of ttre Copenhagen-Stockholm route to the detriment
of over one million passengers who use that route every year. It also appeared that SAS had stopped
flying on the Copenhagen-Venice route and Maersk Air had started operations on this route and,
finally. that SAS had withdrawn from the Billund-Frankfurt route, leaving Maersk Air as the only
carriir. In addition, the parties also negotiated an overall non-compete clause covering ilreir future
oprations on international rcrutes to and from Denmark and on Danish domestic routes.
As a result of the decision. competition between SAS and Maersk Air, the two largest airlines
operating to and from Denmark, was restored. Acrual new enffy on rouies previously covered by
the market sharing was announced. for example, by SAS concerning five round ffips per day
berween Billund and Copenhagen. Pressure on airline tariffs was restored given that the parties'
pricing behaviour wns again constrained by the actual possibility of new entry by the other party.
Car sector
In the car sector the Commission denourrced practices by manufacturers which prevent consumers
from purchasing cars in the country of their choice.
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On 29 June, the Commission adopted a deeislon fining.Volkswagen EUR 30.96 million for resale
price mainteDance in Germany in resp€ct of the new VW Passat. Volkswagen had sent circular
letters.in 1996 and 199'7 tp its German dealers asking them not to sell this model for less than the
recommeffi list price- This is the first ever decision on resale price maintenanee in the car sector.
Resale price maintenance is a very severe restriction of price competition and has a direct impact
on consufircf pnces.
On l0 October. the Comrnission adopted a decisipn fining DaimlerChrysler EUR 71.825 million
for seleral infringements of Article 8l of the EC Treaty. One of these infringements consisted of
obstacles to parallel nade in Germany, preventrng buyers from other Member States from buying
Cars from German dealers. Anothel involved a price-fixing agreement in Belgium ainred at
reducing discounts to customers..
lmportant developments conceming the rcview o[ the car distribution block exempdon 
- 
which
will be finalised in 2002 
- 
took place during 2ffi1. For details please refer to Section I.C. 6.1 of
,,',,,'$bc*$ afr&l'':tlrg,.:.qry or|i9fl,,S0.:,lP.' til'*,',C lgn 1p99ived g.orlplgl$.,'lbnti,:r€on*uruers
.,.:,,.,at1e$.inj',r.ihal.,'..i ...:,u :,..had.:':dCIrildc,*+o .ll,n*id'....tlr.it,:.,e$ i:''.mctexcta"eing euro zone
banknotes. The Corynolssion carried out several surprise inspections at vmious banks and sent
requests for information to most euro zone banks. Subsequently it started proceedings against a
Several banks reacted by presenting unilareral proposals to the Commission to the effect that they
,,.,,,.- ,.si qr$yi,t ,tu,ffiit1 ilt*tei:ff;,sli ,,ed, ,!i',Oeroaer,,200i1a1,,,
,,,.'',,*i,!ate*,,,,*.'!ea$:iCIf..b ',@sA!@;,t$#i*:ior*:;bt.,.s{qqiw:'m}d*q'.'*':.swretxng,: ,,t,
;']]r,anld,S,;nfel9tr:F , :$ tlF , &W:Aq$h 6.Uei,is,ftet$itf$,,:.:,:rr,,,,::l
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Taking into account the ex.ceptional circulqsta$€e of tbe disappeararrce of &e market concerned
,,,,r,iigd,:t*,i 4lq:.qq11..e{!1i.:dg , :@,&e$lpiiwrl1 ,q,eii1 sxi*.*egde$,,:,,
,,:,,ta,,end,,fi$,,4g$l'niqeE$iryra&q$$1..:rnss1::n{.*t{.p,${1..4i..18,& tils,@..fi*$s ,'.'
,l:,qs!k!i4:q$4gfEr,$lt'1m;q.,. Sj: :SSrr4gee.ee*ll]€e,t!$ onof about3 vofs
:n: 
*"* and selling of ewo zone.banknotes.
Mergers :
,1,,$f$d'i'iie$r$i:rl$,W:d4,s1 a'*,n*,,luo**@i,,,,,
.,,,,.,In,.,dbrtt,'i,ie rpr.i{$l;.i:&4:;.C$ !$iofilll',i.ispvd,.t&qlriipguisiti{ti* ,-y *re Scandinavian
.,','b ,,eto,qp..,t{@:.,qfi.{$tsli'gs4trol,,,0f,:$y1{11*l*t:.go**itul',Sffi,'ffi,',$tbjeu,m cqnditioas.
,,'.Pa*,@,tit:,+,.*,h$lijextn ,.:; *id!a .'Of':ffi ed,if'. ,: ;ilihe.i.s h,,,&+i,QfiEce,.It,,,,
r,:,1row$irl,an4:,lpiaf!::'*n:::i*,h :]'gt{b,: :]ltftfqtll;:,li.l &].it,]ri*4|to:'t*pp$,,.dirtt$cgi,pay-mbtt,'
,, :,s*t-ie*,:ls,,rettil,,lSd 4 i{$p-t!!{ryryi r !${.ol:,4},{Q:,pr,g$e*ibq-kltgi,ryi{q!,,tc ,Sqqqgbgldi,il
ir;au$',oa{Bgqtp,,{$,'t.o,imbr*;]incl Sir,&pq$illir&, i.inier[mi4 ,"pqy, ,,S{t,.qp!C,,aild.,
'.,,,ed,*ervicesi.ftb.**lt.t111i${tf.rai!t*. s ,,t :a1NO1@,*oulrl,,h*y{,!, toth,,
,,,Poerellbd!t+d,8.aIt'ksirpit$e.,t.qqilll{lp:p? pdystenlq,s*$t€im$,q.bsdibt',$:weidi*&.h0*s*otqto,,
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pay elechicity, telephone and other bills. Such a significmt level of influence could have led to
price increases directly affecting conswners'daily banking needs. Nordea undertook. however, to
reduce its stake in Bankgirot to l0 %, a level which will no longer give it decisive influence over
the company, and to withdraw from Priratgiru, a coflrpany which competes with Postgirot in giro-
related technical services. By accepting these undertakings and making approval o[ the merger
conditional on them, the Commission made swe that the newly-created entity will continue to face
;ff-;-:::":' 
-.'"#"t or we'-known househord rood brands (seeS*,i." U.:.g. p.tr, i0tt. and two croes concerning the petroUoil distribution seotar (BP/E.ON
and Shell/DEA, see Section II.6, points 317-8) may also be ofparticular interest to consumers.
State atd
;;;"- aid control ptays an impo,rtant role in ensuring that the taxpayer's money is allocated
efficiently and contrib,utes !o a sound economic environment in which viable economic entities can
create sustainable employment oppofiunities for European citizens. In iU State aid decisions the
Commission takes into account aspects relatcd to the proper functioning of services of general
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I 
-ANTITRUST -ARTICLES 81AND 82; STATE MONOPOLIESAND MONOPOLY RIGHTS _ARTICLES 81AND 86
A 
- 
Modernisation of the legislative and interpretative rules
1. Modernisation of the rules implementing Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Tbeaty
12. On 27 September 2000, the Commission adopted its proposal for a regulation introducing a new
sysrem for implementing Articles 8l and 82 of the EC Treaty ('). Once iqforce, the new regulation will,
among other things, replace Regulation No 17 of 1962.Ttne key element of the reform is the proposed
transition from a system whereby the Commission enjoys a monopoly to apply Article 81(3) (the
exemption monopoly) to a directly applicable system of legal exception, whereby agreements which do
not contravene Article 8l(1), or which fulfil the conditions of Article 81(3), are automatically deemed
lawful and agreements in breach of Article 81(1), but not fulfilling the conditions of Article 81(3), are
automatically deemed unlawful. This reform implies the abolition of the notification and authorisation
system as it is provided for in Regulation No 17, an enhanced responsibility for national competition
authorities and national courts to apply Articles 8l and 82, and clear arangements to safeguard the
coherent application ofArticles 81 and 82 throughout the European Union, including a network between
all European competition authorities. The proposed regulation also aims at strengthening the
Commission's powers of investigation (e.g. the right of inspection at non-business premises). Via its
proposal, the Commission's goal is to increase efficiency in tackling breaches of Articles 81 and 82'
thereby ensuring effective competition in Europe (5).
13. On 29 March 2001, the Economic and Social Committee adopted its opinion on the proposed
regulation (o). In its opinion, the Committee 'wholeheartedly supports the reform of the system for
applying competition rules' and it 'appreciates the clear and bold wording used' in the Commission's
proposal, which it qualifies as essential to the reform. However, given the complexity of the topic and in
order to preserve the unity and coherence of the system and the precedence of Community law and to
guarantee effective decentralisation while maintaining maximum legal certainty, the Committee also
urged the Commission to issue, before or after the entry into force of the new regulation, 'accompanying
measures' which would further clarify some of the central concepts of EC competition law, such as the
effect on trade between Member States.
14. On 20 June, the European Parliament's Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs adopted
its final report on the Commission's proposals ('). In its report, the Committee 'accepted that the current
system of regulating European competition policy is too bureaucratic, cumbersome and ineffective' and
acknowledged that the enlargement of the European Union could only aggrav^te that situation. The
Committee therefore welcomed the well-timed proposal from the Commission 'to radically overhaul the
competition rules now, in advance of an enlarged Community'. However, in order to pragmatically
e)
(5)
f)
(?)
coM(2000) s82 (oJ c 36s E, 19.12.2000).
For a detailed description of the Commission's proposal, see Section I.A.3. of the 2000 Competition Report' SEC(2001) 694.
For more details of rhe 1999 White Paper on Modemisation, see Section I.A.2. of the 199 Competition Report, SEC(2000) 720.
oJ c 155, 29.5.2001.
The report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and the opinions of the Comrnittee on Industry, Extemal
Trade, Research and Energy and the Committee on Legal Affairs and the Internal Market (A5-022912001) have not yet
been published in rhe Official Journal, but can be found on http://www2.europarl.eu.int/omk/OM-Europarl?PROG=
*p6g1d.L=EN&PUBREF=J/EP//TEXT+REPORT+A5-2001-0229+GTNOT+SGML+V0//EN'
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achieve the intended objectives of the reform, the Committee encouraged the Commission to modify its
proposal on some points and it suggested some clarifications on essential elements of the proposed
reform. Most of these suggestions were taken over by Parliament when it adopted, by 409 votes to 54, its
opinion on the proposed regulation on 6 September (s). The amendments proposed by Parliament aim
among other things at deleting the clause concerning a registration system for certain types of agreement
(Article 4(2)), harmonising the regime of fines (Article 5), ensuring the proporlionality of the remeclies of
a behavioural or structural nature (Article 7(l)) and clearly defining public interest in the context of
Commission decisions based on Article 10.
15. On 14 and 15 May and 5 December, under the Swedish and Belgian Presidencies respectively,
the Council (Industry) held a substantive debate on the Commission's proposal. Although provisional
agreement was reached on some of the aspects of the proposed regulation, it was concluded that
discussions on the principles and modalities of the envisaged reform needed to be continued in the
Council working group. As guidance for further progress in the working group, the Council debated in
particular the general principles undedying the functioning of the network of competition authorities,
inviting the Commission to lay these principles down in a common declaration. The Council also
subscribed to the objective of Article 3 of the Commission's proposal so as to ensure a level playing field
for agreements affecting trade between Member States, but it urged the working group to discuss further
the effect of such a provision on specific national rules.
2. Revision of the leniency notice
16. In line with the general thinking behind the modernisation exercise, namely the need to refocus
its activities on the most serious infringements of Community law, the Commission adopted in 2001 new
draft rules aimed at better detection and eradication of price-fixing and other cartels. The leniency notice
was revised, after flve years of implementation, with a view to further increasing its effectiveness and
maximising the Commission's ability to detect and successfully prosecute cartels. The draft new notice
published on 21 July (') addressed these issues in more precise terms and prepared the ground for the
adoption of a new notice on immunity from fines and reduction of fines in2002.
3. Review of the block exemption regulation for technology transfer agreements
17. On 20 December, the Commission adopted a report ('0) evaluating the functioning of Regulation
(EC) No 240196 (), the technology transfer block exemption (hereinafter called the 'TTBE'). The report
provides a critical analysis of the application of and policy approach underpinning the TTBE. It stresses
in particular the need to adapt the TTBE to ensure consistency with the new Commission block
(') TheEuropeanParliamentlegislativeresolution(R5-044412001)hasnotyetbeenpublishedintheOfficialJournal,butcan
be found on http:llwww3.europarl.eu.int/omk/omnsapir.so/pv2?APP=PV2&PRG=CALEND&FILE=010906&TPV=DEF
&LANGUE=EN.
Draft Commission notice on immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases (OJ C 205, 21.'7 .zc0l).
Commission evaluation report on the transfer of technology block exemption Regulation @C) No 2,t0l96, COM(2001) 786
fu:al 20.12.2ffiL The report is also available on the Intemet at the following address: http://europa.eu.int/comm/
competition/antirust/technology_transfer/.(") Comrnission Regulation (EC) No 24O196 on the application of Article 8l(3) of the Treaty to certain categodes of
technology transfer agreements (OJ L 31,9.12.1996).
c)
(r0)
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exemptions for distribution agreements (l'?), specialisation agreements and R&D agreements ("), which
follow a more economics-based approach.
18. The report finds that the TTBE uses criteria relating more to the form of the agreement than to the
actual effects on the market. The TTBE has in fact four main shortcomings:
- 
first, it is too prescriptive and seems to work as a straitjacket, which may discourage efficient
transactions and hamper the dissemination of new technologies;
- 
second, it covers only certain patent and know-how licensing agreements. This narrow scope ofthe
TTBE seems increasingly inadequate to deal with the complexity of modem licensing arrangements
(e.g. pooling arrangements, software licences involving copyright, etc.);
- 
third, a number of restraints are currently presumed illegal or excluded from the block exemption
without proper economic justification where the parties lack market power and arc in a vertical
relationship. This concerns in particular restrictions extending beyond the scope of the licensed
intellectual property right (IPR) (e.g. non-compete obligations, tying, etc.);
- 
fourth, by concentrating on the form of the agreement, the TTBE extends the benefit of the block
exemption to situations which cannot always be presumed to fulfil the conditions of Article 81(3),
either because the contracting parties are competitors or because they hold a strong position on the
market.
19. The report invites comments on a number of issues:
- 
should the scope of the TTBE, which applies only to patents and know-how, be widened to cover
also copyright, design rights and trademarks? This issue is of particular importance to a number of
sectors including the software industry, which depends on a chain of copyright licences for
manufacture and distribution :
- 
should the TTBE also cover licensing agreements between more than two companies, such as
licensing pools? Such arrangements have become increasingly important to industry, given the
growing complexity of new technologies. In this respect, it may be observed that multiparty licences
can be efficiency enhancing and procompetitive, in particular where the pool covers only essential
IPRs. However, multiparty licences may also have serious anticompetitive effects, especially where
the agreement covers substitute technologies or where it requires members to grant licences to each
other for current and future technology at minimal cost or on an exclusive basis;
- 
a more lenient approach to licensing agreements between non-competitors. It is generally
acknowledged that, if the parties to an agreement are in a vertical relationship, i.e. are not
competitors, exclusive licences are mostly efficiency enhancing and procompetitive. For instance, if
the IPR holder does not have the assets for the production or distribution ofthe licensed products, it
is more efficient to license to someone who does;
- 
a more prudent approach to licensing agreements between competitors. If the parties are in a
hoizontal relationship, i.e. if the licence prevents competition that could have taken place between
the licensor and the licensee were it not for the licence, licence agreements may give rise to a
('r) Commission Regulation (EC) No 27 90/ 1999 (OJ L 336, 29.12.1999).(") Commission Regulations (EC) Nos 2658/2000 and 2659/2000 (OJ L 304, 5.12.20ffi)
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number of competition concerns. on the one hand, exclusive licences will often lead to market
sharing throughihe allocation of territories or customers, especially where the licence is reciprocal
or the exclusivity also extends into non-licensed competing products. Production quotas agreed in
licensing agreements between competitors may easily lead to a straightforward output restriction'
On the other hand, under certain conditions 
- 
in particular in the case of licensing to ajoint venture
- 
and in the case of non-reciprocal licensing, the exclusivity may lead not only to a loss of'inter-
brand competition but also to efficiencies. To assess whether the negative effects on competition may
be outweigied by the efficiencies, the market power of the parties and the structure of the markets
afi'ected by the agreement need to be taken into account'
Box 2: Newde mintimh notire
(l) for agreements between
(2)Itspecifiesn*#.,'ff&ffi.*..sharethresholdfornetworksofagreementsproducinga
#;ft** 
on the Internct at the followrng address: http://
[i fl:#:ftffi * asreemeilts between courpanies rhat exceed ttre thresholds sei out in q y,* f
"' il'#y
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(3)
The rew notice defines more clearly and consistently $re hardcore restrictions (zuch as price
fixing and market shari4d which are normally always prohibited and cannot benefit from the
de minimis notice. For'agrwments btween non-competitorg. tlre'new notice has taken over
the hardcore restrictions set out in block exernpion Regulation (F-C) No 279O11999 for
vertical agrEemems ('). fuf agreements between competirors. the new notice has taken over
the hardcore reslnbJions sel out in block'exenrption Regulation (EC) No 2658120Cf for
specialisation agreements (r).
Agreements between small md medium-sized ent€rprises are in general de minimis.(4)
irj
f)
The new notice stales Srat agreeqents betweeer small and medium+ized enrerprises (SMES)
are rarely capable of appreciaUty affecting trade between Member States. Agreements
between SMEs therefore generally fall outside the scope ofArticle 8(t).
oJ L 3!6r n.ra.tryil
oI L 304, s.rz2ffi.
4. Review of procedural rules: new mandate of the hearing officers
20. On 23 May, the Commission adopted a decision on the terms of reference of hearing officers in
certain competition proceedings ('o). This new 'mandate of the hearing officers', which replaces the
previous terms of reference dating from 1994 ("), follows the Commission's decision last year to enhance
this function. It aims to reinforce the independence and authority of the hearing officer, to strengthen his
role in EC merger and antitrust proceedings and to enhance the objectivity and quality of the
Commission's competition proceedings and the resulting decisions.
21. The right of the parties concemed and of third parties to be heard is an established principle of
Community law. The principle has been restated in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, as part of the
right of every person 'to have his or her affairs handled impartially, fairly and within a reasonable time'.
Safeguarding that right during the Commission's competition proceedings is the special responsibility of
the hearing officer.
22. The position of hearing officer was created in 1982. His initial responsibility was limited
primarily to the organisation, chairing and conduct of the oral hearing in antitrust proceedings 
- 
i.e.
('4) Decision of 235.20O1 on the terms of reference of hearing officers in certain competition proceedings (OJ L 162,
19.6.2001).
('s) Decision of 12.12.1994 on the terms of reference of hearing officers in competition procedures before the Commission
(oJ L 330,21.12.1994).
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cartels and abuses of dominant positions 
- 
and later on also in merger proceedings. The hearing officer
also ensured that in the preparation of draft Commission decisions in competition cases due account was
taken of all the relevant facts whether favourable or unfavourable to the parties concerned. In carrying out
this task, the hearing officer contributed to the objectivity of the hearing itself and of any subsequent
decision. This remit was updated and widened in 1994 to ensure adequate protection for the rights of
parties, in panicular with regard to confidentiality of documents and business secrets and adequate access
to lhe case files of the Commission.
23. The new mandate, adopted by the Commission on 23 May, maintains these core aspects of the
hearing officer's functions. In addition, however, the role has been strengthened and the terms of
reference adapted and consolidated in the light of developments in competition law.
24. In particular, the fiansparency of the appointment of hearing of0cers has been increased by
publishing these appointments in the Official Joumal, while any interruption or termination of appoiltment
or transfer requires a reasoned decision by the Commission, also published in the Official Joumal.
Significantly, the independence of the hearing officer from the Directorate-General for Competition has
been reinforced in that the hearing officer is now attached for administrative purposes to the Member of the
Commission with special responsibility for competition (the Competition Commissioner) and reports
directly to him rather than to the Director-General for Competition, as was previously the case.
25. In addition, the hearing officer's function is also reinforced in the decision-making process itself.
Members of senior management within the Directorate-General for Competition are required to keep the
hearing officer informed about how a proceeding is developing up to the stage ofthe draft decision to be
submitted to the Competition Commissioner. The hearing officer may present observations to the
Commissioner on any matter arising out of any Commission competition proceeding. More specifically,
the hearing officer's linal report, produced on the basis of the draft decision submirted to thi Advisory
Committee, must now systematically be attached to the draft decision submitted to the Commission so
that the latter is fully aware of all relevant information on the course of the competition proceeding and
on enforcement of the right to be heard. The report may be modified in the light of any amendments made
to the draft decision prior to its adoption. In order to enhance the transparency ofproceedings, the final
report must also be communicated to the addressees of the decision together with the decision itself as
well as to Member States and be published in the official Journal with rhe decision.
26. The new mandate also extends the role of the hearing officer as regards commitments for
remedies proposed by the parties in relation to any proceeding initiated by the Commission under merger
or antitrust control. The hearing officer can report on the objectivity of any enquiry which may have been
conducted in order to assess the competition impact of the proposed commitments.
2'7. The new mandate also addresses the hearing officer's powers with regard to granting or denying
confidentiality when information is disclosed by publication in the Official Journal. This applies in
particular to the published versions of Commission decisions on merger and antitrust cases.
28. The importance parties attach to procedural matters was underlined most recently by actions
brought before the Court of First Instance which resulted in the President issuing orders on
20 December ('6).
29. On 30 and 16 October respectively, the Commission appointed Mr S. Durande and
Mrs K. Williams to the post of hearing off,cer.
('6) CasesT-219/0lRCommerzbankAG,'|-216/0IF.ReisebankAGandT-2I3t}lF.OsterreichischePostsparkasseAG
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B 
- 
Application of Articles 81,82 and 86
1. Article 81
1.1. Cartels
l. I. I. A record year for cartel decisions
30. In2001, the priority given to tackling cartel cases resulted in a large increase in the number of
cases handled. The Commission adopted l0 negative formal decisions in the Graphite electrodes, Sodium
gluconate, SAS/Maersk, Vitamins, German banks, Citric acil, Belgian breweries, Luxembourg
breweries,Zinc phosphate andCarbonless papercases and closed by way of settlement five cases of
cartels in the banking sector connected with the introduction of the euro (1?). It adopted statements of
objections in several other cases, including Plasterboard and GFU ('8).
31. Secret cartels are among the most serious restrictions of competition. They lead to higher prices
and less choice for consumers. And they have a negative impact on the whole ofEuropean industry by
increasing the cost of services, goods and raw materials for European enterprises obtaining their supplies
from cartel members. In the longer term, they reduce European industry's overall competitiveness.
32. For all these reasons, the detection, prosecution and punishment of secret cartels has been one of
the central features of the competition policy pursued by the European Commission ever since it was set
up. The formation in 1998 of a specialised unit (the cartels unit) gave tangible expression to the priority
which the Commission intended to give to the fight against cartels, although other units may also take
part. Moreoveq the entry into force of the future Council regulation replacing Regulation No 17 on
antitrust procedures places the surveillance of markets and the campaign against the hidden
anticompetitive practices which develop therein at the heart of the tasks performed by Community
competition policy. It is with this in view that, for a number of years now, the emphasis has been on
substantially strengthening the resources available to, and thoroughly reorganising the working methods
of, the Directorate-General for Competition in relation to cartels.
33. Detecting, prosecuting and punishing secret cartels poses a constant challenge to competition
authorities. The increasing globalisation of trade means having to deal with secret agreements extending
beyond the frontiers of Europe and sometimes concluded outside the territory of the EEA. Generalisation
of the new information and communication technologies is making it more difficult to gain access to
evidence of such agreements. And the intensiflcation of the struggle against cartels, both inside and
outside Europe, is being matched by greater sophistication in the practices employed.
34. Reform of Regulation No 17, which is currently being discussed in the Council, is vital as it will
enable the Commission to meet this challenge by becoming increasingly efficient at flghting hidden
practices. In particular, the investigatory powers reform, involving as it does the possibility of carrying
out inspections at private dwellings, is a key factor in adapting the struggle against cartels to practices
that are becoming ever more sophisticated.
35. In the same way and for the same reasons, the Commission is undertaking a review of its
guidelines on immunity from and reduction of flnes.
('') See 1.1.2 below.(") Press releases MEMO/01/1 49, 24.4.2N1 and IP l 0l / 830, 13.6.2D01
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36. The commission flrst adopted a leniency pfogfamme in 1996 (''q) in order to increase
effectiveness both in the detection and in the handling of cartel cases. The leniency programme was
conceived as a potent investigative weapon rewarding undertakings cooperating with the commission' It
recognises the difficulty of 
-obtaining hard evidence of secret cartels in an increasingly sophisticated
environment.
37. Five years after it was adopted, the leniency Programme plays an important role in the
enforcement of competition rules against cartels and it has been invoked by companies in many of the
cases opened since July 1996. Up to now, the leniency notice has been applied in 16 final commission
decisions: Extra-alloy surcharfe (), British sugar (2'), Pre-insulated pipes ("), Greek ferries (23),
Seamkss steel tubes (,), Lysine 9, SaS Maersk Air ('?6)' Graphite electrodes ("), Sodium glucotnte (8)'
vitamins cr), Betgian breweries (rn), Luxembourg breweries (3t), citric acid ("), German banks (33), Zinc
phosphate (30) and Carbonless paper (").
38. However, experience gathered to date shows that the effectiveness of the notice would be
improved by an incriase in thJ transparency and certainty of the conditions on which any reduction of
fines is to bi granted. It would also benefit from a closer alignment between the level ofreduction of fines
and the value of a company's contribution to establishing the infringement.
39. For these reasons, after five years of implementation, the Commission decided to revise its leniency
notice with a view to further increasing its effectiveness and maximising the Commission's ability to detect
and successfully prosecute cartels. A draft new notice published on 21 July (36) addressed these issues in a
number of ways and prepared the ground for the adoption of a new leniency nottce in2002.
1.1.2. Cartel d.ecisions in 2001
G rap hit e e I e ctrode s (3' )
40. On 18 July, the Commission fined Germany's SGL Carbon AG, UCAR International of the
United States an6 six other companies a total of EUR 218.8 million for fixing the prices and sharing the
market for graphite electrodes. Following an extensive investigation which started in 1997' the
(,n) oJ c 207. 18.7 .1996.(!) oJ L 100. 1.4.1998.
c') oJ L 76, 22.3.1999.
1tz\ o1L24,30.1.1999.
c.) oJL 109.27.4.1999.
(?') Notpublished.(r) oJL 152.7.6.200L
r?6) Cases COMP1D2|37.M4 arldCOMP|D2I3'1.386 (OJ L 265, 5'10'2001)'
grl Case COMP/36.490; press release IP/01/1010, 18.7.2001'
(,s) Case COMP/36.?56; press release IP/01/1355, 20.10-2001'
1ze; Case COMP/37.5 1 2; press rele ase IP l0l I 1 625, 21.1 t.20Ol'(') Case COMPi37.6 14; press relea se lP | 0I / 17 39, 5 -12'2001'
(1r ) Case COMP/37.800; press rele ase IP 101 | 17 40, 5.12.200 1.
1r; Case COMP/36.604; press release IP/01/1743, 5.12'2001'(") Case COMP/37.919; press release IP/01/1796, tl.l2'2001'
1ro 1 Case COMP/37.027; press rele ase lP 107 | 11 97, l1 -12 -2001'
1rs; Case COMP/36.212; gess rclease IPl0l/1892' 20-12.2001'(*) oJ c 205, 21.7.2001.
1rr.1 Case COMP/36.490; press release IPl01/1010, l8'7 '200l'
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Commission found that the companies had paticipated in a worldwide cartel during most of the 1990s. It
characterised the companies' behaviour as a 'very serious' infringement of the EC competition rules.
41. Graphite electrodes are ceramic-moulded columns of graphite used primarily in the production of
steel in electric arc furnaces, also referred to as 'mini-mills'.
42. With regard to the leniency notice, it is important to note that this is the first time the Commission
has granted a substantial reduction in a fine (70 7o). Showa Denko benefited from this reduction, having
been the first company to cooperate and provide conclusive evidence of the cartel to the Commission.
SAS/Maersk ('"\
43. Again on 18 July, the Commission decided to fine Scandinavian airlines SAS and Maersk Air
EUR 39.375 million and EUR 13.125 million respectively for operating a secret market-sharing
agreement ('o). The agreement had led to the monopolisation by SAS of the Copenhagen-Stockholm route to
the detriment of over one million passengers who use that route every year, and to the shming of other routes
to and fiom Denmark.
M. SAS and Maersk Air had notified a cooperation agreement, which related mainly to code sharing
and frequent-flyer progralnmes. In the course of the preliminary enquiry it transpired that, coinciding
with the entry into force of the cooperation agreement, Maersk Air had withdrawn from the Copenhagen-
Stockholm route, where it had until then been competing with SAS. It also transpired that, at the same
time, SAS had stopped flying on the Copenhagen-Venice route and MaerskAir had started operations on
that route and, finally, that SAS had withdrawn from the Billund-Frankfurt route, leaving MaerskAir 
-its previous competitor on the route 
- 
as the only carrier.
45. These entries and withdrawals, which were not notified, formed part of a wider markersharing
agreement which included an overall non-compete clause covering the parties'future operations on
international routes to and from Denmark and on Danish domestic routes.
46. The market sharing was discovered as a result of on-site inspections. The inspections were
carried out in June 2000, in close cooperation with the national competition authodties in Denmark and
Sweden.
47. As a result of the decision, competition between SAS and Maersk Air, the two largest airlines
operating to and from Denmark, was restored to the benefit of consumers.
Sodium gluconate (aa)
48. On 2 October, the Commission fined Archer Daniels Midland Company Inc., Akzo Nobel NV,
Avebe BA, Fujisawa Pharmaceutical Company Ltd, JungbunzlauerAG and Roquette Frbres SA a total of
EUR 57.53 million for fixing the price and sharing the market for sodium gluconate. It characterised the
companies'behaviour as a 'very serious'infringement of the Community and EEA competition rules.
(") Cases COMPID2/37 .444 and COMP/D2/31.386 (OI L 265, 5. 10.2001 ).
(3') SAS lodged an appeal against the decision before the Court of First Instance on 3 October (Case T-241l01), contesting the
mount of the fine.
(40) Case COMP/36.756; press release IP/01/1355, 20.10.2001.
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49. Following an investigation which started in 1997,the Commission established that the companies
had participated in a worldwide cartel between 1987 and 1995. The cartel agreements were implemented
through detailed sales monitoring, the holding of regular multi- and bilateral meetings, and the
enforcement of a compensation scheme. Throughout the period, the Commission gathered evidence of
over 25 cartel meetings.
50. Sodium gluconate is a chemical used to clean metal and glass, with applications such as bottle
washing, utensil cleaning and paint removal, and as a food additive, together with various other chemical
applications.
51. The Commission granted for the flrst time a very substantial reduction in the fine pursuant to
Section B of the leniency notice. Fujisawa benefited from a reduction of 80 Vo on the ground that it was
the first to adduce conclusive evidence of the cartel's existence, before the Commission had undertaken
any investigation ordered by decision. The Commission did not grant Fujisawa a 100 7o reduction in its
fine, as it could have done under Section B of the notice, as the company did not approach the
Commission until after it had received a request for information. This reluctance to come forward
spontaneously and before any investigatory measrre was taken into account.
Vitamins (at)
52. On 21 November, the Commission adopted a decision under Article 8l of the EC Treaty and
Article 53 of the EEAAgreement finding that 13 manufacturers of vitamins A, E, Bl, 82,85,86, C, D3,
H, folic acid, beta carotene and carotinoids had participated in cartels for each of these products resulting
in a total of 12 separate infringements.
53. The Commission fined eight companies a total of EUR 855.23 million for fixing the prices of
eight different products and allocating sales quotas in respect thereof. The limitation period for fines in
competition cases (") was applicable to the infringements affecting vitamins Bl, 86, H and folic acid; the
Commission therefore did not fine companies for their involvement in these cartels. Each agreement was
a very serious infringement of the Community competition rules and as such justified the overall high
level of fines imposed.
54. A striking feature of this complex of infringements was the central role played by Hoffmarrn-La
Roche and BASF, the two main vitamin producers, in virtually each and every cartel, whilst other players
were involved in only a limited number of vitamin products.
55. The participants in each of the cartels fixed prices for the different vitamin products, allocated
sales quotas, agreed on and implemented price increases and issued price announcements in accordance
with their agreements. They also set up machinery to monitor and enforce their agreements and
participated in regular meetings to implement their plans. The modus operandi of the different cartels
was essentially the same. Given the continuity and similarity of method, the Commission considered it
appropriate to treat in one and the same proceeding and decision the complex of agreements covering the
different vitamins.
('' ) Case COMP/37.5 1 2; press release IP /01 I 1625, 21.I7.2001.(") Council Regulation (EEC) No 2988/74 of 26 November 1974 concerning limitation periods in proceedings and the
enforcement of sanctions under the rules of the European Economic Community relating to transport and competition.
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Citric acid (a1)
56. On 5 December, the Commission decided to fine five citric acid producers a total of
EURl35.22 million.
57 - The Commission's investigation revealed that the five producers had participated, between l99l
and 1995, in a secret cartel of wortdwide scope which had enabled them to fix the price and share the
market for citric acid. The cartel was a very serious infringement of Article 81 of the EC Treaty and
Article 53 of the EEA Agreement, which justified the size of the fines.
Belgian breweries (')
58. On 5 December, the Commission fined five companies a total of EUR 91.655 million for
participating in two separate secret cartels on the Belgian beer market.
59. The first cartel involved Interbrew on the one hand and Alken-Maes and Danone (Alken-Maes's
parent company at the time) on the other. Interbrew and Alken-Maes/Danone, Nos I and 2 on the market,
had agreed on a general non-aggression pact, the allocation of customers in the 'horeca' (hotels. caf6s
and restaurants) or 'on-trade' sector, price fixing in the retail or 'off-trade' sector, the limitation of
investments and advertising in the horeca sector, a new tariff structure (horeca and retail) and a detailed
monthly information exchange system concerning sales volumes (horeca and retail). The cartel lasted
from 1993 until 1998. The CEOs and other senior management of the companies involved met regularly
to initiate and monitor these agreements. The Commission considered the infringement to be 'very
serious'. In setting the amount ofthe fine, it also took into account the fact that Danone had cofiunitted
similar infringements of Article 81 in the past (15).
60. The second cartel concerned private-label beer in Belgium. This is beer which supermarkets
order from brewers but sell under their own label. Between October 1997 and July 1998, Interbre%
Alken-Maes, Haacht and Martens met four times to discuss the privateJabel beer market in Belgium in
general and their prices and customers in particular. During these meetings, the four brewers also
exchanged business information. This cartel was considered to be a 'serious' infrinsement.
Luxemb o ur g b rew e ri e s (*\
61. On 5 December, the Commission fined three Luxembourg brewers 
- 
Brasserie Bofferding,
Brasserie Battin and Brasserie de Wiltz 
- 
a total of EUR 448 000 for their participation in a market-
sharing agreement in the Luxembourg 'horeca' (hotels, restaurants and caf6s) or 'on-trade' sector. A
fourth brewer, Brasserie de Luxembourg, an Interbrew subsidiary, was not fined because it had revealed
the cartel to the Commission and fulfilled all the other conditions of Section B of the leniency notice.
62. The brewers had agreed in writing to respect each other's exclusive purchasing arrangements('beer ties') with horeca customers, as well as measures to restrict the entry of foreign Lrrewers into the
Luxembourg horeca sector. The agreement remained in force from 1985 until 2000. It was held to be a
'serious' infrineement.
(") Case COMP/36.604; press rele ase lP l}l I 17 43, 5.12.20Ot.(s) Case COMP/37.6 14; press rel ease lP l0 1 | 17 39, 5. 12.2001.
(o') Cornmiss.iondecisionof23.7.7984(Flatglass)andCommissiondecisionofl5.5.1974(Flatgtass).
('u) Case COMP/37.800; press release IP/01/1740, 5.72.2001.
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Zinc phosphate (o')
63. On 11 December, the Commission lined six producers or former producers of zinc phosphate a
total of EUR 11.95 million. The Commission's investigation had revealed that the six producers had
participated, between 1994 and 1998, in a cartel covering the whole of the European Economic Area
which had enabled them to fix prices and divide up their 90 7o shate of the market in zinc phosphate, an
anticorrosion mineral pigment used in the manufacture of industrial paints. The cartel was by its very
nature a very serious infringement of Article 8l of the EC Treaty and Article 53 of the EEA Agreernent'
Settlements concerning bank charges for the exchange of euro zone currencies and Germanbanks (ot)
64. Shortly after the creation of the euro on I Janumy 1999, the Commission (Directorate-General
for the Internal Market) received complaints that exchange commissions for euro zone currency notes
and coins remained high. The Commission carried out several surprise inspections at various banks and
sent requests for information to most euro zone banks. It gathered evidence which suggested that certain
nationai groups of banks may have colluded to maintain exchange charges at certain levels in order to
minimise losses caused by the introduction of the euro. On this basis, the Commission started
proceedings in 2000 against a large number of banks and bureaux de change in seven Member States
iAustria, Belgium, Fintand, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands and Portugal).
65. However, several banks took the initiative in presenting unilateral proposals to the Commission
to the effect that they would (i) significantly reduce their charges for exchanging in-currency banknotes'
and (ii) abolish all such charges by October 2001 atthe latest, at least for buying transactions by account
holders.
66. Taking into account the exceptional circumstance of the disappearance of the market concerned'
and the immediate benefit to consumers as a result of these proposals which implied a deviation from the
alleged collusive behaviour, the Commission decided to end the cartel proceedings against more than
50 b-anks in Belgium, Finland, keland, the Netherlands and Portugal and against some of the banks in
Germany (").
67. On 12 December, the Commission flned five German banks a total of EUR 100.8 million for
concluding an agreement on a commission of about 3 Vo for the buying and selling of euro zone
banknotes during the thee-year transitional period beginning on 1 Jantaty 1999.
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68. The Austrian case will be further examined in the
Austrian banking sector currently under investigation.
Carbonless paper (tn)
69. On 20 December, the Commission decided to fine
EUR 313.69 million.
context of a wider-ranging cartel in the
l0 carbonless paper producers a total of
70. In the course of its investigations, the Commission discovered that the producers had
participated, between 1992 and 1995, in a secret, Europe-wide cartel aimed at improving the participants'
(o') Case COMP/37.027; press rele ase lP 101 / l7 9'1, 1 I.12.2001 -(") Case COMP/37.9 1 9; press releas e lP | 0l / 17 96' 11'12'2001'
(nn) hess release IP/01/1159, 31.7.2W1.
(50) Case COMP/36.2 I 2; press releas e IP I 0l | 7892, 20'12'2001'
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profitability through collective price increases. This conduct was by its very nature a very serious
infringement of Article 81 of the EC Treaty and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement, which justifled the
size of the flnes, notably that of EUR 184.27 mlllion imposed on Arjo Wiggins Appleton, the market
leader and instigator of the cartel. Sappi was granted total immunity in respect of its participation in the
cartel because, as the first company to cooperate with the Commission, it supplied conclusive evidence of
wrongdoing.
Court judgment ln British Sugar
71. By decision of 14 October 1998, the Commission flned the sugar producers British Sugar and
Tate&Lyle and the sugar merchants Napier Brown and James Budgett for an infringement of
Article 81(1) of the EC Treaty consisting in coordination of the parties' pricing policy on the white
granulated sugar market in the United Kingdom (").
72. Following n appeal by three of the parties, the Court of First fnstance in its judgment of
12 July 2001 (s'?) upheld the Commission's decision in its entirety, except for a reduction in the fine
imposed on Tate&Lyle. The Court did not accept any of the various arguments by which the parties
sought to show that there had been no infringement and that their behaviour had not been capable of
affecting trade between Member States.
73. With regard to the fines imposed, the Court supported the Commission's findings about the
classification of the infringement as serious, its duration, its intentional nature and the assessment of
aggravating and attenuating circumstances. On the issue of leniency, it did not question the
principles of the Commission's current leniency notice (s3). It did, however, consider that the
Commission had erroneously characterised Tate&Lyle's cooperation as not being continuous and
complete within the meaning of point B(d) of the notice. It therefore exercised its power of
unlimited jurisdiction (") and reassessed the merits of Tate&Lyle's cooperation and increased the
reduction in the fine from 50 to 60 Vo.
74. Meanwhile, British Sugar has appealed to the Court of Justice against the Court of First
Instance's judgment (r').
2. Articles 82 and86
2.1. Article 82 
- 
undertakings in a dominant position
75. Article 82 prohibits undertakings in a dominant position on a given market from abusing this
situation to the prejudice of third parties. Such abuse may consist, for instance, in limiting production,
charging excessive prices, discriminatory or predatory pricing, tying sales, or other commercial practices
not based on the principle of economic efficiency. Such practices have a negative impact on competition;
they are engaged in by undertakings whose market power enables them to isolate themselves from
competitive pressure and eliminate their competitors without significant damage to themselves or to
block market access by new entrants to a significant degree.
(") For a comprehensive description ofthe decision, see 1998 Competition Report, pp. 138-140.(") Joined Cases T-202198,7-2A4198 andT|207/98 Tate&Lyle, British Sugar and Napier Brcwn v Commission.
f,) oJ c 207.78.7 .1996.(") See Article 229 of the EC Treaty and Article 17 of Regulation No 17162.(") Case C-359/01 P.
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76. In 2001, the Commission imposed fines in fourArticle 82 cases. In the remaining cases which it
examined, it was able to accept commitments from the undertakings concerned, or changes to the
agreements, which put an end to the abusive practices. The cases examined were not conflned to specific
sectors and rclate inter alia to the postal sector and the car industry.
Deutsche Post AG I A6'l
77. On 20 March, the Commission issued its first Article 82 decision in the postal sector, finding that
the German postal operator, Deutsche Post AG, had abused its dominant position in the market for
business parcel services by granting fidelity rebates and engaging in predatory pricing. Deutsche post
was fined EUR 24 million. See Section 1.C.2.2.
Deutsche Post AG II ()
78. Another decision in the postal sectoq again relating to Deutsche Post AG, was issued on 25 July.
See Section LC.2.2.
Duales System Deutschland (DSD) (58)
79' On 20 April, the Commission decided that DSD, the company which created rhe .Green Dot,
trademark, had abused its dominant position in the market for organising the collection and recycling of
sales packaging in Germany. DSD is the only undertaking to operate a comprehensive packaging take-
back and recycling service in Germany. The Commission objected to a irovision in the trademark
agreement between DSD and its custorners obliging the latter to pay fees corresponding to the volurne ofpackaging bearing the Green Dot trademark, rather than to the volume of packaging for which DSD was
actually providing its take-back and recycling services. The provision infri"ge-d Article g2 as it forced
consumers to pay for services not actually rendered and prevented market entry by competitors.
Box 3: Competition poticy in the packaging wste sector
3-'.T1,:T:ll"g the Euro.pean iommunity environmental legislation. Member states set rargets
H"Tf"T""iilff 
^[?&Tf#:T,-Hnrffi,;"#ffi 1il?H*;HI#il*I#Tllk
:1"j_::,3_tt^:Tr_LT:j systems for the collection and recycting,of sates packagrng. In so_caltedcomlxehenslve systems, such as those which ilre Commission has recently analysed, tbere are
ffi;:H;:n-.'il"i"ffi?#Ji.fft :ffi fi #producervdistributorsof packagedgoods,
9::11'. the Co1nr.russi1n seeks to act in the consurner's in{eresr- fts aim is ro ensure rhat rhe newmarkets qeated in this sector are open to competition, while maintaining high levels of
environmental protection. At the same rinre, services must be d"li;;.J ;;;h;F*;;'il;
possible value. In 2001. the Commission adopted several formal decisions and issued comforl
('6) Case COMP/Cl/35.141.(") Case COMP/C1136.915.(") Case COMP/34.493 ; press releas e Ip / 0l | 584, 20.4.2001
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letters (two decisions in ttw Duales System Deutschland cav- ('), one decision in tbe Eco
Emballages case (:). and comfort letters in the Pm Europe (r), Returpack-PEf (), Returpack
Aluminiurn (s) and Retwrglas (6) case$) layrng down the basic competition principles such systems
must cornply with. These may be summarised as follows:
(a) A choice for compani.es: The Commission belierrcs that corryanies required to recover and
recycle waste should have a choice befween several systerns or other compliance solutions.
The idea here is that companies must be free not to contract with the dominant system or to do
so only with a partial amormt of their packaging. In view of the very strong martet position of
the systems already in existence, it is of the utmost importance for the emergence of
competition that there be unrestricted maf,ket acc€ss for altemative service providers. A
further aim is to ensure that the developnrcnt of new types of activity in packaging recovery is
possible. and thus to remove obstacles to self-management and other individual conrpliance
solutions. The Commission therefore doo oot accept abusive rnarket behaviour which would
consolidate the dominant position of the incumbent operator.
(b) No unjustified erclusiviry arrangetwnls: Wben trc Commission assesses resEictions of
competition in the packaging wast€ recovery sector, it considers among other things dre scope
and duration ofcontracts. lt is critical in general towards all kinds ofexclusive aranepment
lacking solid and convincing economic justification.
(c) IJnresticled access n thc collzctions infmstnxture" One of the characteristics of the markrt
for the collection and sorting of packaging waste at households is that duplication of the
existing collection infrastructure is in prmtice often very difficult It would be inconvenient
for households to use d.ifferent bins for different collection systems for the same material and
this would not be an economically viable solution. The Commission therefore considers the
sharing of collection facilities by collectors to be a precondition for the occurrence of
competition in practice.
(d) Free markzting of secondary mateial: Cotlected and sorted packaging material can be reused
as a secondary raw material for various new products. The marketing of secondary material
by collectors should also be as free as possible while making sure that materials will find an
appropriate reprocessing channel.
The Commission will apply the prirciples outlined above also to currently pending and future
cases. The consunrcr will benefit directly from the application of these policy principles, since
competition in the relevant packaging waste recovery markets is expected to reduce the price that
the consumer ultimately pays for the products disposed of in the recov€ry systems.
xxxtsT REPoRT oN ooMPETITION POLICY 2001 
- 
SEC(2002) 462 FINAL 37
(') Case COlvIPtD3R4.493, decision of ?-O.4.2Cf1 (OJ L 166, 26.6.2tr1); decision of 17.9.2C01 (OJ L 319,
$
r1:l
$
!:)
{9
4.12.200t).
Case COMP/D384.950, decision of 15.6.2001 (OJ L 233, 3l.8.Xnl ).
Case COMP/D3/38.051.
:ff.T^|f#r7{'r'.r1'r:andcot'ttPtDv3'224'#;#ffiil;:;;;
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Michelin ("\
80. On 20 June, the Commission decided to fine French tyre maker Michelin EUR 19.76 million for
abusing its dominant position in the French market for retread and replacement tyres for heavy vehicles.
The Commission's investigation established that, between 1990 and 1998, Michelin operated a complex
system of rebates, bonuses and commercial agreements which had the effect of tying dealers to Michelin
as their supplier and thus of artificially barring Michelin's competitors from the market. The heavy
penalty reflected the seriousness and duration of the infringement and a previous, similar infringement by
Michelin.
IMS Health (u'\
81. On 3 July, the Commission imposed interim measures on IMS Health (United States), the world
leader in the collection of data on pharmaceutical sales and prescriptions, ordering it to license its ' I 860
brick structure', which segments Germany into 1860 sales zones or 'bricks'. The Commission
considered that MS's refusal to grant a licence for the use of the structure, which, in the Commission's
view, has become a de facto standard in the German pharmaceutical industry constituted a prima facie
abuse of a dominant position. The refusal prevented potential new entry to the pharmaceutical sales data
market and was likely to cause serious and irreparable damage to IMS's current competitors NDC Health
(United States) and AzyX Geopharma Services (Belgium). The President of the Court of First lnstance,
seized by IMS with an application for interim relief, suspended the operation of the Commission decision
on 26 October pending a final judgment in proceedings for annulment (6'). NDC Health lodged an appeal
against the order of the President of the Coirrt of First Instance on 12 December.
De Post/La Poste (Belgiam) (6'z)
82. On 5 December, the Commission decided that the Belgian postal operator De Post/La Poste had
abused its dominant position by making a preferential tariff in the general letter mail service subject to
the acceptance of a supplementary contract covering a new business-to-business ('B2B') mail service and
imposed a fine of EUR 2.5 million. See Section I.C.2.2.
2.2. Lrticle 86(1) in combination with Article 82 
- 
public undertakingVundertakings
with special or exclusive rights and dominance
83. Pursuant to Article 86, the competition rules are also applicable to public undertakings and
undertakings which have been granted special or exclusive rights by Member States; Member States are
not allowed to enact or maintain in force any measure contrary to the competition rules in respect of any
such undertaking.
(") Case COMP/36.(X 1 ; press rele ase lP l0l / 87 3, 2O.6.20O1.
("") Case COMP/38.O44 IMS Heahh/NDC, decision of 3.7.2001 (OJ L 59,28.2.2$2).
(u') Case T-184i01 R. The President found that the abusive natue ofIMS's conduct could not be considered unambiguous
under curent competition rules, that there was a risk that IMS would suffer serious and irreparable harm if it were forced
to grant a licence to its competitors, and that the balance of interests in this case favoured suspension of the decisic,n.
("2) Case COMP/CL|37.859 (OJ L 67,2.3.2002).
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La Poste (France) (63)
84. On 23 October, the Commission adopted a decision on the monitoring of relations between the
French company La Poste and firms specialising in the making-up and preparation of mail. The
Commission saw a conflict of interests in the relations between La Poste and private mail-preparation
firms in that La Poste was both a competitor of those firms and, in view of its postal monopoly, their
unavoidable partner. In the Commission's view, this conflict of interests encouraged La Poste to abuse its
dominant position. Since French legislation did not provide for sufficiently effective or independent
monitoring to neutralise this conflict of interests, the Commission took the view that the French state had
contravened Article 86(1), read in conjunction with Article 82, of the Treaty.
C 
- 
Sector-based competition developments
1. Energy: liberalisation in the electricity and gas sector
85. The year 2001 brought about important developments for the European energy sector (electricity
and gas), which is curently undergoing a liberalisation process. The restructuring of the European
energy industry continued. Energy consumers started to benefit from liberalisation on a larger scale and
many made use of the new possibilities to switch suppliers. New legislation was proposed to accelerate
the liberalisation process. And last but not least, a number of ancillary measures were taken to ensure that
liberalisation becomes an economic realitY.
86. The liberalisation process requires market participants to adapt to the new economic reality. ln
the Commission's vieq liberalisation obliges energy companies to become more efficient
(rationalisation) and to improve services to consumers. At the same time, it creates new market
opportunities for energy companies. These can extend the geographic scope of their activities and
become multinationals. And they can enter new product markets and become multi-utilities. The year
2001 provided evidence that the restructuring process in the European energy sector is under way and is
leading to increased merger activity, with economies of scale and scope being the main drivers. The most
prominent examples in 2001 were EdF's acquisition policy in Spain, Italy and the UK, and the
acquisition of a majority stake in the German gas company Ruhrgas by the German electricity company
EON. To the extent that the Commission is competent to deal with these mergers under its merger
regulation (u.), it ensures that they do not lead to the creation or strengthening of a dominant position in
the energy markets.
87. The ultimate objective of the liberalisation policy 
- 
from a competition perspective 
- 
is to
provide consumers with a wider choice between suppliers, which in turn compete against each other on the
basis of price and services. Consumers 
- 
particularly in those countries which have opted for a market
opening going beyond the minimum requirements of the European electricity and gas directives 
- 
are
already beneflting from the liberalisation process today. Thus, on a Community-wide level, electricity
prices (excluding VAT and energy taxes) to large industrial users have fallen since the initiation of the
liberalisation policy, naturally with certain differences between Member States. There also seem to be
some signs of convergence of prices between Member States (65). As regards the gas sector, the situation
("') Case COMP/Cl/37.133.(") The acquisition of a majority shareholding in Ruhrgas by EON is being dealt with by the German Federal Cadel Office.
(u') Commission staff working paper: Fftst report on the implementation of the internal electricity and gas market (SEC(2001)
r9s7 ,3.t2.20O1.).
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is somewhat different given that gas is to a large extent imported under long{erm contracts and that
continental European prices in these contracts are generally linked to oil prices. The rise in oil prices has
therefore also led to a price increase for gas in the past year. In the medium and long run it is expected,
however, that gas trading hubs will develop also in continental Europe, resulting in more liquidity and
short-term trading. This will provide market participants with a new reference price, which could replace
the oil price link and thus facilitate price negotiations.
1.1. Commission proposal on the completion of the European electricity and gas markets
88. From a legislative point of vieq the most important development in 2001 was the Commission's
proposal for a new directive calling for the completion of the European electricity and gas market.s (66).
The proposal, which was submitted to the Council and the European Parliament in March 2001 following
a public hearing of market participants in autumn 2000, consists of quantitative and qualitative elements.
89. As regards the 'quantitative elements', the proposal envisages a market opening for all
commercial electricity consumers by 2003, for all commercial gas consumers by 2004 and for all other
users 
- 
including private households 
- 
by 2005. When making its proposal the Commission took into
account the fact that the implementation of the existing directives by Member States has led to difl:erent
levels of market opening. In addition, the Commission initiated infringement proceedings in 2001 against
France and Germany for failure to transpose or to transpose completely the gas directive, and against
Belgium for failure to fully transpose the electricity directive.
90. Unfortunately, consumers in countries that opted for a slow market opening suffer from a
competitive disadvantage vis-d-vis consumers in countries that opted for a faster market opening.
Similarly, energy companies in the latter countries are subject to competition across their entire customer
base, whilst energy companies in the former countries still benefit from a protected customer base
leading to unwarranted competitive advantages. These distortions of competition can be reduced or
abolished only if all Member States agree on the same level of market opening.
91. As regards the 'qualitative elements', the proposal envisages, in the first place, a reinforcement of
the unbundling rules. Given that a large number of companies in the electricity and gas sectors are
vertically integrated, i.e. active in transmission and supply (in addition to electricity generation or gas
storage), there is a risk that the transmission branch of a company might grant favourable ffeatment to its
related supply branch to the detriment of third parties requesting third party access. In order to address
this issue, the Commission proposed in its directive that vertically integrated companies be required to
carry out a legal unbundling of the respective business units. The proposal also provides for certain
accompanying measures in order to ensure that there is no undue flow of information between the
unbundled business units. Finally, it was proposed that the reinforced unbundling rules should also be
extended to large distribution companies.
92. Second, the Commission proposes to make it obligatory for Member States to create independent
regulators at national level and to adopt a regulated third-party access regime (as opposed to a negotiated
third party access regime, which is another option under the existing directives). Regulated access means
that access is granted on the basis of tariffs approved by a public authority. The advantage of a regulated
access regime is that it generally results in lower transaction costs for third parties and that the tariffs are
monitored 
- 
on an ex ante basis 
- 
by the national regulator.
f6) COM(2001) 125 final, 13.3.2O0I
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93. The Commission's proposal for the completion of the energy markets was warmly welcomed by
the majority of Member States at the Stockholm European Council in March. Howeveq some Member
States, such as France, expressed concern about the final deadline for full market opening. Others, such
as Germany, which had opted for a negotiated third party access regime and against a national regulator,
expressed concern about the 'qualitative elements'. Nonetheless, negotiations on the draft directive were
initiated in the Council working groups and significant progress was made this year. It is therefore hoped
that the negotiations can be concluded in2002.
94. In June, the Commission reminded Member States of their responsibility to ensure that the
uneven level ofmarket opening is remedied as quickly as possible (o') and drew their attention to the fact
that companies must not unduly benefit from the different levels of market opening. Finally, it announced
that, if Member States are unable or unwilling to adopt its proposal for the completion of the energy
markets, it may make use of the instruments provided for in Article 86(3) of the EC Treaty. This article
makes it possible to adopt 
- 
under certain conditions 
- 
Commission decisions and directives addressed
to Member States, which do not require Member States'approval.
95. In parallel with the legislative proposals, work has been carried out by and discussions have taken
place with international groups of interested parties (national administrations, regulators, consumers,
producers). These groups (Florence Forum for electricity and Madrid Forum for gas) met at the initiative
and with the active participation of the Commission. Discussions took place on certain technical and
regulatory questions in an attempt to achieve harmonisation which will favour cross-border trade and the
creation of a level playing field in Europe with undistorted competitive conditions for both gas and
electricity markets.
1.2. Interaction of competition policy with single market rules
96. Competition policy enforcement ensures in particular that state barriers removed by the
electricity and gas directive are not replaced by anticompetitive behaviour by market operators having the
same effect. Three basic conditions must be met if effective competition is to be brought about and
maintained in both the gas and the electricity market: free supply side, free demand side and free network
access. 'Free' does not, of course, mean 'free of charge' but 'free from artificial restrictions'.
97. The following, in particular, create an unfavourable environment for the development of
competition in the European gas and electricity markets. First of all, the networks are and will remain
natural monopolies. The Commission tries to favour effective network access for third parties under non-
discriminatory and non-abusive conditions. In the electricity sector, particular attention is being paid
to access to congested interconnectors, essential infrastructures in cross-border trade, between different
Member States. Access to these interconnectors is at the same time vital in a number of countries with a
monopolistic supply structure, where effective competition can thus be introduced only by means of
import competition. The Commission intervened in the design of a transmission capacity allocation
system for the UK/France electricity interconnector, and is currently investigating and monitoring the
situation on other borders, e.g. as regards the electricity interconnectors between Spain and France and
the interconnectors into the Netherlands. It also dealt with the construction and use of a new
interconnector linking Norway and Germany (6s). Access to the network is also an important issue for the
gas sector. In the year under review the Commission dealt with a case involving the joint refusal of
continental European gas companies to grant a Norwegian gas producer access to their pipelines. It
(6') hess release IPl0ll812. 20.6.2001.
(0,) Cf. notice pursuant to Article 19(3) of Council Regulation No 17 in Case COMP/E3I31 .921 \4king Cable (OJ C 247 ,
5.9.2001); the notifying parties have since decided to discontinue the Viking Cable project.
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settled the case with one of the European companies concemed after the latter had offered commitments
rendering the third-party access regime more effective (6!').
98. Second, vertical demarcation is and will remain a general feature of the energy industry,
particularly in the gas market, due to the existence of a well-established vertical supply chain where all
companies have their well-defined position and function.
99. Third, producers have traditionally cooperated in commercialisation in these markets, and still do
today, leading to less vigorous competition on the supply side. An example of such a practice was found
in the Irish (Corrib) ('o) and Norwegian gas sector (GF(, ("), or in the French electricity sector (EdF/
CNR), but it would appear that similar arrangements also exist in other countries.
100. Some other features (horizontal demarcation, use restrictions) limiting competition characterise
mainly the gas markets.
1..3. Commission's State aid policy in the energy sector
101. In 2001, particular attention was paid to the following aspects:
Analysis of stranded cost cases (methodology and decisions). See Section [II.A.4.
Assessment of an increasing number of renewable energy promotion schemes. See Section III.C.1.3.
Among other things, the Commission analysed schemes based on operating aid grants, such as the
prime d'encouragement 4cologique in Luxembourg, schemes based on green certificate markets,
such as the new regional electricity laws in Belgium's regions, and more complex schemes
including a combination of various incentive methods, such as the British renewable obligations
system.
Assessment of State aid aimed at securing a level of security of electricity supply. Directive 96/92/
EC (?'?) authorises Member States to give priority to indigenous fossil fuel energy sources, to an
extent not exceeding a fixed threshold based on their annual energy consumption, in order that they
might meet a certain level of security of supply.
1.4. Other developments in the energy sector: motor fuels
102. When the Commission and the national competition authorities met on 29 September 2000 to
discuss competition policy in the motor fuel sector ("), one of the conclusions was that new entranl.s and
independents are essential to maintain and/or improve the competitive pressure on the European rnotor
fuel markets. During 2001, the Directorate-General for Competition carried out a detailed investigation
into the competitive conditions of independent, non-integrated operators in the motor fuel sector.
(u') Press release IPl0l/1641- Commission settles Marathon case with Thyssengas.
C0) Press release IP/01/578 
- 
Enterprise Oil, Statoil and Marathon to market I-rish Corrib gas separately.(") Press release IP/01/830 
- 
Commission objects to GFU joint gas sales in Norway.
(7']) European Parliament and Council Directive 96/92lEC of l9December 1996 conceming cornmon rules for the intemal
market in electrictty (OJ L 2'7 , 30.1.1997 r.(") See 2000 Competition Report, points 1L9-227. See also press releases MEMO/00/55,2O.9.20W,IP/00/1090, 299.2000
and lP /00/ 139I. 30. I 1.2000
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103. The independent operators identified a number of factors that render their situation sometimes
difflcult. These factors are linked to the behaviour of vertically-integrated firms as well as certain
administrative barriers. The independents claimed that certain of their difficulties are due to the behaviour
of some vertically,integrated companies, such as discriminatory pricing, predatory pricing, refusals to
supply, unwillingness to give access to logistic facilities and the long-term exclusive supply contracts
between integrated motor fuel companies and service stations. Although this kind of behaviour would be
liable to fall under the scope of Articles 8l and 82 of the EC Treaty if the criteria for applying these
provisions were met, the investigation did not provide any conclusive evidence of an infringement of EC
competition rules. Finally, the independents mentioned a number of administrative barriers that cause
them considerable difficulties. The state barriers most commonly complained of include the national laws
implementing Directive 98l93lEC on security stocks, certain tax legislation, environmental requirements,
measures increasing price transparency and the methods for allocating retail outlets. The investigation
showed that the situation of the independent operators varies considerably between the Member States
involved in the investigation. The findings ofthe investigation were presented and discussed at a second
meeting between the Commission and national competition authorities on l6 November.
2. Postal serYices
104. The postal sector is expanding, owing in particular to further market opening and the changes
brought about by the e-economy. The Commission took several important decisions conceming this
sector to avoid re-monopolisation of liberalised markets by incumbent operators.
2.1. Commission proposal for further market opening
105. On 15 October, the Council approved a common position of the Member States on a text aimed at
amending the existing postal directive.
106. The main changes introduced by the text approved by the Council are:
a further opening of the market, with a staged reduction in the reserved area as of 1 January 2003
and as of 1 January 2006 ('o);
the possibility, by means of a Commission proposal to be approved by the European Parliament and
the Council, of the completion of the intemal postal market in 2009 (");
the liberalisation of outgoing cross-border mail except for those Member States where it needs to be
part of the reserved services in order to ensure the provision of the universal service;
c") In particular, as of 2003 the non-reserved area will include letters weighing more than 100 g; this weight limit will not
apply if the price is equal to or more than three times the public tariff for an item of correspondence in the fust weight
step of the fastest category. As of 2006 the non-reserved area will include letters weighing more than 50 g; this weight
limit will not apply if the price is equal to or more than three times the public tariff for an item of correspondence in the
first weight step of the fastest category.
In 2006, the Commission will carry out a study evaluating, for each Member State, the impact on universal service of the
completion of the intemal postal market in 2009. On the basis of this study the Commission will submit a report to
Parliament and the Council accompanied by a proposal confirming, if appropriate, the date of 2009 for the full completion
of the internal postal market or determining any other step in the light of the study's conclusions.
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the prohibition of cross-subsidisation of universal services outside the reserved area out of revenues
from services in the reserved area unless it is strictly necessary in order to fulfil specific universal
service obligations imposed in the competitive area;
the application of the principles of transparency and non-discrimination whenever universal service
providers apply special tariffs.
l0'7. The text approved by the Council does not contain any definition of'special services'(?6). The
revised text, although resulting in an opening of the postal market to a lesser extent than originally
envisaged by the Commission, can be considered to be an important step towards a single postal market.
The text still needs to be approved by Parliament.
2.2. Cases
Deutsche Post AG I (77\
108. On 20 March, the Commission concluded its investigation into Deutsche Post AG (DPAG)
and adopted a decision finding that DPAG had abused its dominant position by granting fidelity
rebates and engaging in predatory pricing in the market for business parcel services. DPAG was fined
EUR 24 million in respect of the foreclosure resulting from its long-standing scheme of fidelity
rebates. No fine was imposed in relation to predatory pricing given that the economic cost concepts
used to identify predation were not sufficiently developed at the time. This is the first formal
Commission abuse decision in the postal sector.
109. Following a complaint by United Parcel Service in 1994 claiming that DPAG was using revenues
from the letter mail monopoly to finance below-cost selling in the open market for business parcel
services, the Commission decided that any service provided by the beneficiary of a monopoly in open
competition has to cover at least the additional or incremental cost incurred in branching out into the
competitive sector. Any cost coverage below this level is to be considered predatory pricing. The
investigation revealed that DPAG, for a period of five years, did not cover the costs incremenl.al to
providing the mail-order delivery service.
110. DPAGhas undertaken to create a separate company ('Newco') to supply business parcel services
which will be free to procure the 'inputs'necessary for its services either from DPAG (at market prices)
or from third parties or to produce these inputs itself. In addition, DPAG has undertaken that all inputs it
supplies to Newco will be supplied to Newco's competitors at the same price and under the same
conditions.
Deutsche Post AG II e\
I I l. On 25 July, the Commission, following up a complaint filed by the UK Post Office, decided that
Deutsche Post AG ('q) ('DPAG') had abused its dominant position in the German letter market by
intercepting, surcharging and delaying incoming international mail which it erroneously classified as
(76) A definition of special seruices was included in the Commission's original proposal. Although most of the national
delegations agreed on the need to define special services in the new directive, a compromise could not be reached in the
Council on a specific definition.(") Case COMP/35.141 (OJ L 125, 5.5.2001).(") Case COMP/36.915 (OJ L 331,15.72.2001).(") Press release IP/01/1068, 25.7.2001.
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circumvented domestic mail (so-called A-B-A remail). The Commission also decided that DPAG's
abusive behaviourjustified the imposition of a fine, which, owing to the legal uncertainty that prevailed at
the time of the infringement, was set at the 'symbolic' amount of EUR 1 000.
112. The Commission found that DPAG had abused its dominant position in the German market for
the delivery of international mail 
- 
thereby infringing Article 82 of the EC Treaty 
- 
in four ways:
(i) discriminating between different customers, (ii) refusing to provide its delivery service, (iii) charging
an excessive price for the service offered and (iv) limiting the development of the German market for the
delivery of international mail and of the UK market for international mail bound for Germany. During the
course of the proceedings, DPAG had given an undertaking to the effect that it would no longer intercept,
surcharge or delay international mail of the type to which the case related.
De Postlla Poste (Belgium) (EU)
113. On 5 December, the Commission decided that the Belgian postal operator De PosVLa Poste
had abused its dominant position by making a preferential tariff in the general letter mail service
subject to acceptance of a supplementary contract covering a new business-to-business ('B2B') mail
service. This new service competes with the 'document exchange'B2B service provided in Belgium
by Hays plc, a private operator in postal services based in the United Kingdom. As La Poste exploited
the flnancial resources of the monopoly it enjoys in general letter mail in order to leverage its dominant
position there into the separate and distinct market for B2B services, the Commission imposed a fine
of EUR 2.5 million.
ll4. In April 2000, Hays had lodged a complaint with the Commission alleging that La Poste was
trying to eliminate the Hays document exchange network, which it had been operating in Belgium since
1982. Hays could not compete with the tariff reduction offered by La Poste in the monopoly area and as a
result was losing most of its traditional clients in Belgium, namely the insurance companies-
3. Telecommunications
3.1. Guidelines on market analysis and the calculation of significant market power
115. Following a joint initiative by Commissioners Mario Monti and Erkki Liikanen, on 25 March the
Commission adopted 'draft guidelines on market analysis and the calculation of significant market
power' (sl) with a view to formal adoption of the proposed directive on a new regulatory framework for
electronic communications services and networks. The draft guidelines should help the Council and the
European Parliament to approve the new definition of market power proposed in the framework directive
(Article 13).
1 16. The draft guidelines are based on the case law of the Court of First Instance and the Court of
Justice in the competition sphere and on the Commission's own decision-making practice in defining the
relevant market and in applying the concept of single and collective dominant position, in particular with
regud to electronic communications markets'
ll:.. The draft was first of all discussed with national regulatory and competition authorities on
29 March in Brussels. As part of a public consultation exercise launched by the Commission, the
(s,,) Case COMP/37.S59 (OJ L 61, 2.3.2002); press release IP/01/1738 , 5.l2.2UJl
e') COM(2001) 17 5 final, 28'3.2W1.
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operators concemed were also given the opportunity to express their views and define their position at apublic meeting in Brussels on 18 June. These two events showed that the authorities and the operators
concerned share, in substance, the Commission's approach.
118' The definitive version of the guidelines will be adopted by the commission once the newframework directive has been adopted by parliament and the council.
3.2. Adoption of the seventh implementation report
119' on 28 November' the commission adopted the seventh report examining the state ofimplementation by EU Member states of the current regulatory framework for telecommunications. Thekey conclusion of the report is that the telecom servicesiector -is buoyant and that the national regulatoryauthorities are continuing to make progress with liberalisation. competition between operators isbringing prices down overall. Incumbentsilong-distance calls are down li vo inpicesince last year anddown 45 vo since 1998 for a three-minute cali in Europe, and by 14 vo since last year and 47 vo since1998 for a ten-minute call. The average level of Intemet penetration in EU households was around 36 voin June 2001' on the other hand, a number of regulatory bottlenecks remain and these will have to beremoved rapidly if there is to be continued growth in the telecommunications markets. The key issues arelocal loop unbundling, lengthy delivery times and absence of cost orientation for leased lines, particularlyat the speeds required for broadband and e-commerce rollout, persisting tanff distortions and price
squeezes in certain instances and, finally, the full functioning ofcarrier seleition and pre-selection.
3.3. Monitoring the implementation of directives
120' The commission continued to monitor the effective implementation of the liberalisationdirectives in Member states and the introduction of the regulatory i.urn"*ork in Greece following thecomplete liberalisation of the markets, which became effective on i Junuury.
121' Despite the substantial progress made by Member States, 2l infringement proceedings were stillunder way against Member States which had not correctly transposed the liberalisation directives basedon Article 86(3) of the Treaty or which had omitted to notify transposal measures. The Commissioncontinued, for example, proceedings against Luxembourg in ionnection with the granting of rights ofway' culminating in a reference to the Court of Justic,e n reuruary. It is argued that Luxembourg is atfault for not drawing up clear rules guaranteeing non-discriminatory featment of operators in relation torights of way.
122' on 16 october, the court of Justice found for the commission in connection with proceedingsbrought by the latter against Greece and Portugal. In its judgment conceming portugal, the courtconfirmed that call-back services were not voice telephony *irrii ttre meaninf of Directive 90/3gg/riEcand that the Portuguese Government had therefore wrongly reserved these services for the incumbentoperator pending the liberalisation of telecommunications ('). rn its judgment concerning Greece (s3), thecourt confirmed that, by the terms of the directive, access to the mobile telecommunications market maybe limited only in the absence of frequencies. where access is made conditional upon obtainingauthorisation, the Member state must ensure that procedures for the grant of authorisation are transparentand public, are conducted in accordance with objective criteria and are non-discnminatory.
f.)
("3)
CaseC-429199.
Joined Cases C-396199 and C-39i 199.
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123. On 6 December, the Court of Justice handed down a judgment (*) in a dispute between the
Commission and France over the mechanism for financing the universal service which had been in place
in that Member State since 1997. The matter had been brought before the Court by the Commission in
April 2000. The Court found entirely in the Commission's favour, holding that the French mechanism did
not respect the principles ofproportionality, objectivity and transparency required by the directives, and
thar France had also failed to fulfil its obligations in respect of the rebalancing of tariffs.
124. On the question of the rebalancing of telephone subscription charges, as prescribed by Directive
g6llgtF'c, the Commission continued its infringement proceedings against Spain by sending in July a
supplementary reasoned opinion. This reasoned opinion stresses in particular the inconsistency between
the full unbundled access tariffs set in December 2000 and the price cap mechanism as amended in
May 2001, which creates a price squeeze risk up until 2003 likely to compromise the results of the
unbundling. On 21 December, the Commission referred the matter to the Court of Justice (85).
3.4. Sector inquiry on local loop unbundling
lZ5. In July 2000, the Commission proposed a new regulation requiring local loop unbundling, which
was speedily approved (86) by the European Parliament and the Council and which entered into force on
ZJaniary ("). At the same time, the Directorate-General for Competition launched the first phase of a
sector enquiry on the local loop and sent out letters to incumbent operators in order to investigate local
loop acceis and the development of broadband services over the incumbents'local loops. Broadband
telecommunications use the same end-user's lines to channel higher amounts of information with new
techniques and allow for the provision of high-speed lnternet access services.
126. This inquiry was pursued in 2001 with questionnaires being sent to new entrants in July. The
purpose of this second phase of the inquiry is to assess the competitive situation on the local loop six
months aftet the entry into force of the new regulation, as well as potential abuses of a dominant position
by incumbent operators in breach of Article 82 of the EC Treaty. This second phase should enable the
iommission to have, by early 2002, a comprehensive assessment of the situation of local loop
unbundling in the 15 Member States and of problems encountered by new entrants in obtaining access
under fair and competitive conditions.
3.5. Leased lines sector inquiry
127. The first phase of the leased line inquiry consisted in collecting and analysing comparative
market data for all the Member States. In September 2000, the Commission presented the inquiry's initial
findings at a public hearing in Brussels. A number of competition concetns had been identified and the
Commission decided to tackle those with an apparent Community dimension or of a cross-border nature
and to leave the remaining ones to national authorities.
(Ba) Case C-146l00.
(31) Case C-500/01.
(s6) Regulation (EC) No 28871200A of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2000 (OJ L 336'
30.12.2000).
f?) .Unbundling' the local loop (or the 'last mile" i.e. the physical circuit between the customer's premises and the
telecommunications operator's local switch) amounts to mandatory access on the incumbent's local network to altemative
carriers in order to introduce competition in this segment of the telecom networks, which are mainly in the hands of
former monopolies. Nationwide duplication of these networks is normally impossible.
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128. In November 2000, the Commission opened f,ve ex officio cases (ss) with a view to further
examining the competitive provision of international leased Iines in five Member States: Belgium,
Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. The investigation is being conducted in close cooperation wirh the
national competition authorities and telecom regulators in those countries.
129. Given that the initial sector inquiry results were of a comparative nature and not up to date, in
2001 the Commission sent fomal information requests to the national authorities in the five Member
States and discussed the relevant country-specific factors at bilateral meetings with those authorities. The
ongoing cooperation with the national authorities boils down to close examination of the national
incumbents' competitive behaviour regmding leased line provision. At present, the Commission is
verifying claims that the leased line prices of the five incumbents involved have been reduced, and it is
considering other relevant factors, namely the level, fairness and transparency of discounts, service level
agreements and quality of service parameters.
3.6. Sector inquiry on roaming
130. The sector inquiry was launched in January 2000 to investigate the problem of roaming prices,
which are intransparent to consumers, rigid and at levels unrelated to the cost of carriage, by collecting
comparative information on prices and cost levels for all EU mobile operators (s). Both wholesale and
retail markets were found to be still predominantly national. The inquiry established concentration ratios
of over 90 7o for the two incumbent operators in most national wholesale roaming markets, and a
pervasive lack of competitive pressure throughout the EU, particularly at wholesale level.
131. On 11 July, as part of the follow-up to the sector inquiry, Commission inspectors and officials
from national competition authorities commenced simultaneous unannounced inspections at the premises
of nine European mobile telephony operators located in the UK and Germany (,(,). The data collected are
now being analysed to determine whether there is sufftcient evidence to support a formal finding of
antitrust infringements. In addition, coordination is taking place with national competition and
telecommunications authorities to promote procompetitive action at national level.
3.7. Individual cases dealt with under Articles 81 and 82
3.7.1. Identrus
132. On 3l July, the Commission cleared agreements between a number of major European and non-
European banks creating a global network ('Identrus') for the authentication ofelectronic signatures and
other aspects of e-commerce transactions (q). The Commission has concluded that the Identrus system
will not lead to any appreciable restriction of competition. In particular, it entails no foreclosure risk, it
will face competitive checks from competing systems, and participants are free to join other such
systems. The Commission's clearance decision illusffates the importance it attaches to the development
of competilive e-commerce-related markets.
('") Cases COMP/38.001 lzased lines Spain, COMP|38.002 Leased lines Portugal, COMP/38.003 I*ased lines ltaly,
COMP/38.004 r€ased lines Greece atdCOMP/38.U)5 Leased tines Belgium.
(8'q) Roaming occurs when a mobile phone user makes or receives calls when visiting a network other than his home network.
f0) hess release MEMO/011262, 11.7.2001.
(o') Case COMP/3l.462 (OI L 249, 19.9.2001).
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3.7.2. Intelsat
133. On 1 June, the Commission issued a negative clearance comfort letter to Intelsat for its
restructuring from an intergovernmental organisation into a commercial company. Intelsat was formed as
a government cooperative to provide satellite communications around the world in a time before
telecommunications liberalisation. As telecomrnunications markets developed and other satellite
operators entered the market, Intelsat's structure became less appropriate in both commercial and
competition terms. The Commission's investigation and analysis revealed that the restructuring did not
give rise to an appreciable restriction ofcompetition, noting that Intelsat would carry out an IPO within
two years of privatisation. This finding was in line with the conclusions of previous cases involving other
intergovernmental satellite organisations, namely the maritime satellite organisation Inmarsat (") and the
European satellite organisation Eutelsat ('3).
3.7.3. Wanadoo
134. On 19 December, the Commission sent a statement of objections to Wanadoo Interactive, a
subsidiary of France T6l6com in charge of Intemet access provision (n'). At this stage, the Commission
believes that the compmty has priced its high-speed Internet access services via the ADSL technology
below their incremental costs (and below their variable costs as well), which may constitute an abuse of a
dominant position. This possible abuse has taken place throughout 2001, at a critical time in the take-off
of broadband access services for the residential market in France, to the detriment of Wbnadoo's
competitors.
4. Tlansport
4.1. Air transport
135. The Commission examined a number of airline alliances during 2001. In general, it believes that
airline alliances can bring benefits for passengers by extending networks and improving efficiency.
However, alliances can also restrict competition on individual routes and remedies are often needed to
counter this.
4. 1. 1. British MidlandlhafthansalSAS (")
136. On I March 2000, bmi British Midland Intemational, Lufthansa and SAS notified a joint venture
agreement under which they agreed to coordinate their services within the EEA to and from London
Heathrow and Manchester International airports. The Commission investigated this agreement in close
cooperation with the UK competition authorities. On 12 June 2001, after the parties had given a number
of undertakings, the Commission informed them that they were being granted a six-year exemption for
their joint venture agreement pusuant to Afiicle 5(3) of Regulation (EEC) No 3975187.
137. The JVA provides that Lufthansa is granted the exclusive right to operate flights on almost all
routes between London and Manchester on the one hand and German airports on the other. Similarly,
SAS is granted the exclusive right for the traffic between London/Manchester and Scandinavian
countries. This restriction was found to be problematic for the London-Frankfurt market, which, with
f?) Press release lP/981923. 22.1,0.1998.
('qr) Press release IPl00/1364. 27.71.2400.
('a) hess release IP/01/1899. 21.12.2001.
(o') Case COMP/37.812, public notice of 14.3.2001 (OJ C 83, 14.3.2001).
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2.1 million O&D (point of origin/point of destination) passengers in 1999, is one of the busiest in Europe.
The Commission concluded that British Midland's withdrawal from the London-Frankfurt route
represented an appreciable restriction of competition on both the market for non-time-sensitive 0eisure)
passengers and the market for time-sensitive (business) customers.
138. In its analysis under Article 81(3), the Commission came to the conclusion that, in terms of
efficiency gains and competition, the overall effect of the agreement is positive. It leads to a
reorganisation and expansion of the parties' existing networks, and allows Lufthansa and SAS to
compete for domestic UK traffic as well as for trafftc between the UK and Ireland and to carry passengers
from any point in the STAR network to regional destinations in the UK. It leads furthermore l.o an
increase in network competition. As a result of the agreement, British Midland was able to start providing
new services between London and Barcelona, Lisbon, Madrid, Milan and Rome.
139. With a view to addressing the Commission's competition concerns, the parties submitted a
number of commitments, in particular to make slots available at Frankfurt airport, thereby allowing the
entrant to operate four daily frequencies. The Commission carried out a market test to ascertain that the
slots would actually be taken up by competitors.
140. The Commission also investigated the cooperation between Austrian Airlines and Lufthansa.
On 14 December, it published a notice under Arlicle 16 of Regulation (EEC) No 3975lg7 (,6), stating its
intention of exempting the cooperation on the basis of remedies offered by the parties.
141. Furthermore, the Commission continued its investigations into the Lufthansa./United and KLM/
Northwest transatlantic alliances. It also opened a new investigation into the proposed BA/AA
transatlantic alliance, working in close cooperation with the UK Office of Fair Trading. Decisions on all
these alliances are expected in2002.
4.1.2. SAS/Maersk Air Pj)
r42. See Section I.B.1.1.
4.1.3. IATA cargo tariff consultations
143. The IATA cargo tariff conferences are a forum where air carriers meet to agree tariffs for the
transporl of freight.
144. Until June 1997, this system benefited from a block exemption under Commission Regulation(EEC) No 1617 193 ('!8), which effectively enabled European airlines to agree on tariffs for the carriage
of freight within the EEA. This block exemption was wirhdrawn by Commission Regulation (E-)
No 1523196 of 24 July 1996. The Commission's main reasons for withdrawing the blo;k exemption
were that the tariffs fixed by cargo tariff conferences appeared to be much higher than the market
rates and that the system no longer seemed essential for doing interlining (rr) work within the EEA.
e") oJ c 356, 14.12.200t.
('q7) commission decision of 18.7.2001 in case CoMp/37.444 sAS/MaerskAir (o1L265, 5.10.2001).f) oJL lss.26.6.1993.('") Interlining occurs when cargo is canied for part or all of the joumey by an airline other than the airline with which the
customer has contracted.
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145. Following the withdrawal of the block exemption, IATA notified the system and applied for an
individual exemption (rm). IAIA's main argument in favour of tariff conferences was that they facilitate
cargo interlining. The cargo tariffs fixed by tariff conferences are used at the wholesale level to calculate
each carrier's remuneration for its participation in an interline move.
146. In a statement of objections sent to IAIA in May, the Commission took the preliminary view that
IAIA cargo tariff conferences fell under Article 8l(l) of the EC Treaty. In its analysis under Article
81(3), the Commission accepted that cargo tariff conferences facilitated the provision of a comprehensive
system of interlining within the EEA. It considered, however, that IAIA had not succeeded in
demonstrating that this restrictive system was still indispensable to providing customers with eflicient
interlining services within the EEA.
147. Following the statement ofobjections, IAIA agreed to end thejoint setting ofcargo rates within
the EEA. Concretely, by the beginning of 2002, cargo rates fixed individually by each carrier should
replace those jointly set by the tariff conferences.
148. As a result, the Commission decided to close the case. It also provided IAIA with a comfort letter
covering a number of other administrative and technical resolutions in the cargo sector, which facilitate
interlining and are distinct from the setting of cargo rates.
4.1.4. IATA passenger tariff conferences
149. Airlines within the Community benefit from a block exemption allowing them to consult on
scheduled passenger tariffs so long as these tariffs are for interlining (Commission Regulation (EEC)
No 1617/93). Interlining occurs when a passenger is canied for part or all of his journey by an airline
other than the one he booked with.
150. In practice, the exemption for passenger tariff consultations applies to the activities ofjust one
organisation 
- 
the International Air Transport Association (IAIA). IAIA organises passenger tariff
conferences which meet several times a year to set interlining tariffs for all regions of the world. All EEA
flag carriers and a number of regional airlines participate in the tariff conference that covers Europe. Any
airline which is a member of the passenger tariff conferences can interline with any other at the rates set
in these conferences. Both business and full economy fares are agreed for all EEA city pairs for one year
at a time. For some city pairs APEX and other discounted fares are also agreed. These fares are applied
together with a weighting system known as the Multilateral Prorate Agreement to determine how much
an airline will receive for carrying an interlining passenger on any given journey segment.
151. In February, the Directorate-General for Competition published a consultation paper seeking
views on whether IATA passenger tariff conferences should continue to be exempted. In June, the
Commission renewed the current block exemption for passenger tariff conferences for one year while
considering what approach to take in future. Tariff conferences are a clear restriction of competition in
that they involve price fixing, but they also secure a benefit for consumers by providing them with the
possibility of buying a single through ticket for journeys involving different airlines. The consultation
paper started from the premiss that interlining brings both economic and consumer benefits and asked
whether the restrictions on competition inherent in passenger tariff conferences are necessary in order to
secure these benefits.
('*) Case COMP/36.563.
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4.2. Maritime transport
152. The year 2001 saw significant developments in liner shipping competition policy, both within the
EU and intemationally.
4.2.1. Revised TACA
153. On 29 November, the Commission published a notice stating its intention to exempt the maritime
aspects of the revised Trans-Atlantic Conference Agreement ('the revised TACA) and giving third
parties 30 days in which to comment. This followed the Commission's decision in August 1999 not to
oppose the inland aspects of the agreement, while raising serious doubts about the maritime aspects.
154. In the period since August 1999, the Commission's investigation has focused mainly on verifying
that the provisions for exchange of information between members of the conference are not such as to
jeopardise the confidentiality of individual service contracts concluded between individual carriers and
shippers. The free and widespread availability of such contracts is, in the Commission's view, crucial to
ensuring that the members of the revised TACA remain subject to effective competition. In considering
whether this is indeed the case, the Commission has taken due account of the finding of the United States
Federal Maritime Commission, in its report on the impact of the US Ocean Shipping Reform Act, that no
more than approximately l0 Va of all cargo carried by members of the revised TACA is currently carried
under the conference tariff. The remaining 90 7o is carried under service contracts.
155. In response to the Commission's concerns, the TACA parties have made significant amendments
to the conference rurangements concerning information exchange and given certain undertakings. The
Commission has taken the preliminary view, pending comments from third parties, that these
amendments and undertakings, in combination with the clear evidence of substantial intemal and
external competition, are sufficient to address the serious doubts raised inAugust 1999.
156. The revised TACA case has also served to highlight the issue of capacity management. 'llhe
conference agreement contains a general provision modelled on Article 3(d) of Council Regulatton
(EEC) No 4056/86, which allows a conference to regulate the capacity offered by each of its
members. The revised TACA availed itself of this option over the Christmas and New Year low
season of 200012001. The capacity programme, which covered a period of five weeks and was
notifled to the Commission, gave the latter the opportunity to clarify its view of the scope of
Article 3(d). The Commission thus considered inter alia that a conference capacity management
programme could not be used as an instrument to create an artificial peak season and that capacity
withdrawal could not be combined with an increase in the conference tariff. The revised TACA
parties undertook to comply with these guidelines.
157. The scope ofArticle 3(d) was also at issue in a case involving the Far Eastem Freight Conference
(the FEFC). In October, the FEFC parties decided to implement a six-month coordinated vessel
withdrawal scheme. The scheme was intended to deal with the combined effects of a drastic fall in
demand on the Europe-Far East trades and the introduction of significant amounts of new capacity. In a
warning letter to the parties, the Commission indicated that it considered that the FEFC programme was
not covered by Article 3(d), as interpreted by the Commission in its'IAA (roL) and EATA (10'?) decisions. In
particular, the programme did not, in the Commission's view, have the permissible objective of
addressing a shortterm fluctuation in demand. Nor would the programme qualify for individual
(,0') Commissiondecisionof 19.10.1994inCaseNoIY/34.M6Trans-AtlanticAgreement(OJL376,31.12.1994).
(ro:) Commission decision of 30.4.1999 in Case No IV/34.25O Europe-Asia Trades Agreement (OJ L 193, 26.7.1'999).
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exemption, as any possible benefit to transport users would be more than outweighed by the negative
impact of the programme on the users' costs. In response to the warning letter, the members of the FEFC
immediately terminated their coordinated withdrawal scheme.
4.2.2. Consortia
158. Two consortia agreements were cleared by the Commission in 2001 ('B), confirming that
operational agreements of this nature generally contribute to a more rational organisation of maritime
transport services while bringing substantial benefits to transport users.
4.2.3. OECD report on liner shipping
159. Internationally, the most significant event ofthe year was undoubtedly the publication ofa draft
OECD report on liner shipping competition policy. The report, which was discussed at an OECD
workshop in December, questions the justification for maintaining antitrust immunity or exemption for
the collective price-fixing activities of shipping lines and recommends that member countries should
undertake a review of their current legislation in this respect. The Commission welcomes the report as a
substantial contribution to the debate and will reflect further on the implications for EU liner shipping
legislation.
4.2.4. P&OlStena
160. In the short-sea sector, the highlight of 2001 was the Commission's decision to renew the
exemption for the P&O and Stena Line cross-Channel ferry joint venture. The original three-year
exemption was granted on 26 January 1999 and the parties applied for renewal on22December 2000.
The Commission's investigation found inter alia that the characteristics of the market were such that the
main operators on the market could be expected to compete with each other and that the price increases
that had taken place could be explained by circumstances other than the existence of the joint venture.
The Commission therefore concluded that there were no grounds for opposing a further automatic
exemption for six years, which is the standard period under the relevant maritime transport regulation.
The joint venture is therefore deemed exempt until 7 March 2007.
4.3. Railways
161. In February, the Council and the European Parliament finally adopted the three directives
comprising the railway package ('oo). The package extends rights of access to all types of international rail
freight operating over a specified trans-European rail freight network until 2008, and over the whole EU
network thereafter. The package also includes Community licensing for train operators; detailed rules on
infrastructure charging, train path allocation and safety certification; and the requirement to establish an
independent regulatory body at national level to oversee the charging/allocation process and to hear
complaints.
(,",) Case COMP/3'| .982 Grand Alliance/Americana Consortium and Case COMP/38.021 Eurcpe to Caibbean Consortium.
('*) Directive 2mUnEC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2001 amending Council Directive
9ll440lEEC on the development of the Community's railways.
Directive 2NllI3tEC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2001 amending Council Directive
95/l8nc on the licensing of railway undertakings.
Directive zWllI4lEC of the European Padiament and of the Council of 26 February 2001 on the allocation of railway
infrastructure capacity and the levying ofcharges for the use ofrailway infiastructure and safety certification (OJ L75,
15.3.2001).
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162. In June, the Commission opened formal proceedings against Ferrovie dello Stato (FS) in a case
concerning market access (',,,). In its statement of objections, the Commission considered that FS's
repeated and long-standing refusal to grant access to GVG, a small German railway operator, amounted
to an abuse of a dominant position.
163. In October, the Commission warned Deutsche Bahn (DB) about discriminating against a private
operator (1ft). In this other case involving GVG, the Commission found in its statement of objections lhat
DB had abused its dominant position in three ways. First, it discriminated in its charges for traction.
Second, it subsequently declined to provide traction altogether. And third, it imposed a requirement l.hat
GVG must hire DB staff.
164. The Commission has meanwhile announced in the White Paper European Transport Policy
for 2010: Time to decide (',r) its intention to put forward further legislative proposals to liberalise malket
access by opening up domestic and cabotage fieight services, thereby completing the intemal market in
the rail freight sector.
5. Media
5.1. Sports broadcasting
5. L 1. aEFA broadcasting regulations
165. Access to broadcasting markets, particularly pay-television and pay-per-view markets, is heavily
dependent on access to premium rights and technology. Over the past year, the potential for sports rights
to foreclose broadcasting markets was examined in several cases. In the UEFA broadcasting regulations
decision (r08), for example, the changes limiting the hours when broadcasters would be prevented from
broadcasting football of a particular origin prevented the regulations from having any appreciable effect
on broadcasting markets. The {IEFA regulations on the broadcasting of sporting fixtures originally
submitted to the Commission were highly complex and very broad in scope. The broadcasting of matches
was prohibited throughout the weekend. Following the Commission's intervention, UEFA has simplified
its rules and strictly limited the blocked number of hours. As from the 2000/2001 season, the new UIIFA
regulations will authorise national associations to prevent the broadcasting of fixtures within their
territories for only two and a half hours either on Saturdays or on Sundays at a time when major national
matches are taking place. Similarly, the separation of the FIA's regulatory and commercial functions, and
more particularly the reduced duration of the contracts for the broadcasting of Formula One, would
prevent those broadcasting contracts from distorting the national free-to-air and pay-television
broadcasting markets (10,). The sector will be kept under scrutiny, in particular with regard to
developments in downstream broadcasting markets.
5.1.2. UEFA Champions League
166. The Commission also began to examine how rights are sold, rather than the terms on which they
are sold. It issued a statement of objections against UEFA in respect of the collective selling of the
broadcasting rights to the later stages of the UEFA Champions League. The collective selling of these
('05) Case COMP/37.685.
(106) Press release lPl01l 1415. 5.10.2001.('') COM(2001) 370 final, 72.9.2001.
('il) oJ L r'71.26.6.2001.
('o') Press release lPl0ll1,523. 30.10.2001.
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rights on an exclusive basis risks limiting the supply of such rights, thereby limiting the broadcasting of
football on downstream broadcasting markets; the exclusive sale of those rights risks distoning
competition on those markets.
5.2. Other issues
5.2.1. Collecting socicties
167. The management of rights by collecting societies has traditionally been done by national
collecting societies which have had monopoly positions on national markets. The development of the
Internet challenges this situation, as a service made available over the Internet is theoretically available
anywhere in the world. The collecting societies have therefore begun to examine how rights should be
managed in this borderless environment. The Commission published an Article 19(3) notice in August in
respect of an agreement between collecting societies for the management of rights to broadcast
simultaneously via traditional broadcast media and over the Internet. This agreement would not alter the
monopoly position of each collecting society in respect of its national repertoire, but would introduce
competition between collecting societies for the downstream provision of a global licence to users.
5.2.2. CDs/DVDs
168. Vertical problems were examined in relation to the distribution and pricing of CDs, where the
Commission found evidence of limited retail price maintenance 
- 
which was rapidly discontinued
following the Commission's investigation.
169. The Commission also began to look at a potentially important case for consumers which may
combine both horizontal and vertical restraints: the regional coding system for DVDs. In this case, the
Commission is examining the horizontal agreement on the DVD standard, which includes the region-
coding system, together with vertical agreements for the licensing of the technology and know-how to
use that standard.
6. Motor vehicle distribution
l'70. In the motor vehicle distribution sector, the Commission's activities in 2001 centred on:
- 
continuing the process of evaluating Regulation (EC) No 1475195 (110) following the evaluation
report adopted by the Commission on l5 November 2000 ("');
- 
starting a reflection process on the possible adoption of a specific legislative framework for motor
vehicle distribution after the expiry of Regulation (EC) No 1475195 in September 2002;
- 
monitoring the application of Regulation (EC) No 1475195, with the adoption of, among other things,
two infringement decisions with fines.
(',0) CommissionRegulation(EC)Nol475/g5of2SJune1995ontheapplicationof Article85(3)(nowArticleSl(3)of the
Treaty to certain categories of motor vehicle distribution and servicing agreements (OJ L 145 , 29 .6 .1995) .
(1rr) Report on the evaluation of Regulation (EC) No 1475195 on the application of Article 85(3) (now Article 81(3)) of the
Treaty to certain categories of motor vehicle distribution and servicing agreements (COM(2000) 743 frnal, 15.1 1.2000);
see also 2000 Competition Report, points 112-115.
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6.1. Preparing the ground for a new legislative framework specific to motor vehicle distribution
l7l. Until 30 September 2002, the date of its expiry, Regulation (EC) No 1475195 exempts from the
prohibition in Article 8l(l) selective and exclusive distribution agreements for motor vehicles having
three or more wheels whereby manufacturers set up dealers in exclusive territories; these dealers may rsell
vehicles either to final consumers or their agents, or to other dealers approved by the manufacturer.
l'72. The evaluation report concluded that the aims of Regulation (EC) No 1475195 had been only
partially achieved and that the assumptions underlying the regulation were no longer entirely valid.
173. Before deciding on the legislative fiamework that would best resolve the motor vehicle
distribution problems identified in the block exemption regulation evaluation report, the Commission
launched a study to identify and measure the economic impact on all parties concerned of flve possible
legislative scenarios (11'?). The study is purely consultative in nature and contains no recommendationri as
to the future legislative framework.
174. The economic impact study analyses the effects on inter-brand and intra-brand competition, on
the creation of obstacles to internal market integration, and on competition in the after-sales sen'ice
market. These effects were analysed in order to identify the impact on manufacturers, their official
distribution networks, approved after-sales service providers, independent repairers, consumers, and
manufacturers of spare parts and diagnostic systems.
175. In addition to the flve legislative scenarios, a number of specific issues, considered to be
variables capable of being applied to each scenario, were analysed separately and in the context of
each appropriate scenario (for example, multi-branding and the link between sales and after-sales
servicing).
176. At the same time, a study of consumer expectations was commissioned with a view to
determining consumers' positions with regard to the current system of car distribution and possible
alternatives for the future ("'). These two studies complete the process of evaluation by the Commission
of the block exemption regulation. They come on top of two other studies carried out in 2000 into the link
between new vehicle sales and after-sales servicing and price differentials in the Community ("0). All
these studies are useful sources of information when it comes to determinins the future framework for
motor vehicle distribution.
177. After analysing the lindings of the studies it has had carried out, in early 2002 the Commission
will present a proposal for the future framework applicable to motor vehicle distribution as from
September of that year. It goes without saying that it will examine every other available source of
information ('15).
("') The study's terms of reference may be consulted on the Competition Directorate-General's Internet site: http:/i
europa.eu.int/comm/competition/car_sector/distribution. The study was enffusted to the frrm of consultants Andersen
following a call for tenders. It may be consulted at the abovementioned Internet address.
("r) 'Customer preferences for existing and potential sales and servicing alternatives in automotive distribution', Dr Ladernann
& Partner, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm,/competitiodcar_ sector/distribution.
("a) These two studies may be consulted on the Competition Directorate-General's Intemet site: http://europa.eu.int/comm/
competition/car_sector/. 'The natural linl< between sales md service' (Autopolis), 'Car price differentials in the European
Union: An economic analysis' (Hans Degryse and Frark Verboven 
- 
KU Leuven and CEPR). See also .2000
Competition Repod, point I 13.
('r5) Of these sources, mention may be made of a study commissioned by the European Automobile Manufacturers'
Association (EAMA), also dealing with the economic effects of altemative distribution systems.
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6.2. General assessment of the application of the brock exemption regulation
as regards new car prices
178' Every year the Commission compares the pre-tax prices of new cars in the Community ("u). Thecomparison is carried out twice a year (in May and November) on the basis of the selling prices
recommended by manufacturers for each Community Member State.
179' The situation on I May 2001 shows that, as in November 2000 and despite rhe continueddepreciation ofthe pound sterling against the euro,prices in the united Kingdom 
- 
although they haddecreased or remained stable 
- 
were still higher than in the euro zone. In-the euro zane,Austria andGermany were still the most expensive countries. The Commission noted once more that the averageprice differential within the euro zone was well above 20 vo inthe cheapest segments (A to D), despitethe fact that the large number of_models in segments B to D should normally be a sign of strongcompetition. In general' Denmark, Finland, Greece, the Netherlands and Spain are the markets where thepre-tax prices of new cars are the lowest (il7).
180' These price differentials are much higher than the limit laid down rn the notice concemingRegulation (EEC) No 123185(t'8)' i.e. l2vo("). The notice is still in force, and deals with cenainquestions relating to Regulation (EC) No 1475/95, including price differentials. Above this limit, theCommission may withdraw the benefit of the exemptio; if the price differentials are due toobligations exempted by Regulation (EC) No l475lg5 C,o\.
t8l' These wide price differentials explain why many consumers continue to buy their cars in othercommunity countries, not without difficulty thougi, as can be seen from the steady stream of complaints
reaching the commission' most of the time for excessively long delivery periods.
6.3. Application of the block exemption regulation in 2001
182' The Commission adopted two infringement decisions with fines in 2001 against the two car
manufacturers volkswagen and Daimlerchrysler. It also approved Porsche's new distribution system.
6.3,L Volkswagen (12r)
183' The Commission adopted a decision fining volkswagen EUR 30.96 million for resale price
maintenance in Germany for the new VW Passat. volkswagen Lad sent circular letters jn 1996 and 1997to its German dealers telling them not to sell this model at prices below the recommended list price.Unlike the previous decision againstVolkswagen, this second decision does not concern measures aimed
at hindering cross-border sales. Resale price maintenance is, however, a hardcore restriction. This is thefirst decision on resale price maintenance in the car sector.
("") The comparison is required by Article 1 I of the exemption regulation.("') See commission press releaseslp/o!/227, r9.2.2oor and IplOrlr05r, 23.7.2001.(1'3) commission notice conceming Regulation (EEC) No 123/85 of 12 December 1984 on the application of Arr.icle g5(3)(now Article 81(3)) of the Treaty to certain categories of motor vehicle distribution and servicing agreements, chapter II.l(oI c 17,18.1.1985).
("n) Thedifferentialmay,however, exceedr2vobysixpercentagepointsforaperiodoflessrhanoneyearorrrlrespectofan
insignificant portion of the vehicles.
("0) See Article 8 and the 3lst recital of the resulation.{'' r case coMP/36.693 vorkswagen, commis-sion decision of 29.6.200r (oJ L 262,2.lo.z0or)
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6.3.2. DaimlerChrysler ('22)
184. Following the receipt of complaints from consumers, the Commission opened an own-initial.ive
proceeding against DaimlerChrysler. On 10 October, it adopted a decision fining DaimlerChrysler
EUR 71.825 million for several infringements of Article 81 of the EC Treaty. The first infringement
consisted of obstacles to parallel trade in Germany agreed between DaimlerChrysler and the members of
its German distribution network. The application of Article 81 to these restrictions betwr:en
DaimlerChrysler and its German agents resulted from the fact that these agents bear a considerable
commercial risk linked to their activity (r'?3). The second infringement consisted of the restriction of sales
to independent leasing companies in Germany and Spain. Lastly, DaimlerChrysler participated in a price-
fixing agreement in Belgium aimed at reducing rebates granted to consumers'
6.3.3. Porsche's distribution system
185. Following notification of Porsche's new distribution agreements ("1), the Commission came to
the conclusion that the agreements could be exempted under Regulation (EC) No 1475195 after cerl.ain
modifications had been made by Porsche. In particular, in establishing sales targets all sales are to be
taken into account regardless of the buyer's place of residence and Porsche dealers are to be allowed to
carry out online sales if consumers wish to buy over the Internet. The file was accordingly closed by
comfort letter.
:::j: :::" 
right for covisint, the.automotive B2B markehrace o
ffin commission $anted regulatory approval (':) for the creation of covisint. a business-
to-business (B2Bl marketplace joint venture which had been notified earlier in the year. Covisint
ffi ,fi Hliff ffi ffi ?"lHf;:fi ffi :T:i"i#ffi 5P.'f:,.T*'arMotors'Renaurt
c)
(1)
Case COMPB8.064 (OJ C 49. 15.2.2001): press release IP/01/l 155, 3.1.7.2001.
AI the competirion authorities that have scrutinised Covisint have also given the project the green lighl After
negoriations wirh representatives of Covisint the US Federal Trade Conunission cleared the operation on the
basis of rhe informadon avai.la,blq ahhough it reserved the right to re-open the proceeding should problems arisc.
The German Rderal Cartel Of6ce and the Austian authorities have likewise cleared the project, ad tlrc Japanese
authorities have not raised any ob-iectitons to it.
('") Case CoMP/36.264 DaimlerChrysler; press releaselPl0ll7394,10.10.200l.
('.,) According to the guidelines on vertical restraints (OJ C291,,13.10.2000), the only relevant criterion for determining
whether Article 81(1) applies to the activity of commercial agents is whether or not the agent has to bear a risk linked to
the sale of goods or services he is involved in. In this case, rebates granted by agents were taken off their commission and
agents bore responsibilities with regard to transport; they also bought demonstration vehicles 
- 
a significant proportion
of the total number of cars sold 
- 
and financed spare part stocks.The contract obliged them to supply warranty seflrices
(without being fully reimbursed) and after-sales services at their own risk.
(r:a) Case COMP/37.886 Porsche.
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agreenrnts provide.for adeqr"late data protection tfuough the use of firewalls and security ruhs.
The Commission also notes that Covisint is open to all firms in the industry on a non-
discriminatory basis, is based on open $tandards and allows both shareholders and othe{ users to
participare in other B2B exchanges.
6.4. Order of the Court of Justice in the Asia Motor France SA case (''s)
186. Asia Motor France, and other companies related to it, carried on the business of importing
Japanese vehicles into France. In 1985 and 1988 they complained to the Commission about an alleged
restrictive practice between five importers of Japanese cars (Toyota, Mazda, Honda, Mitsubishi and
Nissan) which were said to have entered into an agreement with the French Government aimed at
limiting Japanese car sales to 3 Vo of total annual motor vehicle sales and to have agreed among
themselves to divide up this 3 qo q\otain such a way as to exclude any Japanese makes other than their
own (1':6). The complaints were rejected by the Commission'
187. The Court's order of 20 September, which was favourable to the Commission, brought the case to
an end. The Commission had good cause to reject the complaints inasmuch as the problems complained of
resulted directly from the policy of the public authorities and not from an agreement between undertakings.
7. Financial serYices
188. In applying competition policy to the financial services sectoq the overall objective is to achieve
more competitive and efficient European financial markets. Such achievements contribute to the welfare
of consumers and the delivery of a dynamic, knowledge-based European economy with higher economic
growth.
189. The EU financial system is integrating progressively under the influence of globalisation,
technological advances, the introduction ofthe euro and ongoing market liberalisation. The introduction
of euro notes and coins on I January 2002 will further increase transparency and strengthen the forces of
integration within the Union. Integration is resulting in increased levels of competition on certain
markets. It also increases the need for greater vigilance in the application and enforcement of competition
policy so as to ensure that financial markets remain open and competitive. There is a risk that companies
might seek to protect themselves from increased levels of competition by entering into anticompetitive
agreements or, where they are in a dominant position, by exercising their market power in a way which
hinders the development of new and innovative business formats.
190. In 2001, major advances were made in the application and clarification of competition policy
towards payment systems. This is of significant importance in view of the forthcoming introduction of a
single payments area within the EU. In the area of financial infrastructure the policy objective is to
facilitate competition, thereby unleashing market forces favourable to the establishment of a lnore
efficient infrastructure. The Commission has started work on ensuring that competition policy is being
fully respected in the so-called back office operations of securities transactions. The effrciency of these
operations, referred to in the industry as clearing and settlement, have important implications for: the
overall efficiency of European capital markets.
("') Case C- 1/01 P 
- 
order of the Court (second chamber) of 2O.9.2001
('") Case COMP/33.0l4Asio Motor
COMPETITION REPORT 2OO1
XXXIST REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 2OO1 _ SEC(2002) 462 FINAL 61
7.1. Competition in the clearing and settlement sector
191' on 15 February, the Committee of Wise Men on the Regulation of European Securities Markets,
chaired by Mr Lamfalussy, pubtished its final report. Its Jerms of reference were defined by the EuropeanUnion's economics ancl finance ministers on 17 July 2000 with the aim of achieving a truly integiated
European fi nancial market.
192' In its repon the committee specifically refers to the clearing and settlement sector. It is convincedthat further restructuring of this sector is necessary in the European Union. The process of consolidation
should largely be in the hands of the pnvate sector. The Committee states, however, that this does not
mean that there are no public policy issues at stake. In particular, public policy should focus on
competition issues and removing the kinds of obstacles and impediments that make consolidationdiffcult' The Committee clearly considers competition issues such as open and non-discriminatory
access and exclusive agreements to be among the most important public policy issues.
193' The Committee suggests that the Commission should examine the situation in the field of
clearing and settlement in order to ensure that the Community's competition policy is being properly
respected in this crucial sector. Against that background and given that the Commission *a. afreaay
examining this sector, it has extended its examination by launchiirg a formal in-depth ex officio inquiry. itis the first time fhat such a large-scale antitrust examination of the clearing and settlement sector has been
undertaken.
194' The Commission had already identifed a number of possible competition concerns in the feld of
clearing and settlement:
first, market participants indicated that some settlement systems may be engaging in discriminatorypricing and applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions;
second, there may be exclusive arrangements between exchanges and clearing and settlement
systems which restrict competition in clearing and settlement services; and
third, market participants have pointed out the possible risk of excessive prices being charged for
clearing and settlement services where the clearing and/or settlement system is held by the Ladingplatform and trades on such platform have to be cleared and/or settlid in that system (so-called
'vertical silos').
195' The purpose of the ex officio inquiry is to determine whefher the above-mentioned possible
competition concems are real competition concems, and if so, whether they can be addressed by
applying EU competition law. The addressees of this inquiry are market participants including banks,
trading platforms, and clearing and settlement systems.
7.7.7. Eurex (127\
196' In December, the Commission closed by way of comfort letter the notification by Deutsche BiirseAG and SWX Swiss Exchange ('the parents') of their joint venture Eurex, a cross-border exchange for
electronic trading in financial derivatives, such as options and futures (lrs).
(rr') Case COMP/D1137.557.
(rr") Press release IP/02/4, 3.1.2N2.
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197. The Commission considered that Eurex is a jointly controlled full-function joint venture and
hence a concentration, but that it does not have a Community dimension. Pursuant to Article 22(l) ot
Regulation (EEC) No 4064189, Regulation No 17162 does not apply to concentrations except in relation
to joint ventures that do not have a Community dimension and which have as their object or effect the
coordination of the competitive behaviour of undertakings that remain independent. Usually the natir:nal
competition authorities examine whether any such risk of coordination is present in the context of their
merger analysis. No such analysis was carried out in this case because the transaction did not need to be
and was not notified to the relevant national competition authorities.
198. The Commission therefore examined under Article 81(l) whether there is any risk of
coordination of the parents' behaviour resulting from the concentration of part of their activities. The
parents are active in a number of markets that are adjacent to the derivatives trading and clearing markets
in which Eurex is present, such as those for the listing and trading services of securities (shares and
bonds) and warrants, the provision of electronic exchange systems and the sale of market information.
199. The Commission published in August 2000 a notice seeking comments on its intention to adopt a
favourable position in this case ('"). The outcome of the Commission's examination is that there is no
appreciable risk of coordination of the behaviour of the parents in these neighbouring markets.
7.2. Payment systems
200. On 9 August, the Commission adopted its first formal decision under Article 8l of the EC Treaty
with regard to international payment cards in theVisa International case ('30). The decision clarifies the
Commission's policy with regard to a number of issues in this sector. It finds that certain provisions in the
Visa International payment card scheme, which had been notified to the Comrnission for clearance, fall
outside the scope of the prohibition ofArticle 81 and covers all types of international Visa cards (cledit
cards with revolving credit facility, deferred debit cards and direct debit cards). It relates exclusively to
the five provisions in the Visa International rules described below:
(a) the no-discrimination rule (NDR), which prohibits merchants from charging cardholders extra for
using their Visa card.
While considering that the NDR limits the freedom of merchants to set their own prices, the
Commission came to the conclusion that this restriction cannot be said to have an appreciable
negative effect on competition. Market studies in Sweden and the Netherlands 
- 
where the NDR
has been abolished by national competition authorities 
- 
had shown that abolition did not have a
significant effect on merchant fees;
(b) the modif,ed rules on cross-border card issuing and merchant acquiring, which now allow Visa
members to issue cards to consumers and contract with (all types of) merchants in other Member
States, without prior establishment of a branch/subsidiary in the country concerned;
(c) the principle ofterritorial licensing, according to which banks normally need a licence to issue and
acquire for each Member State.
(rD) OJ C 231., 1.1..8.2000' p. 2.
('r0) Case COMP/29.37 3 (OJ L 293, 10. I 1.2001)
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Given that banks can obtain additional trademark licences for all Member States in which they are
authorised to carry on banking activities, this principle is considered not to constitute an appreciable
restriction of competition;
the 'no acquiring without issuing'rule, which requires banks to issue a reasonable number of cards
to cardholders flrst before stafting merchant acquiring activities.
However, this rule is held to promote the development of the system by ensuring a large card base,
thereby making the system more attractive for merchants;
the honour all cards rule, according to which merchants must accept all valid cards with either theVisa (usually a credit or deferred debit card) or Electron (usually a direct debit card) brand,
irrespective of the identity of the issuer, the nature of the transaction and the type of card being
issued.
(1r') Case COMP/29.3'73 (OJ C 226, 17-8.2001).
('r?) Cases coMP/37.363 Svenska AtomJbndkringspoolen, CoMPl34.985 PooI ltaliano Rischi Atomici and CoMp/34.55g
A s egurado re s R ie s g os N uc l e are t
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Given that the development of a payment system depends on issuers being able to rely on acceptance
of their cards by merchants contracted to other acquirers, this rule is held to promoie the
development of the Visa payment scheme since it ensures the universal acceptance ofVisa cards.
201' Visa cards are by their nature cross-border means of payment. The decision concludes that the
provisions in the Visa International rules, which are applicable at least in the whole common market,
have at least potentially an effect on trade between Member States.
202' Separately from the decision mentioned above, the Commission published in August a notice
seeking comments on its intention to adopt a favourable position on Viru'* so-calle4 interregional
multilateral interchange fee (or MF) ('t'). The Commission had originally sent Visa a statement of
objections on this, butVisa has now proposecl changes which involve a reduction ofthe level ofthe fees,
the introduction of objective criteria to set the level of the fees, and transparency vis-d-vis merchants on
the level and the relative percentage of the cost categories included in the MIF.
7.3. Nuclear insurance pools
203' In January, the Commission closed by negative clearance comfort letter three notifications of
nuclear insurance and reinsurance pools, namely the Swedish, Italian and Spanish pools (rir). The
Commission considered that three different relevant markets were involved, fo, nu1l"* property
insurance, nuclear reinsurance and nuclear liability insurance. The first two of these markets are
worldwide in extent, as is evidenced by examples of cross-border provision of services, and on those
markets the share of each of the pools in question was well below 5 Vo, which led the Commission to
conclude that the effect of the pooling agreements on competition on those markets was not appreciable.
Markets for nuclear liability insurance, however, are still national, because of greatly differing national
legislative requirements in this field, and the need for locally based claims-settiement facilities. Each of
the pools in question had a monopoly on its national markeJ for nuclew liability insurance. Nevertheless,
the Commission concluded that without the pooling agreements there would be no supply of nuclear
liability insurance with adequate coverage for the risks involved, and therefore the pooling agreements do
not restrict competition in that respect.
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7.4. Convergence between banking and insurance
204. The term bancassurance (or Allfinnnz in German) refers to the increasing convergence between
banks and insurers. In retail finance, convergence is based on supposed distribution synergies: the ability
to cross-sell insurance to bank customers and banking services to insurance policyholders. This is tme in
particular in Germany where recently enacted rules specifically favour private pension products, thus
opening up a vast 
- 
and potentially very profitable 
- 
new area of business for banks and insurers. This
has led to an increased number of bancassurance arrangements, be it in the form of cooperation
agreements or of mergers.
205. From a competition analysis perspective, cooperation agreements or mergers between banks and
insurers tend to pose little competitive concern because the companies involved will typically not have
been present in each other's markets before. As to bancassurance mer9ers, see Case M.2431 Alli.anz/
Dresdner, discussed in Part II, under II, Merger Control.
206. As to bancassurance cooperation agreements, in November, the Commission, after publishing a
Carlsberg notice, cleared by comfort letter the setting-up by Generali-controlled AMB, Germany's
number four insurer, and Commerzbank, Germany's fourth biggest bank, of a joint venture with regard to
the distribution of their respective retail banking and insurance products. The primary reasons for this
clearance were that (a) the market overlaps were minimal, (b) the relevant interlocking directorships did
not raise competition concerns, and (c) the parties will face strong competition from, among others, the
AllianzlDresdner and Mtinchener Riick/Ergo groups.
8. Information society
8.L. Statement of objections sent to Microsoft
201 . On 30 August, the Commission sent a statement of objections to the US software company
Microsoft Corp. ('Microsoft') ('.) conceming several infringements of Article 82. This statement of
objections extended and supplemented a previous statement issued in August 2000 following a complaint
from the US company Sun Microsystems Inc. ('ra).
208. According to the statement of objections of 2001, Microsoft violates EC competition rules by
leveraging its dominant position in the markets for personal computer operating systems and low-end
server operating systems. The Commission considers that Microsoft has been withholding 'intedace
information' from competing software vendors, i.e. information needed to allow the vendors' server
software to interoperate with Microsoft's 'Windows'PC and server software. Microsoft has also applied
a policy of discriminatory and selective disclosure of interface information.
209. In the Commission's view, Microsoft thus engages in a leveraging strategy which is based on
denying competitors' server software the opportunity to compete on the merits with its Windows
software. Indeed, on account of the widespread usage of Windows in information technology networks,
interoperability with Windows has an important influence on customers' purchasing decisions.
210. Fufihermore, the Commission believes that Microsoft abuses its dominant position by means of its
licensing policy for Windows 2000. As a result of Microsoft's all-inclusive licence, customers have to pay
( l ") Case COMP/31 .7 92:' plless release IP l0l / 1232, 30.8.2001.("*) CaseCOMP/3T.245.whichisnowdealtwithiointlvwithCaseCOMP|3T.T92wdercasenumberCOMP/31.792.
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for a full package of services even if they would prefer to obtain some services from competing server
providers. Thus customers who are already using Windows and who want to buy competing iervices
would have to pay double licensing fees. This policy will consequently drive consumers towards Microsoft
server products, thereby reducing their choice for competing software and foreclosing competition.
2ll. Finally, with respect to Microsoft's Media Player (a 'streaming media' software program
allowing for fast ransmission via the Internet and for playback on PCs of audio and video files). the
Commission takes the view that the tying of the Media Player with the Windows PC operating system
distorts competition on the merits. Given consumers' tendency to use the pre-installed configuration on
their desktop, this rying forecloses other vendors of 'streaming media' software,
212. The Commission takes note of the fact that the United States Court of Appeals ruled on 28 June
that Microsoft violated section 2 of the Sherman Act by employing anticompetitive means to maintain a
monopoly in the operating systems market. The Commission is closely following the outcome of this
case and notes that the US Department of Justice and several states agr€ed on a proposed final judgment
settling the case whereas other states continue the litigation. Though any outcome of the US case might
affect some of the practices investigated by the Commission, the US and EC cases do not address the
same facts and are thus complementary.
8.2. Information society and the Internet
213- The creation of conditions of an open and competitive environment for the development of the
Internet and e-commerce remains the primary goal of the Commission. Clearly, the existing competition
rules are able to deal with the peculiarities of the Internet due to their appropriate level of abstraction. The
competition rules are remarkably adaptable to changing economic circumstances, including those
resulting from the fundamental change in the way of doing business in the Internet economy.
214. Competition policy concerns arose in respect of telecommunications infrastructure used for
Intemet traffic. Such concerns related to a variety of markets, notably broadband (high capacity) and
narrowband (low capacity) Intemet access markets as well as markets relating to Internet connectivitv.
215. The lack of competition in the local access markets in all Member States, in particular for
broadband access, was again identified as a major impediment to the deployment of the Internet and lntemet
services in Europe. Earlier, the Commission had initiated important policy steps in this respect such as the
regulation on 'unbundled access to the local loop' and the sector inquiry on the local loop 1'";, and is now
ready to look for even frrther initiatives. The Commission continued to consider any competitive pressure
that might come from altemative broadband access platforms, including mobile wireless access. However,
while mobile wireless access may put a competitive check on the cunently dominating local loop
technology, it is equally important to supervise market-dominating players in the mobile telephony sector.
216. Concerns have also become apparcntin the area oflnternet governance, in particular relatingto
Intemet domain names. The cases the Commission is dealing with involve complaints against registries
of topJevel domain names under Article 82. European competition rules doubtless do apply to the
domain name system. In general, the Commission believes that speculative, discriminatory and abusive
registration of Intemet domain names must be avoided, as this is crucial to securing an open and
competitive environment for the Intemet.
('r5) See Section I.C.3.4.
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9. Sport
217. In its report to the Helsinki European Council on sport ("u), the Commission stated its position on
the manner of reconciling the different functions of sport. The Council of the European Union in its
declaration annexed to the conclusions of the Nice European Council ('37) stressed the need to take
account, in all action by the Community, of'the social, educational and cultural functions inherent in
sport and making it special, in order that the code of ethics and the solidarity essential to the preservation
of its social role may be respected and nurtured'.
218. The declaration underlines the Council's support for the independence of sports organisations
and their right to organise themselves through appropriate associative structures. It is thus the task of
sports organisations to organise and promote their particular sports, particularly as regards the
specifically sporting rules applicable and the make-up of national teams. In performing this task, due
regard must, of course, be had to national and Community legislation.
219. The Council noted especially that sports federations play a central role in ensuring the essential
solidarity between recreational sport and topJevel sport and stressed the principles which must guide
them: access to spolts for the public atlarge, support for amateur sports, non-discrimination, equality of
opportunities, training, health protection and measures to combat doping.
220. In 2001, the Commission had the opportunity, in four competition cases, to put into practice the
principles enunciated by the Council in its declaration.
(tr6) Report from the Commission to the European Council with a view to safeguarding current sports structures and
maintaining the social function of sport within the Community framework (COM(1999) 644 final, 10.12.1999).
("') Declaration on the specific characteristics of sport and its social function in Europe, of which account should be ta.ken in
implementing common policies.
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9.1. Formula One
221' The Formula One case is extremely important both in economic and financial terms and because
it involves the organisation of a sport within an international association. In 1999, the Commission found
that the F6d6ration Internationale de I'Automobile (FIA) was facing a conflict of interest between its role
as the body regulating the sport and its activity as organiser of motor racing championships. This
situation favoured the series organised by the FIA, and in particular the Formula One championship. The
Commission also queried the terms of the contracts between the FOA, the company which administers
the television rights to Formula One races, and broadcasters because they made it possible to block the
organisation of motor sports events that would have competed with Formula one races.
222. The Commission finally reached an agreement with the FIA and FOA. Under the solution agreed
on, which was published in the Offrcial Journal in June, the FIA is to withdraw from business activities in
order to safeguard its independence and impartiality as a regulatory body. It has therefore either waived
its TV rights or transferred them to the promoters concerned. The FIA has also made substantial
amendments to the rules by establishing clearly defined criteria for granting FIA licences to sports events
and the respective participants. As far as commercial activities are concerned, the FOA has removed the
anticompetitive clauses from its agreements with race circuits and television channels and ceased
promoting rallies.
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223. This new situation will have beneflcial effects for motor sport in Europe. The improvement of the
FIA's regulatory arrangements will contribute to enforcement of the necessary safety measures without
harming the business interests of organisers that are independent of the FIA. The FIA's vested interest in
favouring series carrying the FIA label has been neutralised, since the federation will in future receive the
same income from all series. The freedom to operate, improved transparency and the assurance of high
safety standards go to make up an environment that will be favourable to the continued development of
motor sport and a unique type of sports organisation.
9.2. UEFA
224. The UEFA regulations on the broadcasting of sporting fixtures originally submitted to the
Commission were highly complex and very broad in scope. The broadcasting of football matches was
prohibited throughout the weekend. The Commission has tried to strike a balance between the interest of
the sport and compliance with the competition rules. As from the 2000/01 season, the new UEFA
regulations will authorise national associations to prevent the broadcasting of fixtures within their
territories for only two and a half hours either on Saturdays or on Sundays at a time when the major
national matches are taking place.
9.3. Grants to French professional football clubs
225. This case is covered byArticles 87 et seq. ofthe EC Treaty, that is to say the provisions on State
aid. The French authorities wanted the Commission to adopt a position on what was for it a new topic,
namely State aid to sport for the flnancing of training centres for young players. The Commission
authorised the award of the grants concerned in view of their educational and integrative objective and
the little impact they had on competition between the leading clubs.
226. kr2002, the Commission will continue to apply the principles set forth in the Nice declaration in
its scrutiny of two cases the investigation of which is coming to a close, namely the FIFA regulal.ions
goveming the activities of players' agents and the UEFA rule on the ownership or economic control by
one financial operator of several sporting clubs taking part in the same competition. The Commission is
also investigating a number of cases involving the joint sale of exclusive rights to sports broadcast events
to only one broadcaster per country for a period of several years.
10. Pharmaceuticals
227. From a policy point of view, the Commission's antitrust activity in the pharmaceutical sector saw
two developments, in the course of 2001, which are worth mentioning. In both instances, the
Commission was invited to take into account the key importance of research and development in this
sector.
228. First, the Commission took further steps to preserve parallel trade in this sector. It did so, on the
one hand, by appealing against the judgment handed down by the Court of First lnstance (CFI) on
26 October 2000 in a case conceming Bayer's cardiovascular productAdalat ("') and, on the other hand,
by adopting a prohibition decision against GlaxoWellcome's dual pricing system for around 80 drugs
sold in Spain.
tl'3t Case T-4f196 Bayerv Commission.[2OOO] ECR II-3383
COMPETITION REPORT 2OO.I
xxxlsT REPoRT oN oOMPET|T|ON pOLtCy 2001 
- 
SEC(2002) 462 FTNAL 69
229. Second, the Commission's departments assessed and cleared two joint ventures set up by
pharmaceutical companies for the purpose of developing, manufacturing and selling certain novel drugs
in the light of the Commission's recent guidelines on horizontal restrictions of competition (r3r).
10.1. Parallel trade: Adalat. GlaxoWellcome
10.1.1. Adalet
230. Early in January, the Commission lodged an appeal ('00) against the judgment by which the CFI
had annulled its decision prohibiting an agreement between Bayer and wholesalers located in Spain and
France containing an export ban for the drug Adalat (tr'). The issues which are now before the European
Court ofJustice (ECJ) are (i) under what conditions dealers can be said to agree with their supplier on a
particular restriction of competition and (ii) in what circumstances this restriction can be said to amount
to an export ban.
231. These may appear to be narrow legal issues but they are vital for the safeguarding of the
Commission's policy concerning vertical territorial restraints in this sector as well as in other sectors. In
the Commission's view, the CFI has depaned from earlier case law set by the ECJ by giving too strict a
reading ofthe concepts of'agreement'and 'export ban'1*'1. This reading 
- 
ifnot overruled by the ECJ
- 
would enable companies to design policies directed against parallel trade in such a way that their
actions fall outside the scope of Article 8l of the EC Treaty. This could in turn mean the end of the
Commission's policy to preserve parallel trade in the pharmaceutical and other sectors while making a
qualitative assessment of the alleged merits behind the industry's actions.
10. 1.2. GlaxoWelhome ('03)
232. It is that sort of qualitative assessment that the Commission has undertaken in the decision
addressed to GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) prohibiting a dual pricing system under which GlaxoWellcome
(GW) intends to charge Spanish wholesalers a higher price for drugs which they export than for drugs
which they resell for consumption in Spain.
233. In its decision, the Commission does not dwell on the issue of whether or not there is an
'agreement'within the meaning of Article 8l(l), simply because there is evidence that most dealers have
subscribed to GW's pricing system which was contained in its new sales conditions. In the context of
Article 81(1), the Commission does concede GW's point that the pharmaceutical sector is heavily
regulated in that national authorities often have their say in the setting of sales prices and that they all
have reimbursement schemes which turn patients into customers who are not particularly price-sensitive,
It is also evident that the lack ofharmonisation between national laws leads to a certain discrepancy of
price levels between Member States. Yet the Commission holds the view 
- 
in line with standard case
law 
- 
that this lack of harmonisation does not give the pharmaceutical companies the right to
consolidate this price discrepancy by charging higher prices in lower-price countries where drugs are
exported to higher-price countries. In the Commission's opinion, such dual pricing systems unduly
perpetuate the segmentation of national markets.
(*'q) GuidelinesontheapplicabilityofArticle8loftheECTreatytohorizontalcooperationagreements(OJC3,6.1.2001).
(r{) Cases C-2/01 and 3/01P. The Bundesverband Arzneimittel-Importeure has lodged a separate appeal against the CFI's
judgment. The Court ofJustice hasjoined the two appeal cases.(''') CaseCOMP/34.279;Commissiondecisionof 10.1.1996(OJL207,9.8.1996);pressreleaselP/96119,10.1.1996.
(rar) For an executive summary of the Commission's main grounds for appeal, see OJ C 79, 10.3.2001.
(r"') CaseCOMP/36.957;CommissiondecisionofS.5.2O0l(O1L302, 17.11.2ffi|);pressreleaselP/071661,8.5.2C01.
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234. The Commission nevertheless goes on to examine at length GW's contention that this
segmentation of national markets brings benefits to consumers and hence that its dual pricing system
qualifles for exemption under Article 81(3). It is actually the first case in which a pharmaceutical
company has invited the Commission to make such an assessment. GW advances, by and large, two
arguments, both of which are rebutted by the Commission.
235. GW argues first that parallel trade causes losses of revenue, that this reduces its R&D budget
(roughly 15 Vo of its costs) and hence that this weakens its capacity to develop new, innovative drugs. In
this regard, the Commission observes that any losses of revenue could just as well be accounted for in
GW's marketing budget (the remaining 85 7a of its costs). This does appear to be the more plausible
alternative since the pharmaceutical sector is one in which R&D investments are among the highest in the
economy and in which innovation 
- 
more than price 
- 
is the prime parameter of competition. GW also
argues that parallel trade causes delays in the market entry of drugs in low-price countries. The
Commission finds the evidence unconvincins.
236. GW has meanwhile sought to have the Commission's decision annulled ('*).
237. All the issues raised by Adalat and, Glaxo are also present in many other pending notification
cases. Several pharmaceutical companies, including Merck, have asked the Commission to grant them
negative clearance, or at least exemption, for their supply quota systems. These systems, which are said
to be unilaterally imposed on wholesalers, limit the quantities of drugs supplied to wholesalers by
reference to their past domestic sales. The pharmaceutical companies invoke production and distribution
planning as their main justification. Many wholesalers have long-standing complaints against these
systems. Now that the Commission has adopted its Glaxo decision, its departments have started
examining these supply quota systems in more detail.
10.2. Joint ventures
238. The Commission recognises how important research and development activities are in the
pharmaceutical sector. In the course of 2001, its departments issued comfort letters in two cases in which
pharmaceutical companies had notified a cooperative joint venture encompassing development,
production and sales of new drugs. The two cases raised issues under the Commission's guidelines
concerning horizontal restrictions of competition.
10.2. 1. ffiaerlEISAI (tas)
239. In the first case, Pfizer (USA) had decided to cooperate with EISAI (Japan) to bring an anti-
Alzheimer product to market. Pfizer would drop its own pipeline product in favour of that of EISAI,
which would take care of the bulk of the R&D and production activity. Pfizer would use its worldwide
distribution network to handle most of the marketing. By the time both parties notified their cooperation,
their product (commonly known under the brand name Aricept) had already reached the market whereas
virtually none of the competing R&D joint ventures had succeeded in bringing a rival product to market.
Aricept's high market share indicated that it held a dominant position in many Member States.
240. The Commission considered the fact that Pflzer had given up its R&D activity to be a loss of
competition within the meaning of Article 81(1). Had EISAI chosen to team up with a strong marketing
partner which did not have a pipeline product of its own, there would have been more competition in this
('*) Case C-168/01 P.
('a') Case COMP(36.932.
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market. However, in view of the obvious consumer benefits, the Commission departments saw sufficient
grounds to issue an exemption. The high market shares were not held against the parties because they
resulted from the so-called 'first mover' advantage. The duration of the exemption was, however, limited
to seven years starting from market introduction of the drug because the parties had not demonstrated that
they needed a longer period to recoup their relatively small investments (146).
10,2.2, ffizerlAventis ('o')
241. In the second case, Pfizer (USA) was involved in cooperation with one other major player
(Aventis) and a smaller USA-based research company called Inhale. The aim was to develop,
manufacture and sell an inhalable insulin product in a market which so far comprises only injectable
insulin. Pfizer was not present at all in the (injectable) insulin market and Aventis was only the number
three player, lagging behind the two leading manufacturers (Novo Nordisk and Eli Lilly) in most
Member States.
242. For this reason, the joint venture (in reality a series of separate joint ventures) was not considered
to raise a competition issue under Article 8l(l). However, a non-compete obligation (30 years plus
5 years post-termination to organise the practicalities of winding up the cooperation) was considered too
long to qualify as an ancillary restraint. The parties gave a commitment to reduce this period to 20 years
(plus 3 years post-termination). The Commission departments accepted the non-compete clause in view
of the relatively weak market position of the parties involved and the lack of any appreciable foreclosure
effect stemming from the exclusive dealing arrangements between these parties. Under the
circumstances, the Commission deparffnents saw no need to determine with absolute precision the exact
length of the period which the parties would need to recoup their large investments.
243. It should be noted that the two cases involved cooperation at the marketing level in the form of
co-promotion or co-marketing. In the case of co-promotion, two or more companies use their sales force
to market the product under a single trademark, whereas co-marketing means that each company sells the
product under its own trademark. Some countries prohibit co-promotion on the ground that the co-
promotor does not hold a mmketing authorisation for the relevant drug. In these countries, companies
will choose the co-marketing technique.
(re) See guidelines on horizontal agreements, point 73 (OJ C 3, 6.1.2001).("') Case COMP/37.590.
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Figure 3
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II _ MERGER CONTROL
A 
- 
General policy and new developments
1. Introduction 
- 
general developments
244. After seven years of rapid growth in merger activity, the number of merger notifications declined
slightly in 2001, to 335 from 345 the previous year.
245. The Commission took 339 final decisions, 20 of which followed in-depth investigations (five
prohibitions, five clearances without conditions and 10 conditional clearance decisions) and 13 of which
were conditional clearances at the end of an initial investigation ('phase I'). The Commission cleared
312 cases in phase I. In all, 140 decisions (45 Vo) of the first-phase clearance decisions were taken in
accordance with the simplified procedures introduced in September 2000. In addition, the Commission
took seven referral decisions pursuant to Article 9 of the merger regulation and opened in-depth
investigations in 22 cases, three of which were outstanding at year's end ('").
246. Merger activity in the telecoms and media sectors, which were particularly affected by the
decline in stock prices, almost came to a standstill in 2001. While there were 65 notifications in these
sectors in 2000, the number fell to four in 2001, with a marked drop from 13 cases to one between the
fourth quarter of 2000 and the first quarter of 2001.
24'7. The most frequent type of merger and acquisition assessed by the Commission involved two (or
more) EU companies. The number of transactions between EU and non-EU undertakings decreased
from 2000 to 2001, while the number of domestic transactions between companies based in the same
country increased.
2Wl
Domestic
Intra-EU
EU-non-EU
Non-EU-non-EU
248. Despite the slightly lower total number of notifications, there were five prohibition decisions ('4'q),
the highest number ofprohibitions in a single year so far. In addition, five notifications were withdrawn
by the notifying parties in phase II (partly as a result of the Commission's competition concems and
partly for unrelated reasons). All five prohibition decisions were taken on the basis of the creation (four
cases) or strengthening (one case) of a single-dominance position. Potential collective dominance was at
the centre of five of this year's phase tr cases. In MAN/Auwiirter (''n) and in two cases analysed jointly,
UPM Kynmene/Haindl(',,) and Norske Skog/ParencollValsum('') the in-depth investigations led to
(,*) COMPA4.2495 
- 
HanieWels;COMP!M.2547 
- 
Bayer/Aventis Crcp Science; and COMP/]I.2568 
- 
HanieWtong
('a') In accordance with Article 8(3) of the merger regulation.('.) coMPA{.2207. 26.6.200r.
t"' r COMPM.2498. 2I.l 1.2001.
r'" r COMP/I4.2499, 2l.l l.2O0 I.
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unconditional clearance of the transactions. In two other cases examined in parallel, BP/E.ON (t53) and
SheIUDEA ('5a), the Commission cleared the transactions subject to commitments that were offered by the
parties to address the concems of collective dominance on the market for ethylene on the pipeline network
ARG+, which links Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands.
249. Despite the increase in prohibitions, the percentage of notified concentrations resulting in a
prohibition decision remains modest at I Vo, or 2Vo If phase II withdrawals are included. There is no
systematic upward or downward trend in the risk incurred by a notifying party of a notified merger
resulting in withdrawal in phase II or a prohibition decision, as the chart below indicates.
Prohibitions and phase II withdrawals, 1991-2001
1991 1992 1993 r994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Total
Notifications 63 60 58 95 110 l3l 112 235 292
-J4:) 296 I 857
hohibitions I I 2 3 I 2 l 2 5 1E
Phase II withdrawals 4 f 6 3 20
Regulatory risk (7o) 1.6 0.0 t'7 1.1 1.8 3.1 0.6 2.6 2.1 L.J 2.7 2.0
2. National markets and potential competition
250. About half of this year's prohibitions and phase II withdrawals involved mergers of companies
based in the same country. In most ofthese cases, competition concerns arose in several countries, and
not only in the countries where the merging parties' headquarters were located. Nevertheless,
prohibitions of 'domestic' mergers tend to provoke the most vocal criticism and lobbying of national
politicians by the companies involved, as seen after this year's prohibition decisions in General
Electric/Honeywell(ts5) and Schneider/Legrand('56) as well as the phase II withdrawal of SIiB/
Fdreningssparbanken(t51). Since 1990, 12 out of 18 prohibitions have related to such domestic
mergers. Companies based in the following countries were affected by the 12'domestic' prohibitions:
Germany (three), the Netherlands (two cases, both as a result of an Article 22 referral by tlte
Netherlands), the United States (two) and Finland (Article 22 refenal), France, South Africa ('58),
Sweden and the United Kingdom (one case each). The geographic spread of prohibited domestic
mergers appears to reflect the respective countries' relative size, with no discernible differerrce
between any countries or groups ofcountries. In particular, the data do not support any 'small-country
bias' in the Commission's merger regime. Arguably, seven prohibitions of domestic mergers affected
companies headquartered in large economies (D, R UK and the United States), two concerned small
countries (FIN, S), while the status of the Netherlands and South Africa would depend on the size
measure applied (population, GDP, surface area, etc.). In addition to the companies' respective home
markets, most of the prohibited domestic mergers also created competition problems in other EIIA
countries.
(".) coMP&I.2533. 6.9.2001.(,.) coMPiM.2389. 23.8.2001.('") coMPA4.2220, 3.7 .200t.
c*) coMP/M.2282, 10.10.2001('") COMPA4.2380, case withdrawn.
("') Case COMP/M.619 Gencor/Lonrho: although Lonrho is a UK-registered company, its main activities are locatecl in
southern Africa.
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251. Given the small number of prohibitions overall, there is limited scope for statistically significant
conclusions to be drawn from the distribution of prohibitions across different countries and over time.
With this note of caution in mind, the table below indicates the number of undertakings affected by a
prohibition decision along with the number of parties involved (i.e., two or more per transaction) from
each country where companies have been affected by a prohibition decision. Among the EEA countries,
companies from Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Norway and Sweden have faced an above-average
proportion of prohibitions, whereas British and Italian firms had somewhat fewer prohibitions. US
undertakings have also faced a below-average prohibition risk. However, overall, the cross-country
distribution of the relative number of prohibitions is not statistically different from a normal (random)
distribution.
A D DK F NL S FIN UK NO CA lh.Is ZA US
Affected by prohibition
(excl. Art.22) I ll 7 2 4 3 t I 4
No of parties l19 I 007 79 599 310 334 264 85 724 7A 49 24 21 609
Undertakings atrected (qo) 0.8 1.1 1.3 r.2 0.3 0.6 l.) 1.2 o.4 r.4 2.0 4.2 4.8 u.t
252. Horizontal mergers of companies in the same geographic and product markets may cause
competition problems because they increase market shares and lead to the removal of a direct competitor.
This analysis is independent of market size because merger control's fundamental objective of protecting
consumers against the effects of monopoly power (higher prices, lower quality, lower production, less
innovation) applies universally, regardless of whether these consumers are based in a small or a large
country. In 2001, the blocked transactions Schneider/Legrand(t5e), SCA/Metsti Tissue('ffi) and CVC/
Lenzing ('6,) as well as the abandoned Swedish bank merger SEB/Fdreningssparbanken ('u') fell in this
category. All three combinations would have given the merging parties exceptionally high market shares
in the relevant geographic and product markets. While in Schneider/Legrand, SCA/Metsti Tissue and
SEB/Fiireningssparbanken the relevant geographic markets were national, the CVC/Lenzing transaction
would have led to dominant positions at a European level.
2.1. Definition of the relevant geographic market and potential competition
253. A central element in competition analysis is the definition of the relevant geographic market. The
purpose of defining a relevant geographic (as well as product) market is to identify the competitors of the
undertakings concerned by a particular case that are capable of constraining their behaviour. The
approach is laid down in the merger regulation and represents established practice in most of the world's
competition authorities. Demand-side analysis and supply-side analysis are both used in defining
geographic markets. In 2001, the Commission analysed market definitions adopted in its merger
decisions over the past five years. Out of | 295 decisions, in 184 (l4.2%o) markets were deflned as
national. In 187 (14.4 7o), markets were wider than national. [n the remainin 9924 cases (71.4 7o), the scope
of the geographic markets was left open because competition concerns would not have arisen under
any alternative definition, whether EEA-wide, regional or national. Thus, only in a minority of cases was
the geographic market defined as national.
(1$) coMP/M.2283. 10.10.2001.
('*) coMPA4.209',7. 31.1.200r.
r'" r COMP/IV!.2187. 17.10.200-.
(6?) COMP/M.2380, case withdrawn.
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254. However, market definition is only the beginning ofmerger analysis, not the end. Even in cases
where, for industry-specific reasons, geographic markets are defined narrowly, e.g., as national, the
existence of potential competitors has in the past led the Commission to accept relatively high national
market shares.
255. A case in point is this year's decision in SCA/Metsti Tissue (163). The case concemed the proposed
takeover by SCA Mdlnlycke Holding BY controlled by Sweden's Svenska Cellulosa AB, of its Finnish
competitor Metsii Tissue Corp. Both companies are active in the production of tissue paper products,
such as toilet papeq kitchen towels, handkerchiefs and napkins, in a number of EEA countries. llhe
Commission defined the relevant geographic markets as national because the market investigation found
that suppliers could charge customers (supermarkets) different prices in different countries (price
discrimination) and because of the presence of significant transport costs. However, in doing so, the
Commission did not consider each national market in isolation, but took account of all actual and
potential imports into each country in question. For example, the competition analysis for the Swedish
market involved identification of all plants, in whatever country that can supply Swedish supermarkets
with tissue products at competitive cost, the number of such credible competitors left after the merger,
their production capacity and brand ownership. By taking into account all existing and potent.ial
competitors for tissue products, the Commission concluded that market shares in certain national markets
that would, in isolation, appear high created no competition problems in this specific case. Conversely,
the investigation found that no potential competitors with sufficient production capacity existed to
challenge the parties'very high market shares (up to 90 7o) in Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden,
which eventually led the Commission to prohibit the transaction. In Finland, the competition concet-ns
were due primarily to the removal of a potential competitor.
256. A market's openness to entry by new competitors is of key importance in this analysis. High
barriers to entry continue to be an important factor in determining whether an operation poses
competition problems. In CVC/I*nzing (t&), for instance, the Commission found such high entry
barriers in EEA markets in spite of low trade barriers, due to the high capital investment necessary,
barriers of perceived quality, cultural barriers and barriers concerning supply logistics. On the other
hand, the absence of regulatory barriers or local distribution requirements and the existence of credible
competitors in sufficient proximity all raise the market shares that may be acceptable at the national
level. Small countries tend to be at a distinct 'advantage' in this respect and the Commission has
regularly accepted higher market shares in small economies than in the larger markets. Further cases
that were cleared by the Commission because of potential competition or because the removal of
regulatory barriers had led to a widening of geographic markets include Philips/Agilent Health Care
Solutions (t65), Pirelli/BICC ('") and Gerling/ltCM ('u'). These transactions led to national market shares
of between 40 Vo and over 60 Vo in certain countries.
257. Conversely, the removal through merger or acquisition of a potential competitor that has
prevented a company from becoming dominant can lead to competition problems, even if there is no
direct overlap in the undertakings'current activities. Several phase II investigations in 2001 focused 6n
the removal of potential competitors.
(",) coMPA{.2097, 3 1.t.2ml (OJ L 57, 27 .2.2002)
t'*r COMP/iM.2187, 17.10.2001.
('6) COMPA4.2256, 2.3.2001.('") coMP/M. I 882, 19.7 .2ffiO.
t ^ r COMP/M.2602. Il.12.2OOI
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258. In the EdF/EnBlV case ('68), the Commission authorised, subject to conditions, the acquisition of
joint control of German electricity company Energie Baden-Wiirttemberg AG (EnBW) by Electricit6 de
France (Edn and Zweckverband Oberschwiibische Elektrizitiitswerke (OEW), an association of nine
south-west German districts.
259. The investigation concluded that EdF enjoyed a dominant position on the French market for the
supply of eligible customers, with a market share of approximately 90 7o. Besides EdR there are three
other electricity producers active in France, CNR, Soci6t6 Nationale d'Electricit6 Thermique (SNET) and
Harpen AG, which belongs to the RWE group. The three, however, account for only a small share of
electricity generation and supply their production mainly to EdF. EnBW was considered one of the most
likely potential competitors in the French market and would be one of the strategically best-placed
companies to enter the market for the supply of eligible customers. EnBW's supply area is in the south-
west of Germany and has a long common border with France. Two of the four Franco-German
interconnectors are in the EnBW supply area. By acquiring EnBW, EdF would also increase its potential
for retaliation in Germany and would thus become less exposed to competition in France. The remedies
accepted in this case are discussed at point 300 below.
260. The competition concerns raised by the Grupo Villar Mir/EnBWHidroeldcffica del Cantdbrico
transaction (16r), which was also authorised subject to conditions, were of a very similar nature. The
transaction involved the acquisition of joint control over the Spanish electricity company Hidroel6ctrica
del Cant6brico (Hidrocant6brico) by Spanish Grupo Villar Mir and Energie Baden-Wtirnemberg
(EnBW), a German company jointly controlled by Electricitd de France (EdF).
261. The Commission was concemed that the deal would strengthen the existing collective dominant
position on the Spanish wholesale market for electricity held by Endesa and Iberdrola. EdF would after
the transaction have had little incentive to increase commercial capacity on the French-Spanish
interconnector, which was already scarce, creating a barrier for electricity imports into Spain and
resulting in the market's isolation from other continental electicity markets to the detriment of
customers. To eliminate these concems, EdF and the operator of the French electricity grid, RTE,
undertook to substantially increase the commercial capacity from I 100 MW to about 4 000 MW on the
interconnector between France and Spain, thereby creating the conditions for greater electricity trade
volumes to and from Spain to the benefit of Spanish customers.
262. The elimination of potential competition also led to competition concerns in Siidzucker/Saint
Louis (1,r), a transaction cleared subject to conditions following a phase II investigation. The
Commission's investigation revealed that the operation would have strengthened Siidzucker's already
dominant position in the markets for industrial sugar and retail sugar in southern Germany and Belgium
because Saint Louis would cease to exist as an independent and credible potential competitor to
Siidzucker in these geographical areas. The importance of preserving potential competition is all the
greater in highly regulated markets such as sugar where there is little competition and customers are
heavily dependent on a limited number of suppliers.
2.2. Definition of the relevant product market
263. The dynamic analysis of potential competition applies not only to geographic market definition
but also to product markets as highlighted by this year's decision in the Tetra lnvaUSidel case ('71).
(,") coMP/M. I 8 53, 7.2.2m1.
('*) COMPAiL2434, 26.9.2001.
("9 coMPA4.2530, 20.12.2001.(") coMP/M.2416. 30.10.200t.
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264. The Commission undertook a detailed investigation of this proposed concentration in the
packaging sector between Tetra Laval (Tetra), the world leader in carton packaging and carton packaging
equipment, and Sidel, the world leader in PET (plastic) packaging equipment. The concentration, which
was a public bid in the Paris Bourse, was notifled to the Commission on l8 May. tn the light of the results
of its investigation the Commission decided, on 30 October, to prohibit the proposed merger. 'Ihe
grounds for the Commission's decision were, briefly, that the merger would create a market structure
which would (a) enable Tetra to strengthen its dominant position in carton packaging by eliminating the
biggest competitor in a neighbouring market, PET packaging equipment, and (b) enable Tetra to leverage
its dominant position in carton packaging in order to acquire a dominant position in PET packaging
equipment. As a result, the merger would have increased concentration in the packaging sector, raised
barriers to entry and reduced competition to the detriment of consumers.
265. Tetra is the world's uncontested leader in carton packaging. As found in earlier Commission
decisions and as confirmed by the Court of Justice (Case C-333/94 TetraPak v Commission), Tetra holds
dominant positions in the markets for aseptic carton packaging machines and aseptic cartons packaging
with a market share in the EEA of 80 Vo. Sidel is the leading manufacturer of plastic PET packaging
equipment and in particular stretch blow-moulding (SBM) machines, which are used to produce empty
PET bottles, with a market share in the region of 60 Vo. Both sectors are highly concentrated q,itil
competitors having market shares of not more than 15 Eo.
266. Given the strong positions of the parties in their respective fields, the Commission's investigation
focused on the intetplay between carton packaging and PET packaging. Carton packaging, in particular
aseptic carton, has been traditionally used to package products which are sensitive to light oi o*yg"n
such as liquid dairy products, fruit juices, fruiGflavoured drinks, and ready-to-serve tea and coffee drinks(the 'sensitive products'). Aseptic packaging is used for longJife products, which do not require chilled
distribution. PET bottles are transparent plastic bottles made from resin. PET bottles have traditionally
been used for the packaging of mineral water and carbonated soft drinks. In 2000, not more than I Vc of
milk and juices were packaged in PET in the EEA.
267. In the light of the traditionally different focus of the two packaging materials, the parties claimed
that the two markets should be viewed as distinct and unrelated markets for competition la* pu.por"r.
The Commission's detailed investigation showed that, following a market definition analysis uslng ttre
ssNIP (r2) test, the two markets constitute, today, distinct relevant product markets.
268. However, the Commission found that a static and narrow market definition did not reflect
appropriately the dynamic market conditions and, in particular, the interplay between the two packaging
materials. Following a detailed investigation, the Commission found that the two markets, wtrlctr Uetong
to the same industry sector, liquid food packaging, are closely related neighbouring markets and that
interaction between them will grow rapidly in the coming years.
269. The Commission established that, in the coming years, PET packaging equipment companies,
principally Sidel, in conjunction with independent packagers (converters), would compete ln the
marketplace in order to induce a shift from carton to PET packaging. Sidel's strategy, in particular, was to
contribute significantly to the rapid growth ofPET in aseptic packaging for fruitjuices and liquid dairy
products. In the view of Sidel and other market participants, this was eroding the lead of the still-
predominant carton packaging in this market segment.
('") Small significant non+ransitory increase in prices.
COMPETITION REPORT 2OO1
XXXIST REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 2OO1 _ SEC(2002) 462 FINAL 81
270. The merger would have eliminated Sidel as a competitor in a closely neighbouring market
exerting competitive pressure on Tetra's dominant position in carton packaging. The Commission found
that, by enabling Tetra to be active in both packaging markets, the merger would strengthen Tetra's
dominance, would increase prices in carton packaging and would reduce innovation. The forthcoming
rapid future growth of PET meant that increasing potential competition would be lost.
271. In conclusion, both geographic and product market definitions by no means resulf in a static
analysis of simple market share addition but form the starting point for a thorough analysis of the specific
market dynamics prevailing in a specific industry. Regarding the so-called 'small-country' discussion,
this means that, while it is true that mergers more easily lead to high market shares in small national
markets, this does not necessarily equate to competition concems. There is no discernible difference in
the impact of the Commission's merger regime on companies based in one geographic location or
another. This is also corroborated by the statistics on prohibited mergers presented above.
Box 6: The paper ca$e$ and coile('tive dominance
UPM-Kymmenc/Ilaidl (') and Norske Skog/ParencdWalsrm (')
On 20 June 2m0, the Comnission reeeived a notificadon of the Finnish pulp and paper cdnpany
UPM-Kymrnene's proposed takeover of its German rival Haindl and of a socond concentration
which concerned tlre resale of two of the six Ftraindl paper mills to the Norwegian paper
manufucturer Norske Stog. The markets analysed in.this investigation were fte markes for
newsprint and wood-containing magazine paper (the laper market'). The focus of the
Comnrission's investigation was the question whether these two transrctions would resull in the
creation of a collective dorninant position in the markets for newsprint and paper. These were
among the fust cases whqe the Commission investigated the potential crealion of collective
dominance by four firms"
The publication paper indusrry ia general is characmised by long-run competition in (new)
capacity aad short-run competition on prices under capacity constraints. Both the markets
investigated show similu market characteristics which can be summarised as follmvs: (i) relarively
homogeneous pnrdrms, aldrough some vriations within the different paper grades edst;
(ii) fluctuations in the market shares of the top suppliers fu both markets which have been more
pmnormced for newsprint; (iii) a high degrec of transparency on capacities, deliveries and on
avemgp prices, but a lack of trm$parency in relation to investrnont decisions before they become
irreversiblel (iv) inelastic aod cyclical denand; (v) sorne uncertainty about the degree of cost
symmetry, especially in the newsprint markeq (vi) a high level of muhi-martet contacts and links
across the pulp md paper inestry; (vii) limited btryer power; (viii) the rea$ availability of upto-
date tecbnology; and (ix) *re characteristics of a sunk cost indu$try (i.e.. high enfty barriers).
In the newqprint market the Cornmission focused on the top four compunies (LJPM-Kymmene/
Haindl, Stora 8nso, Norske Skog/Haindl-2 ad Holmen). which together would have held around
70 % in terms of sales aod 80 % in terns of capacities. In the papermarket" posf-mergers, the top
{l}{} co}lPA{, 24e& 
21.1 1.200r.
coMg {. 2499, 21.11.200r.
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ttree suppliers (LJPM-Kymmene/Haindl. Stora Enso, and M-Real/Mytlykoski) wcnrld have
accounted for around 70% of the market in tenns of both capacity and sales. The transactions
eliminate fiom the market a significant competitor, Haindl, whose cost structure is somewhat
different from the other top suppliers, especially in the newsprint mar*.et, since it uses recycled
paper as raw material to a significantly larger extent. ln the wood-containing magazine paper
market, Haindl has been particularly active in tlrc last five years as it accounts for a large pan of
the total increase in capacity.
The merger would have resulted in a relatively more transpargnt and less uncertain market, which
is reflected in the reduction from five to four im the newsprint market, and from four to three for
the wood+ontaining magazine paper market. Howeveq a number of characteristics would not be
conducive to the creation of a collective dominant position. These were drc limited stability of
market shares, rt: l..l :f T*rpuol"y. on capacity expansion projects prior to a committedannouncement and the lack of symmeh'y in cost structures.
Initially, the Commission considered whelher coordination could occur throrgh the following
two mechanisms: fust, through the coordination of investrnent in new capacities in mder to limit
capacity in the marketplace. thus raising the level of average prices in the long run; second.
thncugh coordinarion of output downtiriies to support shorl-run prices duriug a slowdown in
demand (there is no need to coordinate in the sholt run during a period of high level of demand).
The Commission concluded that the mechanism identified above for the coordination of
investments would not sustain the creation of tacit coordination in the markets for newsprint and
wood-containing magazine paper (r). However, it maintained that tacit coordination of
downtime is a possible coordination mechanism. which could support the creation of a
collective dominant position ofthe four top suppliers in newsprint, or the three top suppliers in
wood-containing magazine paper. That such actjon'has an inpact on priceo is evident from the
many stdtements by the CEOs of several major paper producers telling the public in various
forms that they are prepared to take downtime if needed to maintain the balarrce between supply
and demand.
However. such coondination. in this specific case, would likely be undermined by action by fringe
players. Indeed, the Commission believes that the remaining fringe players such as SCA. Abitibi,
Pa{m and Burgo can play an active role in their respective rnarkets and make tacit coordination
unsustainable. These players could break coordination by investing were the oligopolists to try to
reftain from investment in order to reach higher prices md by increasing production were the
oligopolists to try lo shut down.their machines lernporarily 
- 
the definition of downtime. These
t@er case which was cleared after an id-deph investigation, @MPA,t.220l
- 
MAN/Awdmr.'26.6.2ffi1, and whicb raised questions of collective dominance. The main impact of this case
will be on thc city-btrs market in Germany. MAN/Auwilrter and tbe other main playe* in ttr market for ciry buses
in Qermany, DaitnlerGrysfer's EroBus, will each supply juir under 
.hg{ of &rr m"GkeL Following a close
exaninarion of the case" however. the Comrnissioil gqmlilqed that there was no risk that the two coanp. nies
would be able to tacitly coo,rdinate tlleh activities. Fi$tly, the Conmisdon found thar any t*it division of the
market between EvoBus and MAN/Auwiirter was not litely as there Would be no viable coordination mechmlsm.
Secodly, significant disparities beiween EvoBus and MAMAuwrfter, such as differelrt cosr strucfiuEs, made it
SOy *1 the companies would compee rarfl tUan cofludc. 
-The Comnission ryf.* cmcluded drat thoGerman bus market scctor would rernain campetitive evcn'after the acquisition.
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3. Merger control in the 21st century 
- 
Green Paper on the review
of the merger regulation
272. The European Union is facing new challenges posed by global mergers, further market
integration, the introduction of the euro and maybe most importantly the enlargement of the European
Union to 25 or more Member States. In order to ensure that the European merger control system is
appropriately tuned to meet these new developments, the Commission adopted on 11 December a Green
Paper on the review of the merger regulation. This Green Paper initiated a consultation period that gives
anyone interested the opportunity to submit comments before the end of March 2O02.The Commission
aims to propose an amended merger regulation in the second half of 2002, once these comments have
been received and analysed.
273. The Green Paper touches upon bothjurisdictional, substantive and procedural issues. The main
amendments suggested are the following.
3.1. Jurisdictional issues
274. Provisions in the merger regulation give the Commission sole competence to handle
concentrations with a Community dimension. The Commission has investigated the functioning of these
provisions, i.e., the trrnover thresholds in Article 1, and has concluded that Article 1(3) has not
accomplished its objective. WhenArticle 1(3) was introduced in1997, the turnover thresholds in this
provision were intended to confer Commission competence over cases that affect three or more Member
States, so-called 'multiple filings'. However, since the last review of the merger regulation, no more than
approximately 20 Vo of those cases subject to filing in three or more Member States were actually caught
by these thresholds. The Commission therefore proposes to arnend Article 1(3) and to introduce
automatic Community competence over cases subject to multiple filing requirements in three or more
Member States. The turnover thresholds cuffently in Article 1(3) would be removed. This solution is
suggested in order to allow the Commission, as the generally best-placed authority, to deal with
transactions with effects in three or more Member States, and to strengthen the level playing field in
European merger control. This amendment should be operational before the enlargement of the
Community in2004.
2'75. Articles 9 and22 are the referral mechanisms set out in the merger regulation in order to adjust a
generally turnover-based merger control system by enabling the best-placed authority to deal with the
case. The Commission proposes to simplify the requirements for referrals, thereby adding transparency
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and facilitating a proper work-sharing between the Commission and the Member States. The main
amendment related to the referral instruments concerns Article 9(2). The proposal in the Green Paper is
to remove the obligation to show that a transaction will lead to a tbreat that a dominant position in a
distinct market in the Member State will be created or strengthened. Instead it will be sufficient for the
Member State to show that the transaction would affect competition in such a distinct market. Moreover,
it is envisaged that the Member State would no longer be required to establish whether such a distinct
market constitutes a substantial part of the cofilmon market.
3.2. Substantive issues
276. As business practices have changed since the merger regulation entered into force, it has become
appropriate to consider whether the concept of a concentration requires updating in order to take proper
account of this development.
277. The concept of a concentration covers the acquisition by one or more companies of legal or de
facto control over one or more companies, including the creation of joint ventures. Transactions that
involve the acquisition of non-controlling minority shareholdings are therefore not covered by the
regulation. Nor does it cover strategic alliances. These alliances are usually cooperative contractual
arrangements but they often imply a significant structural element whereby the parties' business conduct
is linked together. There are several examples of these types of arrangement in the airline and telecom
sectors. Strategic alliances are currently scrutinised under Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty. The Green
Paper describes the difficulties involved in drawing the borderlines with sufficient legal certainty and
concludes that Articles 81 and 82 appear to remain the most suitable tool for assessing these transactions.
It therefore does not propose any change in this regard.
278. The Green Paper proposes certain amendments to the current provisions on multiple
transactions. Multiple transactions are separate legal transactions that for different reasons are linked
but, when taken separately, may not meet the turnover thresholds in the merger regulation. 'Ihe
question arises whether such transactions should be regarded as constituting a single concentral.ion
which as a result would meet the turnover thresholds in the regulation and thereby come under the
Commission's jurisdiction. The Green Paper proposes to amend the current provisions targeting
multiple transactions in order to ensure more consistent and effective application of the merger control
system.
279. The main substantive test for assessing mergers under the merger regulation is the dominance
test. The Green Paper opens a debate on the virtues of the dominance test as the substantive test set out in
the merger regulation compared with the test of 'substantial lessening of competition' which is used in
other jurisdictions, such as the USA, Canada and Australia. The Green Paper calls for a discussion of the
advantages and drawbacks of both tests, as well as of the proper role of efficiencies in merger assessment.
It should be pointed out, howeveq that definite conclusions on this issue are not to be expected within the
time available for the current merger regulation review.
3.3. Procedural issues
280. One of the purposes of the Green Paper is to launch a debate on possible means of further
procedural simplification for cases that do not raise competitive concerns. In addition to discussing such
measures generally, a specific discussion is also developed on the scope for modifications in relatiorr to
certain venture capital transactions.
COMPETITION REPORT 2OO1
XXXIST REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 2OO1 _ SEC(2002) 462 FINAL 85
281. Finally, the most important procedural suggestion in the Green Paper concerns the realignment of
the timetable for the submission and discussion of commitments in the first and second phases of the
Commission's investigation. It is proposed that provision be made for a 'stop-the-clock' provision,
applicable at the parties'request, in order to provide more time for all involved to consider remedies to
the transaction suggested by the parties.
3.4. Joint working group with national competition authorities
282. In formulating the merget review Green Paper, which was adopted on 11 December, the
Commission canvassed opinions from a wide range of parties affected by merger control (the business
world, Member States, etc.).
283. In addition to a number of informal meetings with various business representatives, the
Commission chaired five working group sessions with representatives of all 15 respective ministries
and/or competition authorities. Discussions took place on Competition DG premises and covered,
among other things, jurisdictional issues, remedies procedures and issues of substance (the competition
test) and procedure. Member States also had the opportunity to comment on a draft of the Green Paper
as a whole.
284. The Commission intends to pursue the discussions on the possible reform of the merger
regulation in the same inclusive and open manner and invites all interested parties to make
substantiated contributions in reply to the Green Paper.
Box 7: Ancillary rcsraints 
- 
adaptation of &e Commision's poHcy
The Cornmission adopted a notrce on restrictions directly related and necessary to
concentrations (so-called 'ancillary restraints') ('), which replaces a previous notice dating
from 1990. Ancillary restraints are contrastual agreements directly related to and necessary for
the transaction whieh companiee frequend.y enter into in the context of rnergers. Common
exarnples of such aneillary restrains are non-compete clauses, licence agreeulents, or purchase
ard supply agreements.
The new policy announces an important change of policy in the field. of merger control. The
Commission will no longer assess anciUary.restraints entered into by panies in its merger
decisions, thereby ending an I l-year-old practice. Under the previous policy such clauses would
automatically benefit foorn the effect of the cleararrce decision if the Commission found them
directly related to eod necessary for tbe transaction Insted" uow companies and tbeir lawyers
wilt have to asse$$ whetber any suc} re$traints cm b€ coveFed by the merger decision or by a
relevant block exemEion, or whether they might fall under Article 8t. The notice provides
guidance to the legal and bqrsiness communitie.s, based on past Comndssion practice and
experience in this field. It is in line, noreover, with the ongoing modernisation of the European
Union's competition policy.
(') oJ c 18& 4.7.2m1.
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4. Developments in the application of the failing firm defence
285. The Commission applied a failing firm defence in reaching its decision to clear BASF's proposed
acquisition of the two Belgian subsidiaries of Sisas SPA, (Pantochim and Eurodiol) ('^), which under
Belgian law were subject to bankruptcy proceedings.
286. Before 2000, the Commission had only once based a clearance decision on the concept of the
failing flrm defence (sometimes referred to as a rescue merger). That was in the Kali+Sale case (r?a), which
established three criteria for the concept's application. These criteria were that (a) the acquired undertaking
would soon have been forced out of the market if it had not been taken over by another undertaking;
(b) there was no other less anticompetitive altemative purchaser; and (c) the acquiring undertaking would
have taken over the market share of the acquired undertaking if it had been forced out of the market. This
approach was broadly confirmed by the Court of Justice in its subsequent judgment (175).
287. Only the third criterion would not have been met in the BASF case because, unlike in Kali+Salz,
which was a duopoly merging to become a monopoly, there were other players in the markets affected by
the transaction, for example Lyondell Chemical and ISP. Given the presence of these other suppliers, it
would have been unreasonable to conclude that the demise of Eurodiol would have led to the transfer of
all of Eurodiol's market share to BASF.
288. The Commission, however, compared the market situation of BASF owning the assets with the
inevitable alternative of the assets being withdrawn from the market, and concluded that the withdrawal
of the assets from the market would have led directly to capacity shortages in a market already under
very tight capacity constraints which would not be counteracted in the short term by competitors.
Without the merget market conditions would have been significantly worse for consumers. In any event,
the economics of the case did not suggest that BASF would be likely to enforce major price increases
after the merger. Given the particular and exceptional circumstances of the case, the Commission
therefore took some cautious steps forward in developing the highly restrictive failing firm defence
criteria established during the Kali+Salz proceedings.
("') See COMP/M.2314 
- 
BASF/EurodioUPantochirn 11.7 .2001.
(''a) CommissionDecision94lM9lEECinCaseIV/IvI.308-Kali+Salz/MDUTreuhand(OJL186,21.7.1994).
('7i) JoinedCasesC-68/94andC-30/95FrenchRepublicvCommissionandSCPAvCommissiontlggSlECRI-1375;see,in
particular, paragraphs I 12-l 16.
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Box 8: Schneiderfl,egrand (')
Following a derailed investigation. dre Commission in Oetober prohibited the qerger of Schneider
Electric and Legrand, the two rnarn French manufacnrrers of electrical equipment. The merger would
have considerably weakened ttrc operation of the market in a number of counlries, particularly in
France, where the ri lry bgtwe€4 the two co[panies was the mainstay of competition.
The effects of the merger on competirion related primarily to low-volrage el,ectrical equipmen!
i.e., all.the systerns used for electricity disrrlbution and the conhnl of electrical circuits in honres,
offices or factories. Such equipnrent covers many different fypes of product, ranging from
electrical distribution boards and sockets and swirches to cable trays.
There were substantial overlaps between the activitiee ofschneider and Legrand in the markets for
elecffical switchboards (dishibution boards ard final panelboards, sogether with their coryonents,
where tbe combined rnarket share would have been between 40 and 70 % depending on the
counury). wiring accessories (in particular, sockets and switches and fixing and connecting
equipment, where combined rnarket shares rapged from 40 to 90 %), and certain products for
industrial use (industrial pushbufons 
,and ,low-voltage transformers) or for more specific
applications (for exarnple, emergency lighting).
ln France, the merger gave rise to particularly sedous problems over virtually the whole range of
products concerned and would, in mmt cases, have resulted in th€ strengthening of a dominant
posirion. Schneider and Legrarrd are by far the largest players on the French market, and the
Commission's inrrcstigation demonstrated clearly that there was little prospect of any significant
development in the activity of foreign competitors in the short and medium term. FurtJrermore,
ffir1r:i1;;ffiffiH:t 
would have been created in DeDmarl" Greece,Italy, Ponugal, Spain
In an anempt to remedy these competition problems. Schneider submitted an initial series of
undertakingi to the Commission on 14 September, the deadline for presenting undertakings.
However. it became evident, following the market investigation carried out by the Comrnission
that drese initial undertakings were not such as to restore the conditions of effective competition.
After the deadline has passed" the Commission can onJy accept 'last minute' undertakings if it can
be established immediately and without any possible doubt that they. would restore the conditions
of competition. Schneider subrnitted new undertakings on 24 September, but they left serious
doubts as to the cornpetitive capaciry of the entities to be sold off. notably as regards access to
distriburion in Rance and dre economic risks associated with the acnral separation of ttrese entities
from the rest of dre group to which they belonged. Furthermore, Schneider's proposals did not
provide any effective solution as regards a number of geographic markets and/or product markets
on which competition problems had been identified. This left the Commission no other option but
t,o profiibit fte transaction.
|*lr-?frJ*r, Schneider lodged an appeal against the Commission's decision with dre Court of
I 
.:$.cOln**ala83,t{3*
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5. Remedies
289. This year has been a year of consolidation and development in regard to the Commission's
remedies policy and practice in merger cases. The Commission's notice on remedies (r?6) ('remedies
notice') was adopted in December 2000. The remedies notice provides guidance on commitments an{ on
the types and form of remedial actions acceptable to resolve competition problems.
290' The Commission's aim of developing consistency of treatment and best practices in the
handling ofremedies was significantly furthered by its decision to establish, inApril, an enforcement
unit within the Merger Task Force dedicated to advising on the acceptability and implementation of
remedies in merger cases. This enforcement unit has several functions. On a day-to-day basis, its
most important role is to provide an internal centre of expertise on the specific issues raised in merger
cases requiring remedies. Members of the enforcement unit also join the case teams working on
merger cases where remedies may be required or even just discussed, and do so at the earliest
possible moment. In such cases, their role is to ensure that the general principles set out in the
remedies notice are applied as consistently as possible while taking account of the specific
requirements of each case.
29I. The enforcement unit is also seeking to develop best practice guidelines, building on the
experience obtained from previous merger cases so as to identify aspects that have worked well and th.ose
that have not.
292. One example of the improved clarity which the adoption of the remedies notice has introduced is
that decisions now include clear statements as to which aspects of the commitments are conditions and
which are obligations ('??). Articles 2 and,3 of the operative part of the decision in the The Post Ofiice/
TPG/SPPL (r78) case are good examples of such statements. There are different legal consequences
attaching to breaches of conditions as opposed to breaches of obligations. In drawing a clear distinction
between such conditions and obligations in the Commission's clearance decisions subject to
commitments, the intention is to ensure that there can be no doubt about the implications of failure to
comply with the different parts of the commitments.
293. A further example of the impact of the remedies notice is that trustees were employed in all but
one ('7') of the cases which involved conditional clearances in 2001. Furthermore, the mandates
establishing the role and powers of the trustees were significantly developed during the course of the
year. In the first half of 2002, the Commission intends to launch a consultation exercise with a view to
producing a standard text for divestment commitments and a pro forma trustee mandate. The introduction
of such precedents is intended to assist the parties to a notified operation and the Commission when
drafting and negotiating remedies. The aim is to do so in a manner that ensures consistency of approach
across different cases while retaining the flexibility to customise commitments to take account of the
particular circumstances of individual cases.
("u) Commission notice on remedies acceptable under Council Regulation (EEC) No 4O64189 and under Comrnission
Regulation (EC) No 447198 (OJ C 68, 2.3.2W1).('") See Section II, paragraph 12 of the notice.
(,*) coMP/M.1915, 13.3.2001.
("") COMP/M.2437 
- 
Allianz/Dresdner. 19.'/.2001.
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5.1. Remedies 
- 
statistical developments
294. There were 13 decisions taken during this year subject to undertakings after a phase I
investigation 1ttt0;. In addition, l0 cases were cleared subject to commitments following phase II
investigations ('''). In two of these (Metso/Svedala(t82) and Bombadier/Adtranz (183)), commitments
had also been offered in phase I but these had been deemed not to remove the Commission's serious
doubts, therefore phase II investigations had been initiated. Five further cases were cleared
unconditionally following phase II investigations ('80). It should be noted that the parties in the MAN/
Auwdrter case had submitted commitments in phase I, but these became redundant after the
Commission decided at the end of its in-depth investigation that there were no grounds for reaching an
adverse flnding about the effects ofthe deal.
295. Of the five deals that were prohibited in 2001, in two cases (SCA/Metsri Tissue (t85) and CVC/
Iznzing ('86)) the same set of undertakings was submitted in phase II as had been rejected as insufficient
in phase I; in two others (Schneider/Legrand(18') andTetra ktvaUSidel ('88)) different remedies were
submitted in the two phases, and in one (GE/Honeywell ('8'q)) there were no remedies submitted in phase
I. These latter three cases are discussed elsewhere in this chapter.
5.2. Nature of remedies accepted in 2001
296. A fundamental principle set out in the remedies notice is that, where competition concems
arise, 'the most effective way to restore effective competition, apart from prohibition, is to create the
conditions for the emergence of a new competitive entity or for the strengthening of existing
competitors via divestiture' 1uo;. In accordance with this principle, the vast majority of the competition
concerns that arose in merger cases in 2001 were addressed by means ofdivestments. For example, of
the 13 cases that were cleared conditionally in phase I, seven involved a divestment of a business or
('*) COMP&I.2602 
- 
Gerling/tlCM, ll.l2.2D0l:' COMP/JV.56 
- 
Hutchison/ECT, 29.11.20O1:' COMP/M.2567 
-Nordbanken/Postgirot,8.ll.2O0l; COMP{M.2514 
- 
Pirelli./Ed.izione/Olivetri/lelecom ltalia,2O.92@l; COMPlM.2337
- 
Nestl4/Ralston Purina, 2i7.7.2M1; COMP|M.243I 
- 
Allianz/Dresdner, I9.7.20O1.; COMP/1v1.2300 
- 
YLilTDF/
Digita/JV,26.6.200L; COMP/M.2396 
- 
Industri KapitaUPerstorp (II), ll.5.2O0l: COMP/M.2268 
- 
Pemod Ricard/
Diageo/Seagram Spirirs, 8.5.2001; COMPA{.2286 
- 
Buhrunn/Sams Ofice Supplies, 1L.4.20011' COMP/M.2277 
-Degussa/Inporte, 12.3.2O01; COMPiJV.54 
- 
Smith & Nephew/Beiersdorf/JV, 30.1.20O1; COMP/M.2MI 
- 
United
Ai rline s/U S Ai m ay s, 12.1.2007.("') COMPA{.2389 
- 
ShelUDEA,20.12.2001:, COMP/M.2530 
- 
Siidzucker/Saint Inuis,2O.12.2001; COMP/M.2533 
-BP/E.ON,20.12.20O1i COMP|M.2420 
- 
Mitsui/CVRD/Caemi, 30.10.2001; COMP{M.2434 
- 
Grupo Vllar Mir/ENBW
Hidroelectrica Del Cantabrico, 26.9.2001; COMP/JV.55 
- 
Hutchison/RCPM/ECT, 3;7.2OOl COMPA,I.2139 
-Bombadier/Adtranz, 3.4.2001;' COMP/M.1915 
- 
The Post Ofice/TPG/SPPL, 13.3.2001; COMP/M.1853 
- 
EDF/
ENBW. 7 .2.2001:. COMP/M.2033 
- 
Me tso/Svedala. 24.I.2001.(',) coMP/M.2033, 24.1.2007.
(",) coMP/2 139, 3.4.2001.
('*) COMPA4.220I 
- 
MAN/Auwtirter,20.6.2OOll, COMP/M.2314 
- 
BASF/Pantochim/Eurodiol,17.7.2O0L; COMPA4.2333
- 
De Beers/L\MH,25.7.2ffi1; COMP/M.2498 
- 
UPM-Kymmene/Haindl, 21.17.2001; and COMP/1r4.2499 
- 
Norske
S ko g / Pare n c ofil'a I s um, 21. 7 l.2OO 1.(,") coMP/2097. 31.1.2001.
t'"r COMPiM.2l87. 17.10.200-
('M) COMP/M.2283, 10.10.2001.
("*) coMPA4.2416, 30. 10.200;.
('*) coMPA4.2220, 3.7.2001.
('s) Section III.l, paragraph 13.
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businesses ('n'), and another one involved the divestment of landing slots (United Airlines/US
Airways ('o')). In phase II, the divestment of a business or businesses was also the most frequerrtly
accepted type of remedy. Indeed, in Metso/Svedala (Le:r) and The Post OficelTPG/SPPL (1'q4), the
competition concerns were fully addressed by the divestments to which the parties committed
themselves. And in Bombadier/Adtranl (1e5), the parties committed themselves to divesting their
Regioshuttle and Variotram businesses by means of exclusive, non-transferable licences.
297. In four cases in phase I and a further four cases in phase II, the parties gave a commitment to sell
shareholdings that they held in other companies in order to remove control or influence over companies
which would have led to competition concerns ('nu). For example, in Allianz/Dresdner, the Commission's
concerns about probable de facto control of Miinchener Rtick, a major competitor, were removed by the
parties' commitment to reduce their shareholding in that company to 20.5 Vo by the end of 2003 and not
to exercise more than that proportion of their voting rights at Miinchener Riick's annual general
meetings. Likewise in Nordbanken/Postgirot, the Swedish banking group Nordea would have had full
control over one of the two main payment systems, and undertook to reduce its stake in the other,
Bankgirot, to l0 Vo and to waive its shareholder rights accordingly.
298. Most of the divestment remedies that were adopted in 2001 involved a commitment to complete
the divestment within a certain period from the date of the decision. Two cases involved an up-front
solution (''?). In the The Post Office/TPG/SPPL (re8) case, the parties gave a commitment not to implement
their operation until a buyer was found for the divested business and approved by the Commission
because the Commission considered that the success of the remedy depended to a very large extent on the
characteristics of the purchaser (1").
299. Tbe Nestl€/Ralston Purina case ('?00) was the other example in 2001 of the Commission accepting
an up-front buyer. For the first time, this provision was coupled with an alternative remedy which is
informally referred to as a 'crown jewels' remedy ('n'). The possibility of accepting such crown jewels
remedies was provided for in the remedies notice ('?0'?) and it is a form of commitment which the
Commission expects to see more of in the future. In this case, the first alternative solution was the
licensing of Nestl6's Friskies brand in Spain. If this licensing alternative were not implemented by either
(''') COMPA,I.2602 
- 
Gerling/l'lCM, 71.72.2O01; COMP{M.2514 
- 
Pirelli/Edizione/Olivetti/Ielecom ltalia, 2O.9.20O1,
COMPA{.2300 
- 
YLE/TDF/Digilct/JV 26.6.2C07; COII/P|M.2396 
- 
Industri KapitauPerstorp (II),11.5.2001; COMP/
M.2286 
- 
Buhrunn/Samas Ofice Supplies, 11.4.2O0I; COMP|M.227'1 
- 
Degussa./Lctpone, 12.3.2C01; COMPiJV.54
- 
Smith & Nephew/Beiersdorf/JV, 30.1.2001.
('n') The merger agreement between these two companies was subsequently withdrawn as a result of antitrust objections to the
deal in the United States.
c") coMP/M.2033, 24.1.2001.
c*) coMP/M.1915, 13.3.2001.(,') coMPA{.2l 39, 3.4.2001.
("6) Phase I 
- 
COMP/JV.56 
- 
Hutchison/ECT, 29.11.20O1;' COI\IP/M.2567 
- 
Nordbanken/Postgitot, 8.11.2C[1', COMPI
M.2514 
- 
Pirelli/Edizione/OlivettilIelecorn ltalia, 2O.9.20O7; and COMP/I\4.2431 
- 
Allianz/Dresdner, l9;l.2OOI.
Phase II 
- 
COMP/M.2530 
- 
Siidzucker/Saint Inuis, 20.12.20O1; COMP/M.2533 * BPIE.ON, 20.12.2N1,: COMPI
M.2420 
- 
Mitsui,/CVRD/Caemi,30.10.2001; and COMP/M.1853 
- 
EDF/ENBW7.2.2O0l.
(r") See Section III.1, paragraph 20 of the notice.
(1*) COMP/M.1915, 13.3.2001.
(''n) See also below (Section 5.3) for a discussion of the implementation of remedies.
cm) coMPA4.2337. 2',7.7.2c01.
('?o') Thistypeofprovisionhasbeenseenbeforeinpreviouscases,forexmplelV/1\4.1453-AXA/GRE,8.4.1999andCOMP/
M.1813 
- 
Industi Kapital (Nordkem)/Dyno, 12.7.200O.
('?o:) Paragmphs 22 and23.
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a fixed date ('?03) or the date on which the notified operation was closed, then the option to license Nestl6's
brands would no longer be available to the parties and the crown jewel alternative would have to be
implemented. This altemative involves the divestiture of the 50 7o shareholding in the Spanish joint
venture with Agrolimen (Gallina Blanca Purina JV), which represents a crown jewel because it consists
of a larger and more easily saleable package compared with the licensing of Nestl6's Friskies brand.
300. Although the majority of remedies accepted by the Commission are in accordance with the
principle that simple, structural remedies are the ideal solution, the Commission has accepted remedies
which were somewhat more complicated than a straightforward divestment. For example, in the EdF/
EnBW ('zM) case, cleared after an in-depth investigation, there were three elements to the package of
remedies accepted. There were two relatively standard elements to the remedies package ('0s) and an
innovative third element. This third element of the EdF remedy sought to address the competition
concerns that had arisen in relation to so-called 'eligible' customers in France, i.e., those whose
electricity supply is open to competition. To resolve these concerns, EdF undertook to provide
competitors with access to generation capacity located in France in the form of virtual power plants
(5 000 MW) and back-to-back agreements to existing co-generation power purchase agreements with a
maximum of I 000 MW. In this respect, it has to tre trome in mind that a divestiture of power plants could
not be envisaged as an appropriate solution, for economic reasons in general (it was very unlikely that
newcomers would have taken the risk of acquiring such a plant) and for legal reasons in the particular
case of nuclear plants. According to the terms of the commitments, the contracts for the virtual power
plants will be awarded through an open, non-discriminatory public auction open to utilities and energy
traders alike. It is envisaged that these arrangements for access to generation capacity will remain in
place for a period of five years and that they may be terminated only on the basis of a reasoned request by
EdF. It is anticipated that in that period the electricity market in France will have developed so as to allow
sufficient alternative supply sources to be made available.
301. The lessons that can be drawn from this example are perhaps limited due to the highly specific
circumstances of the EdF/EnBW case. Nevertheless this case does show that the Commission is prepared
to accept non-standard remedies when circumstances demand them and when there is sufficient time for
the efficacy of such proposals to be examined. This is usually within the context of phase tr proceedings.
302. There is one notable difference in the types of remedy that the Commission accepted in phase I
cases in 2007 comparcd with 2000. This difference is that in 2001 the Commission did not accept any
remedies in phase I which involved commitments to provide competitors or customers access to delivery
networks or potentially blocking patents. These types of commitment had been accepted in 2000 in six
cases (2ft). In Vvendi/Canal+/Seagram the Commission accepted a package of commitments which
included access for competitors to Universal's films and online music 
- 
without discrimination in favour
of Universal's affiliated companies, namely Canal+ and Yizzavi. Other examples were BASF/ShelU
Project Nicole (patent licensing), Vodafone Airtoucly'Mannesmann (access to roaming tariffs and
('"') The precise date is considered to be commercially confidential information.
(,q) coMPAlI.1853, 7.2.2001.
('"') Firstly, EdF undertook to renounce the exercise of its voting rights in CNR, an electricity producer active in France, and to
withdraw its representative from the CNR board of directors; EdF will also no longer be involved in CNR's commercial
policy and market conduct. This comrnitment will ensure that CNR is in a position to become an active competitive force
in the electricity sector in France. Secondly, EnBW will divest its 247o co-controlling shareholding in WATT, which will
restore the status quo ante in Switzerland.
C*) COMPA4.2050 
- 
Vivendi/Canal+/Seagram, 13.10.2000; COMP/JV.48 
- 
VodafoneMvendi/Canal+, 2O.7.2000:'
COMP/M.1795 
- 
Vodafone Airtoucly'Mannesmann, 12.4.2000; COMPA,i.1751 
- 
SheIUBASF/JV * Prcject Nicole,
29.3.20O0; COMP/M.1838 
- 
BT/E9AT,27.3.2000:' CO]:N.f,PIJV.ST 
- 
BSIEB/Kirch Pay TV,21.3.2000.
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wholesale services) and BSIqB/Kirch Pay TV (access to Kirch's conditional access system and pay-TV
services).
303. Although the Commission did not accept remedies aimed at providing access to delivery networks or
potentially blocking patents in phasel, in 2001 these types of remedy were accepted in five phase II
cases ('?07). The fact that such remedies have continued to be accepted in phase II while not being accepted
during phase I investigations may reflect a greater degree of caution from the Commission following the
adoption of the remedies notice. This is also reflected in the fact that the number of cases involving
remedies in the fust phase of investigation has fallen this year compared with 2000 (13 as against 27 slch
decisions in 2000), while at the same time the Commission opened more phase tr investigations in 2.001
than in any previous year (22 in 2001 compared with 12 in 1998, 19 in 1999 and 20 in 2000).
5.3. Remedy implementation
304. The above discussion has focused on the new remedies that have been accepted by the
Commission over the year. However, this is only part of the story. It is also important to examine the
implementation of remedies previously accepted by the Commission, as a remedy will only fully address
the competition concerns raised if it is fully and properly implemented.
305. Several of the companies involved in cases which were conditionally cleared during 2001 have
already made considerable progress towards full implementation of their commitments. Such progress is
particularly notable in relation to those cases where the remedies involved divestments.
306. One example where a buyer was found for a divesfinent extremely quickly was in The Post
Office/TPG/SPPL ('?08), where the parties committed themselves to an up-front solution. The decision was
taken on 13 March, and less than three months later a signed sale and purchase agreement with Swiss
Post Intemational was submitted to the Commission for its approval, which was granted on 14 June. The
divestment was subsequently completed ('') and, in accordance with the commitments in that case, The
Post Office, TPG and SPPL were then able to implement their notified operation.
301 . In Metso/Svednla (:"0), the Commission issued a conditional clearance decision on 24 January and
in September was able to approve the Swedish corporation SandvikAB as a buyer for the divested assets.
Although the solution was not proposed within a particularly short time, this was an interesting case in that
it involved cooperation with the United States competition authority not just during the Commission's
investigative period, but also during the remedy procedure, after the Commission's decision had been
issued. The reason for the ongoing cooperation was that, owing to the differing timetable in the United
States, the Federal Trade Commission's (FTC's) investigation continued until October when it was in a
position to finalise its consent order. In the United States, the divestment of the various rock-crushing
businesses to Sandvik AB was an up-front solution to most of the competition concerns identified.
308. Significant progress was also made during 2001 on many of the remedies that had been put in
place in 2000. For ex.rmple, the divestments of polypropylene plants and businesses to which the parties
C') COMP/M.2389 
- 
ShelUDEA, 20.12.20O1; COMPA4.2530 
- 
Siidzucker/Saint lruis, 20.12.2N1; COMP|M.241.+ 
-Grupo Villar Mir/ENBWHidroelectrica Del Cantabrico,26.9.200l; COMP/JV.55 
- 
Hutchison/RCPM/ECT, 3.7.2ffil'
and COMP/lvI.l853 
- 
EdF/ENBW. 7.2.2001.(,) coMPA{.1915, 13.3.2001.
(r@) As with alnost every case involving a divestment, the completion of the divestment did not mark the completion of the
commitments as certain pads of the commitments related to the seller's behaviour after the divestment.(,,) coMPA4.2033, 24.1.2001.
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had committed themselves irt SheIUBASF/JV 
- 
Project Nicole (2tt) were completed in the first half of
2001, as were those in the polyethylene markets where competition concerns had arisen in Dow
C hemic aW nion C arb ide (2'2\.
309. Another example was the successful sale of the portfolio of brands and businesses which
Unilever had committed itself to selling in order to obtain clearance for its acquisition of Bestfoods in
September 2000. The brands to be divested were Bachelors, McDonnell's, Oxo and Vesta (soups) in the
UK and lreland, Royco, Heisse Thsse, Super Noodles, Aiki Noodles, LiebiglLiebox. Oxo, Aardapel
Anders, Rijke Sauzen, Raguletto and Lesieur (mainly soups, wet sauces and dry side dishes) in
continental Europe, Casa de Mateus (ams) in Portugal and BleBand, Touch of Taste and Isomitta
Oouillon) in the Nordic countries. This sale was made in one tranche to Campbell Soup Company in a
deal which itself reached the Community dimension thresholds so that it had to be notified for clearance
to the Commission ('?'i). The notifled divestment was subsequently cleared in April.
310. However, progress has not been smooth in relation to all the commitments that have been offered
to the Commission underpinning clearance decisions.
3l I . For example, in relation to the remedies that had been submitted by the parties in TotalFina/Elf
Aquitaine ("0) in September 2000 the Commission had rejected TotalFina's first proposed buyers
because the package included buyers that did not have the incentives to bring competition effectively to
the market for French motorway pehol sales. One of these proposed buyers, Le Mirabellier, subsequently
lodged an appeal before the Court of First Instance (CFI) against this decision. The CFI has not yet
reached a final decision on the appeal, but it did reject Le Mirabellier's request for interim relief (''').
After the rejection of this flrst proposal for purchasers for the petrol stations, TotalFina proposed a second
group of buyers, which was accepted by the Commission in May.
312. A separate aspect of the remedies package accepted in TotalFina/Elf Aquitaine ('') was the sale
of the liquid petroleum gas (LPG) business Elf Antargaz. This sale was finalised in 2001 ("?) when the
Commission authorised PAI, a subsidiary of BNP Paribas, and the US firm UGI to purchase the business.
PAI and UGI had already been approved by the Commission as part of that commitment. However, the
buyers had first had to convince the Commission that this solution, combining as it did a financial
purchaser with a US company specialising in the distribution and sale of electricity, natural gas and LPG,
represented a pennanent, structural solution to the problems identified on the market for the sale of LPG
in France. The conditions under which the Commission approved the TotalFina/Elf Aquitaine merger
have now all been fulfilled.
313. The Commission has also seen examples of how the timetable to which parties commit
themselves can be frustrated by the actions of third parties. For example, in Canefour/Prcmodis (2t8)
Carrefour had committed itself to selling its shareholding in Cora within a fixed period. Despite
Carrefour's genuine efforts, the shareholding could not be sold within the time specified. However, rather
than rescind the decision, the Commission was able to extend the deadline and the sale was subsequently
(,") coMPA4. 17 51, 29.3.2000.(") coMPA4.16"t 7, 3.5.2000.
("1) See COMP/JvI.2350 
- 
CampbelUECBB (Unilever), 2.4.2M7.
(,") coMPA4. 1628, 9.2.2000.("\ Case T-342JU) Petrolessence and. Socidti de sestion de restauration routiirev Commission
coMPA4.1628, 9.2.2000.
See COMP/1\4.23'15 
-PAI + UGI/EIf Antarsaz2l.3.2}0l
coMP/M. 1684. 25. 1.2000.
(=')
(rr7)
(13)
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completed with a financial investor. As the sale of the shareholding was not achieved in time, this
emphasised the important role that the trustees can play in such situations in ensuring that no competitive
harm comes to the company affected during the period between implementation of the original operation
and sale of the shareholding. This experience has contributed significantly to the Commission's work on
preparing a standard mandate for the trustee.
314. Also, as the Carrefour/Promodis case eventually involved a sale to a financial investor, this
obliged the Commission to consider carefully the conditions under which a financial investor could be
considered acceptable as a purchaser. While the circumstances of each individual case have to be taken
into account in deciding whether a financial investor would be a satisfactory buyer, certain factors
could raise difficulties. For example, it is important that the buyer and seller are independent from each
other, hence the seller should not have signif,cant loans provided by the buyer, nor indeed should the
buyer be in receipt of significant loans from or under obligations towards the selling party.
Furthermore, the Commission has to assess whether the flnancial investor has the necessary business
expertise to be able to develop or maintain the business as an active competitive force. This is
especially important where the buyer is taking a majority stake in a divested business.
5.4. International cooperation on remedies
315. The significance of the Commission's coordination with the relevant authorities in the United
States and in other countries is discussed elsewhere in this report. However, it is important to stress that
the discussions that take place between the Commission and other authorities relate not solely to the
substantive issues at stake, but also to the remedial action required. There are several cases from 2001
where such coordination took place.
316. In Metso/Svedala (2te), the United States' 'FTC' was undertaking a parallel investigation which,
owing to different time constraints in the two jurisdictions, continued after the Commission's
investigation had been concluded. In this case the commitments that had been given by the parties to the
Commission also largely resolved the concerns that had been identified in the United States.
6. Article 9 referrals to Member States 
- 
new developments
3l'1. In the context of the merger review, it has been suggested that the referral mechanism set out in
Article 9 should be amended. However, the Commission's policy with regard to the application of Article
9 also evolved this year as the Commission referred a part of two transactions, BP/E.ON ("01 and ShelU
DEA (2'zt), concerning oil products to the German Federal Cartel Office. At the same time, the
Commission opened an in-depth investigation into the petrochemical parts of both transactions based on
concerns in the market for ethylene. The analysis ofthe petrochemical sector was thereby split from the
analysis of the downstream oil products in Germany and the total analysis of the latter area was referred
to the Federal Cartel Office.
318. For the first time, the analysis of a complete sector within a Member State was referred to a national
authority even though that authority had not established that the transaction would lead to the threat of the
creation or strengthening of a dominant position in all markets in this sector (for downstream oil products)
in Germany. This decision was taken on the basis that the transaction would affect several other oil product
c,) coMPA4.2033, 24.1.2001.
("9 COMPA4.2533, 6.9.2001.
c") coMPtM.2389. 23.8.2001.
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markets which were not addressed by the request (e.g., base oils, additives, petroleum jelly and slack
waxes), or in which the Federal Cartel Ofhce did not see any primafacie competition problems arising from
the ffansaction. These markets are intrinsically linked to the assessment of the oil products and lubricants
markets specifically mentioned in the request, as they are all part of the chain of products resulting from the
refining process, and therefore the issues of access to refineries and infrastmcture are similarly relevant in
these markets. A separation of these markets would have inappropriately fragmented the assessment of the
case as regmds oil products. To avoid such fragmentation, the Commission decided to refer the part of the
transaction dealing with oil products as a whole.
319. In Govia/Connex South Central ("'), the Commission considered that the conditions laid down in
Article 9(2Xb) of the merger regulation were fulfilled. For these conditions to be satisfied, the
Commission had to decide that the affected market did not constitute a substantial part of the cotlmon
market. The UK authorities made their request on the ground that the operation affected competition on
specific railway routes, particularly in the London-Gatwick-Brighton area where it would create overlap
between South Central and the parties' existing train operating company Thameslink. This was the first
ever instance of a case being referred to a Member State under Article 9(2Xb) of the merger regulation.
320. In two Article 9 cases, the Comrnission referred the cases to national authorities whose final
decisions were subsequently appealed against before the national courts. According to the merger
regulation, national authorities are required to take only the measures strictly necessary to restore
competition in the markets concerned. However, Member States can be challenged under national and
European law in relation to the action they have taken on referred cases. That is what happened this year
in the abovementioned two cases.
321. The first of the cases was Interbrew/Bass ("'), which had been referred to the United Kingdom
authorities in 2000. After an in-depth investigation by the Competition Commission, the Secretary of
State for Trade and Industry decided on 3 January to impose a remedy which involved the complete
divestment of the Bass Brewers business, in effect prohibiting the transaction. On 2 February, Interbrew
sought a judicial review of the remedy on the ground that it was unreasonable, disproportionate and based
on unfair procedures. On 23May, the High Court in London rejected Interbrew's main challenge but held
that the Competition Commission's procedures had been unfair in that Interbrew had not been given a fair
opportunity to deal with critical issues that were relevant to the assessment of an alternative, lesser
remedy. After further consideration and consultation, the UK authorities decided that Interbrew should be
required to dispose of either Bass Brewers or Carling Brewers to a buyer approved by the Director
General of Fair Trading to remedy the adverse effects of the Interbrew/Bass Brewers merger.
322. The second case concemed the electricity supply aspects of EneUFT/Wind/Infostrada ("0), which
were referred to the Italian competition authority. Following an in-depth investigation, the competition
authority approved the proposed merger subject to a number of conditions imposed on Enel. This
decision was subsequently appealed against by Enel (25) and by Codacons, the Italian consumer
protection association. In ajointjudgment on both appeals published on 14 November, the court which
heard the appeal (the TAR) held that Enel was not dominant in the market for the supply of electricity and
annulled the competition authority's decision in relation to the remedies.
c") coMP/1v1.2446, 20.7 .2U)1.
('?r) COMPA,I.2044. 22.8.2W.
c-) coMPtM.22l6. 19.1.2N1.
(r") The appeal was made to the Tribunale Amrninistrativo Regionale del Lazio (TAR)
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7. International cooperation
323. The Commission is developing its bilateral cooperation with non-EU countries in competition
matters, in particular in relation to merger cases. It is also active in the multilateral arena and this year
focused its efforts on the creation of an International Competition Network.
324. Practical and legal problems associated with the control of concentrations having a global scale
have demanded effective cooperation between competition authorities in the enforcement of our
respective rules.
7.1. Cooperation with the United States authorities
325. EU/United States cooperation is conducted on the basis of the two competition cooperation
agreements that have been concluded over the past decade with the United States. Indeed, this
cooperation in the area of competition law enforcement has become something of a model for
transatlantic cooperation generally.
326. Experience of day-to-day cooperation has been that it works very effectively, particularly in
merger cases, substantially reducing the risk of divergent or inconsistent rulings. However, the
Commission and the United States authorities occasionally disagree about the merits of a particular deal,
even one involving global markets. This year witnessed a high-profile difference of view with the US
authorities over the Commission's decision to prohibit the GE/Honeywell merger ('?26). Both GE and
Honeywell appealed against the prohibition decision before the Court of Justice in September.
32'1. While such differences of approach have been very rare indeed, there is much to be gained from
ensuring a maximum of EU/US convergence in merger control. That is why the work of an existing
transatlantic mergers working group has been refocused in order to identify areas where more
convergence might be possible. Dialogue and cooperation between the Commission and the US antitrust
authorities has already made a substantial contribution to the trend toward convergence, and by looking at
cases where we may have adopted somewhat different approaches the Commission aims to reduce the
risk of unnecessary disagreements in the future.
Box 9: GElEoneywell
On 3 July, the Commission declared the proposed merger between the US companies General
Electric (GE) and Honqrwell incompatibte with the common market.
,,,,:,,,,Shir,msgef,;@iiilil,two categories of indrrstrial Ssehr,, ,'afl€iF :.trOd!+et{,,,(iqt;,cqgqres,,' ':' 
,,avieaiw;rinfi.avionic-il,e4dgnq+g s1qqfq,and indue$al;,qytte1f:,1$1!]. 
,8ar:t*ibi*s].:,,,,, r, ,,
The Commission considered the horizontal and exclusionary effects of the rerger stemming ftom
the complementary products and services thar the rnerged entity wouLd be able to offcr to a
common custonrcr base. In particular, the Corymrssion conoidered that the merger would enable
the leveraging of rna*.et power with a view to foreclosing competition in those mar*as.
("6) See the box in this chapter for a discussion of this case, COMP/I\4.2220 
- 
General Electrtc/Honevwell,3.7 .2001.
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GE's dominant posltion
An important frctor in the Cornmissim's rsses$ment was dre transfer of GE's dominance in jet
engines for large commercial and lage regioflal eircraft, its financial strength and its vertical
integration into aircraft purchasing, financing and leasing to Honeywell's leading market positions
in corporate jet engines, avionics and non-avionics poducts.
GE can be characterised as a rather unique company. It is not only a leading industrial
conglomerate, but also a major financial organisation thrcugh its subsidiuy GE Capital, which
provides GE's industrial units with erlo(mous financial means. lndeed, the Comrdssion's analysis
of the transaction confirmed frat an irnponant financial surface and the ability to absorb product
failrnes in an industry characterised by long term investments and imperfect financial markets is
CE is further venically integrated into aircraftgnrchasng.financing and leasing rctivities through
GE Capital Avialion Sewices (GECAS), the largest purchaser of new aircraft and the owner of
the largest fleet of aircraft in service and the largest share of aircraft on order and options. Unlike
any otlrer independent leasing company, GECAS's poliry is to select only GE engines when
purchasing new aircraft. GE, through CECAS, has the incentive and the ability to enhance the
market position of GE's engines through various means. As a custorner. whether it is a launch
customer or not, GECAS can influence the selection of aircraft equipment by the airftame
manufactur,ers and tilt the balance in favour of it being retained as the exclusive supplier. GECAS
also contributed to strengthening CE's position vis-d-vis airlines by persuading airlines that would
not otherwise have chosen a GE-powered aircraft to select such an aircraft.
Thanks to the combination of its financial strength through GE Capital and its vertical integration
into GECAS, GE has nranaged to achieve the highest and moct sustainable positioning in the large
commercial and regional aircraft engine markets, to increase the gap with its competitors and to
secure exclusive positions as the engine supplier in a series of airftame platforms, to the detriment
of its rivals.
Given the natrue of the jet engines market, characterised by high barriers to entrJ and to
expnnsion, GE's incumbent position with many air{ines, its incentive to use GE Capital's financial
power with customers, its abiliry to leverage its vertical integrationflhrough GECAS, th€ limited
countervailing power of eustotrrcrs and the comparatively weak'position of its rivals, GE was
considered to h in a position to behave independently of its competitors, customers and ultimately
consumers and thus to be a dominant f,rrn on the markets for large commercial jet aircraft engines
and for large regional jet aircraft engines.
The effects of tbe merger
The proposed merger would have led to the creation of dominant positions on several markets as a
result of the combination of Honeywell's leading positions on those martets with GE's financial
strength and vertical integration into akcraft purchas'ing, financing, leasing and aftermarket
services as described above.
In addition, given the parties' dominant and/or leading psitions in theb respecrive markets. and
the wide combination of complementary products that it could have offered, these effects would
COMPETITION REPORT 2OO1
98 XXXIST REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 2OO1 _ SEC(2002) 462 FINAL
COMPETITION REPORT 2OO1
XXXIST REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 2OO1 
- 
SEC(2002) 462 FINAL 99
B 
- 
Statistics
Figure 4
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III_ STATEAID
A 
- 
General policy
328. The ninth survey on State aid in the European Union, published by the Commission in July (,,?),
covers the peiod 1997-99. During that period, grants of aid amouniing to an annual average ofEUR90billion were paid by the 15 Member States to the manufacturing,lgricultural, fisherieslcoal
mining, transport and financial services sectors. White this is a considerabli amount, it nevertheless
represents a reduction of nearly 12 vo in comparison with the previous period, 1995-97. Over the period
1997-99, Stateaidforregionalobjectives was77 vo ofthetotal andl0%wasforhorizontalobjeciives.
329. Particularly noteworthy has been the decline in aid to the manufacturing sector, which has nowfallen below the level of aid granted to the transport sector. The ninth survey indicates that the average
total amount of aid granted annually to manufacturing in the 15 Member States was EUR 27.6 billion,
compared with EUR 35.8 billion over the peiod 1995_97.
1997-99
Overall State aid (billion EUR)
State aid to the manufacturing sector (billion EUR)
State aid as a percentage of value added in the manufacturing sector
("') coM(2001) 403.
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330. The need to achieve further reductions in overall aid levels and to redirect aid towards horizontal
objectives of Community interest was underlined by the Stockholm European Council in March, which
committed the Member States to demonshating a downward trend in state aid expressed as a percentage
of GDP by 2003, taking into account the need to redirect aid towards horizontal objectives o1 
"o--oninterest, including cohesion objectives. This was confirmed by a Council resolution of 6 December which
invited the Member States to continue their efforts to reduce aid levels as a percentage of GDp; to focus
efforts on reducing and eliminating aid which has the greatest distortive effects; to redirect aid towards
horizontal objectives, including cohesion, and, where appropriate, towards small and medium-sized
enterprises (SMEs); to further develop the use of ex ante and ex post evaluations of aid schemes; and toimprove the transparency and the quality of reporting to the Commission, particularly by means of
national control and follow-up procedures and, where possible, the provision of relevant statistics.
331. The resolution invited the Commission for its part to develop, together with the Member States,
statistical tools and indicators of the effectiveness and efficiency of utd; to give greater emphasis to
assessing the impact of aid on competition; to encourage exchanges of eiperience and concerted
evaluation exercises; and to continue its efforts fo simplify, modernise and clarify European rules on State
aid. The commission was also asked to submit an initial assessment of progress in 2002.
l. Thansparency
332' On 22 March, the Commission unveiled the new public State aid register. The register provides
details on State aid cases dealt with by the Commission. It will be updated ai frequent intervals and will
thus ensure that the public has timely access to the most recent State aid decisions. The register, which is
90
27.6
1.9
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available on the home page of the Competition DG's Intemet site http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/
index_en.html, is in two parts. The first part presents aggregated information on all cases under
preliminary examination that were registered after I January 2000. The second part allows users to carry
out simple searches for information on all Commission State aid decisions pertaining to cases registered
after I January 2000, allowing users to access information by: case number, aid instrument (e.g. interest
subsidy, soft loan, guarantee, tax deferment), case type (individual application or aid scheme), decision
type (e.g. opening of formal proceedings, final decisions), legal basis, Member State (and regior/
province), the objective of the aid and the sector concemed.
333. By providing links to press releases and Commission decisions that are either published in the
Official Journal or sent directly to Member States, the register brings together under one roof the
impressive amount of information on the Commission's State aid decisions that is already available on
the Intemet.
334. In July this was followed up by the second major transparency initiative, with the publication of
the first edition of the State aid scoreboard. The scoreboard is presented in five parts. The first part of the
present scoreboard shows State aid expenditure in the European Union and in each Member State
expressed as a percentage of GDP. The shares of aid are then given according to the main purposes
pursued: fostering horizontal objectives like research and development, small and medium-sized
enterprises or training; helping agriculture and flsheries; assisting the transport sector; aiding other
specific sectors like coal mining, shipbuilding or steel production; supporting regions that lag behind.
The second part provides seminal ideas for a Member State forum that will offer information on their
national State aid policies and levels of transparency. The idea is that it should act as a catalyst for
discussion between Member States. The third part looks at Member States' success in complying with
State aid rules and identifies problems and areas where improvements might be necessary. It also
includes information on the recovery of illegally granted State aid. With a view to identifying possible
areas where future action by the Commission under State aid rules might be desirable, the fourth part of
the scoreboard highlights the amounts of aid granted by the Member States for different objectives and
specific sectors. The Member States are encouraged to discuss certain spending trends and patterns and
ascertain their impact on the functioning of the intemal market. The final part of the scoreboard attempts
to generate a discussion on the relationship between State aid levels in the Member States as identified by
the Commission, the functioning of the internal market and the success of the economic reform process'
In so doing, the scoreboard goes beyond mere competition issues.
335. The scoreboard will in future be published twice a year and will develop gradually in response to
the needs of its various future user groups. It will be based on a core set of indicators that will, over time,
demonstrate long-term policy shifts and State aid spending patterns. These core indicators will be
accompanied in each scoreboard by other indicators that will focus on certain topics for deeper analysis.
The scoreboard will also add value to other Commission documents, in particular the proposals for broad
economic policy guidelines, structural indicators and benchmarking enterprise policy.
2. Modernising State aid control
336. As already announced in last year's report, the Commission has embarked on a long-term reform
exercise aiming at simplifying State aid procedures for clear-cut cases and concentrating Commission
resources on the most serious distortions of competition, with the objective of ensuring that the necessary
changes are in place before enlargement.
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337. The first three regulations adopted in principle in December 2000 on the basis of the enabling
Regulation (EC) No 994/98 entered into force, representing an important step in rhe modemisation
process. They consist of two regulations introducing block exemptions for aid to small and medium-sized
enterprises and training aid and a regulation codifying the de minimisnrle (r'r).
338. The regulation on de minimis aid codifies the application of that rule, which was previously set
out in the form of a Commission notice published on 6 March 1996, and thereby increases tigat certainty.
Under the de minimis rule, aid to an enterprise that does not exceed the threshold ofEUR 100 000 over
any period of three years is not considered State aid within the meaning ofArticle 87(1) of the Treaty and
is therefore not subject to the notification obligation.
339. The block exemptions allow Member States to grant aid immediately, without need for prior
notification to and authorisation by the Commission, provided the conditions laid down in the block
exemption regulation are met. The block exemption regulations benefit not only the Commission, but
also the national, regional and local administrations in the Member States, since the procedure for
granting aid can be much quicker and the administrative burden is reduced. However, this procedural
simplification does not entail a lesser degree of control in or a relaxation of the rules on state aid. Several
provisions in the regulations require Member States to provide the Commission with summary
information sheets and annual reports, thereby allowing it to monitor the application of the bloci
exemptions. Moreover, since the regulations are directly applicable in the Member States, complainants
can also go to national courts if their competitors have received aid which does not comply with the
conditions laid down in the relevant block exemption regulation.
340- On the basis of the summary information forms sent in by Member States, it is possible to make
an initial assessment of the use of the block exemption regulations by them. By the end of December, the
Commission had received 106 forms on the basis of the regulation on aid to SMEs and 47 forms on the
basis of the regulation on training aid. The great majority of these forms concerned aid schemes rather
than individual aid. The substantial use made of the block exemption regulations has resulted in a
decrease in the number of notified cases, with 286 notifications receivid between February and
November, compared with 400 notifications received during the same period in 2000. Recourse to the
block exemption regulations varies considerably from one Member State to another. By the beginning of
December, Italy had sent in 56 forms, Germany 54 and Spain 20. These countries are by far ttre larlest
users of the block exemption regulations. At the other end of the spectrum, France, portugal, FinlandLd
Luxembourg had not yet sent any forms in.
341. The Commission is currently preparing a third block exemption regulation on employment aid.
on 2 October, it adopted a draft proposal, on which it consulted the Member Srates in-rh; Advisory
Committee on State Aid on 7 December. The draft regulation proposes exempting from notification,
subject to certain conditions, aid for the creation of employment, aid for the recruitment of disadvantaged
categories of workers, and aid to meet the additional costs of employing disabled workers. The rules on
aid for the creation of employment are aligned on those in the block exemption regulation on aid for
SMEs concerning the creation of employment linked to investment.
342. on 13 November, the Commission decided to extend the validity of the multisectoral ftamework on
regional aid for large investment gojects, the code on aid to the synthetic fibres industry and the
Community ftamework for State aid to the motor vehicle industry to 3L December 2002(rrr). If the new
multisectoral framework enters into force before 31 December 2002, it will replace the above three
frameworks as of the date of its entry into force.
CB) OJ L 10, 13.1.2001;2000 Competition Report, points 293_5.("") oJ C 368,22.12.2001.
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Box 1& Risk capital
An importanr development in State aid in 2001, showing how State aid rules may need to be
adapted to new market situations. was the adoption by the Commission of a new communication
on State aid and risk capital ('). together with the assessment by the Commission of several
rneasures designed to promote the provision of risk capital in different Member States.
The communication was prepared ,rs a response to a number of factors, in particular the concern to
stimulate risk capital markets in the Community and the difficulty of assessing certain measures
with this objective. proposed by Member States. under existing State aid rules, particularly when
there is no direct link between the grant of aid and a specific set of eligible costs for investment or
research and development. Depending on the design of risk capital measures, they may grant aid to
economic operators at one or rnore different 'levels'. by providing a benefit to investors (by
enabling them to make risk capital investments on rnore favourable terms) and/or to the enterprises
invested in. The communication sets out cenain criteria against which the Commission will assess
these measures. as well as giving a non-exhausfive list of forms of aid measures which could meet
these criteria.
Applying the Commission comrmrnication on State aid and risk capital for the first time. the
Commission approved the Regional Venture Capital Funds (') in the United Kingdom even though
there was no link to specific eligible costs and accepted State aid for a measure where dre
participation in a company may be in the nature of capital needed for daily business expenses
(working capital). The aim of the UK scheme is to address a lack of firnding at regional level
available to SMEs for equity investments. The Commission acknowledged market failure for this
segment because the thresholds as laid down in the risk capital commtmication were not exceeded.
The same line of reasoning was adopted in the French 'Rdgime Cadre 
- 
Fonds de capital
investissement'case (r). When assessing these notifications. the Commission applied point VIft of
the communication and was able to comlude that the aid granted to the private investors and to the
SMEs was compatible with State aid rules. As for the funds created under the measures, the
Commission conch&d thar they iue not enterprises receiving aid within the meaning of
ArticleST(l) of the EC Treaty. Other cases where the communication was applied in 2001
included 'Linea de apoyo a ta capitalizaci6n de empresa de base tecnol6gica' (Spain) (a), and a
fuither UK scheme intended to fill the gap in the provision of risk capital in small amounts to
SMES in the coalfield areas of England (').
:
As well as adopting and applying the new communication. the Commission continued its practice
ofapproving measures to assist participation in companies in the form ofrisk capital ifotlrer State
aid nrles were complied with (.). Such approval generally requires the existence of a link to a
concrete inrestment project, or to the eligible costs in the case of R&D projects, if this type of aid
{:i
{E
t:l$
*)
($
*: 31tt iffii?':*ssion decisim or 6.6.200 1 (or L 253. 3. r0.2m r ).
ff il liffi ru*ffi#'ffitl I liiffi i?j*i !#T#' "Case N 7222S0, Commission decision of 20.12.2@1. not y€:l p
Cf. paragraph II.3 of the communicadon: 'Nothing in this document should be talrcn to call into question the
ffi:jTlti:ffiHff*"*. which nreet the criteria of anv other guidelines, toamewor*s m rcgulations
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is to qualify as aid for initial investment (r). Cases in poi-a were a loan for inveshent in equitv
capital of start-ups, which was assessed as being compatible with the StWe exemption
lgulation ('), or a silent partnership, i.e. a panicipation in equity capital without managernentftrncuon'.f-or-pre-cornptitive R&D activities. which was assessed as being conrpafible with the
uommunlty lramework for State aid for research and der.e@ment (3). A further example was the
Commission's decision on a German aid scheme (o) which ei-s to increase equtty caDital for ore_
comperitive R&D activities and innovative investments. Tbe Commission distinzuisired berween
the level ofpublic banks, private investors and ttrc small enterprises invested in anA OeciaeO tnat
either no aid within the meaning of Article 87 of the EC Treary was involved or that rhe aid was
compatible with the common market, either under the sb{E exernption regulation or uuder the
R&D framework. It is interesting to note that the Commission's decision takes into account the
relatively underdeveloped state of dre risk capital market ('infanl marker') in Geruranv if
compared to the US early phase venture capital market.
{r}
l
{i}q
(,)
For the definition of initial lwestment. see, for exarnple, pnt 4.4. of the guidelinas on national regional aid(oJ c 74, I0.3.1998).
Case N 465/2000. Commission decision of 3.7.2001 @l C 328, Z3.tl.Zffl)-
Case NN 94/2000, Commission deision of 23.S.200t (OJ C 219, 4.S.200t).
Case N 551/20ffi, Corrmission docision of 28.2.2001 (OJ C lt?,2tA-ZC/|j).
3. State aid and tax policy
343. The monitoring of State aid in the form of taxation remains one of the Commission's priorities. In
line with its notice on the application of the State aid rules to measures relating to dirict business
taxation ('?r0), the Commission invited four Member States, pursuant to Article 88(l) of the EC Treaty, to
amend or abolish existing aid schemes and initiated formal investigation proceedings in respect of eleven
other measures in force in eight Member States.
344' Most ofthe relevant measures are tax schemes conferring advantages on certain types ofactivity(financial services, offshore activities) or certain types of undertakings that meet certain turnover,
internationalisation or indeed nationality criteria. The proceedings initiated by the Commission will
enable it to determine whether the selectivity of the measures is justified and whether the schemes confer
an advantage within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty, in pafiicular as a result of
discretionary practices by the tax authorities.
345. As far as indirect taxation is concemed, the Commission decided to initiate proceedings under
Article 88(3) of the Treaty in respecf of excise duty reductions granted by three Member States on heavy
fuel oil used as fuel for the production of alumina. These reductions in excise duties were authorised by
the Council (Decision 200ll224lEc of 12 March 2001) (,), pursuant to the provisions of Council
Directive gzl8ltEEc of 19 October 1992 on the harmonisation of the structures of excise duties on
mineral oils. However, as the fifth recital of Council Decision 200ll224lEc stipulates, ,this Decision
shall be without prejudice to the outcome of any procedures relating to distortions of the operation of the
single market that may be undertaken, in particular under Articles 87 and 88 of the Treaty'. The
(r) oJ c 384, 10.12.1998.('') oJ L 84,23.3.2001.
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Commission would point out that, as a general rule, decisions authorising reductions in excise duty that
are taken on the basis of the Treaty provisions relating to taxes are without prejudice to the application of
the competition rules laid down in the Treaty.
4. Stranded costs
346. Before the liberalisation of the European electricity market, recovery of investments by
electricity undertakings was achieved through adequate tariff fixation by the State. In these
circumstances, many of these undertakings invested in relatively costly electricity production plants or
long-term take or pay contracts. The decrease in electricity prices following the liberalisation of the
sector may compromise the recovery of many of these investments or long-term contract costs, and thus
generate non-recoverable costs. Such costs are generally known as 'stfanded costs'.
347. Unlike other previous liberalisation processes, the liberalisation of the electricity sector does not
take place coincidentally with a technological leap or a large increase in demand. On the contrary, the
electricity market is more and more subject to various external constraints that have a tendency to
increase production costs, such as environmental protection or security of supply.
348. In such circumstances, certain undertakings may be tempted to pass the whole burden of their
stranded costs on to their captive customers, thus threatening the viability of other undertakings. It may
therefore be necessary to devise some compensation mechanism for stranded costs.
349. This compensation mechanism must strike a delicate balance between, on the one hand, the need
not to weaken electricity undertakings to a point where they would no longer be in a position to ensure
proper delivery of electricity, which is vital to the economy of the European Union, and, on the other
hand, the need to ensure that new entrants are not prevented from entering the market, which would
hamper the liberalisation process and the benefit it brings to consumers.
350. It is the Commission's view that where such balanced compensation mechanisms constitute State
aid, they can be viewed as compatible with the EC Treaty under Article 87(3Xc), as they facilitate the
transition of the electricity sector to a liberalised market and hence the economic development oI the
sector, while ensuring that the compensations are limited and proportionate, and therefore do not
adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest.
351. On 26 July, the Commission adopted a communication on the methodology for analysing State
aid linked to stranded costs, which sets out the criteria it will use in examining whether a stranded costs
compensation mechanism that constitutes State aid can be authorised under the EC Treaty ('3').
352. The basic principle of the methodology is that compensations should be limited in time and in
extent. They should not exceed the costs actually borne by undertakings, directly caused by the
liberalisation and resulting in losses. For example, no compensation should be paid for a plant that
became less profitable following the opening-up of the market, but nonetheless remained profitable.
Compensations must be bounded ex ante and should also provide for an ex post adaptation mechafsm
that takes into account the real evolution of the market as a result of liberalisation, and in particular the
actual change in electricity market prices.
(?3r) Available in all languages on the Competition DG pages of the Europa web site
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353. On 26 July, applying this methodology for the lirst time, the Commission authorised three
individual stranded costs cases, inAustria, Spain and the Netherlands (r33).
5. Public broadcasting
5.1.. Communication from the Commission on the application of State aid rules
to public service broadcasting (r3a)
354. On 17 October, the Commission adopted a communication which explains how it applies State
aid rules to the funding of public service broadcasters. The communication acknowledges that Member
States are in principle free to define the content and scope of the public service and the way it is financed
and organised. Howeveq the Commission calls for transp:uency on these aspects so that it can assess the
proportionality ofstate funding and control possible abusive practices. Member States should establish a
precise definition of the public service remit, formally entrust it to one or more operators through an
official act and have an appropriate authority in place that monitors its fulfilment. The Commission will
intervene in cases where the aid causes a distortion of competition that cannot be justified by the need to
perform the public service obligation.
6. Cinema and audiovisual production support
6.1. Review of the national cinema and audiovisual production support schemes
355. Following its 1998 decision on the French scheme of automatic aid for film production, the
Commission is reviewing the schemes in place in other Member States under the same assessment
criteria. The Commission has already reviewed and approved the schemes operating in a number of
Member States. The Commission is at present completing discussions with the remaining Member States
to bring their schemes into line with EC law. The completion of the review will provide the sector with
legal certainty.
6.2. Communication from the Commission on certain legal aspects relating to cinematographic
and other audiovisual works
356. On 26 September, the Commission adopted a communication which explains and clarifies the
criteria governing the application of the State aid rules to aid given by the Member States to support their
national film production. The communication recognises that Member States are in principle free to
support their national film production and that they can do so by whatever method they deem most
appropriate. However, the Commission requires Member States to comply with certain specific
conditions so as to ensure that the aid does not conflict with the functioning of the common market. The
Commission does not intend to alter the existing compatibility criteria unless they prove incapable of
preventing undue distortions of competition within the European Union. In the communication, the
Commission notes that possible distortions of competition created by aid in this sector stem more from
territorialisation requirements (e.g. conditions requiring producers to spend a certain proportion of the
film budget in the national territory) than from the level of aid itself. In its 1998 decision on the French
aid scheme, the Commission took the view that Member States should be encouraged to reduce national
preferences as to the place of expenditure in respect of a substantial proportion of the costs. In this regard,
(']r.) See Part Two of the XXXI Report on Competition Policy 2001.
320,15.tl.2007.
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the communication announces that the Commission intends to examine the maximum level of admissible
territorialisation further, in the light of the results of the review of aid schemes it is currently undertaking-
7. Enlargement
357. The year 2001 was important in the preparatory work on enlargement as regards State aid. In
February, the Directorate-General for Competition decided to set up an enlargement and State aid
task force to assess the State aid control situation in the l2 applicant countries. For each applicant
country, an assessment was made of the legal framework for State aid control, the administrative
capacity established for this purpose and the actual enforcement record achieved- The result of the
assessment exercise provided a basis for preparing the State aid part of the draft common position
for each applicant country, including a position on the provisional closure of the competition
chapter.
358. With the adoption by the Council of the EU common positions on the competition chapter, which
were tabled in the accession conferences on 11 and 12 December, an initial phase of the task force's
activities came to an end. The respective conferences agreed to provisionally close the competition
chapter for four applicant countries (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia). With respect to the eight
other applicant countries, the common positions conclude that, in spite of the progress made on State aid,
it is not yet possible to provisionally close the chapter.
359. In a second phase, the enlargement and State aid task force will carry out a second round of
assessment of the enforcement record of the eight applicant countries for which the competition
chapter could not yet be closed. In this regard it will in particular follow up specific State aid problems
identified in the common positions (major issues such as the conversion of incompatible tax aid, the
establishment of regional aid maps and steel restructuring programmes). The task force will also
continue to monitor closely the State aid situation in the four countries for which the competition
chapter has been closed. Finally, the follow-up of the State aid inventories and annual surveys of Sl.ate
aid prepared by the applicant countries will continue to be an important task.
Box 11: German public banks (Ansta kslast and Gewiihr#iigerhafrung)
As announced in last year's report, the Commission continu€d its exarnination of the compatibility
** 
*: :*" "i,U1un:of the German system 
of starc guzrantees for publicJaw credit institutions
(Anstalts last alltd Gewtlhnrit ge rhafiun g\.
Iegal and economic conteld
Ansnltslastcould be translated as 'mainlenance obligation'. It means that the public owners (e.g.
federal govemment. Iiinder, municipalities, etc.) of the institution are responsible for securing its
economic basis and its function for the entire duration of its existence. lt was first recognised in
1897 as a general principle of law by a German high court. Gewtihrtrtigerhaffung could be
translated a$ 'guarantee obligation'. It stipulates thar the guarantor will meet all liabilities of the
bank which cannot be satisfied from its assets. It was explicitly introduced in several limderlaws
in l93ll32 when the previous direct liability of the municipalities was replaced.
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Both guarmtees ue limited neidrcr'intime nor in arnounl Also, the credit institutiorx do not have
to pay any remunerafion fs them.
Asssmt un&r the Stat€ aid nrtes and **T*""
On 8 May. following intensive contacts betweon the Commission and the Germru authorities, the
Commission adopted a formd recornmendation proposing to the German Government appropriate
ff::ffiilJfffl$tf;l#" $tate suaftmtees or render them compatible with the state aid
The recornmeodati,on explains &ar the guara$Ge sy$tem has to be considered to be State aid
within the meaning of the Treaty: the measures are ba*ed on State reEources and favour certain
groups of wdertakings. they distort competition and affect Eade within the Community. However,
since the system already existed when the EC Treaty entered into force in 1958" the aid qualifies as
'existing'ai4 on whic
,;;;ff"J; -- ".-'h 
the commission can on$ demand charrges for the tuture, b{rt cannot act
According ,g-t: Cg1.n*-oio-n recommendafion, cornpatibility with the EC rul,es should be
achieved by 3l March 2002" However. it is expticitly provided for in the recornmendation thar rhe
Commission can decide to agree to a later date if it considers this objectivety necessary and
justified in sder to allow appropria,te transition for certain public banks to the new situation. The
Commission is aware of the rrecd to protect existing creditors who provided funds to the
prblic-law credit institutions on the basis of the guarantee system.
Solution
On 18 July" the German goverrunent accepted the formal recomrnendation adopted by the
Commission on 8 May. This acceptarce was based on an understanding rcached on 17 July
between Commissioner for Competition Mario Monti anrd German State-Secretary for Finance
Caio Koch-Weser, leading a delegation of three kinder finarrce ministers and the president of the
:-t- 
savings banks'and giro association.
The German govemment confirrrs by its accepance that the existing aid system of guarantees,
which constitutes incompatible State aid within the meaning of the Treaty, needs to be changed. lts
fi:y#1Tffilfffif*-,*;ffi;"Tffi,filerilneni to bring the svstem of suara$rees inro
The understanding of 17 July provides for a four-year transitional period, which lasts from
l9 July 2(Dl to 18 July 2(X)5. During this period. the two existing guaranrees rnay rernain in place.
After that, on the basis of the so-called 'platform-model', one guruantee (Anstaltslastl will be
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- ffi:'.x?;HTff#ffffih3##,fi #1tt 
Jurv 2005' Gantiihrtrnserhartuns wltttu
affer 2015, Gewtihmiigerhsung wlr*'u".*i,#Jil1015 
otherwise' for those mahrring
i$ir*"":['l:ffiH#'H*:*rfrruffi :*]n#',v;;ltn:
##ff ;Jru:ff#rothere,evantredera,or#*ltfi"*ffi #,.m,i*j#ffifffifi*: Y"";tr#'ff""t"ifin**ts contained in the su&qtees w'r be
treateO as nlw aid from the beginning of 2003 for bank falling urder the legislation of the
exceptions are allowed.
Hfi#:;f-TilHHf,orlTJulvrerersonlvtot'andesbanknandsavingsbanks'rhe
;",T,trfi :"Jl:ff#nHl:l:"#t*Ti"ffit"ffi 'H'ffi:if jd;*ilffi
conditions for neutrality of competition under wlich special credit institutions can oPerate io tbe
::ffi #.,ffi 'H:'ffi j;l[-,ffi il'ffi -T&H'"1'H;"ff''"-:1l#";ffJT"il:?#
ffif,f.ffi*itf*,j"m:t. conseqllentlv, tue stare iio element could be recovered
$ffi :#,,ffi ffiqfft;:?ffi #.hlffi%t',,T;ffi h:;t'tr#*il't";rJ
B 
- 
Concept of aid
360. According to the definition set out in Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty, State aid is incompatible
with the common market if it is granted by a Member State or through State resources, if it distolts or
threatens to distort competition by conferring an advantage on certain undertakings or the production of
certain goods and if it is liable to affect trade between Member States. The form in which the aid is
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granted (interest rebates, tax reductions, loan guarantees, supply of goods or services on preferential
terms or capital injections on terms not acceptable to a private investor) is irrelevant.
1. Origin of resources
361. The first of the conditions to be fulfilled is that aid must be granted by a Member State or through
State resources. The previous case law of the Court has established that both the terms 'state' and the
notion of 'resources' in this context are to be interpreted widely. However, the judgment of the Court of
13 March in the PreussenElektra case defined the limits of the concept of State resources. The case
concerned an obligation imposed on electricity distributors in Germany to pay a higher feed-in price for
electricity generated from renewable sources. Following litigation in Germany, the Court of Justice was
asked to give a preliminary ruling on whether such a system would amount to State aid within the
meaning of Article 87(l) of the Treaty.
362. In its judgment the Court ruled that the measure incontestably constituted an advantage for the
producers of electricity from renewable sources as they received guaranteed higher prices than would
otherwise be the case. However, for a measure to rank as State aid, it was not enough that the
advantage was conferred by the State. The advantage had to be provided directly or indirectly through
State resources. Having regard to the facts of the case, the Court found that the system of electricity
pricing in Germany which required one private company to pay another a higher price than would
otherwise have been the case did not involve the use of State resources and therefore could not be
deemed to be aid.
363. Based on the reasoning of the Court of Justice in PreussenElektra, the Commission declared a
Belgian measure, applicable in the Flemish region, not to be caught by Article 87(l) of the EC
Treaty (':r5). The Commission found that a measure whereby the distributors have to buy annually a
certain quantity of green certificates did not involve State resources ("0). Equally, the Commission decided
that the issuing of certificates by state authorities in order to prove that the green electricity corresponds to
the delinition given in the law did not involve State resources ('?r?). Notwithstanding this assessment, the
Commission also examined the measure as State aid and considered it to fulfll the criteria of the
guidelines on State aid for environmental protection (see below).
2. Advantagetoafirm
364. In order to constitute State aid, a measure must also confer a direct or indirect advantage on the
beneficiary. The question of whether compensation for the costs of meeting public service obligations
may be considered to be an advantage is addressed in the specific chapter of this report dealing with
services of general economic interest. The Commission has also addressed the question of advantage
in the field of waste management. On 3l January, in Case N 484/00, the Commission decided not to
raise any objections to the Dutch waste disposal system for PVC facade elements, because the
alrangements did not confer an advantage on the participating companies (producers and importers on
the one hand, recycling companies on the other). They did not therefore constitute State aid within the
meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty. The system ensures that the companies selling PVC facade
("') Case N 550/2000, Commission decision of 25.7.200 1 (OJ C 330, 24.1 l.200l).('") For the same line of reasoning, see Cases N 678i2001, Commission decision of 28.11.2001, OJ C 30,2.2.2W2, and Case
N 504/2000, Commission decision of 28.11.2001,OJ C !O,2.2.2W2.("') See also Case NN 30/B/2000, Commission decision of 28.l l.200l, not yet published.
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elements assume responsibility for recycling these elements, in line with the 'polluter pays'principle.
The system is based on a voluntary agreement between several organisations in the PVC production,
consumption and recycling chain. The agreement stipulates a fixed payment for PVC frames and
facade elements marketed in the Netherlands to be paid by the PVC facade element producers and
importers. These resources are used for the cost ofthe collection and recycling ofthe facade elements,
including the transport. The Commission took similar decisions with respect to Dutch systems for
waste paper and cardboard and car wrecks (Cases NN 87/00 and C 11/01). The latter system was
approved only after obtaining substantial evidence on the absence of overcompensation to car
dismantling companies.
365. Sometimes the question of whether a particular state measure constitutes an advantage must be
decided by considering whether a private investor acting in a free market would participate in the
transaction (r,'). On 6 June, in Case C 36/2001, the Commission decided to initiate the formal procedure
for the investigation of State aid measures in the case of a measure taken by the authorities in the Walloon
region of Belgium involving the Beaulieu group, one of the leading manufacturers of carpets in Europe,
which is based in the Flemish region of the country. In the course of its enquiries in the Verlipack case,
the Commission became aware of possible State aid to the Beaulieu group. This was a fresh measure
taken by the Walloon region, and the Commission accordingly asked the Belgian central government for
information to enable it to assess the measure in the light of the rules in force. From the information
supplied, the Commission learnt that in December 1998 the Beaulieu group had settled a debt of
BEF I13 7l2O0O owed to the Walloon region by transferring 9 704 shares in Holding Verlipack lI, the
nominal value of which was BEF 100 million but the real value of which must have been significantly
lower, given the assets position of the company at the time. The Commission therefore doubted that a
private investor would have accepted this transaction.
3. Selectivity
366. To be caught byArticle 87(1) ofthe EC Treaty, a measure must not only be a State measure, but
it must also be selective, affecting the balance between the recipient firm and its competitors. This
selective character distinguishes State aid measures from general economic support measures which
apply across the board to all llrms in all sectors of activity in a Member State. As long as they do not
favour a particular area of economic activity, such general measures fall within the scope of Mernber
States' power to determine their economic policy. Consequently, measures that have a cross-sectoral
impact, being applicable throughout the territory of a Member State and to the whole economy, do not
constitute State aid for the purposes ofArticle 87(1).
367. In the Adria-Wien pipeline case, the Austrian Constitutional Cotrt (Verfassungsg,erichtshofl
asked the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling concerning the interpretation of Article 87, the
question being whether legislative measures adopted by a Member State which provide for a rebate of
energy taxes on natural gas and electricity, but grant that rebate only to undertakings whose activity is
shown to consist primarily in the manufacture of goods, are to be regarded as State aid within the
meaning ofArticle 87(1). The Court ofJustice concluded that, although objective, the criterion applied
by the national legislation was not justified by the nature or general scheme of that legislation and could
not therefore save the measure from being State aid.
('.") See the Commission paper on the application ofArticles 92 and93 to public authorities' holdings, Bulletin EC 9-1984,
also available on the Competition DG pages of the Europa web site.
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368. By contrast, the Commission decided that the Italian legislative measure designed to promote the
regularisation of firms and workers in the underground economy was a general measure for the purposes
of Article 87(l) of the Treaty('?3'q). The measure, which provides for tax concessions and reductions in
social security contributions, applies throughout Italy to all firms in all sectors that have not propedy
declared their employees and do not fully comply with statutory requirements regarding taxes and social
security contributions. The Commission found that the measure did not introduce any systematic
discrimination in terms of either the rules themselves (by identifying specific beneficiaries) or the way
they are applied (by conferring discretionary powers on the public authorities).
369. The Belgian measures providing for reductions in employers' social security contributions for
firms which introduce shorter working hours were also deemed to be a general measure (,'u). The rules
apply automatically to all firms in Belgium and to all private-sector workers and autonomous public
enterprises, and the public authorities do not have any discretionary power in applying the rules, which
do not contain any type of sectoral, regional or other specificity.
370. In the decision on the UK climate change levy (']a') (see 'Environment' below), the Commission
decided that a tax exemption for combined heat and power plants was not selective and therefore did not
constitute State aid for the purposes ofArticle 87(1) of the EC Treaty.
371. The German system under which companies are obliged to accumulate financial reserves for the
financing of future statutory obligations gave rise to a complaint on the application of this system to
nuclear power stations and their reserves for waste management and decommissioning ('?4,). The
Commission found that the German commercial code requires all undertakings to constitute reserves for
contingent liabilities. These rules are applied to all companies in the same way and cannot be restricted
by the discretionary power of the State. They therefore fall into the category of general measures and are
not caught by the State aid rules of the EC Treaty. The Commission accordingly declared the provisions
justified by the nature or general scheme of the German corporate tax system.
372. In its decision initiating formal investigation proceedings on Aland Island captive insurance
companies (C 55l200l), the Commission took the view that the selectivity criteria were met because the
beneficiaries of a corporate tax reduction were limited to companies active in captive insurance
operations, which represent only a segment of the insurance business.
373. In its preliminary assessment of the Dutch intemational financing activities scheme (C 5ll200l),
which provides for tax benefits linked to an international activity, the Commission also found that the
measure was selective because the benefit was limited to groups of companies operating in at least four
foreign countries or on two continents. Groups of companies which were internationally active but did
not fulfil the aforementioned criteria were not elisible for the measure.
374. Selectivity can also derive from the nationality of the company, as in 'Co-ordination centres of
foreign companies in Germany' (C 4712001) and 'Gibraltar exempt and qualifying companies' (C 5212001
and C 53/2001).
('?r') Case N 67412001, Commission decision of 13.1 1.2001, not yet published.('*, CaseN 23212001, Commission decision of 3.7.2001 (OJ C 268, 22.9.2001\.
(2ar) Case C 18/2001 (ex N 12312000), Commission decision of28.3.2001 (OJ C 185, 30.6.2001).("') Case NN 137 l20OI, Commission decision of 1 1.12.2001, not yet published.
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4. Effect on trade between Member States
3'tS. In a case conceming aid to road haulage companies in the Friuli-Venezia Giulia region ('z03), the
Court of First lnstance confirmed its case law with regard to two conditions for the application of
Article 87(l), namely that trade between Member States must be affected and competition distorted. The
Court pointed out that these two conditions are as a general rule inextricably linked. In particular, where
aid strengthens the position of an undertaking as compared with other undertakings competing in intra-
Community trade, the latter must be regarded as affected by that aid'
376. ln the case concerned, the Court recalled first that it is settled case law that even aid of a relatively
small amount is liable to affect trade between Member States in sectors with strong competition such as
the transport sector. Secondly, for the application ofArticle 87(l) it is sufficient that the aid threatens to
distort competition and is capable of affecting trade between Member States. The onus was therefore not
on the Commission to establish that the aid had affected the competitive position of certain haulage
undertakings in this case. The Court also pointed out that the essentially local activity of most recipients
of the aid was not such as to prevent the aid from having an effect on trade between Member States and
on competition, as from the partial opening-up of the cabotage market to competition' The aid
strength;ned the flnancial position of the road haulage sector and hence the scope of commercial road
haulage companies in the Friuli-Venezia Giulia region vis-ir-vis their competitors.
c 
- 
Assessing the compatibility of aid with the common market
1. Horizontal aid
1.1. Research and develoPment
3'17. The Commission declared an Italian aid project providing support for research and development
carried out in the field of non-volatile flash memories compatible with the cofilmon market, applying the
Community framework for State aid for research and development ('?*). On the basis of an expert
scientific ieport, the Commission found that the aid benef,ciary, ST Microelectronics, undertook
industrial research. As for the design of the new production processes, the Commission deemed this part
of the project to be precompetitive development.
378. The Commission has consistently held that an advance from the State, even if reimbursable ln the
event of the project proving successful, is State aid. The UK notification of an advance for an R&D
project being carried out by Rolls-Royce was accordingly examined in the light of the R&D framework.
The Commission held that the R&D project could partly be considered as not closer to the market than
precompetitive development. Based on an expert report, the Commission decided that the level of
iechnological risk required State support and therefore accepted that the aid had an incentive effect. As all
other criteria of the R&D framework were met, the Commission considered the aid to be compatibb with
the EC Treaty.
(:a') Judgment o1'4.4.2001 in Case T28819'7,120011ECR II-1169.
t'a) Case N 3212000. Commission decision of 11.4.2001 (OJ C 199, 14'1 '2W7)'
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379. In the area of lithography, which plays a key role in defining the precise structure of integrated
circuits, the Commission approved several R&D projects ('?4s).
1.2. Employment, training and working conditions
380. Denmark notified, as a measure introduced as part of its active labour market policy, a job
rotation scheme ("6) under which an employer or an employee may receive a grant covering part of the
salary costs if the employee participates in education or training as part of the scheme. Job rotation means
that an unemployed person receiving unemployment benefits takes over the job of the employee who is
temporarily absent on training. When the training is over, the trained person comes back to another job
with the same employer and the newly hired person may stay on. The Commission took the view that the
scheme did not favour certain undertakings or the production of certain goods. Thus, Article 87(l) of the
EC Treaty did not apply. The scheme needs to be seen in conjunction with a previous Commission
decision concerning an employment grant covering part of the salary for the newly hired person (o').
Both schemes together are an example of how to combine training and employment as a national policy
measure for the labour market.
381. In order to encourage employers to improve working conditions and the working environment
beyond the requirements of the legislation, Denmark notified a scheme under which a company active on
land, including road transport flrms (as opposed to offshore operations and shipping and air transport
companies), may receive a grant to compensate for the working environmental tax and to cover the costs
linked to the certification procedure ('o'). The Commission accepted the argument that the differentiation
between land-based firms and others can be justified by the nature or general scheme of the system.
Furthermore, the certification body has no scope for favouring certain undertakings or the production of
certain goods. The measure was therefore deemed not to be covered by Article 87(l) of the EC Treaty.
With regard to the exemption from the chargeable inspections in companies with particular
environmental problems, the Commission decided that it did not lead to a loss of revenue or higher costs
for the State. Accordingly, this measure was deemed not to fall under Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty
either.
1..3. Environment
382. The Commission had various opportunities to apply the new guidelines on State aid for
environmental protection, which were adopted in principle in December 2000 and published in the
Oflicial Journal on 3 February 2001 ('?1'). Pursuant to the Kyoto Protocol to the UN Framework
Convention on Climate Change adopted in December 1997, several Member States seek to reduce green
house gases by taxing environmentally unfriendly energy. The United Kingdom, for example, introduced
a climate change levy on the non-domestic use of energy. Various beneficiaries are charged reduced rates
or granted total exemption from the levy for a period of l0 years.
("') Case N 430/2001, Commission decision of 30.10.2001, not yet published, Case N 43312001, Commission decision of
30.10.2001, not yet published, Case N 801/2000, Commission decision of 18.7.2001 (OJ C 333, 28.11.2001). ln the first
two decisions, the Commission expressly stated that the aided projects could also have been allowed on the basis of
Article 87(3Xb) of the EC Treaty, since they could be considered important projects of common European interest within
the meaning of that provision.
("") Case N 23612001, Commission decision of 25.7.2001 (OJ C 268, 22.9.2001).
('o') Case N 35'711996 (OJ C 67, 4.3.1997), as amended in Case N 14211999 (OJ C 15l, 29.5.1999).("') Case N 24612001, Commission decision of 19.9.2001, not yet published.
c{) oJ c 37.3.2.2001.
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3g3. The uK notification on tax exemption/reduction from the climate change levy ("0) raised an arra{
of different state aid questions, one of which (exemption for dual-use fuels) led to the initiation of formal
investigation Proceedings.
384. In the Dutch 'green electricity'case ('?5r), concerning electricity suppliers who contracted with a
generatof of energy sources such as wind energy, hydro power up to 10 MW tidal power or wave energy'
ihe Commission accepted the argument that the exemption was justified by the nature or general scheme
of the tax system. As ih" p.odu.iion of green electricity does not contribute to long-cycle CO, emissions'
it is logicai that the CO, tax does not apply. Therefore, this tax exemption falls outside the scope of
appliciion of Article 8(1) of the EC Treaty. Nevertheless, the Commission continued to examine the
uranotheDutchmeasuresapplyingtheguidelinesonenvironmentalaid.
385. For the uK levy, compatibility was assessed, for the f,rst time, on the basis of 'operating aid in
the form of tax reductrons or exemptions and based on the conclusion of agreements between the
Member State and the aid recipients' 1x:;. In the Dutch green electricity case, compatibility was assessed
on the basis of the ruIes applicable to existing taxes. As all conditions set out in the environmr:ntal
guidelines were fully met, th; Commission did not raise any objections to these types of exemptions'
3g6. The second UK notification ofparticular interest in this area was a total tax exemption from the
climate change levy for f,ve years for niatural gas in Northern Ireland ('?53)' The Commission recognised
the specific Jituation of the natural gas market in Northern lreland, i.e. infant industry (since 1996)'
40-7:0 vo higher gas prices than in the rest of the united Kingdom, lack of a gas infrastructure'
marginal share of gas in energy consumption (2.4 7o), and acknowledged that a climate change levy for
gas ivould add further obstacles to this already precarious but environmentally preferable markel' and
that, if businesses were tndeed encouraged to substitute gas for coal, oil or electricity, this had the
potential to lead to a significant reduction in CO, emissions due to the relatively small share of gas in
iotal energy consumption. The Commission also accepted the United Kingdom's argument that
infrastructure development for gas may proceed only if there is a business market for gas' In approving
favourable conditions in ordeito deveiop such demand, the Commission's decision indirectly also
supports the development of a gas infrastructure in Northern Ireland'
3g7. A Belgran measure, resfficted to the Flemish region, introduces green certificates for gteen etrergy
producers. Although the Commission found that the issuing of green certificates by the Flemish authorities
did not involve State resogrces (see 'Origin of resources' above), it continued assessing the notified
measure on the basis of the environmental guidelines and declared it compatible with the conlmon
market (2sr). The same approach was taken for measures adopted by the united Kingdom requiring
electricity suppliers in Scotland, England and Wales to ensure that a proportion of electricity supplied to
customeis in Great Britain is from renewable sources of energy ('?55). The measures also require suppliers
who do not have a sufficient amount of green electricity certif,cates to make payments to a fund set up
and run by the State. The revenues of this fund will be distributed to the suppliers' The Commission
considered that the redistribution mechanism was State aid. As the rules governing the redistribution
@ommissiondecisionof28.3.2001(oJC1s5,30.6.2001),("') Case NN 30/8/2000, Commission decision of 28'1 1'200l, not yet published'
(r,r) On this point, see also Case N B4)lN2}(n,Commission decision of 6.6.2001 and its corrigendum, Commission decision
of 17.10.2001 ( OJ C 358' 15.12.2001).
ix') Case N 660/4/2000, Commission decision of 18'7 2001 (OJ C263' 19'9'2001)'
C') Case N 550/2000, Commission decision of 25 7'2001 (OJ C 330' 24'11''2001)'("') Case N 5}4t2}O},Commission decision of 28.1 1'2001, not yet published'
COMPETITION REPORT 2OO1
xxxlsT REPoRT oN coMPETtTtON POLTCY 2001 
- 
SEC(2002) 462 FTNAL 117
mechanism were in line with the environmental guidelines, the Commission declared them compatible
with the Treaty.
388. The UK notification on an emission trading scheme to reduce green house gas emissions was
considered to be compatible with the guidelines on State aid for environmental protection ("0). The
trading system allows target holders from different mechanisms to trade emission allowances among
themselves and with other participants. Emission allowances are allocated to participants free of charge.
The notification was also interesting as, besides the trading scheme, the United Kingdom provides grants
to companies in retum for absolute emission reductions for which they bid in an auction. The United
Kingdom argued that such grants were necessary as an incentive, and the Commission declared them
compatible with the environmental guidelines because and so long as no EU-wide compulsory scheme
existed on this subject.
1.4. Rescue and restructuring
389. In1999, the Commission proposed appropriate measures to all Member States in connection with
the Community guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty. All Member
States accepted them. One of the measures proposed was to bring existing rescue and restructuring aid
schemes in operation in some Member States into conformity with the new guidelines. In 2000, the
Commission had to enter into a bilateral dialogue with several Member States on changes to their
existing aid schemes. In relation to Germany ('?5?), the Member State with the most such schemes, the
Commission took note in 2001 that the aid schemes in question had been brought into conformity with
the new guidelines.
390. On 28 March, in Case C 41199, the Commission closed investigations into one of the biggest and
most diflicult cases of State aid in eastern Germany. In March 1996, the Commission allowed aid to be
given to the Lintra holding company and its eight subsidiaries. A plan to privatise the group subsequently
collapsed. The Commission concluded that DEM 623 million in aid was nevertheless granted in
accordance with the restructuring plan for the group and complied with the Commission decision
authorising assistance. However, a sum of DEM 35 million was misused and must be recovered from the
recipients, the Lintra holding companies and its subsidiaries. State aid to several of the Lintra subsidiaries
is being looked at in separate proceedings.
391. On 8 May, in Case C 112000, the Commission authorised a subordinated loan from the state-run
Kreditanstalt fiir WiederauJbaa ('KfW') of EUR 76.7 million (DEM 150 million) and an 80 Vo federal
guarantee for a loan of EUR 63.9 million (DEM 125 million) for the German construction company
Philipp Holzmann AG. The Commission came to the conclusion that the restructuring measures were
appropriate to restore the company's long-term viability and to deal with past mistakes. In that context, the
Commission took into account modifications to the original plan and authorised a one-year credit line of
DEM 125 million (EUR 63.9 million) provided by the Kreditanstalt fiirWiederauJbau at the end of 2000.
("') Case N 416/2001, Comrnission decision of 28. I 1.2001, not yet published.
("') CmesE4/2001 (exN297/01,exN81/93),E52001 (exN591/90),86/2001 (exN77/90),8712001 (exN18193),8812001,
E912007(exN512/91),E10/2001 (exN594i91),Ell/2ffiI (exN627/91),Ely200l(exN255/90),E73|ZOO1
(exN 155/88),8 1412001 (ex N 442191), E 1512001 (ex N 24i95), E 161200l (exN 73193), El'7l200l (ex N 413/91),
E 18i2001 (ex NN 8l/90), E 20l2OOl (ex N 18/83), E 2l/2001 (ex N 81/95, ex N 851/96), E22|2OOI (ex N 901/96),
E23l2ffil(exNl8l/95,exN79/98),E24l2OOl(exN400/94,exN997/95),E25lZOOl(exN219/96),82612001
(ex N 75195, ex N 420197, ex NN 106197),82712001 (ex N 599/96), E 2812001 (ex N 181/97, ex N 117/95,exN 767195),
E2912001(exN711/95,exN618/96),E30/2001(exN629/96),E3ll2ffil(exN337/96),832/2001(exN452i97),
E33l2OOl (ex NN 74195, ex N 370/97), E 3412001 (ex N 183i94).
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392. On 3 July, in Case C 33198, the Commission took a partly negative decision regarding aid granted
ro Babcock Wilcox Espafla ('BWE'). In April 1998 the Commission had initiated a formal investigation
under the State aid rules of the EC Treaty into two capital increases, both of EUR60.I million
(ESP l0 000 million), that the Sociedad Estatal de Participaciones Industriales (SEPD had contributed
in 1994 and 1997 to its wholly owned subsidiary BWE. In July 1999, the Commission decided to extend
the procedure to include under the investigation a new capital increase of EUR 246.4 million
(ESP 41 000 million) notified by the Spanish authorities. Finally, in July 2000 the Commission extended
the procedure again to cover aid of EUR 463.5 million in total (ESP 77 I l0 million) proposed under the
privatisation arangements between SEPI and Babcock Borsig AG. The Commission decided to prohibit
the aid of EUR 21.44 million that the Spanish authorities intended to grant to the ongoing business for
future investments in the equity of joint ventures through which it will contract future orders. The
Commission judged that, unlike other assisted investments included in the industrial plan, this
disbursement was very close to the market, formed part of the commercial policy of the company and,
consequently, its assistance by the State could seriously distort competition to an extent contrary to the
common interest.
393. On 30 October, in Case C 3612000, after a thorough investigation which started in June 2000, the
Commission took a negative final decision on aid to the German porcelain manufacturer Graf von
Henneberg GmbH located in Thuringia. The Commission ordered recovery of some EUR 71.3 million
(DEM 139.4 million), which was found to constitute incompatible and illegal aid. In line with its
practice, the Commission decided that the Graf von Henneberg company in its present form was jointly
liable with its predecessor for the recovery of all the incompatible aid.
2. Regional aid
394. The Commission closed the formal investigation proceedings on the investment allowance law
(Investitionslulagengesetz) 1999 for the new German kinder, including Berlin (?58). This law is the most
important regional aid scheme for east German companies. A positive decision was made possible due to
several amendments of the German law, introduced in the course of the investigation proceedings. In
particular, Germany accepted the distinction between initial investment, for which investment aid can be
given, and replacement investment, which ranks as operating aid. Specific conditions for operating aid
were added (aid intensity of a maximum of 5 Vo, no more operating aid after 31 December 2004). The
German law was also amended to bring it into line with the geographical coverage of aid and the
maximum amount of aid intensities set out in the Commission decisions on the German regional aid map
(maximum aid intensities varying between l0 and 27.5 Vo, depending on whether the aid beneficiary is an
SME and/or is located in an Interreg Itr region bordering the Czech Republic or Poland). In this respect, the
labour market region of Berlin needs to be looked at separately. The labour market region consists of Berlin
city and its periphery (which is part of the ktnd of Brandenburg) and is a region covered by Arlicle 87(3Xc)
of the EC Treaty, unlike the east German kinde4 which are Article 87(3Xa) regions. Aid intensity for the
labour market region of Berlin is therefore only up to 20 7o netfor investment aid, and there is no possibility
of granting operating aid.
395. The main regional aid scheme for Flanders ("n) was approved by the Commission without the need
to initiate formal investigation proceedings. The primary aim of the Aid scheme for large and medium-
sized firms in regional aid areas covered by Article 87(3)(c) of the EC Treaty (Economic Expansion Law
of 30.12"1970)' is to encourage business investment. Under the scheme, the Commission approved the
C*) CaseC72198(exN702/97),N671/99,E5/98,Commissiondecisionof28.2.2O0l,notyetpublished.
(,'") CaseN715/2000,Commissiondecisionof21.12.2000, lettertotheMemberStatedated7.2.20Ol,(OJC244,1.9.2001).
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leasing of a building as an eligible investment cost, i.e. as a fixed capital cost rather than current
expenditure of a company, but only if each of the following conditions are satisfied: the leasing contracts
must be included as fixed assets in the balance sheet of the aid beneficiary; the lessee must apply
depreciation on the leased assets; the length of the leasing contract must be at least five years; the leasing
contract must not cover current expenditure (e.g. maintenance costs or insurance costs).
396. Under the UK regional selective assistance scheme ('?n), the Commission again accepted leasing
of a building as a fixed capital cost. The conditions to be met are: the lease must be for a minimum period
of eight years and relate to the building only, excluding all ancillary operating costs such as rates,
cofilmon services, insurance, repairs and utilities. In order to calculate the value of the lease, the rental
payments over at least eight years will be discounted to give a figure of the net present value of the rental
commitment.
397. An Italian notification(,u') gave rise to an interesting debate on the definition of initial
investment. The relevant fiscal scheme does not make explicit reference to initial investment as deflned in
points 4.4 and 4.6 of the guidelines on national regional aid. It does, howeveq put forward a technical
definition of eligible investment as being the net investment calculated as fhe difference between: a firm's
gross investment in new assets during a given reference period (representing the increase in the flrm's
production capacity) and the total amounts of sales, write-offs and depreciation of all the firm's assets
during the same reference period (representing the decrease in the firm's production capacity). In order to
determine investment, the scheme thus deducts from total gross investment the replacement investment
carried out to restore the firm's production capacity, minus the sales, write-offs and depreciation of all the
assets during a given period. On the basis of this definition, the Commission accepted that the investment
eligible for the aid was equivalent to initial investment within the meaning of the guidelines on national
regional aid.
398. By contrast, the Commission decided that the definition (investment in new material fixed assets)
applied in a number of Spanish laws ('?6?) could not be deemed equivalent to initial investment within the
meaning of the guidelines, because the expenditure could cover replacement investment, which ranks as
operating aid.
399. In seven cases, the Commission had to initiate formal investigation proceedings against
unnotified Spanish tax aid schemes ('o'). The argument that the exemptions could be justified by the
nature and general scheme of the tax system was rejected by the Commission. In three cases ('?s), the
Commission refuted the argument that the tax scheme under examination should be considered to be
existing aid. The Commission found that there was new aid because the schemes under scrutiny either
contained substantial modifications or were not connected at all to tax schemes existing before the
accession of Spain to the EU. In three cases (concerning reductions of the amount of tax payable of up to
45 Vo of an investment made (26a)), the Commission took the view that the aid was partly investment aid
and partly operating aid, and in four cases (concerning 'fiscal holidays', i.e. sliding-scale reductions of
('u") CaseN73l/2000,Commission decisionof 25.4.2001 (OJC211,28.7.2001').
('u') Case N 6461N2ffi0, Commission decision of 13.3.2001 (OJ C 149, 19.5.2001).
(?6:) Cases C 48 I 1999. C 53 | 1999 and C 54 I 7999, see below.
(,u,) Case C 48tI999, Commission decision of 11.7.2C07, not yet published, Case C 4911999, Commission decision of
71.7.2O0I, not yet published, Case C 50/1999, Commission decision of 71,.7.2001, not yet published, Case C 5111999,
Commission decision of 11.7.2001, not yet published, Case C 5211999, Comrnission decision of 11.7.2001, not yet
published, Case C 53/1999, Commission decision of 11.7 .2001, not yet published, Case C 5411999, Commission decision
of 1.1.7.2007, not yet published.
('?*) Cases C 48 | 7999. C 53 / 1999. C 5 41 1999, see above.
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the basic taxable amount over four consecutive tax periods ('u')), it found that the aid was operating aid.
In none ofthe cases did it consider the aid compatible under any derogation provided for in the Treaty,
and it asked Spain to recover the illegal aid.
400. In 1998, the Commission proposed appropriate measures to all Member States in connection with
the guidelines on national regional aid. In 1999 and 2000, the Commission had to enter into a bilateral
dialogue with several Member States in order to bring their existing regional aid schemes into line with the
exact wording and meaning of the provisions in the regional aid guidelines. [n relation to Italy ('uo) and
Germany (201), a falrr number of such administrative co-operative measures ended this year with a letter
from the Commission taking note of the fact that the regional aid scheme in question had been brought
into line with the regional aid guidelines.
401. In addition, the Commission took a number of decisions under the multisectoral framework on
regional aid for large investment projects ('n'). On 8 May, in Case N 78312000, the Commission decided
not to raise any objections to proposed aid amounting to EUR 119 080 000 for Wacker Chemie GmbH
Niinchritz, for the extension and modernisation of the former Hiils AG silicone plant. The Commission
concluded that the proposed 26.77 7o GGE intensity was below the maximum aid intensity allowable
under the multisectoral framework for this particular project. In assessing the compatibility of the aid" the
Commission took into account the market situation, the number of jobs directly created by the prcrject
and the beneficial effects of the investment on the economies of the assisted regions ('un). On 18 July, in
Case N 18412000, the Commission approved EUR 27.6 million in investment aid for Kartogroup in
Leuna, Saxony-Anhalt. The investment concerned the setting-up of a tissue plant to produce toilet
paper and kitchen towels. The total investment costs amounted to EUR 85 million (DEM 166 million)
and the aid approved represented 35 Vo of the eligible investment costs. The investment project creates
154 permanent jobs in an area suffering from high unemployment. The Commission approved the aid,
since it found it to be compatible with the multisectoral framework on regional aid for large investment
projects.
3. Sectoral aid
3.1. Sectors subject to specific rules
3.1.1. Shipbuilding
402. In accordance with Article 3(l) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1540198 establishing new rules
on aid to shipbuilding ("u), no new operating aid to shipbuilding has been authorised since the start
of 2001.
403. In line with its position of 29 November, the Commission implemented its two-pronged strategy
to defend the Community shipbuilding industry from alleged subsidies granted by Korea to its
shipbuilding industry. On the one hand, it carried out investigations under the trade barriers
('u') Cases C 4911 999, C 5Ol 1,999, C 5 1 / 1999, C 52/ 1999, see above.('") CasesN272198,NN132/93,N307/96,NN61/93,NN88/93,N26/98,N487/95,N747197,N659tat97,N288i96and
c27t89.
('o') Cases N 711195 md N 618/96.
c*) oJC 101,7.4.1997.
('o') The ceiling for regional aid in the assisted area concemed is 35 7o gross for large companies.
(,n, oJ L 202. 18.7.1998.
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regulation C") (TBR) and prepared its action against Korea in the WTO. On the other hand, it proposed a
regulation for a temporary defensive mechanism ('??'z).
404. The proposed temporary defensive mechanism (TDM) is an exceptional measure, designed to
support the Commission's action against Korea under the WTO agreement on subsidies and
countervailing measures. It will not become effective until the Commission starts the WTO action against
Korea and would cease to be effective if the Community and Korea reach an agreement on this matter. It
would, in any case, expire on 31 December 2002.
405. The Industry Council of 5 December was unable to adopt the TDM. Accordingly, the
Commission has not yet started the WTO action against Korea. However, it will update its TBR
investigations during the first half of 2002.
406. On 25 July, the Commission decided to declare unnotified State aid for the investors in the ship
'Le Levant'incompatible with the common market ('?73). The ship had been financed by private investors
whose property it still was. The ship was operated by the firm CIL, which was also to become the
eventual owner. The investors had been entitled to deduct their investment costs from their taxable
income in accordance with a tax scheme ('Loi Pons'). For this kind of project, the Commission must
verify the development content of the project. In this case, the Commission took the view that the vessel
would not contribute in any significant way to the development of SainrPierre-et-Miquelon. As the
unlawful aid had abeady been granted, it had to be recovered. The Commission considered that the
investors, as the direct beneficiaries and current owners of the ship, should repay the aid.
407. The Commission decided to extend a formal investigation on the restructuring of Spanish
shipbuilding to include all transactions that led to the creation of the shipbuilding group ZAR ("'). The
Commission doubts whether the prices paid by the State-owned military shipbuilding group Bazan
(which then changed its name to IZAR) for a number of shipyards bought from the State-owned civil
shipbuilding group Astilleros Espanoles (AESA) and from the State holding company Sociedad Estatal
de Participationes Industriales (SEPI) were genuine market transactions and therefore might constitute
aid to the new IZAR group. The Commission doubts whether such aid would be compatible with the
shipbuilding aid rules. It therefore decided to extend the investigation procedure already initiated
concerning a transaction whereby AESA sold two shipyards and a motor factory to SEPI.
3.1.2. Steel
408. The sixth steel aid code, which remains in force until the ECSC Treaty expires in JuJy 2002,
allows aid to be granted in only a limited number of cases, namely for research and development, for
environmental protection and to finance social measures in connection with plant closures.
409. The Commission approved aid for environmental protection for the following ECSC steel
companies: Voest Alpine Linz (EUR 1.6 million), Voest Alpine Donawitz (EUR 2.6 million), Bcihler
Edelstahl (EUR 348 830) and several Spanish companies. It adopted a negative decision against aid for
BRE.M.A Warmwalzwerk (EUR 622 564), since no deduction had been made as to the savings generated
by the investment, as required by the annex to the steel aid code.
('?7r) Council Regulation (EC) No 3286/94 (OJL349,31.72.1994)
C?r) COM (2001) 401 frnal; OJ C 304 E, 30.10.2001.("') CaseCT4/99.
('??') Case C 40/00, decision of28.11.2001.
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410. The Commission approved R&D aid for Corus Technology BV (EUR 166 661), Sidmar NV
(EUR 505 620), Stahlwerke Bremen (EUR 290 828) and Cogne Acciai Speciale (EUR 2.58 million). It
adopted a negative decision against aid for Eko Stahl (EUR 399 004), since it considered that this
company would merely function as a 'testing ground'for the other participants in an R&D project.
4ll. The Commission also took two final decisions conceming Georgsmarienhtitte Holding GmbH
and Gr<iditzer Stahlwerke GmbH and found that no aid was involved in the manasement contract and the
sale of assets.
3.1.3. Coal
412. Four Member States currently produce coal in the EU. Because of unfavourable geological
conditions, most EU mines are not competitive against imported coal. Nevertheless, the Member States
concerned choose to support their coal mining industry mainly on social and regional policy grounds.
State aid to the coal industry is governed by Decision 3632/93|ECSC ("'), which sets forth the terms and
conditions under which such aid may be granted. Member States notify State aid on an annual basis. The
Commission carefully screens the applications before authorising them. This arrangement will apply
until the expiration of the ECSC treaty.
413. On 25 July, the Commission adopted a proposal for a Council regulation on State aid to the coal
industry ('??6) to deal with State aid to be granted beyond 23 July 2002.
414. The Commission authorised State aid schemes allowing Germany (r"), France (r"), Spain ("0) and the
United Kingdom (40) to grant the necessary public funding of the coal industry for the year 2001. The aid
covers the difference between production costs and the price of internationally traded coal and also
compensation for the payment of social security costs.
3.1.4. Motor vehicle industry
415. On 13 November, the Commission decided to extend the period of validity of the Community
framework for State aid to the motor vehicle industry (OJ C 279, 15.9.1997). All Member States agreed
to the extension. The extension is valid for one year, i.e. until 31 December 2002, unless the new
multisectoral framework on regional aid for large investment projects, replacing the specific sectoral
framework for the motor vehicle industry. enters into force before that date.
416. On 17 January, the Commission authorised regional investment aid of GBP 40 million for Nis.san
Motor Manufacturing Ltd ('?8'). The aid is regional investment aid for the conversion of the car plant in
Sunderland (United Kingdom) for production of the new 'Micra' model. The Commission's initial
doubts, which had led to the initiation of formal investigation proceedings in September 2000, had not
been borne out.
("') ot L 329, 30.12.7993.
C*) COM (2$1) 423 frnal; OJ C 304 E, 30.10.2001.("') Case N l/2001, Commission decision of 2l. [2.2000 (OJ L 127, 9.5.2001).("') Case N3/200 1, Commission decision of 23.5.200 1 (OJ L 239, 7 .9.2001).
("n) Case N2/2001, Commission decision of I 1.12.2001, not yet published.
('*o) Case N4i2001, Commission decision of 8.5.2001 (OJ L 247, 11.9.2001), Case N6/2001, Commission decision of
25.7.2001' (OJ L 305, 22.ll.2Dl), and Cases N7i2001 and N8/2001, Commission decision of 17.10.2001. nol vet
published.
('?3r) Case C 51/2000.
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417. On 6 June, the Commission took a negative final decision regarding research and development
aid that the Italian authorities were proposing to grant to IVECO SpA, a subsidiary of the Fiat group. The
planned aid amounted to EUR l6million in nominal terms towards an EUR lllmillion investment
project for the renewal and expansion of IVECO's range of light vehicles.
418. The Commission concluded that the planned aid was not necessary for IVECO to develop the
new light van range. While the project led to an improved product compared with the previous model, the
innovative cbancter of tlte investnent was limited to what is cofilmon in the motor vehicle industry in the
context of the development and launch of new models.
419. Under the rules governing R&D aid, aid can be granted if it serves as an incentive for firms to
undertake R&D activities in addition to their normal day-to-day operations. If the development of a new
model or range of models were to be considered research activities deserving aid, every car manufacturer
could claim R&D aid for every new model it brings to the market. The public subsidy would then simply
amount to operating aid and would not achieve its goal of inducing firms to pursue research which they
would not otherwise have pursued.
420. On 23 October, the Commission authorised a capital injection for the Spanish motor vehicle
manufacturer Santana Motor carried out in 1999, since the measure did not constitute State aid. The
Commission also partially approved investment aid for Santana in relation to its 1998-2006 strategic
plan.
421. Where capital injections for companies involve public resources, the Commission has to ensure
that the measure does not contain any State aid element. To do so, the Commission carries out an in-depth
investigation to establish whether the profitability and growth prospects of the company justify the capital
injection from the point of view of a market economy investor. In this instance, the Commission
concluded that Santana's profitability prospects were good enough to justify the capital injection. The
Commission therefore decided that the capital injection did not constitute aid.
422. Regarding regional investment aid granted to Santana Motor, the Commission concluded that the
aid was compatible with the common market insofar as it complied with the limits above which a more
detailed assessment under the specific rules goveming aid to the motor vehicle industry becomes
necessary. The maximum amount of aid that could be granted was fixed at EUR 8.68 million.
423. On 28 February, after conducting the formal investigation procedure, the Commission authorised
regional investment aid of ITL 78 billion (EUR 40 million) for the production of the new 'Punto' model
at the Fiat plant in Melfi (southern Italy). The Commission studied the geographical mobility of the
project and concluded that the Fiat group's plant at Tychy in Poland would have been a viable altemative.
To assess the proportionality of the aid, a 'cost-benefit analysis' was carried out. The cost-benefit analysis
compared the costs of the project at Melfi with those of the alternative location. As the proposed aid
intensity was both below the regional aid ceiling and the regional handicap intensity, i.e. the exfia
cost for locating the production in Melfi rather than in Poland, the Commission concluded that the
rules laid down in the Community framework for State aid to the motor vehicle industry had been
complied with and that the aid was compatible with the Treaty.
424. On 20 December, following formal investigation proceedings, the Commission decided that
Germany must reduce regional investment aid to be granted to DaimlerChrysler for the consffuction of a
new engine plant in Kiilleda (Thuringia), an assisted area pursuant to Article 87(3Xa).
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425. As regards the necessity of the aid, Germany stated that the investment could be carried out at an
alternative site in Hungary (in Nyergesrijfalu). On the basis of the documents received, the Commission
concluded that the site in Hungary was a credible commercial alternative. As regards the proportionality
of the aid, the assessment of the cost-benefit analysis showed that K<illeda had a regional handicap ratio
of 31.93 Vo, which was lower than initially indicated by Germany. Due to the signiflcant increase in
production capacity, the allowable aid ratio was further reduced by one percentage point to 30.93 7o.
Consequently, the Commission could only authorise an aid amount of 30.93 Vo of the eligible investment
of EUR 185 million (net present value), which corresponded to EUR 57.22 mlllion (net present value).
The remaining EUR 6.58 million in notified aid was considered incompatible with the common market.
426. On 18 July, following formal investigation proceedings, the Commission decided to reduce
planned regional investment aid to be granted to Volkswagen for a new car plant in Dresden. The
assembly of the new model and the intermediate storage centre were planned to be located in Dresden
and the new bodyshop and paintshop in nearby Mosel, both assisted areas pursuant to Article 87(3)(a).
427. As regards the necessity of the aid, the Commission concluded, on the basis of the documents
received during the proceedings, that production in the Czech Republic (in Prague and Kvasiny) had been
considered by the company as a credible commercial alternative. The Commission based its assessment
of the proportionality of the aid on two separate cost-benefit analyses: for the Dresden and Prague sites
on the one hand, and for Mosel and Kvasiny on the other. As regards the investment in Mosel, the
planned aid intensity was lower than both the regional handicap and the regional aid ceiling. The
Commission therefore authorised an aid amount of DEM 65 million for Mosel. As regards the investment
in Dresden, the aid intensity proposed by Germany exceeded the regional handicap. Consequently, the
Commission authorised an aid amount of DEM 80 million, whereas an excess amount of DEM
25.7 million was considered incompatible with the common market.
3.1.5. Transport
Rail
428. The Commission has for some years pursued a policy of shifting the balance between modes of
transport and promoting modes that are less damaging to the environment in order to achieve a
sustainable transport system. In its recent White Paper on a common transport policy, the Commission
recalled that rail transport was the strategic sector on which the success of the efforts to shift the balance
will depend. The Commission will therefore continue to take a favourable approach to aid in the rail
sector, both with regard to rail services and, in particular, to investments in rail infrastructure which, due
to heavy investments costs, are not viable without public co-financing.
429. In line with its common transport policy, the Commission decided, on 13 February, to raise no
objections to the United Kingdom's decision to award public grants to a number of projects. The purpose
of the projects is to demonstrate to a wider public that rail can be an efficient and viable mode of
transport and an altemative to, in particular, road (N 68712000, Innovative solutions in rail logistics) (282).
Furthermore, on 19 September, it authorised a substantial amount of aid to the infrastructure manager in
the United Kingdom to help it finance a renewals investment prograrnme on the principal railway
network infrastructure (N 500/2001 UK Network Grants) (283).
("') Comission decision of 13.2.2001.
('"') Commission decision of 19.9.2001 (OJ C 333, 28.11.2001).
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Maritime transport
430. The Commission authorised a number of aid schemes for the employment of Community seamen
during the year. The pulpose of the measures, which help to reduce wage costs, is to enable shipping
companies to stand up to international competition without having to resort in large numbers to flying the
flags of countries where taxation and social security contributions impose less of a burden on shipowners.
The measures also help to safeguard the employment of Community seamen so as to maintain seagoing
know-how and a high level of safety in the sector.
431. On 8 February, the Commission authorised France to extend beyond 2001 the scheme for the
reimbursement of employers' social security contributions paid by shipping companies, authorised by the
Commission in 1999 for a period of three years. Under the scheme, companies which employ ship crews
and whose ships face intemational competition are reimbursed the social security contributions for old
age, sickness and accident risks paid, the previous year, to the bodies responsible for collecting such
contributions.
432. On 30 April, the Commission authorised France to introduce a further aid measure in support of
the employment of Community seafarers by allowing family allowance contributions and unemployment
insurance contributions to be refunded to shipping companies.
433. On 6March, the Commission authorised Finland to repay to shipowners the employers'
contributions paid toward the seafarers'pension fund, unemployment insurance, accident insurance, life
assurance and leisure time insurance. The aid measures apply to all ships registered as being used in
international trade, including, subject to certain conditions, tugs and pusher craft. In both cases, the
measures apply only to ocean-going ships.
434. On 28 February, the Commission decided to initiate Article 88(2) proceedings in order to assess
aid measures to compensate for the public service obligations performed by SNCM ('*). The decision
was taken in the light of new information provided to the Commission under the investigation
proceedings initiated in 1998 in respect of aid which Corsica Marittima, a subsidiary of SNCM, was
believed to be receiving from the French State for the transport of passengers between France and Italy
on the Genoa-Bastia and Livomo-Bastia routes (285).
435. On 30 October, the Commission decided to teminate the two proceedings jointly. It concluded
that, since the subsidies granted to SNCM had not exceeded the costs bome by it in providing public
maritime services to Corsica, as laid down by the public authorities, it could be concluded that there were
no cross-subsidies to SNCM's subsidiary Corsica Marittima. The Commission's investigation also
showed that the rents paid by Corsica Marittima were determined on market terms. The Commission also
asked France to inform it, before the entry into force of the new contract on public maritime services to
Corsica, of the measures taken for the structural adaptation of SNCM to the new market conditions
resulting from the application of Article 4 of Regulation (EEC) No 3577192.
436. On 20 June, the Commission terminated the proceedings initiated in August 1999 in respect of
aid granted by Italy to Tinenia di Navigazione from 1990 to the end of 2000, having concluded that fhe
aid was eligible for the derogation provided for in Article 86(2) of the Treafy for undertakings entrusted
with the operation of services of general economic interest. The Commission noted that the aid granted
by Italy was compensation which was necessary and proportionate to the task entrusted to Tirrenia di
("') Case C 1412001,O1 C 117 (21.4.2001).
('"') Case C 78/98, OJ C 62, 4.3.1999.
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Navigafione of guaranteeing a sufficient level of regular services to and from certain ports in Sicily and
Sardinia throughout the year.
437. In order to take account of the changes in the market due to the liberalisation of coastal shipping
since I January 1999 and the recent anival of new operators, the Commission decided that the
compensation paid to Tirrenia di Navigazione as from I January 2001 would be limited to cover of the
deficit incurred during the provision of the services which represent commitments entered into by Italy
for the period 200H4. These provide for a reduction in the number of services operated by Tirrenia di
Navigazione in order to allow more room for other operators on commercially viable routes.
438. On 25 July, the Commission authorised the aid granted by Spain to the Trasmediterranea
shipping company under the public service contract agreed with the State in 1978. The Commission also
authorised aid compensating the company for public service obligations between the Canary Islands
which it took on in 1998.
439. The Commission took the view that the aid resulting from the liquidation of the public service
contract concluded in 1978 between Trasmediterranea andthe Spanish State was existing aid. The aid
was linked to the rights and obligations arising during the period covered by the contract and represented
the balance of compensation due to Trasmediterranea for providing maritime cabotage services from
1978 until the end of 1997 under the contract.
440. On 18 July, the Commission decided to terminate the proceedings pursuant to Article 88(2) of the
Treaty which it had initiated and extended, respectively, on 3 September 1993, 23 June 1996 and
2l January 1999 in respect ofaid granted to the port sector in Italy between 1992 and 1998 (16). In 1991,
the Italian government began a far-reaching structural reform of the sector. As part of the reform,
substantial aid was granted for the purpose of dismantling the existing system and allowing the sector to
be opened up to competition. In its final decision, the Commission concluded that aid amounting to
EUR 120 million paid by Italy to port undertakings, companies and groups, in the form of subsidies
intended to wipe out the debts and cover the deficits of such undertakings, companies and groups, was
incompatible with the common market and must be recovered by Italy. However, the Commission
concluded that the aid granted by Italy for the payment of severance pay and early retirement
contributions for the departure of dock workers belonging to dock-work companies did not constitute aid
within the meaning of Article 87 of the Treaty. Similarly, the measures adopted by Italy in respect of the
Cassa integraTione guadagni straordinaria (special earnings supplement fund), invalidity severance pay
and the Cassa di soggiorno di Dovadola (holiday fund) to preserve dock workers'social security rights
did not constitute aid within the meaning of Article 87 of the Treaty.
441. On 20 December, the Commission approved the extension of the UK scheme Freight Facilities
Grants to coastal and short-sea-shipping, as well as the Port of Rosyth project (,8?), which became the
first application of the State aid rules to port infrastructure. The Commission normally considers that
state financing of infrastructure open to all potential users in a non-discriminatory way and managed by
the state does normally not fall under Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty. From the Court of First Instance's
judgment in Adroports de Paris v Commission of the European Communities ('?88), one may draw the
conclusion that the management and provision of infrastructure facilities may constitute an economic
activity for the purposes of Article 87(l) of the Treaty. However, state support for an infrastructure
manager chosen by an open and non-discriminatory procedure for construction and maintenance of
(:36) Cases C 27193 andC 81/98 (OJ L 312, 29.11.2001).
('?3?) CaseN649/2001.
(:"*) Case T-128l98 ECR II-3929.
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transport infrastructure represents a market price and does not normally tigger the application of
Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty. The FFG scheme and the Port of Rosyth project were authorised under
Article 87(3)(c) of the EC Treaty.
Inland waterway transpo rt
442. The White Paper on European transport policy for 2010 (8) sets out the broad lines and priorities
of Community transport policy. It calls for priority to be given to shifting the balance between modes of
transport. This is to be done by promoting modes of transport that are less harmful to the environment
and have unused capacity available, such as inland waterway transport. Inland waterway transport is safe,
clean and efficient in terms of energy consumption and has large unused capacity available. Switching
the transport of goods from road to inland waterways is therefore in the common interest within the
meaning of Article 87(3Xc) of the EC Treaty. Council Regulation (EC) No 718/1999 also seeks to
encourage Member States to take a number of measures to promote inland waterway transport ('?*').
443. Aid granted to the inland waterway sector during the year came from aid schemes intended to
encourage the adaptation of the inland waterway fleet to market requirements, as in France ("'), or to
promote the establishment, extension and bringing into operation oflinks between industrial plants and
inland waterways so as to bring about a modal shift to inland waterway transport, as in the
Netherlands (p'?). In the latter case, the Commission took the view that what was involved was public co-
financing of infrastructures for which there was no competitive market. State intervention was thus
justified, since it met the needs of coordination of transport, in line with Article 73 of the EC Treaty.
444. In addition, the Commission authorised State aid for the building of loading and unloading
facilities (transhipment terminals) along the Flemish inland waterways, the purpose of which was to
make inland waterways more accessible and to increase the use of this mode of transport (t"). In its
decision, the Commission nofed, in particular, that inland watetway transport requfued heavy investment
in infrastructure in order to perform eff,ciently and that such investments would not be economically
viable without public co-financing.
Air transport
445. The year was divided into two parts, 'before 11 September'and 'after ll September', with the
terrorist attacks in the United States having a major impact on air transport. As far as aid for civil aviation
and airports is concerned, the Commission pursued a policy based on the December 1994 guidelines ("').
446. The Commission quickly clarified its policy in response to the terrorist attacks ("'). The
Comrnission acknowledged that some aid could bejustified as a reaction to the extraordinary events. It
made mention of aid for cases where there was no appropriate offer of insurance cover, and aid to offset
the losses suffered by airlines following the closure of air space for four days and the high costs involved
c*) coM(2001) 370.
('*) Council Regulation (EC) No 71811999 on a Community{leet capacity policy to promote inland waterway transport
(oJ L 90, 2.4.1999).
("') Case N 299101, decision of 2.10.2001 (OI C 342, 5.72.200I).
("?) Case N 59712000, decision of 3 1. 1.2001 (OJ C 102, 31.3.2001).
('o') Case N 550/2001, Commission decision of I 1.12.2001,not yet published.
('?q) Application of Articles 92 and 93 of the EC Treaty and Article 61 of the EEA Agreement to State aid in the aviation sector
(oJ c 3s0, 1.0.12.1994).("') Commission communication of l0 Octob€r 2001 on the repercussions of the tefforist allacks in the United States on the
air transport industry 
- 
COM(2001) 574 final.
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in increased security measures. All these aid measures taken by Member States had to be notified by
them for examination under Article 87(2Xb) of the Treaty. A number of State aid measures relatirrg to
insurance were authorised by the Commission before the end of the year.
447. So as to allow planes to take off and airports to function, Member States notified the Commission
of aid to be granted under public guarantee schemes to private companies providing insurance against
terrorist risks. The Commission gave the go-ahead, provided a number of criteria were complied
with ("6), to aid for airlines and for private providers of insurance against terrorist risks in the case of the
following Member States:
- 
United Kingdom: decision of 23 October 2001 (,,)
- 
Portugal and Luxembourg: decisions of 28 November (r,8)
- 
Belgium and Sweden: decisions of I I December (rrr)
- 
Austria, Denmark, France, Germany and Spain: decisions of 20 December (r00).
448. For the rest, the Commission pursued its established policy on aid to the air transport industry. It
also began looking into airport financing.
449. On 18 July, the Commission decided that training aid granted by the Belgian authorities ro
Sabena (30') was compatible with the EC Treaty in line with the framework on training aid (rr).
450. On l8 July, following the judgment of the Court of First Instance of 12 December 2000 annulling
Decision 97/789/EC on aid granted to Alitalia, the Commission adopted a new decision correcting the
errors of assessment and the failure to state reasons identified by the Court and declared the aid granted to
Alitalia(r0r) in the form of a capital injection of ITl2750billion, payable in three instalments,
compatible with the common market.
451. The Commission also authorised two grants of rescue aid to airlines, both belonging in part to the
bankrupt group Swissair. On 17 October, the Commission decided to raise no objections to rescue aid of
EURl25million granted to Sabena ('on). On 20December, the Commission raised no objections to
rescue aid of EUR 120 million granted in the form of a loan guarantee by the Land of North-Rhine
Westphalia to the German airline LTU.
("u) Comission communication of 10 October 2001 on the repercussions of the terrorist attacks in the United States on the
air transport indusfy, as adapted by the Council's ad hoc group.
("?) CaseNN90/2001.("') Cases NN 140/2001 and NN 14412001.
('*) Cases NN 13912001 and NN 141/2001 (OJ C 24,26.1.2N2\.
(rm) Cases NN 153/2001 (Austria), NN 15712001 (France), NN 146 and 16112001 (Denmark), NN 143i2001 (Spain) and
NN 16212001 (Germany).
cu) oJ L 249, 19.9.2001.
c") oJ c 343,11.1r.1998.
a.) oI L 27 1, 12.1,0.2001.
C*) C (2001) 3137 final, not yet published.
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452. With regard to airports, one decision related to an exemption from the obligation to pay
corporation tax, which was deemed to be State aid; in two other cases, the measures in question were
deemed not to be State aid.
453. On 3 July, the Commission decided that the exemption from Dutch corporation tax granted to the
Dutch Schiphol Group, i.e. the company which owns and operates Amsterdam Schiphol airport as well as
other airports in the Netherlands, constituted State aid and that it should therefore be discontinued by
I January 2002 ($).
454. On 13 March, the Commission decided that the public flnancing by the region of Piedmont (Italy)
of improvements to and fuither development of the infraslructure of the airports of Turin, Cuneo and
Biella could not be considered to be State aid. It was considered that the location of the airports in
question and thet predominantly local importance as far as their economic and competition impact was
concerned amply justified this conclusion ('06).
455. On 5 October, the Commission adopted a decision concerning a complaint againstAer Rianta,
the Irish state-owned company which owns and runs the airports of Dublin, Cork and Shannon. It was
decided that as the special tax status ofAerRiantahad changed a$ from 1 January 1999,the previously
existing tax exemption was no longer an issue. Furthermore, the transfer of airport infrastructure from
the State to Aer Rianta at a value deemed below the market price was not considered to be State aid,
nor was the fact that Aer Rianta is the concessionaire for duty-free shops and multi-storey car
parks ('o').
3.1.6. Agriculture
456. On 6 June, the Commission adopted new guidelines on the use of State aid to advertise
agricultural products (.s). The new text clarifies the Commission's policy in relation to the advertising of
quality products, products of regional origin and traceability systems.
457. As far as the regional origin of products is concemed, such origin can now be promoted on
condition that the rules on the free movement of goods are complied with. The new guidelines will allow
subsidies for advertising where the origin of a product is the primary message, if it takes place outside the
Mernber State or the region ofproduction. The objective should be to introduce consumers to products
with which they are not familiar. Where advertising is aimed at consumers in the Member State or region
of production, information about the origin of the product can also be given. However, in such cases the
reference to origin has to remain secondary to information about the quality of the product.
458. Aid for advertising quality products may also be granted where these products clearly meet
higher standards, or have a protected designation of origin. Claims that products are of high quality when
in fact they simply meet the legislative requirements applicable to all similar products may mislead the
consumer. State support for advertising will only be possible where no internal market rules are
infrinsed.
(ro') This decision has not yet been published in the Official Journal, but can be found on the Competition DG's website under
the number E 45/2000. See also IP/01/934.
(36) This decision has not yet been published in the Official Journal, but can be found on the Competition DG's website under
the number N 58/2000.
('o') This decision is not yet on the Competition DG's web site.
eJ oJc252.12.9.2M1.
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459- In the case ofproducts bearing a protected designation of origin (Protected Designation of Origin
- 
PDO, Protected Geographical Indication 
- 
PGI, Traditional Speciality Guaranteed 
- 
TSG)
registered by the EU, the Commission in general does not oppose aid for advertising which includes a
reference to the origin ofthe product concerned, provided that it corresponds exactly to the designations
which have been registered.
460. Following the introduction of compulsory beef labelling, the new rules also set out how the
advertising of traceability systems may be subsidised. State aid for advertising of individual lirms
remains prohibited, and the maximum aid intensity allowed is 50 Vo, or 75 7o for certain products from
SMEs from disadvantaged regions.
461. The new guidelines supersede the two existing texts dating from 1986 and 1987. This
consolidation and clarification should help to further simplify the Community State aid rules and make
them more transparent. The new guidelines will apply to new State aid, including pending notifications,
from I January 2002.
462. The main issue of the year, as far as State aid in the agricultural sector was concemed, was
without any doubt linked to the consequences of the 'BSE crisis'. State aid rules normally prevent
Member States from paying income aid to farmers because this could distort competition and interfere
with the functioning of the Community market organisations. Only in exceptional circumstances may
such aid be granted to offset the damage caused by such situations.
463. The ongoing crisis in the beef market, which had been caused by a BSE scare at the end ofthe
previous year, was recognised by the Commission as an exceptional occurrence within the meaning of
Article 87(2Xb) of the EC Treaty. It was not the drop in sales or turnover that was considered exceptional.
The drop in sales was seen by the Commission as a consequence of an exceptional and rare combination
of circumstances which caused farmers' income losses: the closure of export markets to Community beef
and the extent of the negative reaction of European consumers, both preceded and accompanled Uy a
series of incidents including the first cases of BSE detected in countries such as Germany, Italy and
Spain' the ban at Community level of the marketing of any type of meat and bonemeal as animal feed,
and the sometimes controversial management of the crisis at national level.
464. The Commission accordingly authorised Member States to pay income aid totalling EUR 460 million
to beef farmers who had suffered losses between November 2000 and June 2001 because of the BSE
crisis and other BSE-related State aid (i.e. towards the costs of BSE tests, compensating slaughterhouses,
the value of slaughtered animals, the restocking ofherds on farms where BSE had been found, storage
transport and the disposal of processed animal proteins and animal feed).
465. Overall the Commission received 379 notiflcations of State aid draft measures to be granted in
the agricultural and agro-industrial sector. The Commission also started the examination of 39 aid
measures which had not been notified before under Article 88(3) of the EC Treaty. The Commission
raised no objections to 212 measures. Several of these measures were approved after the Member States
concerned either amended them or undertook to amend them in order to bring them in line with
Community State aid rules. The procedure provided for inArticle 88(2) of the EC Treaty was launched in
respect of 15 cases in which there were serious doubts as to the compatibility of the measures with the
common market. The Commission terminated the Article 88(2) proceedings in five cases, taking a
negative final decision in two of them. In all the cases where a negative decision was taken and State aid
had already been granted by the Member state concerned, the commission requested recovery of the aid
disbursed.
COMPETITION REPORT 2OO1
XXXIST REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 2OO1 _ SEC(2002) 462 FINAL 131
3.1.7. Fisheri.es
466. On account ofits social and economic features, the fisheries sector is still receiving large amounts
of public assistance, both from the Community and from national sources.
467. The Commission examined the compatibility of national aid schemes in the light of the
guidelines for the examination of State aid to fisheries and aquaculture ('o').
468. The new guidelines, applicable from I January, spell out the rules more clearly in certain areas.
They thus provide that the guidelines on national regional aid do not apply in the fisheries sector and that
aspects of regional aid schemes which concem flsheries will be examined in the light of the fisheries
guidelines. They also provide further details for assessing training aid, aid for consultancy services and
aid to experimental fishing and set out more precisely the conditions for granting aid for rescuing and
restructuring firms in difficulty (reference to the Commission's submission of a plan aimed at reducing
fleet capacity). More detailed rules and conditions are likewise set out for aid intended to improve the
management and control of fishing activities and aid in connection with the purchase of used vessels. As
far as special cases are concemed, more detailed rules are set out for income aid (measures linked to
exceptional circumstances are to be examined on a case-by-case basis, and for temporary cessations of
activity reference is made to the relevant point ofthe guidelines), the point dealing with operating loans
has been deleted and specific points have been added to cover aid to compensate for damage caused by
natural disasters or other exceptional occurrences, insurance premiums, the outermost regions and
employment aid. The new guidelines contain two annexes which will make for closer monitoring of
approved schemes: one setting out the information to be supplied when aid schemes are notified, the
other specifying the information which must appear in the annual report to be submitted to the
Commission on all existing aid schemes or all individual aid measures granted outside an approved
scheme that are not made subject to a specific reporting obtgation by a conditional decision.
469. A large number of schemes were notified to the Commission, especially during the second half of
the year, owing to notification of all national joint financing measures adopted under the Financial
Instrument for Fisheries Guidance and as part of the preparatory work on measures implementing the
new Community support framework.
3.2. Specific sectors not subject to special rules
3.2. I. Financial sector
4'tO. On 25 July, in Case NN 53/2001 (Bankgesellschaft Berlin (BGB), the Commission approved
rescue aid of some EUR 2 billion to bring the bank's own funds ratio back to its pre-crisis level of 9.7 Vo.
The bank had incurred substantial losses in 2000 mainly through bad operations in the real-estate sector.
The approval ofrescue aid was based on the undertaking given by the German authorities that they would
present a restructuring plan within six months and limited to this period or the time-span the Commission
needed to take a decision on the restructuring plan. Under this second examination, the Commission was
to have a close look at th9 necessary volume of the aid and ask for compensatory measures to offset the
competition-distorting effect of the aid, if this was found appropriate.
471. On 11 December, the Commission decided that the tax measures for banks introduced by
Italian Law No 461/98 of 23 December 1998 and the related Legislative Decree No 153/99 of
17 May 1999 were incompatible with the State aid rules laid down in the EC Treaty. The measures in
('') oJ c 19,20.r.2001.
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question provide a discriminatory competitive advantage to the banks that participate in the
operations being assisted. Italy must now recover the amounts that the banks benefiting from tax
exemptions avoided having to pay. The Commission's investigation into State aid to banking
foundations (as distinct from banks themselves) continues. The status of these measures still needs to
be defined. The Commission also examined whether the special tax treatment could be considered to
be restructuring aid. However, the conditions for applying the Community guidelines on State aid for
rescuing and restructuring firms in difflculty were not met. The aid was not notified individually to
the Commission. The banks that benefited from the aid were not in difficulties nor was the aid
intended to restore the firms' long-term viability. Finally, the guidelines require that measures must
be taken to mitigate as far as possible any adverse effects of the aid on competitors (usually this takes
the form of a reduced market presence of the company after. ite restructuring). No such situation is
envisaged in the present case.
3.2.2. Semices
472. On 13 November, in accordance with the procedure provided for in Article 88(1) of the EC
Treaty and Article l8 of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999, the Commission proposed appropriate measures
to France in Case E 4612001, namely the ending of the exemption from the tax on health insurance
contracts enjoyed by mutual and provident societies. Alternatively, the French authorities may also grant
the exemption in retum for the performance of a service of general economic interest, ensuring that the
aid resulting from the exemption does not exceed the costs imposed by the constraints assumed for this
purpose.
473. On 13 November, the Commission initiated formal investigation proceedings on a number nf ad
hoc measures granted to the Portuguese public broadcaster RTP, since it had doubts whether or not the
Portuguese State had overcompensated the reimbursable public service costs of RTP in 1992-98 to the
tune of EUR 83.6 million. The initiation of proceedings followed three complaints that the Commission
received in 1993, 1996 and 1997 from the private Portuguese broadcaster SIC. On 7 November 1996, the
Commission abeady took a decision on the first and part of the second complaint, which was annulled by
the Court of First Instance (r1o).
3.2,3, Exceptianal occurrences
474. The Commission authorised proposed aid in the region of Valle d'Aosta to offset the damage
caused by the floods and landslides resulting from the torrential rain that hit the region in
October 2000 (3"). The scheme aims to provide compensation for the fixed costs borne by firms which
had to stop business because of the rain, provided that the firm has since resumed business. The aid
consists of a subsidy covering up to 95 Vo of the fixed costs borne by firms during the period between the
disruption of business and its resumption, which must not exceed six months. Any amounts received by
way ofinsurance indemnities must be deducted from the aid. The project has a duration ofone year, and
the budget set aside by the Italian authorities is EUR 516 456. The scheme was deemed compatible with
the EC Treaty pursuant to Article 87(2Xb), since it was intended to make good the damage caused by
natural disasters. The Commission took the view that the events covered by the scheme were natural
disasters within the meaning of that provision. The Commission also noted that the aid would not give
("0) CaseT-4619'l [2000] ECR II-2125.("') Case N 42912W1, Commission decision of 17.10.2001, OJ C 5, 8.1.2002. The Commission had already approved an aid
scheme for emergency planning to deal wilh natural catastrophes in Valle d'Aoste on 29.11.2000 (N 43312000). This latter
scheme provides the reference framework for the scheme dealins with the effects of the torrential rain.
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rise to any overcompensation and that, in view of the budget set aside and the number of recipients
envisaged, the sums to be paid to each firm would probably be modest.
D 
- 
Procedures
475. Following the adoption and entry into force of Council Regulation (EC) No 65911999, many of
the detailed procedural rules goveming the examination of State aid have been codif,ed and consolidated
into a single legislative text. Although some of the cases decided by the Court continue to concern
decisions adopted by the Commission before the entry into force of the regulation, others may provide
useful guidance on the interpretation and application of the provisions of the regulation.
1. Initiation of formal investigation proceedings
476. In two judgments, the Court emphasised that the Commission does not have any discretion in
deciding whether or not to initiate the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 88(2). tn
particular, the Court emphasised that reasons of administrative convenience, either for the Commission or
for the Member State, could not justify the failure to initiate proceedings in cases where the Commission
had, or should have had, serious doubts about the compatibility of a measure with the common market.
477. Inits Prayon-Rupel judgment of 15 March(r'), the Court provided further clarification on the
circumstances in which the Commission is required to initiate the formal investigation procedure. The
procedure serves a dual purpose: it is intended both to protect the rights of potentially interested third
parties and to enable the Commission to be fully informed of all of the facts of the case before adopting
its decision. Thus, the formal investigation procedure is obligatory if the Commission encounters serious
difficulties in establishing whether or not aid is compatible with the common market. The notion of
serious difficulties is an objective one. It follows that judicial review by the Court of First Instance of the
existence of serious difficulties goes beyond simple consideration of whether or not there has been a
manifest error of assessment. The Court examines whether the information in the Commission's
possession or available to it at the time when it adopted the contested decision should have led to serious
doubts. In this regard, the Court points out that the evidence of serious difficulty may also be inferred
from the length of time taken by, and the particular circumstances of, the preliminary procedure. In the
particular case, the Court concluded that the eight-month period which elapsed between the time of
notification and the decision, as a result of the repeated requests for information and the reluctance of the
Member State to provide information, constituted an indication of serious difficulties. Taking account of
all these elements, the Court found that the Commission had insufficient knowledge of the facts when it
adopted its decision to raise no objection to the aid and should thus have initiated the formal investigation
procedure in order to gather more ample information and overcome the serious difficulties of assessment.
478. The Court followed the same line of reasoning in annulling the Commission's decision not to
raise any objections to aid granted by the French Republic to producers of liqueur wines and eaux de
vie (.'3). Since the complaints received by the Commission contained strong evidence of a link between
the draft aid plan and a system of taxation that might infringe other Treaty provisions, there was a serious
difficulty for the Commission to determine whether the aid plan was compatible with the common
market. In those circumstances, the Article 88(2) procedure should have been initiated.
1:t:1 CtseT-73/gS,socilt4chimiquePrayon-RupelvCommission [2001]ECRII-867.
(r,r) Judgment of the Court of 3 May 2001 in Case C-204197 Portugal v Commission [2001] ECR I-3175.
COMPETITION REPORT 2OO1
134 XXXIST REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 2OO1 
- 
SEC(2002) 462 FINAL
479. [n an action for annulment brought by Austria against a Commission decision to initiate formal
investigation proceedings regarding aid granted to Siemens Bauelemente OHG, Austria argued that in the
case concerned the period of two months laid down in the Lorenz judgment in which the Commission
must conclude its preliminary examination had already expired and that the aid had become existing aid
when the Commission initiated the proceedings. The Commission was therefore no longer entitled to
initiate the formal investigation proceedings. The Court confirmed the Inrenz case law, pointing out that
notifled aid becomes existing aid if two necessary but sufficient conditions are met: the two-month period
following complete notification must have expired and the Member State must give the Commission
prior notice of the implementation of the planned aid. The Court rejected the Commission's argument
that, having received such prior notice, it would still have a right ofobjection. The Court made it clear,
however, that, at the relevant time, no rules ofprocedure had yet been adopted on the basis ofArticle 89
of the EC Treaty. Meanwhile, the provisions of Article 4(5) and (6) of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999
make the ruling of the judgment no longer applicable, since they give the Commission an explicit right of
objection within a period of 15 working days following the receipt of the prior notice of the Member
State. Although thejudgment does not, therefore, directly affect the current procedural rules, it confirms
the strict attitude of the Court with regard to compliance with imposed time limits by the Commission. It
also fits into the general line taken by the Court that, whenever the Commission has doubts about the
compatibility of aid, the procedure should be initiated quickly.
2. Existing aid
480. The Court addressed the issue of distinguishing new aid from existing aid (."). The case
concemed a Commission decision which had already been partially annulled by the earlier judgment of
15 June 2000 in Alzexa Mauro (315). The Court confirmed that a system of aid established in a market that
was initially closed to competition must, when that market is liberalised, be regarded as an existing aid
system, in so far as at the time of its establishment it did not come within the scope of Article 87(1) of the
Treaty, which applies only to sectors open to competition. The Court of First Instance rejected the
argument that only aid granted after full liberalisation can be classified as new aid. It confirmed that in
State aid matters it is sufficient that the market concerned be open, even partly, to competition, for aid to
be capable of affecting trade between Member States. It is important to point out that whilst the Court of
Ffust Instance confirmed that aid granted before liberalisation constituted existing aid, it stressed that it
had reached this conclusion in the absence of detailed provisions implementing Article 88 of the Treaty
ruling out the classification of such aid after the date fixed for liberalisation. [n the meantime, however.
Council Regulation (EC) No 65911999 contained an explicit provision in Article l(b)(v) according to
which 'where certain measures become aid following the liberalisation of an activity by Community law,
such measures shall not be considered as existing aid after the date fixed for liberalisation'. A situation
such as that in Case T-288197, but arising after the entry into force of the regulation, cannot therefore be
treated as existing aid any more.
481. UnderArticle 88(2) of the Treaty, the Commission is entitled to initiate the procedure only in
respect of new aid. Where aid is classified as existing aid, the Commission is obliged to first make a
proposal for appropriate measures to the Member State concerned. This classification is of more than
procedural importance. In cases where new aid has been put into effect unlawfully and is subsequently
found to be incompatible with the common market, the Commission is normally required to order
("') Judgmentof theCourtof Firstlnstanceof 4April 2001 inCaseT-2SslgTRegioneautonomaFriuliVeneziaGiuliav
Commission, [2001] ECR II-1 169.("') Judgment of the Court of First Instance of 15 June 2000 in Joined Cases T-298l97 to T-23198 Alzetta and oth.trs v
Commission, t20001 ECR II-2319.
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recovery pursuant to Article 14 of Council Regulation (EC) No 65911999. However, recovery cannot be
ordered in the case of existine aid.
482. The Court .*u-rn"J the procedural situation where the Commission had classified an aid
measure as new aid and initiated the procedure under Article 88(2), whereas the Member State
concerned had maintained that the measure was existing aid ("u). The Court considered that the choice
of procedure made by the Commission, in connection with its invitation to the Italian authorities to
suspend payment, implied a classification of the aid, even if provisional, as new and itself entailed legal
effects. The initiation of the formal examination procedure implied that the Commission did not intend
to examine the aid in the context of the procedure for existing aid pursuant to Article 88(1) of the EC
Treaty and that from its point of view the aid had been unlawfully implemented. Such a decision altered
the legal position of the measure concerned and of the beneficiaries, since it created at the very least a
significant element of doubt as to the legality of the measure, which must lead the Member State to
suspend payment. It might also be invoked before a national court called upon to draw all the
consequences arising from the infringement of the last sentence ofArticle 88(3) of the EC Treaty. For
these reasons, the Court declared the action by the Italian government against the initiation of the
procedure admissible.
3. Recovery of aid
483. Following the principle laid down in Article 14 of the procedural regulation, the Commission
orders recovery of all aid that has been granted in violation of the notification obligation and is
incompatible with the corlmon market. Article 14 further requires that Member States carry out recovery
without delay and in accordance with the procedure under their national laws provided that they allow the
immediate and effective execution of the Commission's decision.
484. During the year, the Commission ordered recovery in 20 cases. At the end of the year, there were
67 recovery cases still pending. These cases are closely monitored by the Commission, which ensures
that the principles laid down in Article 14 are fully complied with by the Member States. During the year,
failure by the German authorities to do so in the Lautex GmbH case (r'?) led the Commission to bring a
complaint to the Court of Justice on 25 July for non-compliance with the recovery order, on the basis of
Article 88(2) of the EC Treaty.
4. Non-execution of decisions
485. When Member States refuse to comply with a recovery decision, it has become standard
Commission practice to bring an action before the Court of Justice. In 2001, the Court of Justice decided
on two actions for non-implementation of a Commission decision. The first case concerned the recovery
of the aid granted to the 'Nouvelle Filiature Lainibre de Roubaix'. In November 1998 (r'8), the
Commission had adopted a decision according to which the aid granted to this company was
incompatible with the cotnmon market and had to be recovered by the French authorities. This decision
gave rise to two appeals to the Court of Justice. In January 1999, the French govemment lodged an action
for annulment (.p) of the decision. Since actions for annulment do not have suspensive effect, they do not
(3,6) Judgment of the Court of 9 October 2001 in Case C-,100/99 ltaly v Commission, [2001] ECR I-7303.
(''') Commission decision of 20.7.1999 (OJ L 42, 15.2.2000).
(.rs) Commission Decision l999l378lBc of 4 November 1998 (OJ L 145, 10.6'1999).
c") c-r'7199.
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affect the Member State's obligation to comply with the recovery decision. In July 1999, since no
recovery was taking place, the Commission brought an action for the non-implementation of the recovery
order in the period imposed 1:zo;. On 22 March, the Court rejected the action for annulment (3") and
decided on the same day on the action for non-implementation of the recovery order (3"). The Court
stressed that according to established case law, only the absolute impossibility of implementing the
decision could be a valid defence for the Member State's non-compliance. If a Member St.ate
encountered unforeseen and unforeseeable diffrculties in the implementation of a decision, it had to
submit such problems to the Commission together with proposals for suitable amendments to the
decision in question. In such circumstances, the Commission and the Member State concerned were both
bound by the principle of Article l0 of the EC Treaty, which imposes a duty of genuine cooperation in
order to overcome the difflculties, whilst fully observing the State aid rules. Since the French government
failed to inform the Commission of any such difficulties, the Court concluded that France had failed to
fuIfil its obligations under the Treaty. On 3 July, the Court reiterated these principles in a judgment
declaring that the Belgian authorities had failed to adopt the measures necessary to recover the aid
provided for under the Maribelbislter schemes (,'3).
486. If a Member State fails to comply with the Court's judgment, the Commission may, in
accordance with Article 228, institute further proceedings against the Member State concemed which
may ultimately lead to the imposition of a penalty payment. On 18 July, for the first time in a State aid
recovery case, the Commission decided to send a reasoned opinion to Italy specifying the points on
which Italy had not complied with the Court's judgmentin Commission v ltaly (324).
(,0) c-261199.
(r'?r) JudgmentoftheCourtof22March200linCaseC-17/99FrancevCommission,l2ODllECRI-2481.
("') Judgmentof theCourtof 22March2001 inCaseC-26ll99CommissionvFrance,!2C0IIECRI-2537.
(1'3) JudgmentoftheCourtof3July200linCaseC-378/98CommissionvBelgium,l2}}llECRI-5107.
("0) Case C-280195, Commission v ltaly t19981 ECR I-259. In that judgment, Italy had already been condemned for failure to
comply with the recovery order in the Commission decision of 9June 1993 (tax credit for professional road hauliers)
(oJ L233,16.9.1993).
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Figure 6
Trend in the number of aid cases registered (other than in agriculture, fisheries,
transport and coal) between 1996 and 2001
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Figure 7
Trend in the number of decisions taken by the Commission
(other than in agriculture, fisheries, transport and coal) between 1996 and 2001
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Figure 8
Number of decisions by Member State
(other than in agriculture, fisheries, transport, and coal)
European Union
Belgium
Denmark
Germany
Greece
SPain
France
lreland
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Austria
Portugal
Finland
Sweden
United Kingdom
39
7
39
e
20
15
coMPEilIoNREPoRr2ool 
I
xxxtsT REPoRT oN COMPETITION POLICY 2001 
- 
sEc(2002) 462 FINAL 139
ry _ SERVICES OF GENERAL INTEREST
1.. General principles
48i. EC competition rules are in principle fully applicable to undertakings which the State has
entrusted with the performance of services of general economic interest (SGEIs). However, according to
Article 86(2) of the EC Treaty, the application of the EC Treaty rules, and in particular the competition
rules, may not obstruct the performance, in law or in fact, of the particular tasks assigned to these
undertakings. On the other hand, the development oftrade must not be affected to an extent that is contrary
to the interests of the Community. Therefore, under the principle of proportionality enshrined in Article
86(2), the application of the EC Treaty rules has to be limited to the extent necessary to allow the
undertaking concerned to fulfll the specific mission with which the State has entrusted it.
488. The importance of services of general economic interest was highlighted in particular by the
Treaty of Amsterdam's introducing Article 16 into the EC Treaty. This article provides that: 'Without
prejudice to Articles ?3, 86 and 87, and given the place occupied by services of general economic interest
in the shared values of the Union as well as their role in promoting social and territorial cohesion, the
Community and the Member States, each within their respective powers and within the scope of
application of this Treaty, shall take care that such services operate on the basis of principles and
conditions which enable them to fulfil their missions'.
489. The Commission has set out its position on the subject in detail in its two communications on
services of general interest in Europe of 1996 (3'5) and 2000 ('u). In them, the Commission explains the
criteria for applying the Treaty rules on competition and the single market, and demonstrates with the
help of specific examples that the correct application of these criteria does not endanger the proper
operation of SGEIs.
2. Recent developments
2.1. Request by the Nice European Council
4g0. The Nice European Council, meeting on 7, 8 and 9 December 2000, took note of the Commission
communication of 2000, but requested the Commission to report on the implementation of services of
general interest for the Laeken European Council on 14 and 15 December 2001. In particular, the
iurop.un Council requested the Commission to consider ways of ensuring greater predictability and
increased legal certainty in the application of competition rules to services of general interest. The
European Council also approved a statement made by the Council of the European Union (meeting on
intemal market issues) on 28 September 2000, expressing two specific concerns:
- 
first, there is a need for clarification of the relationship between methods of funding services of
general economic interest and application of the rules on State aid;
- 
second, services of general economic interest should be assessed regularly, particularly in terms of
quality of service, accessibility, safety and pricing.
c-) oJ c 281, 26.9.1996.
C") COM(2000) 580 final, 20.9.zOc/J,, also published in OJ C l?, 19.1.2001. See also 2000 Competition Report, Box 3, after
pointl.C.2.7.
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2.2. Commission report to the Laeken European Council
491. The Commission adopted its report on 17 October ("'). In it, the Commission stresses the
importance it attaches to services of general interest as essential building blocks of the European model
of society, and points out that Community law in no way hinders the introduction and operation of
efficient services of general interest.
492. The Community rules on State aid thus allow Member States to grant firms entrusted with
operating services of general economic interest the financial assistance necessary to offset the additional
costs generated by the specific tasks entrusted to them, and to enable the firms concerned to perform
those tasks in conditions of economic equilibrium. On the other hand, Community law does not allow the
amount of aid granted by the State to exceed what is necessary for the performance ofthe public service
obligation or to be used by a firm entrusted with operating a service of general interest for the purposes of
cross-subsidising activities that are subject to competition-
493. In order to increase predictability and legal certainty in the State aid field, the Commission
adopted a two-phased approach:
- 
as a first step, it intends duing 2002, in close consultation with the Member States, to lay down
Community guidelines for State aid granted to undertakings entrusted with the provision of services
of general economic interest. Such guidelines will provide Member States and firms with
information on the terms on which the Commission may authorise State aid for undertakings
entrusted with services of general economic interest;
- 
as a second step, it will evaluate the experience gained from the application of these guidelines and,
if and to the extent that experience justifies it, will adopt a regulation exempting certain aid for
services of general economic interest from the prior notification requirement.
494. The Commission also took two steps to increase transparency as regards services of general
economic interest:
first, it will in future devote a specific section of its annual competition report to services of general
interest, setting out how it has applied the competition rules to such services;
second, it will in future identify cases relating to services of general interest in its State aid register
so as to facilitate access to the available information.
495. Lastly, it is worth noting that on 22 November the Court of Justice delivered its ruling in
Ferring (3'?8). In this specific case, the Court found that compensation granted to certain firms entrusted
with the operation of a service of general economic interest was not State aid within the meaning of
Article 87(1) of the Treaty. If this case law is confirmed by the Court, the Commission will naturally draw
the necessary conclusions.
496. In its report to the Laeken European Council, the Commission also set out its position on how
firms entrusted with services of general economic interest should be selected. Where Member Stat.es
decide to entrust the provision of such services to a third party, they must follow the applicable
Community rules. A contract by which a public authority entrusts the management of a service of general
r,:'r coM(2001) 598. t7.10.2001
("*) Case C-53/00.
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interest to a third party, and which meets the conditions set out in the Community directives on public
procurement (rrr), constitutes a public contract within the meaning of those directives and must be
awarded in accordance with them.
4g7. Moreover, according to the case law of the Court of Justice (330), contracts not covered by the
directives on public procurement must none the less be awarded in accordance with the rules and
principles of the Treaty, namely the rules on the freedom to provide services and the freedom of
establishment, and with the principles of transparency, equal treatment, proportionality and mutual
recognition.
4g8. The Commission takes the view that the application of these principles cannot but be of bene{it to
users and firms. It will consider whether other measures are needed to clarify these rules.
4gg. The Commission report was welcomed by the Council meeting on internal market, consumer
affairs and tourism on 26 November. The Council particularly encouraged the Commission to establish in
the near future guidelines clarifying in particular the conditions under which compensation for public
services are not covered by the rules on State aid. It also invited the Commission, in the light and on the
basis of experience gained in applying these guidelines, to draw up as soon as possible, in close
cooperation with the Member States, a proposal for a regulation exempting certain aid for services of
general interest from the prior notification requirement, taking account of sectoral specificities. Lastly,
the Council asked the Commission to report to it on the drawing up of such a regulation in preparation for
the Copenhagen European Council.
500. The European Council meeting on 14 and 15 December concluded that it 'welcomes the
Council's conclusions and the joint Council and Commission report concerning services of general
interest, which will be the subject of an assessment, at Community level, as to their performance and
their effects on competition. The European Council encourages the Commission to set up a policy
framework for State aid to undertakings entrusted with the provision of services of general interest.'
501. During 2002, the Commission will endeavour to achieve the objectives set out in its report to the
European Council, in the light of developments in the case law of the Court of Justice.
3. Antitrust (including liberalisation)
502. In the antitrust field, the Commission dealt in the course of 2001 with various cases and
legislative issues involving services of general interest, following the principles of law and policy as set
out in the Commission communication on services of general interest in Europe of 20 September 2000.
The growing body of case law and legislation thus contributed to increasing predictability and legal
certainty in this area.
503. EC competition rules do not apply where the activity in question is of a non-economic nature
and/or where any effect on trade between Member States can be ruled out. On these grounds, the
Commission closed various cases in 2001 ('').
(3:n) Directives 9A50, %n'7, 93136 an,d 93138.
(,r0) Judgment of 7.12.2000 in Case C-324l98Telaustna, [2OOO] ECR I-10745'
C,') Such as Case COMP/D-3138213 Ryanair/ENAV and ltaly, on the basis that ENAV (the entity in charge of air traffic
control in Italy) did not exercise an economic activity.
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504. In other cases, the EC competition rules could be fully applied because terminating the
anticompetitive conduct of the undertaking entrusted with a service of general economic interest would
obviously not obstruct the performance of the particular tasks assigned to that undertaking within the
meaning of Article 86(2) C'). In the postal sector, several Commission decisions (33r) showed that abuses of
a dominant position held by an undertaking entrusted by the State with a service of general economic
interest can normally not be justified under Article 86(2). Of particular importance was the decision in
Deutsche Post AG I (DPAG), where the Commission considered that a derogation under Article 86(2) was
not applicable because termination of the fidelity rebates agreed by DPAG with its cooperation partners
and an increase in DPAG's price to cover at least the incremental cost of providing mail-order parcel
services would not prevent DPAG from complying with its statutory obligation to perform a service of
general economic interest ('carrier of last resort').
3.1. Court developments
505. In its judgment of 17 May (3ra), the Court of Justice had to assess whether an Italian law which
granted an undertaking the exclusive right to operate a universal postal service was compatible with
Article 86(1) in conjunction with Article 82 inasmuch as it made the right of any other economic operator
to provide an express mail service not forming part ofthe universal service subject to payment ofpostal
dues equivalent to the postage charge normally payable to the undertaking responsible for the universal
service. The Court stated that, in so far as trade between Member States may be affected, such legislation
was contrary to Article 86(1) in conjunction with Article 82 since it created a situation in which the
incumbent undertaking enjoying the exclusive right could not avoid abusing its dominant position by
receiving payment for services which it had not supplied. However, the Court also held that this
restriction of competition, which consisted in the fact that undertakings operating outside the universal
service were obliged to contribute to the viability of the universal service provider, could bejustilied
under Article 86(2) ('') if the financial contribution was limited to the amount strictly necessary to oflset
any losses which may be incurred by the incumbent undertaking in the operation of the universal postal
service (336).
506. In the field of health care, the Court of Justice issued a preliminary ruling on 25 October (.'3')
assessing the compatibility with Article 86 in conjunction with Article 82 of a German legislative
provision under which undertakings are to be refused authorisation to provide patient transport services
where the grant of such an authorisation is likely to have adverse effects on the operation and profitability
of the emergency transport service, which is entrusted for given geographical areas to medical aid
organisations (MADs) that offer patient transport services at the same time. The Court first held that
MADs are undertakings within the meaning of EC competition law, because emergency transport and
(r1'1) Similarly, in the Commission decision of 23.1O.2NI in In Poste (France)/SNELPD (COMP/C1/37133), Articles 86(1),
3(1Xd, 10(2), 81 and 82 could be fully applied against a Member State because terminating the anticompetitive situation
created by that Member State in the context of an undertaking entrusted with services of general economic interest would
not obstruct the performance of the particula tasks assigned to that undertaking.
(rrr) For cases Deutsche Post AG I, Deutsche Post AG II and De Post/In Poste (Belgium), see Section I.C.2.2.
(rra) Case C-340l99 TNT Traco, paras 5 1-63.
(rr5) The facts to which the judgment relates occurred prior to the deadline for implementation of Dftective97l6'7/EC
(i.e. February 1999). Article 9(4) of that directive makes it clear that only undertakings operating inside the universal
service may be obliged to contribute to the universal service fund.
("") In addition, the Court held that in these circumstances the incumbent, when supplying a service not forming part of the
universal service, had also to be required to make a financial contribution to the universal service. Lastly, it ruled that the
incumbent also had to ensure that its express mail activity outside the universal service was not subsidised by the
universal service, thereby improperly increasing the potential losses of that service.
(."') Case C-475199 Ambulanz Gktckner.
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patient transport services constitute activities of an econornic nature. It then stated that it was for the
national court to establish, first, whether the MADs held a dominant position on the market in emergency
transport and whether this market represented a substantial part of the common market; and second,
whether the German legislation had an effect on trade between Member States, i.e., whether there was a
sufficient degree of probability that it would actually prevent operators established in Member States
other than Germany either from providing ambulance transport services in Germany or from establishing
themselves there. Assuming these conditions were met, the Court held that the German legislation would
result in extending the MADs' dominant position to the neighbouring but separate market of patient
transport, thus constituting an infringement of Article 86(l) in conjunction with Article 82 if there was no
objective justification for the legislation. However, it finally concluded that the German legislation
concemed a service of general economic interest and could be justified under Article 86(2) provided that
all requirements under this provision were met and that the possibility were not ruled out of independent
undertakings' obtaining authorisation for providing patient transport services if the entrusted
undertakings were manifestly unable to satisfy demand for these services.
3.2. Liberalisation through tegislative measures
507. The conclusions of the Lisbon European Council in March 2000 called upon the Commission,
the Council of the European Union and the Member States, each in accordance with their respective
powers, to set out by the end of 2000 a strategy for the removal of barriers to services and to speed up
liberalisation in areas such as gas, electricity, postal services and transport. Accordingly, throughout
2001, the Commission continued to promote market opening and competition by making legislative
proposals and by monitoring the implementation of existing EU legislation. This activity included areas
in which seryices of general economic interest are performed, taking account of the proportionality
principle and the particularities of each sector dealt with.
508. In the energy sector, the Commission proposed a new directive (338) stipulating full market
opening in electricity and gas supplies in three steps between 2003 and 2005. The proposed directive also
aims to safeguard a high level of services of general economic interest by obliging Member States to
ensure the right for household consumers to be supplied with electricity on reasonable terms as well as
the attainment of various essential objectives, such as the protection of vulnerable customers, basic
guarantees for final customers (a minimum set of conditions for contracts, transparency of information,
and the availability of low-cost and transparent dispute settlement mechanisms) and security of supply.
509. In the postal sector, the Commission continued its efforts to pave the way for further market
opening. The Commission proposal of 21 March stresses inter alia that each Member State sets its own
detailed universal service standards. In the common position adopted by the Council on 15 October,
several amendments were made to the text. Of relevance for services of general economic interest are,
first, the objective of liberalising outgoing cross-border mail except for those Member States where its
inclusion in the reserved services is necessary to ensure the provision of the universal service, and
second, the prohibition of cross-subsidisation of universal services outside the reserved area out of
revenues from services in the reserved area unless this is strictly necessary to fulfil specific universal
service obligations imposed in the competitive area.
510. In the telecommunications sector, the Council reached political agreement on 6 December on a set
of directives ('the telecom package'), which will replace the current Community regulatory framework
for telecommunications. The main improvement on the current framework is that it is technology-neutral
C") COM(2001) I25 fnal,13.3.2001. For details see point 88.
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and dissociates the carrier services from the content provision. It ends the distinction between the
regulation of telecommunications networks and broadcasting networks. In addition, it introduces
competition-law definitions of the markets and dominant operators with the aim of applying sector-
specific legislation. [n order to ensure coherent application of these principles, the Commission was
granted the right to vet national interpretation not compatible with Community law.
5ll. The Commission's activity concentrated on reviewing implementation of the existing
liberalisation directives and on pursuing inquiries into local loop unbundling, into the leased lines sector
and into roaming. By its judgment of 6 December in Case C-l46l0O Commission v France, the Court of
Justice clarified certain issues concerning the financing of the universal service and the calculation of the
net cost of this service under the telecom directives. The Court ruled entirely in the Commission's favour,
finding that the French legislation on the financing of the universal service did not comply with the
principles ofproportionality, objectivity and transparency required by the directives, and that France had
failed to meet its obligations as regards re-balancing tariffs.
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V _ INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITIES
A 
- 
Enlargement
L. Accession preparations and negotiations
512. In 2001, the European Union proceeded with the accession negotiations in the competition field.
In March, competition negotiations were formally opened with Bulgaria. Accession negotiations with
Turkey have not started yet, but preparations for the analytical examination of the compatibility of
Ttrkish competition rules with Community law are well under way.
513. In assessing whether the candidate countries had prepared the ground sufficiently for it to
propose to the Member States that the competition negotiations be provisionally closed, the Commission
examined in particular whether the candidate countries had achieved a satisfactory level in relation to
(i) their legislative framework for antitrust and State aid; (ii) their administrative capacity in the
competition field; and (iii) their competition enforcement record. The methodology for assessing these
criteria was explained in detail in the Commission's progress report on the accession negotiations on the
competition chapter, presented to the Council's enlargement group in January. The progress report also
covered the state of play in the negotiations with Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland
and Slovenia. In July, the Commission presented an updated version of the progress report to the
Council's enlargement group. It was expanded to incorporate the state of play for Bulgaria, Latvia,
Lithuania, Malta, Romania and Slovakia. The enlargement group welcomed both reports.
514. As regards the timing of the enlargement negotiations, the Gdteborg European Council meeting
on 15 and 16 June reaffirmed the 'road map'presented in the Commission's enlargement strategy paper
of 8 November 2000. According to that paper, the EU was to prioritise in the second half of 2001 the
definition of common positions, including positions on requests for transitional measures for a number of
chapters, including the one on competition policy. In line with the road map, the Commission presented
revised draft common positions on the competition chapter to the Council at the end of October. The draft
common positions concerned all 12 candidate countries with which the competition chapter was being
negotiated. The aim was to enable the Council to assess whether conditions were right for the provisional
closure of the competition chapter.
515. In November, on the Commission's recommendation, the Council decided to provisionally close
the competition negotiations with Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia. For all other candidate
countries, the Council approved the Commission's proposal that the competition negotiations be
continued. In December, the Laeken European Council reaffirmed the European Union's determination to
bring the accession negotiations with those candidate countries that are ready to a successful conclusion
by the end of 2002, so that the countries concerned can take part in the European Parliament elections in
2004 as members. In addition, the Laeken European Council agreed 'with the report of the Commission,
which considered that, if the present rate of progress of the negotiations and reforms in the candidate
States is maintained, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, the Slovak Republic,
the Czech Republic and Slovenia could be ready'.
2. Progress in the alignment of competition rules
516. The Commission reports regularly on the progress made by each of the candidate countries
towards accession. The fourth set of regular reports for the t0 central and east European countries
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(CEEC$, Cyprus, Malta and Turkey adopted by the Commission in November assessed progress since
the previous reports were delivered by the Commission in 2000.
517. The achievements in the antitrust and merger areas were generally considered satisfactory both
on the legislative side and with regard to the creation of the necessary administrative capacity. The main
challenge facing antitrust authorities in the candidate countries remained the need to give priority to
antitrust enforcement regarding the anticompetitive conduct that most seriously obstructs the proper
working of markets, such as cartels, monopolistic acquisitions, and exclusionary practices by dominant
firms. The further strengthening of the antitrust enforcement record of the candidate countries should, in
general, also include a more effective policy regarding penalties.
518. In comparison with the antitrust field, the introduction of State aid monitoring in the candidate
countries has generally proved much more controversial, slower and politically sensitive. However, the
accession negotiations have helped to speed up the creation of legal and procedural frameworks for State
aid discipline.
519. By 2001, all candidate countries with which negotiations were ongoing had created national State
aid monitoring authorities. Turkey agreed to do so by I January 2003. The Commission has emphasised
that these authorities should effectively monitor new and existing State aid granted by all aid-granting
authorities. Monitoring authorities should receive prior notification of all new aid measures. They should
have the power to collect all the information they need in order to examine State aid from all aid-granting
authorities. They should also have the power to give an independent opinion on the compatibility of all
new aid measures with the Europe Agreements prior to the granting of any such aid. However, not all
monitoring authorities seemed to receive, systematically, information on all new aid granted such as
would enable them to perform their duties comprehensively.
520. To ensure the necessary transparency, most candidate countries have created comprehensive
inventories of existing aid that are kept permanently up to date. In addition, the Commission has
continued to work with the monitoring authorities ofthe candidate countries to ensure that their annual
State aid reports conform to the methodology of the Commission's State aid survey.
521. The Commission has continued to draw the attention of several candidate countries to the need to
bring their tax aid regimes, often used in attracting foreign investment, and their State aid measures in
special economic zones into line with Community law well before accession. It has also underlined the
need for transparency and rigorous application of Community rules in restructuring cases.
3. Implementing rules under the Europe Agreements and the customs union decision
522. With a view to further completing the legal framework of the EuropeAgreements for competition
relations between the Community and the 10 associated CEECs, two sets of implementing rules have
been prepared. The first concerns the implementation of the competition provisions of the Europe
Agreements applicable to undertakings (antitrust). The second relates to the rules on State aid.
523. Implementing rules for the competition provisions applicable to undertakings had already been
adopted in previous years for the Czech Republic (33'q), Poland ('oo), the Slovak Republic ('o'),
(r]'q) Decisionl/g6oftheEU-CzechAssociationCouncilof30Janualry1996(OJL31,9.2'1996).
(340) Decision l/96 of the EU-Poland Association Council of 16 July 1996 (OJ L 208, 17 .8.1996)-
(]ar) Decisionl/g6oftheEU-slovakAssociationCouncilof 15August1996(OJL295,20.11'.1996).
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Hungary(31'z), Bulgaria(43), Romania(3{), Estonia(Is), Lithuania(46) and Slovenia(,ot). In 2001. the
Association Council also adopted the implementing rules for the competition provisions applicable to
undertakings with respect to Latvia (t*). The wording of the implementing rules is basically G same for
all the associated countries. They contain mainly procedural-type rules, i.e. rules regarding competence
to deal with cases, procedures for notification of cases to the other party, consultation, .o-ity and the
exchange of information. With respect to certain constitutional problems regarding the application of the
implementing rules in Hungary, progress has been made towards trying to resolve the remaining
difficulties. The Commission has submitted a proposal to the Council for amended implementing rulei
for Hungary. After agreeing on a text, the EC-Turkey Association Council can likewise adopt the
implementing rules as requested under the customs union decision of 1995, covering both rufus for
undertakings and State aid monitoring.
524. Major progress was achieved in 2001 with respect to the adoption of implementing rules for State
aid. The implementing rules have been in force for the Czech Republic since 1998 (s,). In 2001, the
Association Council also adopted implementing rules with regard to Lithuania (350), Latvia (r5,),
Romania (3s'?), Slovenia (r5r), Poland (r5a), Bulgaria (s5) and Slovakia (156). Implementing rules constitute a
two-pillar system of State aid monitoring. On the Community side, the Commission assesses the
compatibility of State aid granted by EU Member States on the basis of the Community State aid rules.
On the side of the associated country, a national authority is to monitor and control existing and new
public aid, on the basis of the criteria arising from the application of the Community State aid rules. The
implementing rules include procedures for consultation and problem solving, rules on transparency (i.e.
the associated countries are to draw up and thereafter update an inventory oftheir aid progiammes and
individual aid awards), and rules on the mutual exchange of information. After preparatory work in the
Council, draft State aid implementing rules were ready for approval by the Association Council with
Estonia in early 2002.
4. Extension of Article 87(3Xa) status under the Europe Agreements
and the adoption of regional aid maps
525. The Europe Agreements lay down that public aid granted by the associated countries is to be
assessed taking into account that for a five-year period they are to be regarded as areas identical to those
areas of the Community described in Article 87(3)(a) of the Treaty establishing the European
Community. In 2000, the Association Councils had decided to extend this status for another five years
('o') Decision2/96oftheEu-HungaryAssociationCouncilof6Novemberlgg6(OJL295,2}.lj,.lgg6\.
(3ar) Decision2/9ToftheEU-BulgariaAssociationCouncilofToctoberlggT(oJL15,2l.l.lggs).
(r*) Decision u99 of the Eu-Romania Association council of 16 March 1999 (oJ L 96, 10.4.1999).
(ra') Decisionl/99oftheEU-EsroniaAssociationcouncilof23Aprillggg(oJLl44,g.6.1999).(*) Decision4/99of theEU-LithuaniaAssociarioncouncilof 26May 1999(oJL 156,23.6.1999).(!7) Decision4/2000of theEu-SloveniaAssociationCouncilof 21 December2000(OJL 130, LZ.s.2WI)("') Decision 5/2001 of the EU-LatviaAssociation council of 25 April 2001 (oJ L lg3,6.i .2$r).
('nn) Decisionl/98oftheEU-czechAssociationcouncilof24Junelgg8(oJLl95, 11.7.1998).("') Decision2/2001 of theEU-LithuaniaAssociationCouncilof 22February 2001 (oI 9s,7.4.2C/Jl).
c51) Decision4/2001 of theEU-LatviaAssociationcouncilof 20March200l(oJL 163,2o.6.2mD.("') Decision 4/2001 of the EU-Romania Association council of 10 April 2001 (oJ 13g, 22.5.2001).("') Decision2/2001 of theEU-SloveniaAssociationcouncilof 3May200l (oJ 163,2o.6.2N1).('") Decision 3/2001 of the EU-Poland Association Council of 23 May 2001 (oJ L 215,9.s.2001).("') Decision 2/2001 ofthe Eu-BulgariaAssociation council of23 May 2001 (oJ L 216, 10.s.2001).("6) Decision 6/2001 of the Eu-Slovakia Association Council of 22 November 2001 (not yet published).
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with respect to Bulgaria (,,'), Romania (35'), Lithuania (3se), and Estonia (3e). In 2001, similar decisions
were adopted by the respective Association Councils with the Czech Republic (36'), Latvia (36'?),
Poland (''), Slovakia (3il) and Slovenia ('u').
526. The Association Council decision extending Article 87(3)(a) status generally adds that the
associated country has to submit GDP per capita figures at the appropriate statistical level. These figures
are to be used by the State aid monitoring authority of the associated country and the Commission to
jointly draw up the regional aid map for the associated country, on the basis of the Community guidelines
on national regional aid. The regional aid map identifies the eligibility of regions for regional aid as well
as the maximum aid intensities allowed in each of these regions. On a proposal from the associated
countries, the Commission has prepared the submission of draft regional aid maps to the Council with a
view to their adoption by the respective Association Committees for the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania. Poland. Slovakia and Slovenia.
5. Technical assistance to the candidate countries
52'1 . In view of the remaining shortcomings, technical assistance in the field of competition continues
to be an essential tool to prepare the candidate countries for accession. Specific actions are being taken
under the PHARE programmes. Under the institution-building ('twinning') arrangement, EU Member
State experts are now also providing advice on a long-term basis to the competition and State aid
authorities in the CEECs. In addition, joint training sessions were organised in March for officials from
the competition offices ofthe candidate countries. Thesejoint training sessions focus on explaining new
competition legislation to the candidate countries and on implementation and enforcement of the
competition rules.
528. The Commission has pursued a proactive policy of further intensifying its contacts with the
competition authorities of the candidate countries. On 17 to 19 June, the seventh annual competition
conference between the competition offices of the candidate countries and the Commission took place in
Ljubljana, Slovenia. The delegations included highJevel officials from the respective competition and
State aid authorities, including Commissioner Monti. The annual conference serves as a forum for the
exchange of views and experience. It also serves to establish and strengthen professional contacts
between officials responsible for competition. This year's conference concentrated on the assessment of
enforcement practice in the candidate countries and on the need for effective implementation of the rules
in the fields of both antitrust and State aid.
6. Western Balkans
529. At Santa Maria da Feira, in June 2000, the European Council recognised that the countries o1'the
Western Balkans were potential candidates for EU membership. The Union committed itself to
(..?) Decision 1/2000 of the EU-Bulgaria Association Council of 28 February 2000 (OJ L 144, 17 .6.2000).
("') Decision 2/2000 of the EU-Romania Association Council of 17 July 2000 (OJ L 23O, 12.9.2000).
(.',) Decision 2/2000 of the EU-Lithuania Association Council of 24 July 2000 (OJ L 199, 5.10.2000).
(.tu) Decision3/2000oftheEU-EstoniaAssociationCounciloflDecember2000(OJL2l'23.1.2OOI).
('u') Decision3/2001 of theEU-CzechAssociationCouncilof 8March200l (OJL 10O, 1f .4.2001)'
('o') Decision 3/2001 of the EU-Latvia Association Council of 20 March 2001 (OJ L 156, 13.6.2001).
(36r) Decision 2il2001 of the EU-Poland Association Council of 7 May 2001 (OJ L 215, 9.8.2001).
(re) Decision 3/2001 of the Eu-Slovakia Association Council of 18 May 2OO1 (OJ L 217, 11.8.2001).
('6') Decision 4/2001 of the EU-Slovenia Association Council of 25 July 2001 (not yet published).
COMPETITION REPORT 2OO1
XXXIST REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 2OO1 
- 
SEC(2002) 462 FINAL 149
supporting the stabilisation and association process for this region, notably through technical assistance.In 2001' the Commission began a process of discussion with the rccently established competition
authorities in the Western Balkan countries. This is with a view to the work that will be required under
the competition provisions of the Stabilisation and Association Agreements that are cunintly being
concluded with these countries (366). The Commission has also been an active participant in the OECD3
Regional Flagship Initiative on competition policy for the countries of the Westem Balkans that was
launched at Ljubljana in July.
B 
- 
Bilateral cooperation
1. United States
530. Every year, the Commission reports in detail to the Council and the European parliament on
its cooperation activities with the US under the 1991 Cooperation Agreement (,u') and the l99g
Positive Comity Agreement ('u'). The latest report covered the period from I January 2000 to
3l December 2000 (tu'). The report for 2001 will be published during the course of 2002.
531. During 2001, the Commission continued its close cooperation with the Antitrust Division of the
US Department of Justice (DoJ) and the US Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in an ever greater number
of cases. The trend towards the globalisation of markets continued apace during the year, as most vividly
illustrated by the record number and scale oftransnational mergers: the year 2001 saw a notable increase
in the number of transactions notified to both the Commission and the US antitrust agencies. A large
number of operations in all areas of antitrust were scrutinised simultaneously by the Commission and the
US agencies. Inter-agency discussions tend to focus on issues such as the definition of markets, the likely
competitive impact of a transaction on those markets, and the viability of any remedies suggested.
532. Merger investigations involving close transatlantic cooperation included GE/Honeywell, Metso/
Svedala and CYC/I'enzing ("0). The Commission also cooperated closely with its US counterparts in a
number of non-merger investigations, for example in the Commission's and FTC's respective enquiries
into the creation of the Covisint business-to-business joint venture between the manufacturers of
automobile spare parts. Case-related EUruS cooperation is discussed in further detail in this report's
chapter on merger control, and in the seventh report to the Council and the European parliament for the
year 2001, which will be published during the course of 2002.
533. There were numerous bilateral contacts between the Commission and the relevant US authorities
during the course of 2001. Commissioner Monti paid a visit to Washington in March, and used the
occasion to meet, among other persons, key members of the administration. On 24 September, he met in
C*) In 2001, two Stabilisation and Association Agreements were signed. The Stabilisation and Association Agreement
between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the former yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia, of the other part, was signed on 9 April in Luxembourg. The Stabilisation and Association Agreement
between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Croatia, of the other
part, was signed on 29 October in Luxembourg.
(16r) Agrcement between the European Communities and the Govemment of the United States of America regarding the
application of their competition laws (oJ L 95, n .4.199s, as corrected by oJL 131, 15.6.1995).
('63) Agreement between the European Communities and the Government of the United states of America on the application of
positive comity principles in the enforcement of their comperirion laws (oJ L li3, lg.6.199g).
c@) coM(2002) 45. 29 -r.2c0.2.
(1?0) ForGE/Honeywell,seepoint326andBoxg:forMetso/Svedala,seepoints30Tand3l6;forCyC/I*nzing,seepoint256.
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Washington the newly appointed heads of the US antitrust agencies, Assistant Attorney General Charles
James of the [DoJ] and Chairman Timothy Muris of the FTC, for the annual bilateral EUruS meeting.
The meeting coincided with the 10th anniversary of the EU/US bilateral agreement on competition
policy. Meetings also took place during the course of the year between the Commission and other US
agencies, such as the US Department of Transportation (which have some responsibility for the
management of competition policy issues in their respective sectors).
534. The mandate of the joint EU/US merger working group was refocused at the 24 September
meeting. The work will continue and be intensified. The topics need to be further defined and will reflect
a number of issues resulting from ongoing questions in merger assessment that have been raised in recent
cases.
2. Canada
535. Bilateral cooperation with Canada is based on the Competition Cooperation Agreement which
entered into force in June 1999 ("'). Every year, the Commission reports in detail to the Council ancl the
European Parliament on its cooperation activities with Canada. The latest report covered the period lrom
1 January 2000 to 31 December 2000 (''). The report for 2001 will be published during the course of 2002.
536. An increasing number of cases are being examined by the competition authorities on both sides.
Contacts between the Commission and its Canadian counterpart, the Canadian Competition Bureau, have
been frequent and fruitful. Discussions have concemed both case-related issues and more general policy
issues. Two bilateral meetings, as foreseen in the Cooperation Agreement, took place, one in February in
Brussels and one in September in Ottawa, in which the heads of the respective competition authorities
participated.
3. Other OECD countries
537. During 2001 the Commission engaged in cooperation with the competition authorities of a
number of other OECD countries, most notably Australia, New Zealand and Korea. These contacts
concemed both case-related and more general competition policy issues. The Commission also continued
its efforts to conclude a bilateral cooperation agreement with Japan.
538. During the course of the year the Commission continued its close cooperation with the ESA
(EFTA Surveillance Authority) in enforcing the Agreement on the European Economic Area.
4. Mediterranean countries
539. The Euro-Mediterranean Agreements establishing an association between the EU and
Morocco (3?3), Tunisia (ttt), and Israel (375) are in force. Morocco, Tunisia and Israel have competition
(3'r) Agreement between the European Communities and the Government of Canada regarding the application of their
competition laws (OJ L 175, 1.0.7.1999).
c7\ coM(2N2\ 45, 29.1.2002.
C") OJL70, 18.3.2000. Articles 36-41.
C*) OJ L 97, 30.3.199'7, Articles 3641.
C-) OJ L 747,21.6.2000. k icles 36-38.
COMPETITION REPORT 2OO1
xxxtsT REPORT ON COMPETIT|ON pOLtCy 2OO1 _ SEC(2002) 462 FTNAL 151
legislation, which facilitates negotiations on a mechanism for cooperating with the Commission in
connection with the commitments laid down in Article 36 of each of the three agreements. As regards the
other Euro-Mediterranean Agreements, the one with Jordan (376) is not yet in force, the Jordanian
Parliament having rejected the draft law on competition presented by the Government. The agreement
with Egypt (377) was signed in 2000 and the Egyptian authorities are currently considering a draft law on
competition. The interim agreement with the Palestinian Authority (,") has not yet undergone final
renegotiation. The Commission has been monitoring the situation with a view to bringing the EU's
Mediterranean partners closer to cooperation on competition policy.
540. With a view to giving a boost to Mediterranean policy, negotiation meetings were held with
Algeria, Lebanon and Syria. The competition chapter of the future agreements will make it possible to
align the existing or future competition policies of these countries with Community policy. The
Commission offers new partners the possibility of stepping up technical and institutional cooperation.
Algeria already has a law on competition and an authority responsible for enforcing it. Lebanon and
Syria, on the other hand, have not yet reached this point.
5. LatinAmerica
541. The mechanism for cooperation (r7'g) between their competition authorities laid down in the
agreement between the EU and Mexico (380), which is in force, gave rise to exchanges of information,
consultations on certain activities and a provision on technical cooperation.
542. Four negotiation meetings on trade liberalisation were held between the EU, Mercosur and Chile.
The goal is to establish mechanisms for cooperation between the competition authorities of the parties,
with the application of competition rules ensuring legal certainty and transparency of treatment for firms
on the respective markets. The regulatory framework for competition in the Mercosur countries has
progressed; Argentina has enhanced its institutional and regulatory system by creating a Secretariat and
must now set up a competition court. Uruguay set up a competition department responsible for drawing
up regulations implementing the competition provisions of the law. Paraguay now has a very
comprehensive draft law on competition.Brazil is considering a new proposal for a law integrating its
competition departments. With these developments, the Commission received regular updates on
Mercosur's competition policy.
543. As regards the Andean Community, the flnancial protocol to the proposal on technical
cooperation in competition was signed between the Commission and the General Secretariat of the
Andean Community. EuropeAid is to be responsible for the procedure to select the consultant that will
manage the programme.
544. During the year, direct information campaigns on Community rules and practice continued, as
did the provision of information via the Boletin l-atinoamericano de competencia.
("0) Articles 53-58, COM(1997) 554 final.("') Articles 35-39, COM(2001) 184 final.
C^) OJ L 187,76.7 .1997, Articles 33-34.(r') OJ L 245, 29.9.2000 and OJ L 157, 30.6.2000.
c*) oJ L 276.28.10.20N.
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6. Russian Federation and Ukraine
545. Cooperation with the Russian Federation in the field of competition made important prolless
over the year through a series of highJevel meetings. During these meetings the whole range of
competition matters of common interest was covered, from case-related cooperation in specific antitrust
investigations, through an exchange of experience in the field of liberalisation policy, to discussing the
prospects for State aid monitoring policy within the Russian Federation.
546. Moreover, a considerable number of working meetings were held to advance the work required
by the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. A workshop for increasing understanding of European
State aid policy in the steel sector was organised.
547. With Ukraine, the Commission organised a short study tour to enhance understanding ol EC
competition law and practice for members of the Ukrainian Competition Committee.
C 
- 
Multilateral cooperation
548. The year 2001 saw two major developments in relation to Commission initiatives within the
framework of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and as regards the new International Competition
Network 0CN).
1. WTO: trade and competition policy
1.1. Competition in the Doha DevelopmentAgenda
549. Following a long preparatory process, the fourth WTO Ministerial Conference took place in
Doha (Qatar) from 9 to 14 November. The declaration adopted by WTO members in Doha (38') addresses
among other issues the 'interaction between trade and competition policy'. The relevant passages of the
declaration (r8'z) (paras 23-25) bear testimony to the recognition 
- 
for the first time 
- 
by all WTO
members, with no exceptions, that a multilateral framework is needed today to enhance the contribution
of competition policy to international trade and development. There was agreement in Doha that. the
WTO members will negotiate and conclude a multilateral agreement on trade and competition. It was
also agreed that the formal phase of negotiations will open immediately after the fifth WTO Ministerial
Conference, due to take place in Mexico in 2003, and that the negotiated result on competition will lbrm
an integral part ofthe overall result ofthe negotiations (para. 47).The negotiating arrangements will be
decided at the fifth Ministerial Conference.
550. In keeping with its 'developmental'aspirations, the declaration also highlights the need to step up
efforts to provide technical assistance to build and enhance the capacity of developing and least
developed countries in this area. It is obvious that these countries urgently need all the assistance that
developed countries can provide in order to develop their capacity to evaluate the implications of closer
("') Also known as the 'Doha Development Agenda', because of the central position that the development dimension will
occupy in future WTO work.
('*') Available online at the WTO web site: www.wto.ors.
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multilateral cooperation in this area for their development policies and objectives, as well as for theirhuman and institutional development. The Commission will work together with all relevant
intergovernmental organisations, including Unctad, and through the appropriate regional and bilateral
channels, to provide coordinated, strengthened and adequately."rou.."d usirtun..lo respond to these
needs.
551. Finally, the declaration mentions that the pre-negotiation period leading up to the Iifth Ministerial
Conference should be used to clarify with partners in the Geneva process the various elements
constituting this future multilateral framework and most likely to figure in a negotiating mandate. The
declaration contains an indicative list of such key issues with the 
"L-ent, that the fu nas repeatedlyearmarked as the pillars of the planned multilateral framework on competition, namely certain core trade
and competition principles, including transparency, non-discrimination and procedural fairness; a
commitment to combat hardcore cartels; the arrangements for voluntary cooperation between antitrust
agencies; and support for progressive reinforcement of competition institutions in developing countries
through capacity building.
1.2. An initial assessment of the declaration adopted in Doha
552. The result of discussions on trade and competition in Doha and the formulation of the relevant
passages in the ministerial declaration are most satisfactory for the Commission for the followine
reasons:
- 
first, the WTO members which have signed up to the package agreed in Doha (including some of
those which were sceptical about the role of the WTO in the area of competition, such as certain
developing countries, most notably India, as well as Hong Kong) recognise for the first time that it
may be to their benefit and to the benefit of the multilateral trading system to negotiate and conclude
a multilateral agreement on trade and competition in the WTO. Up until quite recently, even theprinciple of having such an agreement was controversial. The reiognition of the imiortance of
establishing such a framework and its relevance for international trade and development will
contribute to the introduction and more effective application of domestic competition rigimes and
will be of considerable benefit to consumers worldwide;
- 
second, even if another decision will have to be taken at the fifth WTO Ministerial Conference in
2003 on the arrangements for the formal and final phase of negotiations on this multilateral
agreement, there now exists a unanirnous and clear commitment to launching such negotiations on a
fixed date so that the new trade and competition rules will be an integral part of the so-called .single
undertaking'resulting from the negotiation process set in motion at Doha, which is to be concluded
no later than I January 2005. As far as the EU and the other proponents for negotiating such rules in
the WTO are concerned, we have now entered a crucial phase within which we have the firm
intention to clarify with our partners from developing and developed countries the elements that
WTo members need to include in this multilateral agreement and to draft with them a precise and
inclusive negotiation agenda to be adopted by the flfth WTO Ministerial Conference inZOOZ;
- 
third' our proposals regarding the key components of the future multilateral agreement on trade and
competition have been widely accepted. The EU was the first to put concrete substantive proposals
on the table, so it takes particular note of the fact that that the Doha declaration focuses on precisely
those elements that we have highlighted in our proposals and identifies them as the items that the
WTO members will have to take up first for clarification;
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lastly, as the working group in Geneva will now shift its attention to concrete pre-negotiation work
on these elements, the declaration opens up the scope for more focused technical assistance and
capacity building that will help emerging and developing economies to better understand and
appreciate the significance of these issues, including for the development of their own economies. In
this process Unctad and other international institutions, as well as regional and bilateral
arrangements, will certainly contribute and have an important role to play in order that everybody
may be ready to open formal negotiations following the next Ministerial Conference.
Box 12: Thade and comp€tition: from the Van Miert report to Doha
Effons to include coryetition in the WTO work programme started io lp6 when, on-the lT, ?f
the Van Miert report (r), the Commission propsed to ttre Council (t) that the World Trade
Organizarion should set up a working group respoosible for initial work on the development qf an
international frarrework of.competition rules. This initiative was approved by the Council and
supported by several other WTO members and a decision was adopted by the Singapore WTO
Ministerial Conlerence on ll December 1996 '[to] establish a working Sloup to snrdy issues ...
relating to the interaction between .trade ad competition .policy, including urti+ompetitive
practices. in order to identifu any {reas that may merit consideration in the WTO framework'.
At that tirne. the Commission argued that the discuosions should focus on an rurdertaking by all
WTO members to develop actjve domestic competition structures, the identification and adoption
of common conrpetition principles at international level (most harmful practices), the creation of
the means of cooperation between competition authorities and 
"the 
adapting of the WTO rules for
the settlement of disputes to the competition area (3).
,q
,e)
t1)
2. OECD
553. The main events of the May session were the round tables on the training programmes of
competition authorities for their officials and on price transparency. On price transparency, the EC
addressed the advantages of governmentally mandated price transparency measures (e.g. in certain utility
markets, in the motor vehicle market) in order to achieve market integration and enhance competition and
entry, as well as the anticompetitive effects of private voluntary price transparency agreements or similar
practices between suppliers. Other delegations addressed different issues focusing on the pros and cons
of price transparency for the consumer. Discussions boiled down to the conclusion that price
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transparency may in certain cases benefit the consumer but it can also have serious anticompetitive
effects, depending on the structure ofthe market and the type ofprice transparency arrangements (level
of aggregation of the information exchanged, time frame of the data eichanged, frequency of the
exchanges, etc.).
554. In June the Commission took part in and contributed to the first OECD conference on
competition policy in the countries of south-eastern Europe, which was held in Ljubljana, the day after
the seventh annual conference with the applicant countries.
555. During the Competition Law and Policy Committee (CLP) meeting in October, the OECD
organised the flrst Global Forum on Competition, which brought together representatives of more than
50 countries. Commissioner Monti took part in the event. In his opening rpeech h" called on competition
authorities throughout the world to step up their cooperation and to establish mechanisms for governance
in the field of international competition policy. Topics covered during the Forum included the role of
competition policy in economic reform, cooperation instruments, unjustifiable agreements and
cooperation on cross-border mergers. The Commission also participated during the CLp session in the
round tables on regulating prices for access to network infrastructures, especially in the
telecommunications field, but also as regards gas and electricity, and on means of investigation other than
leniency prograrnmes (in particular surprise inspections).
3. Unctad
556. The Commission took part in the Unctad meeting from 2 to 4 July on intemational cooperation
between competition authorities, at which Commissioner Monti announced specific plans for tichnical
assistance to developing countries: a technical assistance project in the competition field for Comesa(Common Market for Eastem and Southern Africa), a planned seminar for competition officials from
developing countries and a joint study with Unctad on the importance of a competition policy for poor
countries. Commissioner Monti advocated competition for developing countries and called for efforts to
develop intemational cooperation.
4. International CompetitionNetwork
557. From 2 to 4 February, the Intemational Bar Association organised a meeting in Ditchley park in
the United Kingdom, bringing together a large number of competition authorities and practitionirs for an
informal discussion of the recommendation by the US Committee ICPAC f8) to establish an
international competition network (ICN). Following the Ditchley meeting, a steering group was set up ro
supervise the launch of the project. The group, in which the Commission took an active part, met foithe
first time in Berlin in May and then on the fringes of the OECD CLp meeting in paris in October.
558. As a result of the above discussions and practical efforts, the creation of an intemational
competition network (ICN) was announced publicly on Thursday 25 October in New york. This is the
first time so many competition authorities have taken an autonomous initiative designed to enable them to
share experience and exchange views on competition issues deriving from the ever-increasing
globalisation of the world economy. The ICN will be a project-oriented, consensus-based, informal
network of antitrust agencies from developed and developing countries that will address antitrust
enforcement and policy issues of common interest and formulate proposals for procedural and
(133) International Competition Policy Advisory Committee.
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substantrve convergence through a results-oriented agenda and structure' It will encourage the
dissemination of antitrust experilnce and best practices, promote the advocacy role of antitrust agencies
and seek to facilitate intemational cooperation. The ICN will concentrate its efforts on international
antitmst issues that are difficult but capable of being resolved. Initially, the ICN will work on two
important antitrust issues: the merger control process in the multi-jurisdictional context and the
competition advocacy role of antitrust agencies. This agenda will be later opened up to include issues of
particular relevance to transition and developing economies.
559. Any national or regional competition agency responsible for the enforcement of antitrust laws
may become a member of the ICN. The network will also actively seek advice and contributions from the
private sector and various non-governmental organisations, and will cooperate closely with the following
iypes of entity: international organisations, such as the OECD, WTO and Unctad, industry and consumer
asiociations, practitioners of antitrust law and/or economics and members of the academic community. In
particular, tfre fCN will seek input from these non-governmental advisers, who are not members of the
network but who will provide ruppo.t in terms of identifying projects. The ICN may also request that
certain non-governmental advisers participate in working groups for designated projects and contribute
papers or participate in hearings related to ICN projects.
560. As regards its organisation, the ICN is intended as a virtual structure without any permanent
secretariat, flexibly organised around its projects, and guided by a steering group which will identify
projects and devise work plans for approval by the ICN as a whole. The authority hosting the annual
.onf.."n.. will cover for a year logistic and secretarial costs related to its organisation. There will be
one ICN conference per year. The conference will bring together heads of antitrust agencies to
commission new projects and review the progress and recommendations of current projects. The
conferences will provide a structured dialogue by focusing on a limited number of projects selected
sufficiently in advance by the ICN to permit meaningful participation by all members. The first official
ICN conference will be hosted by the Italian antitrust authority and is scheduled for October 2002.
Thereafter, annual conferences will be held in the following countries: Mexico (2003); Korea (2004);
Germany (2005); and South Africa (2006).
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VI _ OUTLOOK FOR 2OO2
1. Antitrust
1.1. Legislative and regulatory activities
Proposalfor a new regulation implementingArtictes gI and g2 EC
561. Following the discussion held by the Council on 5 December, the Belgian presidency concluded
that the new regulation implementing Articles 81 and 82 EC had to be adopted i n 2002 inorder to ensure
that it was fully applicable before the forthcoming enlargement of the European Union. Work on the
Commission's proposal for a new regulation will therefore continue in the iouncil under the Spanish
and, if necessary, the Danish presidency. In parallel to discussions on the proposed regulation in the
Council working group and in response to requests by the European Parliament, the Council and the
Economic and Social Comminee, the Commission will in 2002 present drafts of several notices
clarifying some of the main concepts in the new regulation.
Review of the block exemption regulation for technology transfer agreements
562- After discussing the report (see points 17tr) with industry, consumer associations and other
interested parties in the flrst half of 2002 the Commission will propose new competition rules for the
application of Article 81 to licensing agreements.
Commission guidelines on mqrket analysis and recommendation on relevant markets for electronic
communications semices and networksl adoption of a consolidaled Commission direitive
for competition in electronic communications markets
563- Following adoption of the proposed directives making up the new regulatory framework for
electronic communications services and networks in early 2002, the Commission will, in accordance
with Article 15 of the framework directive, publish guidelines on market analysis and the calculation of
significant market power as well as a recommendation on relevant markets. Both texts should provide
national regulatory authorities with necessary guidance for applying the new competition law-based
concepts of the new regulatory framework.
564. The Commission will also adopt a consolidated directive on competition in the electronic
communications markets to replace Directive 90/388 and all subsequent u."nding directives.
Proposalfor the motor vehi.cle distribution regime
565. The block exemption regulation for car distribution (Regulation (EC) No l475lg5) expires on
30 September 2002. The Commission will in eady 2002 adopt its proposal for the motor vehicle
distribution regime, based on the November 2000 evaluation report and the hearing held on 14 and
15 February 2001 with all interested parties, the four studies carried out for the Commission (r*) and all
other relevant information and studies at its disposal.
('*) Two in 2000 (Price differentials between Member States, and Link between sales and after-sales service) md two in 2001(Impact of possible future legislative scenarios for motor vehicle distribution on all parties concerned, and Customer
preferences for existing and potential sales and servicing altematives in automotive distribution).
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566. The adopted proposal will be published in the Offrcial Joumal in order to give all interested
parties an opportunity to comment. After receiving written and oral comments from interested parties and
irom the Advisory Committee and after informing the other institutions, the proposal will then be
finalised and submitted to the Commission for adoption. The Commission should adopt the future regime
during the summer of 2002, i.e. before expiry of the current block exemption at the end of
September 2002.
1.2. Enforcement activities
567. Following the publication for consultation in July of a draft leniency notice with a view to
replacing the existing notice on the non-imposition or reduction offines in cartel cases, adopted in1996,
the Commission carefully reviewed the comments received and intends to adopt an updated and revised
notice in the course of 2002.
568. Access to the file is one of the main procedural guarantees intended to protect the rights of the
defence. In order to take account of experience gained so far under the Commission's notice on the
intemal rules of procedure for processing requests for access to the file, as well as to bring the notice into
line with the recent case-law of the Court of First Instance, a revision exercise was initiated in 2001. The
revised norice is expected to be adopted by the Commission during the second balf of 2002.
2. Mergers
569. In order to ensure that the European merger control system is ready to meet the challenges it will
face in the future, most notably the forthcoming enlargement of the European Union, on 11 December the
Commission adopted a Green Paper on the review of the merger regulation. This initiated a period of
consultation that gives anyone interested the opportunity to submit cofirments on the jurisdictional,
substantive and procedural issues raised. The consultation period will close at the end of March 2002,
after which the Commission plans to propose an amended merger regulation. The proposal is expected to
be adopted in the second half of 2002.
570. The Commission's jurisdictional scope will also be affected by expiry of the European Coal and
Steel (ECSC) Treaty on 23 Jtly 2002. Once the ECSC Treaty has expired, mergers will be considered
either under the EC Treaty, and in particular the merger regulation, or, if they do not meet the latter's
thresholds, under the appropriate national legislation. This will mark the end of the Commission's
exclusive jurisdiction over mergers in the coal and steel industries. After the expiry of the ECSC Treaty, it
will no longer be possible for a merger to be covered by two different Treaties as happened in four (''8s) of
the eleven cases that were handled under the ECSC Treaty in 2001. Together with the changes being
considered under the merger review, this should help to ensure that the European merger control system
operates as effectively and efficiently as possible and that coal and steel mergers are dealt with at the
appropriate level.
571. Last but not least, cooperation with US merger control agencies will be stepped up with a view to
achieving closer convergence in procedures and substantive analysis when applying merger control law
to the growing number of cases which affect both EU and US jurisdiction. For this purpose, the EU/US
working group on mergers and its five specialised subgroups recently set up by the agencies involved (the
C$\ Baili,/Klocknar- COMP/ECSC.1359, 1.10.2001 and COMP/M.2481, 31.9.2001; BHP/BiIIiton 
- 
COMP/ECSC.1356,
t4.6.2OOl and COMP/M.2473, 14.6.2O01' Endesa/CDF/SNET 
- 
COMP/ECSC.1352, l8.4.2OOl and COMPllt4.228l,
17.4.2001i I|sinor/Arbed/Aceralia 
- 
coMPlEcsc.135r, 23.1,1.2OO1and COMP/1VI.2382, 19.7.2001.
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European Commission, the US Federal Trade Commission and the US Deparhnent of Justice) will
continue to figure among the priorities for 2002.
3. State aid
572. In the field of State aid, the Commission will continue and intensify its efforts to review State aid
rules and procedures in order to ensure that simple cases are dealt with quickly and simply so that
resources can be concentrated on those cases which present the greatest potential risks from the
standpoint ofcompetition policy. Nevertheless, even for these cases, the aim will be to ensure that they
are handled in accordance with transparent and predictable procedures and rules. These efforts do noi,
however, imply any relaxation of the Commission's traditional position, which is also recognised by all
Member States, that overall aid levels in terms of GNP remain too high and that the most distortive forms
of individual aid must be eliminated and aid measures reoriented towards horizontal measures in support
of the Community's broader economic aims, including cohesion objectives. Continuing efforts wili thus
be made to ensure prompt and effective repayment of incompatible aid and effectively monitor the
implementation of decisions by Member States. Further improvements in transparency will also be
sought through the progressive development of the register and scoreboard.
573- As regards horizontal and cohesion policy development, the Commission should normally
complete the review of the guidelines for aid for research and development, a new legal framework foi
employment aid and the review of the multisectoral framework for large regional investment projects. tn
line with the commitments given in its report to the Laeken European Council, the Commission will also
give high priority to clarifying, in the light of developments in the case-law of the Court of Justice.
application of the State aid rules to services of general economic interest (386).
4. International field
574. In the international sphere, the Commission will continue to pursue its dual policy of enhancing
bilateral cooperation with its foreign counterparts while at the same time exploring possibilities foi
expanding multilateral cooperation. Regarding the former, the Commission will continue to cooperate
with the United States and Canada within the framework of the existing bilateral agreements. A similar
agreement is expected to be concluded with Japan. Cooperation in the competition field will also be
developed with all the Mediterranean countries, the Commission having assigned priority to that region.
The growing importance of Asian countries for global competition policy will necessitate an increased
level ofcooperation and technical assistance in that region too (with special reference to China, Korea,
and India). Moreover, the Commission will have to develop appropriate cooperation with major countries
with which association agreements are already in force or are in the process of being finalised, such as
Russia, {Ikraine, Mexico, Mercosur and Chile.
575. As regards multilateral initiatives, the Commission will continue to participate actively in all
international forums where competition policy is on the agenda, in particular under the OECD, WTO and
LINCTAD. Furthermore, the Commission is currently contributing to a new concept of governance by
pafiicipating in the Intemational Competition Network, which is striving to improve cooperation among
competition authorities around the world in order to enhance the convergence of competition policies.
(",) coM(2001) 598, 17.10.2m1
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576. Under the timetable towards accession agreed by the Giiteborg European Council in June,
accession negotiations will be in the process of finalisation with some candidate countries but will
continue with others. A reinforced monitoring process will apply to those candidate countries with which
accession negotiations have been completed in the area of competition. Building on progress already
achieved, relations will continue to be developed in the competition field with Turkey.
577. Particular attention will be devoted to the development of technical assistance to the candidate
countries, as well as to developing countries.
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ANNEX 
- 
CASES DISCUSSED IN THE REPORT
1. Articles 81,82 and 86
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184
De Post/La Poste (Belgium) oJ L 61. 2.3.2002 82,113tr
Deutsche Post AG I oI L 125,5.5.2001 77, 108tr
Deutsche Post AG II oI L 331. 15.12.2001 78,1lltt
Duales Svstem Deutschland (DSD) oJ L 166. 21.6.2W1 79,Box3
Eurex rP/o2/4. 3.1.2002 196ff
Formula One (FIA & FOA) oJ c 169, 13.06.2001
IP/01/1523,30.10.01 22lff
German banks rPtOU1796. tl.l2.zml 64ff
GlaxoWellcome oI L 302, 17.11.2001 23zff
Graphite electrodes IP/01/1010, 18.7.2001 4Off
IATA Cargo Tariff Consultations tPtol/694, 15.5.2001
rP tor/ 1433. 19. 10.2001 143tr
IATA Passenser Tariff Conferences o1 L 177. 30.6.2W1 r49tr
Identrus oJ L249.19.9.2001 tJz
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Michelin rP/0u873,20.6.2001 80
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SAS/Maersk oJ L 265. 5.10.2001 Box 1,43ff
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2. Merger control
3. State aid
LPt0u01t984, 11.7
tPt0yt247.6.9.200r
IP/01/1 893. 21.12.2001
oJ c 164, t4.6.20W
rP I 01 I 1436. 17 .r0.2001
oJ L 59. 28.2.2002
t/79,19.1.2001
tPt0u298. 1.3.2001
IPtOI/842, 14.6.2001
rP/01/855, 18.6.2001
rP/01/939.3.7.2001
IP/01i 1048, 20.7.2001
Villar Mir/EnBW Hidroel6ctrica del Cantdbrico IPl0t/1320. 26.9.2W1
oJ c293, 14.10.2000
tPtot/940,22.8.2000
rPtouro3,24.1.2001
oJ c239,25.8.2001
IPt01/1136,27 .7 .2001
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IPtOt/1552,8.11.2001
rP/01/1053,23.7 .2001
tP tot / 1629, 21.1 r.2001
Norske Skos/Parenco/Walsum
IP/00i 1063, 26.9.20n,O
rP/01t147.31.1.2001
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IP t0t / 1393, 10. 1 0.2001
rP/w173.31.1.2002
1Pt01n222.23.8.2001
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rPt02n73.31.r.2002
The Post Offi oe/TPG/SPPL IP tOO/ 1317 . I 5. 1 1.2000
tPtol/364, 13.3.2001
L 143,29.5.2001
rPl00/1076,29.9.200/0
rPt01/494.3.4.2001
UPM-Kymrnene/Haindl IP/01/1053. 23.7.2001
rP lor I 1629. 21.t t.2001
Aid to businesses affected by rain in October 2000 oJ c 5, 8.1.2002
Aid to the agricultural sector following the floods
in October 2000 (Valle d'Aosta)
Aid to the French inland waterway sector oI c342.5.12.2001
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Aid to the inland waterway sector 
- 
Netherlands oJC r02.31.3.2001 443
Aland Island captive insurance companies not yet published 3't2
Babcock Wilcox Espaffa not yet published 392
Banking Society Berlin BGB not yet published 470
Biihler Edelstahl oI c 226. 11.8.2001 409
Capital grants 
- 
renewable technologies oJ c 30, 2.2.2W2 363.387
Capilal injection 
- 
Verlipack not yet published 36s
Capitalisation aid for technology based firms oJ c32.s.2.2ffi2 Box l0
Coalflelds entreprise fund not yet published Box l0
Cogne Acciai Speciali R&D not yet published 410
Collection and processing of PVC facade elements oJ c 358. t5.12.2W1 364
Competition for innovative solutions in rail based
logistics not yet published 429
ControVcoordination centres of foreign companies not yet published 374
Conrs Technology, ECSC steel oI c 347.8.12.2001 410
DaimlerChrysler Kdlleda (DE) not yet publsned 424
Eko Stahl not yet published 410
Emission tradine scheme not yet published 388
Entrepreneur loans oJ c 328, 23.11.2001 Box 10
Environmental protection oJ c 30. 2.2.2002 363
EUV-Lithography oJ c 333, 28.il.2001 3't9
Extatic lithography oJ c 5. 8.r.2002 379
Fiat Melfi (IT) oI L 177,30.6.2001 423
Fluor lithography oJ c 5. 8.1.2002 379
France: Aid to coal industry oJL239,7.9.2ffi1 474
Freight facilities grant oJ c 45. 19.2.2002 44r
Futour 20(X) ot c 219.4.8.2W1 Box 10
Germany: Aid to coal industry o1 c 127,9.5.2001 474
Gibraltar exempt offshore companies not yet publlshed 374
Gibraltar qualifying offshore companies not yet published 3 tq
Graf von Henneberg GmbH not yet published 393
Grants to companies with working environment
certrncates oJ c 5.9.1.2001 381
Grants to large energy consumers oJ c 358, 15.122001 385
Green electricity certifi cates oJ c 330. 24.tt.2m1 363,387
International financial activities not yet published Jt3
Investment allowance not yet published 394
Investment capital funds oJ c 318, 13.11.2001 Box l0
IVECO (rr) oI L 292.9.11.2001 417
Job rotation oJ c 268, 22.9.2001 380
Kartogroup oJ c 5.9.1.2001 401
Landesbanken (Germany) not yet published Box l1
Lautex GmbH oIL42. 15.2.2W0 484
LinFa Beteiligungsholding not yet published 390
Loading and unloading facilities for inland waterway
Yesse.ls oJ c24,26.1.2002 444
Modi{ication of aid to Philipp Holzmann AG not yet published 391
Network grants for licensed heavy rail infrastructure
managers oJc 333. 28.11.2001 429
Nissan Micra oJ L 140. 24.5.2W1 416
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Non-volatile fl ash memories oJ c 199. 14.7.2001
Nuclear power plants not yet published )Il
Planning for natural disasters oJ c 71. 3.3.2001 474
Promotion of Piedmont airport system not vet published 454
Reductions in employers' social security contributions
for firms which introduce a 38-hour workins week and
a shorter workins time oJ c 268, 22.9.2001 369
Regional aid Flanders (expansion law) ot c244. 11.9.2001 395
Resional selective assistance oJ c 211. 28.7 .2001 396
Regional Venture Capital Funds oJ L263.3.10.2001 Box l0
Regularisation of the underground economy oJC 30.2.2_m2 368
Santana Motor not yet published 4ZO
Schiphol Group AVI tax exemption not yet published 453
Shipbuilding at L327,12.12.2001 406
Shipbuilding 
- 
restructuring of public yards oJ c21,24.1.2002 407
Sidmar not yet published 410
Soci6t6 national maritime Corse-Mddit6rann6e oJ c 117. 21.4.2001 434
Spain: Aid to coal indusry not yet published 414
Stahlwerke Bremen oJ c244,1.9.200r 4to
Tax aid in the fotm of a 45Vo tax credit in the province
ofAlava not yet published 398,399
Tax aid in the form of a 457o tax credit in the orovince
of Guiprizcoa not yet published 398. 399
Tax aid in the form of a 45Vo tax credit in the province
ofYrzcaya not yet published 398,399
Tax aid in the form ofa 507o reduction in the amount of
corporation tzx payable by business start-ups in the
autonomous community of Navarre not yet published 399
Tax aid in the form of a reduction in the amount of tax
payable by certain new businesses in the province of
Alava not yet published 399
Tax aid in the form of a reduction in the amount of tax
payable by certain new businesses in the province of
Guiprizcoa not yet published 399
Tax aid in the form of a reduction in the amount of tax
payable by certain new businesses in the provinces of
Alava, Guiprizcoa and Vizcaya not yet published 399
Tax credits Mezzosiorno oJC 149. 19.5.2001 397
Tax measures applicable to mutual and provident
societies in France not yet published 472
UK 
- 
Climate change levy 
- 
N. Ireland oJ c263. 19.9.2001 386
UK climate change levy oJ c 185, 30.6.2001 370. 383
UK: Aid to coal industry oI L241, Il.9.200l
oJ L 305, 22.11.2001
oJ L 35, 6.2.200.2 414
Venture capital for small technology enterprises oJ c 117,21.4.2001 Box 10
VoestAloine Donawitz oJ c 318, 13.n.2001 409
Voest Alpine Linz, ECSC oJ c 333. 28.1t.2001 409
WV Dresden (DE) oJ L 48. 20.2.2002 426
Wacker Chemie GmbH oI c 211.28;7.2W1 401
Waste disnosal svstems for car wrecks not yet published 364
Waste disposal systems for paper and cardboard 
I
not yet published 
I
oJ c 30, 2.2.2M2 
_,]
364 )363,384 I
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I 
- 
ANTITRUST: ARTICLES 8I,82AND 86 OF THE EC TREATY 
-ARTICLE 65 OF THE ECSC TREATY
A 
- 
Case summaries
1. Prohibitions
1.1. Horizontal agreements
SAS/Maersk Air (Case COMP/D-2J37.444) and Sun-Air/SAS
and Maersk Air (Case COMP/D-2/37.386) (')
On 18 July, the Commission decided ('?) to fine Scandinavian airlines SAS and Maersk Air
EUR39.375million and EUR 13.125 million respectively for sharing markets on routes to and from
Denmark.
SAS and Maersk Air had notified to the Commission a cooperation agreement, which entered into force
on 28 March 1999. The two main areas of cooperation that the parties notified related to code-sharing and
frequent-fl yer programmes.
In the course of the preliminary enquiry, it emerged that, coinciding with the entry into force of the
cooperation agreement, Maersk Air had withdrawn from the Copenhagen-Stockholm route where it had
until then been competing with SAS. It also emerged that, at the same time, SAS had stopped flying on
the Copenhagen-Venice route and Maersk Air had started operations on this route. Finally, it emerged
from the preliminary enquiry that SAS had withdrawn from the Billund-Frankfurt route, leaving Maersk
Air 
- 
its previous competitor on the route 
- 
as the only carrier.
These entries and withdrawals, which were not notified, formed part of a wider agreement between the
parties that the Commission discovered as a result of on-site inspections. The inspections were carried
out in June 2000, in close cooperation with the national competition authorities in Sweden and Denmark.
In addition to the agreed entries and withdrawals, the parties also negotiated an overall non-compete
clause covering their future operations on international routes to and from Denmark and on Danish
domestic routes. The parties agreed that Maersk Air would not operate new international routes from
Copenhagen 'without specific request or approval by SAS'. SAS and Maersk Air also agreed that SAS
would not operate on Maersk Air's routes out of Jutland, and that 'the share-out of the domestic routes'
would be respected.
The Commission considered that the market-sharing agreement between SAS and Maersk Air qualif,ed
as a very serious infringement of Community competition law. In reaching this conclusion, the
Commission took account of the nature of the infringement, its actual impact and the size of the relevant
geographic market.
(') See also Part One, points 43-47 and Box 1.
C) Commission decision of 18 July 2001 relating to proceedings pursuant to Article 81 of the EC Treaty and Article 53 of the
Agreement on the European Economic Area (OJ L 265,5.10.2001, p. l5).
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The infringement was of medium duration. It started on 5 September 1998 (the date on which the parties'
ug.""-"ni*u. recorded) and ended on 15 February 2001, when 
- 
according to an exchange ofletters
between the parties 
- 
the two companies regained their freedom to compete'
In the present case, there were no aggravating or extenuating circumstances. The parties benefited,
however, from section D.2 of the 1996 notice on the non-imposition or reduction of fines in cartel cases
(.leniency notice') ('). Maersk Air was able to benefit from the application of the first indent of Section
D.2 of the leniency notice ('active' cooperation) and from the application of the second indent ('passive'
cooperation of companies not contesting the statement of objections), while SAS was able to benefit only
from the application of the second indent of Section D-2.
As a result of the decision, competition between SAS and Maersk Air, the two largest airlines operating
to and from Denmark, was restored to the benefit of consumers.
Graphite electrodes (Case COMP/E-1/36'490) o
On 18 July, the Commission fined eight producers of graphite electrodes a total of EUR 218.8 million for
their participation in a worldwide price-fixing and market-sharing cartel. Graphite electrodes are
ceramic-moulded columns of graphite used primarily in the production of steel in electric arc furnaces,
also referred to as 'mini-mills'.
The cartel started in 1992 atthe instigation of SGL Carbon AG (Germany) and UCAR International Inc.
(USA) and continued until 1998, despite the fact that investigations had already been carried out in the
EU and in the United States before that date.
The Commission characterised the companies' behaviour as a 'very serious' infringement of EC
competition rules.
In setting the fines, the Commission took account of the gravity and duration of the infringement and the
existence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The role of each undertaking was assessed
individually. Where appropriate, the leniency notice was applied.
As to the basic amount of the fine within the category of very serious infringements, the undertakings
were divided into three groups according to their relative importance in the relevant market. Further
ijJff:.fj*,ments 
were made in the case of two companies in the light of their size and overall
Most of the cartel members committed an infringement of long duration (more than five years).
Aggravating circumstances were taken into account for several of them (role of ringleader, continuation
oi th" infritrgement after the Commission started its investigation and attempts to obstruct the
Commission's investigation). Mitigating circumstances (passive role, partial non-implementation of the
agreements) were applied to only one company.
With regard to the leniency notice, this is the first time the Commission has granted a substantial
reduction in a fine (70 7o). The Japanese producer Showa Denko benefited from this reduction, having
been the first company to cooperate and provide conclusive evidence of the cartel to the Commission.
c) oJ c 207, 78.7.1996.(') See also Part One, points 4G42.
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UCAR International also cooperated with the Commission at an earlier stage of the investigation. The
Commission therefore granted a reduction of 40 7o. A significant reduction in the fine was also granted to
SGL Carbon QA Vo), VAW Aluminium (20 Vo) arrd The Carbide Graphite Group (20 Vo). The Japanese
producers Tokai Carbon, SEC Corporation and Nippon Carbon were granted a l0 Vo reduction as they
had not substantially contested the facts.
This decision was a further milestone in the Commission's fight against hardcore cartels, which, by
destroying competition, cause serious harm to consumers and economies.
Several companies have lodged an appeal against the decision before the Court of First Instance in
Luxembourg (').
Sodium gluconate (Case COM P/E- | /36.756) (')
On 2 October, the Commission fined six producers or former producers of sodium gluconate a total of
EUR 57.53 million for their participation in a worldwide price-fixing and market-sharing cartel. Sodium
gluconate is a chemical used to clean metal and glass, with applications such as bottle washing, utensil
cleaning and paint removal. The product is also used as a retarder and water reducer in concrete
admixtures, as a paper and textile bleaching admixture and as a food additive, as well as in various
chemical applications.
Following an investigation which started in 1997, the Commission established that Archer Daniels
Midland Company Inc. (ADM'), Avebe BA ('Avebe', as parent of Glucona BV), Akzo Nobel NV
('Akzo', as former parent of Glucona BV), Fujisawa Pharmaceutical Company Ltd ('Fujisawa'),
Jungbunzlauer AG ('Jungbunzlauer') and Roquefte Frdres SA ('Roquette') participated in the cartel
between 1987 and 1995.
At the material time, world production of sodium gluconate was almost entirely in the hands of Fujisawa,
Glucona BV (a 50/50 joint venture between Akzo and Avebe), Jungbunzlauer and Roquette. After it
entered the market in 1990, ADM also became a significant player until it withdrew in 1995. The EEA
market for sodium gluconate was worth about EUR 20 million in 1995.
In setting the fines, the Commission took account of the gravity and duration of the infringement and of
the existence of aggravating and/or mitigating circumstances. The role of each undertaking was assessed
individually. The leniency notice was applied.
All the undertakings concemed were found to have committed a very serious infringement. Within this
category, for the purpose of fixing the appropriate starting amounts, the undertakings were divided into
two groups according to their relative importance in the relevant market. Akzo and Avebe were held
jointly responsible for the anti-competitive conduct of their subsidiary Glucona. In this regard, the
Commission split into two equal parts the starting amount that would have been applicable to Glucona
had it been the addressee of the decision. The amount obtained constituted the starting amount applicable
to each parent company.
(') CasesT-236/0lTokaiCarbonCo;T-239fiTSGLCarbonAG:T-244lOlNipponCarbonCo.Lt{T-245/01 ShowaDenko
K.K;T-24601 UCAR International Inc.;T-25ll0l SEC Corporation;T-252/01 The Carbide Graphite Group Inc.(6) See also Part One, points 48 et seq.
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In order to ensure that the fines had a sufflcient deterrent effect, further upward adjustments of the
starting amount were made in the case of two companies given their very large size and hence their
overall resources.
With the exception of ADM, which committed an infringement of medium duration, all the other cartel
participants committed an infringement of long duration (more than five years). Leadership of the
infringement was taken into account as an aggravating circumstance in respect ofJungbunzlauer. As to
mitigating circumstances, none was found to be applicable in the present caie.
The Commission granted for the first time a reduction in the fine pursuant to Section B of the leniency
notice. Fujisawa benefited from a reduction of 80 Vo of the fine it would otherwise have had to pay on thlground that it was the first to adduce conclusive evidence of the cartel's existence, beiore the
Commission had undertaken any investigation ordered by decision. The Commission did not grant
Fujisawa a 100 Vo reduction in its fine, as it could have done under Section B of the notice, ai the
company did not approach the Commission until after it had received a request for information. This
reluctance to come forward spontaneously and before any investigatory measure was taken into account.
All the other parties were granted reductions in the fine they would otherwise have had to pay pursuant to
Section D of the leniency notice. Before the Commission adopted its statement of objections, ADM,
Glucona, Jungbunzlauer and Roquette provided it with information and documents which materially
contributed to establishing the existence of the infringement. Moreover, none of them substantially
contested the facts on which the Commission based its statement of objections. Roquette and ADM were
both granted a 40 Vo reduction in their fine. As for Glucona (i.e. Akzo and Avebe) and Jungbunzlauer, the
Commission considered that only a reduction of 20 Vo was appropriate in the light of theiicooperation.
This decision is further proof of the Commission's determination to uncover and punish hardcore cartels,
which are the worst kind of violation of competition rules.
Several companies have lodged an appeal against the decision before the Court of First Instance in
Luxembourg.
Vitamins (Case COMP/E- I /S7.St 2) (,)
On 21 November, the Commission fined F. Hoffmann-La Roche AG, BASF AG, Aventis SA, Solvay
Pharmaceuticals BV Merck KGaA, Daiichi Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd, Eisai Co. Ltd and Takeda Chemical
Industries Ltd a total of EUR 855.23 million for participating in eight distinct secret market-sharing andprice-fixing cartels affecting vitamin products (vitamins A, E, Bt, 85, C and D3, beta carotene and
carotinoids). Each cartel had a specific number of participants and duration, although all operated
between September 1989 and Februaly 1999. Five other companies 
- 
Lonza AG, Kongo Chenrical
Co. Ltd, Sumitomo Chemical Co. Ltd, Sumika Fine Chemicals itd and Tanabe Saiyaku Co. LtA 
- 
were
not fined because the cartels in which they were involved 
- 
vitamin H or folic acid 
- 
ended five years
or more before the Commission opened its investigation. Under EU law, prescription applies under these
circumstances. Prescription also applied to cartels in vitamins B I and B6.
Following the opening of an investigation in May 1999, the Commission found that 13 European and
non-European companies had participated in cartels aimed at eliminating competition in the vitamin A,
E, Bl, B2, 85' 86, C and D3, biotin (H), folic acid, beta carotene and carotinoids markets. A strikins
() See also Part One, points 52 et seq.
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feature of this complex of infringements was the central role played by Hoffmann-La Roche and BASF,
the two main vitamin producers, in virtually each and every cartel, while other players were involved in
only a limited number of vitamin products.
Vitamins are vital elements for human and animal nutrition and are essential to nomal growth,
development and maintenance of life. They are added to both compound animal feeds and human food
products. Vitamins for pharmaceutical purposes are marketed to the public as diet supplements in tablet
or capsule form. In the cosmetics industry, vitamins are added to skin care and healthcare products. The
Commission estimates that the European Economic Area (EEA) market for the products covered by the
decision was worth around EIIR 800 million in 1998. This includes vitamin E, which in 1998 was worth
approximately EUR 250 million in the EEA, and vitaminA, which represented some EUR 150 million.
The participants in each of the cartels fixed prices for the various vitamin products, allocated sales
quotas, agreed on and implemented price increases and issued price announcements in accordance with
their agreements. They also set up machinery to monitor and enforce their agreements and participated in
regular meetings to implement their plans.
Given the continuity and similarity of method, the Commission considered it appropriate to deal in one
and the same proceeding with the complex of agreements covering the different vitamins. The
Commission therefore covered several infringements in a single decision.
When setting fines, the Commission takes into account the gravity of the infringement, its duration, any
aggravating or mitigating circumstances and the cooperation of a company. It also takes account of a
company's market share in the relevant product market and its overall size. The upper limit to any fine is
fixed at l0 7o of a company's total annual turnover.
The Commission considered that each cartel in this case represented a very serious infringement ofEU
competition law. Furthermore, most of the cartel participants committed infringements of long duration,
i.e. more than five years.
The addressees of the decision cooperated with the Commission within the terms set by the leniency
notice at different stages of the investigation and in relation to different vitamin products covered by the
investigation. The decision applies the leniency notice as follows.
Aventis was the first undertaking to adduce conclusive evidence of the existence of an international cartel
affecting the EEA in the vitamin A and vitamin E markets before the Commission had any knowledge of
its existence. It was granted a lO0 Vo reduction in the fine that would have been imposed in respect of its
activities in the vitamin A and vitamin E markets.
Roche and BASF acted as instigators or played a determining role in the illegal activities affecting the
vitamin A, E,82, 85, C and D3, beta carotene and carotinoids product markets. Therefore neither of
them met condition (e) of Section B of the leniency notice and they could not benefit from any reduction
under Sections B or C of the notice. Both Hoffmann-La Roche and BASF were granted under Section D
ofthe leniency notice a 50 7o reduction in the fine that would have been imposed had they not cooperated
for each of the cartels in which they were involved.
Prior to the Commission's statement of objections (SO), Daiichi, Solvay, Takeda and Eisai provided the
Commission with information and documents, in particular detailed corporate statements, which helped
establish important aspects of the infringement committed in the vitamin B5 (Daiichi), D3 (Solvay), B2
and C (Takeda) and C (Eisai) markets.
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The documents provided by the companies gave details of the organisation and structure of the cartels.
However, in the case of Eisai, these were forthcoming only after three other participants in the vitarnin C
cartel (Roche, BASF and Takeda) had submitted detailed evidence of that cartel. Daiichi, Solvay and
Takeda were granted a35 Vo reduction in the fine that would otherwise have been imposed and Eisai a
30 7o reduction.
As to Merck and Aventis, with regard to the vitamin C and vitamin D3 cartels respectively, they only
cooperated actively with the Commission once they had received the SO. Merck was granted a reduction
of 15 Vo of the fine that would otherwise have been imposed and Aventis a reduction of l0 7o.
Fines imposed on participants by product (million EUR)
Since the decision was adopted, BASF AG, Daiichi Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd, Sumitomo Chemical
Co. Ltd and Sumika Fine Chemicals Company have brought actions for annulment before the Court of
First Instance (*).
Citric acid (Case COMP/E-|/96.604) (,)
On 5 December, the Commission fined Archer Daniels Midland Company (ADM), Cerestar Bioproducts
BV (Cerestar), Haarmann & Reimer Corp. (H&R), F. Hoffmann-La Roche AG (Hoffmann-La Roche)
and JungbunzlauerAG (Jungbunzlauer) a total of EUR l35.22mlllionfor fixing the price and sharing the
market for citric acid, the world's most widespread acidulent and preservative.
(') Cases T-I5rc2 BASF AG;T-251O2 Daiichi Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd;T-23tOZ Sumitomo Chemical Co. Ltd andT-11,4/02
Sumika Fine Chemicals Co.
C) See also Part One, points 56 et seq.
n/a = not applicable
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Citric acid is used primarily in the food and beverage industry, but it is also used in detergents and in
pharmaceutical and cosmetic products. The annual market value was approximately EUR 320 million
(EEA) in 1995 (the last year of the infringement).
After a careful investigation which started in 1997, the Commission found that the US companies ADM
and H&R (the latter ultimately owned by Bayer AG), the Dutch company Cerestar and the Swiss
companies Hoffmann-La Roche and Jungbunzlauer had participated in a worldwide cartel between l99l
and 1995. The cartel participants flxed market shares for citric acid, agreed on price targets and price lists
for the product, agreed to eliminate discounts for all but the five largest customers and set up machinery
to monitor and enforce their asreements.
The Commission characterised the companies' behaviour as a 'very serious' infringement of EC and
EEA competition rules, and adopted a decision under Article 8l(1) of the EC Treaty and Article 53(1) of
the EEA Agreement, imposing fines. The two cartel leaders, Hoffmann-La Roche and ADM, were fined
EUR 63.5 million and EUR 39.69 million respectively. The other cartel participants 
- 
Jungbunzlauer,
H&R and Cerestar 
- 
were fined EUR 17.64 million, EUR 14.22 million and EUR 170 000 respectively.
In setting the fines, the Commission took into account the gravity and duration of the infringement, as
well as the existence of any aggravating and/or mitigating circumstances. The role of each undertaking
was assessed individually. The leniency notice was applied.
The undetakings were divided into three groups according to their relative importance in the relevant
market. Further upward adjustments were made in the case of three companies given their very large size
(or the very large size of the group by which they were wholly owned) and hence their overall resources.
The cartel started in March 1991 and ended in May 1995. Under the guidelines on fines, the duration of
the infringement has to be considered medium-term for ADM, H&R, Hoffmann-La Roche and
Jungbunzlauer (four years) as well as for Cerestar (three years). The respective basic amounts of the fines
were increased accordingly.
Part of the evidence of the cartel was provided to the Commission by the companies involved, under EU
rules providing for full or partial immunity from fines for companies that cooperate with the Commission
in cartel cases.
Cerestar Bioproducts, the first undertaking to provide the Commission with conclusive information, was
granted a90 Vo reduction in its fine. All the other participants cooperated with the Commission and were
granted appropriate reductions.
Since the decision was adopted, Jungbunzlauer and ADM have brought actions for annulment before the
Court of First Instance (").
Belgian breweries (Case COMP/F-3/37.614) ("\
On 5 December, the Commission fined Interbrew, Danone, Alken-Maes, Haacht and Martens a total of
over EUR 9l million for participating in cartels on the Belgian beer market between 1993 and 1998. The
infringements included market sharing, price fixing and information exchange ("). In the course of 1999,
('") Cases T-43l02 Jungbunzlauer AG andT-591D2 Archer Daniels Midland Company.(r') See also Part One, points 58-60.(") See also press release IPl01/1739,5.12.2007.
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the Commission undertook surprise inspections at the premises of Interbrew, Alken-Maes and the
Belgian brewers confederation (CBB). These inspections led to an investigation which enabled the
Commission to find evidence of two distinct cartels in the Belgian market.
The first cartel involved Interbrew (by far the largest brewer in Belgium, with a market share of zround
55 Vo, and the second largest brewer in the world) and Alken-Maes (the number two player in Belgium,
with a market share of around 15 Vo) and its then parent company Danone. This cartel covered a wide
range of anti-competitive anangements in the 'horeca' sector (i.e. sales for away-from-home
consumption in hotels, restaurants and caf6s) and in the retail sector (for example sales in supermarkets
or smaller food shops for consumption at home).
The second cartel concerned specifically the segment of so-called private label beers, i.e. beers which
supermarkets order from brewers but sell under their own brand name. Interbrew, Alken-Maes, Haacht
and Martens (a brewer whose production consists almost entirely of private label beer) participated in
this second cartel.
Fines were imposed on the companies as follows:
- 
Interbrew: EUR 46 487 000 (");
Danone/Alken-Maes: EUR M 628 000 (");
Haacht: EUR 270 000;
Martens: EUR 270 000.
l. The cartel between Interbrew and Danone/Alken-Maes
From early 1993 until the beginning of 1998, the two parties were involved in wide-ranging cartel
activities on the Belgian beer market. lnterbrew used the code name 'Universit6 de Lille' or ;project
Green' for these activities. The car"tel activities encompassed a general non-aggression pact and more
specifically the limitation of investments and advertising in the horeca sector, the allocation of horeca
customers, price fixing in the retail sector, a new tariff structure to be applied in the horeca sector and in
the retail sector and, finally, a detailed monthly information exchange system concerning sales volumes
in both sectors.
A striking feature of this cartel is that the CEOs themselves and other top management of the companies
regularly met to initiate and monitor the above-mentioned arrangements. Another feature worth
mentioning is that Danone, which was Alken-Maes's parent company during the relevant period, was
itself very actively involved in these arrangements.
The cartel took off with a price-fixing agreement for the retail sector and an agreed limitatign of
commercial investments in the horeca sector. An internal Interbrew note from the spring of 1993 showed
that Interbrew's and Danone's top management were already considering closer cooperation. However,
Interbrew thought that Danone had more to gain from such cooperation and, moreover, had antitrust
concerns.
(") EUR456T5000forthecartelwithDanone/Alken-MaesandEUR8l2000fortheprivatelabelcartel.
Cl 8UR44043000 for Danone's and Alken-Maes's participation in the cartel with Interbrew and EUR585000 for
Alken-Maes's participation in the private label cartel.
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In May 1994, contacts between the two companies intensified owing to a threat from Danone: if
Interbrew did not transfer 500 000 hl (roughly 5 Vo of the Belgian market) to Alken-Maes in the Belgian
retail sector, it would make life difficult for Interbrew-France. Evidence of this threat was furnished by
statements by former Interbrew representatives and by an internal Heineken document, found during an
inspection of Heineken's premises in another cartel investigation.
The threat eventually led to a 'gentlemen's agreement' between the parties at the end of 1994, under
which they committed themselves to generally respecting each other's market positions. They further
agreed on a number of specific points, including price fixing in the retail sector, market sharing in the
horeca sector (traditional outlets to begin with, followed later by national accounts (")), commercial
investments and a new tariff structure in both sectors. In addition, throughout this period the parties
exchanged monthly information about their sales volumes in both sectors.
At the beginning of 1998, the parties noted that they had achieved a good many of their objectives.
The Commission considered that the price-fixing and market-sharing cartel between Interbrew and
Danone/Alken-Maes represented a very serious breach of EU competition law. For such a breach, the
likely amount of the fines was at least EUR 20 million. Despite Interbrew and Danone both being big
international companies, Interbrew's starting amount for gravity was higher than Danone's because its
market share on the Belgian beer market was substantially larger than Danone's. The basic amounts were
increased for both companies by almost 50 Vo in view of the medium-term nature of the infringement
(five years).
For Danone, there were two aggravating factors which led to the fine being increased by a further 50 7o.
First, Danone (formerly called Boussois-Souchon-Neuvesel 
- 
BSN) had participated in similar antitrust
infringements already twice before (in 1974 and 1984) ('u). The circumstance that these infringements
occurred in a different sector (flat glass) was irrelevant, since it is the nature ofthe infringement and the
identity of the company that matter in this respect. Moreover, the Commission noted that, for the entire
period during which BSN, later Danone, had committed these infringements, the same person acted as
CEO of the company, and some flat glass managers at the time were active in Danone's retail business
during the period of the beer cartel.
The second aggravating circumstance concerns Danone's threat which led to an increase in cartel activity.
As a mitigating circumstance, the Commission recognised that Alken-Maes had ended the information
exchange with Interbrew. For this, a reduction of l0 7o was granted.
Both parties cooperated to some extent during the investigation by supplying information to the
Commission. However, Interbrew's cooperation was more mateialthanthat of Danone/Alken-Maes. On
this basis, Interbrew was granted a reduction of 30 Vo and Danone/Alken-Maes a reduction of l0 Vo.
2. The private label cartel
In the course of the investigation of the cartel between Interbrew and Danone/Alken-Maes, Interbrew
informed the Commission of a series of meetings devoted to the private label beer market in Belgium
during the period from October 1997 to July 1998 between itself, Alken-Maes, Haacht and Martens.
(") Typical examples of national accounts are caterers, airpons and large cinema complexes.
('o) SeeCommissiondecisionsofl5.5.l9T4(OJL160,l'7.6.1974)and23.7.1984(OJL272,8'8.1984).
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The discussions during these meetings were aimed at avoiding a price war and at consolidating the
existing allocation of customers. This amounted to a concerted practice within the meaning of Article 8l
of the EC Treary. The parties also agreed to exchange information about their customers in the private
label segment.
Interbrew and Alken-Maes took the initiative in organising the four meetings. Howeveq Haacht and
Martens did not merely play a passive role in the concerted practice. Both participated in all meetings and
actually exchanged information about sales volumes. Martens suggested, moreover, at one point, that the
Dutch private label beer producers should be invited to the meetings.
Since the cartel was limited to the small private label beer segment in Belgium (roughly 5 Vo of beer
consumption in Belgium), the Commission considered the parties' behaviour to be only a serious
infringement, for which the basic amount of the fine ranged in principle from EUR 1 million to
EUR 20 million. The cartel was of short duration (nine months).
The fact that Interbrew and Alken-Maes took the initiative in calling these meetings was considered an
aggravating circumstance and their fines were increased by 3O Vo.
All parties cooperated with the Commission during the proceeding. Interbrew even disclosed the
existence of the cartel. Although it blew the whistle, it could not beneflt from full immunity under the
Commission's leniency notice because it was one of the instigators of the cartel. For its cooperation, it
was granted a reduction of 50Vo. The other brewers were granted a reduction of l\Vo for their
cooperation.
Since the decision was adopted, Danone and Haacht have brought actions for annulment before the Court
of First Instance (r7).
Luxem bo u rg b reweries (Case COM P/F-g/97. 800) (,')
On 5 December, the Commission fined three Luxembourg brewers 
- 
Brasserie Nationale-Bofferding,
Brasserie de Wiltz and Brasserie Battin 
- 
a total of EUR 448 000 for their participation in a
market-sharing cartel affecting the Luxembourg 'horeca', or 'on-trade', sector ('e). The brewers had
agreed to respect each other's exclusive purchasing arrangements with horeca customers and to restrict
penetration of the sector by foreign brewers. A fourth cartel member, Brasserie de Luxembourg
Mousel-Diekirch (a subsidiary of Interbrew), was spared the imposition of a fine in recognition lbr its
having disclosed the cartel to the Commission.
Following an investigation which began in February 2000, the Commission found that all four brewers
active in Luxembourg had participated in a market-sharing cartel in the Luxembourg horeca sector
between 1985 and 2000.
The cartel consisted of a written agreement signed in 1985 by which the parties agreed not to supply beer
to any horeca outlet (hotels, restaurants, caf6s and beer wholesalers) which was tied to another party by
an exclusive purchasing contract ('beer tie'). The beer tie guarantee extended to beer ties which were
invalid or unenforceable in law, as well as to supply arrangements where a brewer simply investecl in a
drinks outlet but did not impose an exclusive purchasing contract. To this extent, the beer tie guarantee
(") Cases T-38/02 Groupe Danone andT-48/02 Brouweij Haacht.('") See also Part One, points 61-62.(") hess release IPl01l11 40, 5.12.2001.
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was more restrictive than the beer ties themselves. It therefore served to protect each party's clientele.
The beer tie guarantee was reinforced by a mechanism of prior consultation, which obliged the parties to
check with each other whether there was a beer tie before supplying new customers. Financial penalties
were provided for for non-compliance with the guarantee or the consultation mechanism.
The cartel agreement also contained provisions designed to keep foreign brewers out of the Luxembourg
horeca sector. First, there was ajoint defensive mechanism whereby the parties agreed to consult each
other in the event of a foreign brewer attempting to negotiate a supply contract with one of their tied
outlets. Priority would then be allocated to one of the parties to attempt to keep the outlet as a customer.
If that party succeeded in negotiating a new contract with the outlet, it was obliged to compensate the
party which had lost the outlet by transferring an equivalent outlet to it. Other provisions allowed for the
exclusion from the cartel of any party which cooperated with a foreign brewer or distributed its beer.
The cartel agreement was signed for an unlimited period and required the parties to give 12 months'
notice to tenrinate. No party gave notice before Interbrew, the parent company of Brasserie de
Luxembourg Mousel-Diekirch, disclosed the cartel to the Commission in February 2000. Furthermore,
parts of the agreement had been implemented until 1998.
The Commission imposed a fine of EUR 400 000 on Brasserie Nationale-Bofferding and flnes of
EUR 24 000 each on Brasserie de Wiltz and Brasserie Battin.
The Commission considered the infringement to be 'serious'. Although market sharing and attempts to
impede trade between Member States are by their very nature very serious infringements, the cartel was
limited to the relatively small Luxembourg horeca sector and was not implemented in full. Within this
category, the undertakings were divided into three groups according to the volume of their sales in the
relevant sector.
The infringement was of long duration (more than 14 years). This led the Commission to double the
amount imposed for gravity.
As an extenuating circumstance, the Commission recognised that there was legal uncertainty surrounding
the enforceability of beer ties in Luxembourg at the time the cartel agreement was signed and that this
may have led the parties to doubt whether certain aspects of the beer tie guarantee constituted an
infringement. This merited a20 Vo reduction in the fines.
Brasserie de Luxembourg Mousel-Diekirch was granted total exemption from the substantial fine that
would otherwise have been imposed because it provided the Commission with conclusive evidence of the
cartel before the Commission had any knowledge of it and satisfied all the other conditions of Section B
of the leniency notice.
Since the decision was adopted, Brasserie Nationale, Brasserie de Wiltz and Brasserie Battin have
brought actions for annulment before the Court of First Instance ('n).
('") Cases T-49l02 Brasseie Nationale;T-5j|O2 Brasseie de Wihz (Brasserie Jules Simon & Cie);T-51101 Brasserie Battin.
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Zinc phosphate (Case COMp/E-t/97.027) (^)
On I I December, the Commission fined six producers of zinc phosphate a total of EUR I 1.95 million for
fixing the price and sharing the market for zinc phosphate. Zinc phosphate is widely used as an
anticorrosion mineral pigment in protective coating systems. Paint manufacturers use it frrr the
production of anticorrosive industrial paints for the automotive, aeronautical and marine sectors.
Following the opening of an investigation in May 1998, the Commission found that the Ilritish
companies BritanniaAlloys & Chemicals Ltd, James M. Brown Ltd and Trident Alloys Ltd, the German
company Dr Hans Heubach GmbH & Co. KG, the French company Soci6t6 Nouvelle des Couleurs
Zinciques SA (SNCZ) and the Norwegian company Waardals Kjemiske Fabrikker A,/S had participated
in a Europe-wide cartel between 1994 and 1998, through which they fixed the price and shared out the
market for zinc phosphate.
During the infringement period, the annual market was worth around EUR 16 million in the European
Economic Area 
- 
the 15 EU Member States plus Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein. While the
companies concerned are of a modest size, they noticeably accounted for over 90 Vo of the EEA-wide
market for zinc phosphate.
In setting the fines, the Commission took into account the gravity and duration of the infringement, as
well as the existence of any aggravating and/or mitigating circumstances. The role of each undertakine
was assessed individually. The leniency notice was applied.
All the undertakings concerned were found to have committed a very serious infringement. Within this
category the undertakings were divided into two groups according to their relative importance in the
relevant market. Without prejudice to the very serious nature of the infringement, the Commission had
regard to the limited size of the zinc phosphate market when setting the appropriate starting amounts.
The cartel was of medium duration (between one and five years). The Commission did not identifv anv
ringleader, since the creation of the cartel, which followed various preliminary informal contacts, was ajoint initiative.
Waardals approached the Commission shortly after surprise inspections were carried out and cooperated
fully with it, giving an account of the cartel which included, among other things, a list of the cartel
meetings held between 1994 and 1998. This allowed the Commission to establish a clearer picture of the
history and mechanisms of the cartel, and to more accurately interpret the documents in iti possession.
The explanations provided by Waardals enabled the Commission io address very detailed riquests for
information to the other cartel participants. On this basis, the Commission granted Waardals a 5O Va
reduction in its fine.
Trident began to cooperate only after it received a request for information from the Commission. It
subsequently provided the Commission with a written statement giving a detailed account of the cartel,
as well as a number of documents relevant to the case. On these grounds, the company was granled a
40 Vo rcduction in its fine.
C') See also Part One, point 63.
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Bitannia, Heubach and SNCZ did not substantially contest the facts as set out in the statement of
objections they received in August 2000. For this reason, they were each granted a 10 7o reduction in
their fine. James M. Brown was also granted a l0 Vo redtction in its fine.
This decision is yet funher proof of the Commission's determination to clamp down on hardcore cartels.
Several companies have lodged an appeal against the decision before the Court of First Instance in
Luxembourg (").
Bank charges for the exchange of euro zone currencies 
- 
Germany
(Case COMP/E-I /37.91 9) (*)
On 12 December, the Commission fined five German banks a total of EUR 100.8 million for concluding
an agreement on a commission of about 3 7o for thebtying and selling of euro-zone banknotes during the
thrce-year transitional period beginning on I January 1999. The purpose was to recover about90Vo of
the 'exchange margin' income after the abolition of the 'spread' (i.e. buying and selling rates) on
1 January 1999.
Following an investigation which started in 1999, the Commission established that various German banks
and one Dutch bank had taken part in a meeting at which the abovementioned agreement was concluded
in October 1997.
With a view to ending the Commission's cartel proceedings, several banks which had attended the
October 1997 meeting unilaterally proposed to the Commission to substantially reduce their charges for
the exchange of euro-zone banknotes. The banks thereby abandoned their collusive behaviour and
recovered their freedom to set prices individually.
Considering the exceptional circumstances ofthis case (market disappearance as of 1 January 2002) and
the immediate and direct benefits to consumers, the Commission ended proceedings against those banks
which had proposed an acceptable reduction in their charges.
Commerzbank AG, Dresdner Bank AG, Bayerische Hypo- und Vereinsbank AG, Deutsche Verkehrsbank
AG and Vereins- und Westbank AG did not submit acceptable proposals, and the Commission therefore
addressed a decision to them imposing lines.
In setting the fines, the Commission took into account the gravity and duration of the infringement as
provided for in the guidelines on fines (2').
The banks concerned were found to have committed a serious infringement owing to the limitation of its
effects to Germany and the Dutch regions bordering on Germany. Within this category, for the purpose of
fixing the appropriate starting amounts, the undertakings were divided into two groups according to their
relative importance in the relevant market.
(') Cases T-33102 Brttannia Alloys & Chemicals Limited;'t-52102 Sociit€ Nouvelle des Couleurs Zinciques; T-6?/02
Waardals:T-64102 Dr Hans Heubach.
C) See also Part One, points 64 et seq.
c) oJ c 9, 14.1.1998.
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In order to ensure that the fines had a sufficient deterrent effect, further upward adjustments of the
starting amount were made in the case of Commerzbank, Dresdner Bank and Bayersiche Hypo- und
Vereinsbank given their very large size and hence their overall resources.
There were no extenuating or aggravating factors applicable in this case. As none of the banks cooperated
with the Commission during the proceedings, the leniency notice was also not applicable.
Since the decision was adopted, Commerzbank, Dresdner Bank, Bayersiche Hypo- und Vereinsbank,
Deutsche Verkehrsbank and Vereins- und Westbank have brought actions for annulment before the Court
of First Instance.
Carbonless paper (Case COMP/E-|/96.212) ("s)
On 20 December, the Commission flned l0 producers of carbonless paper a total of EUR 313.69 million
for their participation in a Europe-wide price-fixing cartel. Carbonless paper, also known as self-copying
paper, is intended for the multiple duplication of documents and is made from a base pup"r to *iti.tt
layers of chemicals are applied. Business forms (for example delivery slips, bank transiei forms, etc.)
have always been the single largest application for carbonless papers, accounting for over 90 Vo of total
consumption. Carbonless paper is sold in reels (80 Vo) and sheets (20 Vo\.The size of the EU carbonless
paper market was some ECU 850 million in 1995 (the last year of the infringement). That same year,
estimated carbonless paper production capacity in the EEA was I 010 000 tonnes.
After a detailed investigation, the Commission established rhat, between 1992 and 1995, the following
companies had taken part in a Europe-wide cartel designed essentially to implement concerted prici
increases: A{o Wiggins Appleton Ltd (AwA), Carrs Paper Lrd (both Unired Kingdom), Mitsutishi
HiTech Paper Bielefeld GmbH (MHTP), Papierfabrik August Koehler AG, Zanders Feinpapiere AG (all
three Germany), Bollor6 SA, Papeteries Mougeot SA (both France), Distribuidora Vizciiiade papeles
SL (Divipa), Papelera Guipuzcoana de Zicrtfiaga SA, Torraspapel SA (all three Spain) and Sappi Limited(South Africa). All the companies except Carrs, Divipa andZicufiagawere members of the AEMCp.
In setting the fines, the Commission took account of the gravity and duration of the infringement. For the
purpose of fixing the basic amount of the fine within the category of very serious infringements, the
undertakings were divided into five groups according to their relative importance in the relevant market.
Further upward adjustments were made in the case of three companies taking into account their size and
overall resources. The cartel members committed an infringement of medium duration (one to five years).
Leadership in the infringement was found to be an aggravating circumstance in the case of AWA. The
basic amount of its f,ne was therefore increased by 50 Vo, in line with the Commission's normal prar1ice.
No mitigating circumstances were found to apply in this case.
Sappi was granted total immunity pursuant to Section B of the leniency notice. This is the third time the
Commission has granted a 100 Vo reduction in a fine (after Aventis SA in the Vitamins (A and E) case,
and Brasserie de Luxembourg Mousel-Diekirch in the Luxembourg breweries case). Some of the 6ther
parties were granted reductions pursuant to Section D of the leniency notice in the fine that would
otherwise have been imposed. On that account, the Commission reduced the fine for Mougeot by 50 Vo,
forAWA by 35 vo and for Bollord by 20 vo because these companies supplied informationihat h;lped to
shed further light on the unlawful practice in question before the statement of obiections was sent out.
('?5) See also Part One, points 69-70.
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The Commission also reduced the fines for Carrs, MHTP and Zanders by l0 7o as these companies did
not dispute the facts set out in the statement of objections.
AWA was fined EUR 184.27 million, the highest flne ever imposed on a single company in connection
with a single infringement.
This decision came at the end of a year in which the Commission has taken a long line of decisions
against cartels in various sectors. This unprecedented level of activity shows on the one hand that such
secret practices are (still) widespread, but on the other hand that the Commission has successfully
employed the means at its disposal to implement its fines criteria to detect and prosecute such offences as
well as to impose effective penalties.
1.2. Yertical agreements
G I axoWel I co m e (C ase CO M P/F-3/36. I 57) (^)
On 8 May, the Commission decided to prohibit the dual pricing system which GlaxoWellcome (GW) had
introduced for all its pharmaceutical products in Spain ("). According to clause 4 of GW's new sales
conditions, Spanish wholesalers were required to pay higher prices for Glaxo products when they
exported them to other Member States than when reselling the same products for consumption on the
domestic market. The system was clearly aimed at reducing parallel trade within the single market. The
Commission found that the system partitioned the common market along national lines, thereby
interfering with the principal Community objective of integrating markets. It also reduced pice
competition for GW products by making exports of cheaper Spanish products to other Member States
impossible or at least more difficult. The Commission found that the system did not fulfil the conditions
for exemption under Article 8 I (3) of the EC Treaty.
This case is an important one because it underlines the Commission's determination to object to
distribution systems which perpetuate the partitioning of the single market into national markets even in
heavily regulated sectors. It is also novel, this being the first time a pharmaceutical company has sought
to justify restrictions to parallel trade using economic and consumer welfare arguments. The Commission
looked carefully into these justifications but did not find any of them convincing upon closer scrutiny.
The case began in March 1998 when GW Spain notified its new sales conditions to the Commission. The
Commission received complaints from a Spanish wholesaler and European and Spanish associations of
wholesalers involved in parallel trade in pharmaceutical products.
The Commission qualified GW's system as a restriction of competition 'by object' because it sought to
impede parallel trade and was tantamount to an export ban in a considerable number of cases. But, the
Commission also looked carefully into the effects of the GW system in order to identify those cases in
which the system made exports impossible or at least more difficult. It took the view 
- 
based on the
case-law of the European Court of Justice 
- 
that there was no a priori exception to the application of the
competition provisions to agreements impeding parallel trade in this sector. In any event, the high volume
of exports of GW products from Spain to the United Kingdom, which is what prompted GW to introduce
the dual pricing system, appeared to have been caused mainly by the appreciation of the British pound,
f) See also Part One, points 232 et seq
C') Press release IP/01/661, 8.5.2001.
COMPETITION REPORT 2OO1
186 APPLICATION OF THE COMPETITION RULES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
not by the divergence between Member State (for example Spanish and UK) price regulations. Currency
fluctuations have never been accepted as a justification for restrictions of parallel trade.
Despite the finding of a restriction 'by object', the Commission accepts the principle that there is no
restriction of competition which can at least in theory not be exempted ("). It therefore went at length into
the merits of a series of economic arguments which GW advanced in an attempt to justify the new sales
conditions. In the Commission's view, GW had not established a causal link between the existerrce of
parallel trade and possible losses (lost profits) for its R&D budget. Nor could the Commission find any
evidence to support GW's assertion that parallel trade had caused introduction delays for its products in
'low-price' markets. As to benefits to the consumer, the Commission noted that it was for the notifying
party to justify the restriction of competition resulting from the agreement by showing that this restriction
fulfilled the conditions of Article 8l(3). It was not for the Commission to prove that its intervention
against a restriction increased consumer welfare. The Commission nevertheless added that consumers
might benefit directly from parallel trade in cases where they co-financed the products they purchased
and that parallel trade gave national health systems opportunities for achieving cost savings to the benefit
of their members.
Volkswagen (Case CO M P/F-2/36. 693) (*)
The Commission adopted a decision ('o) imposing a flne of EUR 30.96 million on Volkswagen AG, the
biggest German and European car manufacturer, for having instructed its German Volkswagen dealer
network in 1996 and 1997 to observe 'price discipline' in respect of the new VW Passat and not to sell
this model at prices considerably below the recommended list price. This case is the third in a series of
proceedings concerning motor vehicle distribution. Unlike the two previous cases ('') and the
DaimlerChrysler decision (3'), this second decision finding against Volkswagen does not concem
measures that directly hinder the re-export of new cars. However, the case also has to be seen in the
context of the monitoring of the relevant block exemption regulation, Regulation (EC) No 1475195 on
motor vehicle distribution and servicing (r3).
The Commission established that in 1996 and 1997 Volkswagen had sent three circular letters to its
German dealers urging them either not to grant or to limit discounts to customers when selling the (then)
new VW Passat model. Prior to taking these measures, Volkswagen had learnt that a number of dealers
had offered this new model for sale with heavy discounts. The company also addressed individual letters
to certain dealers, warning them not to grant healy discounts and threatening them with retaliatory
measures (for example termination of the dealer contract in the event of non-compliance with this
instruction).
CaseT-|7193 Matra Hachette v Commission t19941 ECR II-595.
See also Part One, point 183.
Commission decision of29.6.2001 (OJ L262,2.10.2001); press release IP/01/760, 30.5.2001.
Commission decision of28.1.1998 (OJ L 145, 25.4.1998) finding against Volkswagen AG, Iargely upheld by the Court of
First lnstance in its judgment of 6.7.2000. Volkswagen challenged this judgment before the European Court of Justice in
September 2000; this proceeding is pending. Commission decision of 2O9.2Un (OJ L 59, 28.2.2001) finding against
Opel Nederland/General Motors Nederland. The companies appealed against this decision to the Court ofFirst Instance in
December 2000.
(r'?) Commissiondecisionofl0.l0.200l(notyetpublished)findingagainstDaimlerChryslerAG.Seebelow
f) On 15.11.2000, the Commission adopted a report on the application of this regulation. The report, which forms an
essential basis for the preparation of the future legal framework for motor-vehicle distribution and servicing agreernents,
is available on the Competition DG's web site: http://europa.eu.int/comn/competition/cr.
e)
c)
e9
f')
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Measures to limit discounts are aimed at fixing retail prices and represent a hardcore restriction of
competition. Such measures violate Article 81(1) of the EC Treaty, which prohibits price-fixing
measures, and are incompatible with the block exemption regulation applicable to motor vehicle
distribution. This is the flrst Commission decision on resale price maintenance in this sector, and it
confirms the Commission's strict policy on price-fixing practices in the area of vertical restraints.
Dealer contracts in car distribution usually provide for recommended list prices for new cars. By sending
the circulars, and the individual letters, Volkswagen was instructing its dealers to consider the
recommended prices as essentially binding, and to grant no or only limited discounts to customers when
selling the VW Passat, which is a very popular model in Germany and within its segment. The measures
had as their object the restriction of price competition among Volkswagen dealers, since they targeted an
essential factor in competition, namely the ability to grant discounts. As dealers usually grant discounts,
Volkswagen's instructions can be seen as an attempt to compel them to deviate from their normal
commercial behaviour.
For the purposes of the fine, the Commission considered that the measures of retail price maintenance
represented a drastic interference with competition and were therefore to be considered by their very
nature a very serious violation of competition rules. The infringement began on 26 September 1996, the
date ofthe first circular letter to dealers, and lasted until 6 September 1999, the date ofa ci.rcular letter
from Volkswagen informing all German VW dealers that the instructions and warnings contained in the
three preceding circular letters had been lifted and that they should not fear any retaliatory measures. The
infringement therefore lasted for almost three years.
The measures were aimed at maintaining or reinforcing an artificially high price zone for the new VIV
Passat model on the German market, which accounts for a large share of all car sales in the EU. Although
the infringement concerned only one model (in two versions) from Volkswagen's product range, this
popular model accounts for alarge share of vehicle sales within a segment for which demand in Germany
is strong. The circular letters were addressed to the whole German VW dealer network and thus
concerned all sales of the VW Passat in Germany. The measures were also likely to have an effect on
consumers from other Member States.
In the light of these considerations, the infringement was considered overall to be serious. The fine also
takes into account, as one of two aggravating factors, that two of the three circular letters and a number of
the individual letters to dealers contained not only instructions to observe price discipline, but also
admonishments, warnings and threats oflegal action in case ofnon-compliance. It further took account
of the fact that, on the date of the flrst circular, the Volkswagen sales manager for Germany had requested
dealers to give him details of all dealers lacking in price discipline, thereby introducing an indirect
monitoring system which increased the pressure which the circular letter already exerted on dealers
directly. Volkswagen appealed against this decision before the Court of First Instance in Sepfember.
DaimlerChrysler (Case COM P/F-2/36.264) (*)
On 10 October, the Commission decided to fine DaimlerChrysler AG EUR7I.825 million for infringing
EC competition rules in the area of car distribution (3s). The decision concems measures by
Daimle(hrysler to impede parallel trade in cars and limit competition in the leasing and sale of motor
See also Part One, point 184.
Press release IP/01/1394, 10.10.2001 (decision not yet published).
(')
c)
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vehicles. This is the fourth Commission decision fining a car manufacturer for failing to comply with EC
competition rules ('u).
The Commission identifled three types of infringement of Article 81 of the EC Treaty. The first consisted
of measures by DaimlerChrysler that constituted obstacles to parallel trade. The undertaking had
instructed members of its German distribution network for Mercedes passenger cars, roughly half of
which were agents, not to sell cars outside their respective territories. This was done in particular by
means of circular letters. In addition, DaimlerChrysler instructed its distributors to require foreign
consumers to pay a deposit of 15 Vo to DaimlerChrysler when ordering a car in Germany. This was not
the case for German consumers, even though they might present the same 'risk' of, for instance, being
unknown to the seller, ordering a car with particular specifications, or living far away.
The applicability of Article 81 to the restrictions agreed between DaimlerChrysler and its German agents
stems from the fact that these agents have to bear a considerable commercial risk linked to their activity.
From the point ofview ofEC competition laq they must therefore be treated as dealers (3?).
In a second infringement, DaimlerChrysler limited in Germany and Spain the sale of cars by Mercedes
agents or dealers to independent leasing companies as long as these companies had not yet found
customers ('lessees') for the cars concerned. It thereby restricted competition between its own basing
companies and independent leasing companies in that the latter could not build up stocks of cars or
benefit from the discounts that are granted to fleet owners. The independent leasing companies were
therefore unable to pass on such favourable terms, in particular as regards prices and the availability of
cars, to their customers. It is important to note that sales of Mercedes cars to leasing companies represent
a substantial part of all sales of Mercedes cars. Commission Regulation (EC) No 1475195 on motor
vehicle distribution and servicing agreements (r8) states that leasing companies have to be treated in the
same way as final customers, to which distributors are completely free to sell new cars, as long as the
leasing contract does not provide for a transfer of ownership of the motor vehicle or an option to purchase
prior to the expiry of the contract.
Finally, DaimlerChrysler was party to a price-fixing agreement in Belgium aimed at limiting the
discounts granted to consumers by its subsidiary Mercedes Belgium and other Belgian Mercedes dealers.
A 'ghost shopper' investigated the dealers' sales policies, and DaimleChrysler agreed to enforce the
agreement by reducing the supply ofcars to dealers that granted higher discounts than the 3 Vo thathad
been agreed upon. This amounted to resale price maintenance, a practice already proscribed by the
Commission in its decision of 29 June in the Volkswagen case.
The measures adopted by DaimlerChrysler infringed Article 8l(1), which prohibits all agreements
between undertakings which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their obiect or
('u) Commission decision of 28.l.l998Volkswagen AG (OJ L 124,25.4.1998); Commission decision of 2O.9.200Q Opel
Nederland BV/General Motors Nederland BV (OJ L 59,28.2.20OI): Commission decision of 29.6.2001 Volkswagen AG
(OJ L 262,2.10.2001').
f') This conclusion is based on the case-law ofthe Court ofJustice. It is also compatible with the Commission guidelines on
vedical restraints (OJ C291,13.10.2000). According to these guidelines, the only criterion that is relevant when it comes
to determining whether Article 81(1) applies to the activity of commercial agents is whether or not the agent has to bear a
risk linked to the sale of the goods or services he is involved in. In this case, rebates granted by agents were taken off their
commission, and agents were liable for the risks linked to product transport and bore the transport costs; they also bought
demonstration vehicles 
- 
a significant proportion of all cars sold 
- 
and financed spare part stocks.
C") OJLl45,29.6.1995.Theregulationexpireson30september2C{Jt2.TheComrnissionadoptedanevaluationreportonthe
application of the regulation on 15 November 2000. The report is available on the web site of the Commission's Directorate-
General for Competition (http://europa.eu.int/comm,/competition/car_sector/distribution/eval_re 9_1475_95lrcpottI).
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effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the single market. Moreover,
Regulation (EC) No 1475195 prohibits car manufacturers and their importers from restricting, either
directly or indirectly, the freedom of final consumers to buy new motor vehicles in the Member State of
their choice, the aim being to ensure that European consumers can buy cars wherever it is most
advantageous to them. The regulation states, furthermore, that the freedom of dealers to determine prices
and discounts when reselling to final consumers must not be restricted. This means that sales prices and
conditions must not be fixed bv the manufacturer. Thev have to be determined bv each individual dealer.
The amount of the fine takes into account the gravity of the infringements (for which purpose the position
of the company on the market is also looked at) and their duration. In keeping with the Commission
guidelines on the method of setting fines ("), the flne must also have a sufficient deterrent effect.
The flrst infringement was considered a very serious infringement of long duration because it directly
jeopardised the proper functioning of the single market by partitioning national markets. The restrictions
imposed on the sale of cars to leasing companies were qualified as a serious infringement of medium
duration. Finally, the resale price maintenance, which is by its very nature a very serious infringement,
was also qualified as serious because of circumstances peculiar to this case. This qualification is in line
with the Comrnission's 29 June decision in Volkswagen In the present case, this infringement was of
medium duration.
1.3. Abuses of dominant positions
Deutsche Post AG I (Case COMP/35.141) (*)
On 20 March, the Commission concluded its investigation into Deutsche PostAG and adopted a decision
finding that the company had abused its dominant position by granting fidelity rebates and engaging in
predatory pricing in the market for business parcel services (for further details see Part One, points 77
and 108 et seq).
Duales System Deutschland (Case COMP/34.493 
- 
Abuse decision) ( )
The Commission took two decisions laying down the necessary conditions for the occurrence of
competition in the area of the collection and recovery of sales packaging waste in Germany. One 
- 
an
abuse decision adopted on 20 April (") 
- 
concerns a payment provision in a trademark agreement.
Duales System Deutschland (DSD) is currently the only undertaking that operates a comprehensive
packaging take-back system in Germany. DSD does not perform the task of collection itself but uses
local collecting companies. DSD has concluded service agreements with those undertakings. Once the
material has been collected and sorted, it is either conveyed to a recycling plant directly by the collector
or handed over to so-called guarantee companies. These guarantee companies have given DSD an
assurance that they will recycle the used packaging. DSD is financed by fees paid by manufacturers and
retailers, who are under a legal obligation to take back sales packaging. They conclude a trademark
agreement with DSD, which entitles them to use the Green Dot logo on their packaging and provides
(") oJC9, 14.1.1998.
(oo) AIso referred to as UPS/Deutsche Post (OI L 125,5.5.2M1).
t''t See also Pan One, point 79.
c) oJ L 166.21.6.2N1.
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them with a guarantee that a collection and recycling service will be established in such a way that they
are exempted from their legal obligations.
The Commission has identified three relevant markets. The first market in which DSD operates is in its
widest conceivable definition the market for organising the take-back and recovery of used sales
packaging collected from private final consumers. Even on the basis of this market definition, DSD has a
market share well in excess of 80 Vo. The second relevant market is that for the collection and sorting of
household packaging waste. The market is separate from traditional household and residual waste
disposal and from collection from industry and large commercial enterprises. The third relevant market is
that for recovery services and secondary raw materials.
In its decision, the Commission objected to a payment provision in the trademark agreement according to
which a licensee must pay for all sales packaging bearing the Green Dot logo put on the German rnarket
whether or not DSD actually provides its exemption service. In certain circumstances, this contractual
arrangement infringes the basic principle of 'no service, no fee'. Abuse always occurs where an obligated
undertaking avails itself of DSD's exemption service in respect of only some of its sales packaging or
dispenses entirely with DSD's exemption service in Germany while participating in a system which uses
the Green Dot logo in other Member States.
In all these examples, the licensee would be obliged under the payment provision to pay a licence fee for
using the Green Dot logo on all marked sales packaging despite the fact that DSD was providing only a
partial service or no service at all. This would result in a double payment situation (the licensee has to pay
the competitor and DSD) or in an obligation to operate at least two different packaging and distribution
lines (packaging with and without the Green Dot). DSD thereby imposes unfair prices and commercial
tenns on undertakings which use the exemption service for only some of their sales packaging or which do
not use it at all in Germany but participate in a Green Dot system in another Member State.
In July, DSD lodged an appeal against the Commission's decision before the Court of First Instance. By
decision of 15 November, the President of the Court of First Instance decided not to suspend the
Commission's decision (o').
Michelin (COM P/E-2/36.041 ) (*l
On 20 June, the Commission adopted a decision finding against Manufacture Frangaise de Pneumatiques
Michelin for having abused its dominant position on the French market for new replacement tyres for
heavy vehicles and on the French market for retread tyres for heavy vehicles (45). Michelin enjoys a very
clear dominant position on both relevant markets (holding over 50 7o of the market for new replacement
tyres for heavy vehicles in France; on the French market for retread tyres, its share is even higher). In
addition, the two relevant geographic markets are strictly limited to the French market: inasmuch as the
retread market is a service market, and services cannot be stocked, it is by definition a local 
- 
and hence,
at most, national 
- 
market. [n the case of the geographic market for new replacement tyres, what needed
to be done here was to gauge the actual capacity of retailers to obtain supplies from outside their national
territory. The Commission noted that the large manufacturers organise the distribution and marketing of
their products along national lines, a feature which led the Court of Justice in its 1983 NBIM
judgment (oo) to conclude that the market is a national one.
(") Case T-151/01 R.(*) See also Part One, point 80.
c') oJ L 143,31.5.2002.(") Case 322/81 NV Nede rlandsche Banden Industrie Michelin t19831 ECR 346 1.
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The decision states that Michelin had introduced a complex system of quantity rebates, bonuses and
commercial agreements which constituted an unfair loyalty-inducing system vis-d-vis retailers, the
effect of which was to tie the latter and which helped foreclose the French market. Michelin's
commercial policy towards specialised dealers (retailers) consisted during the relevant period of three
elements, namely the 'general price conditions for France for professional dealers', the 'agreement for
optimum use of Michelin truck tyres' ('PRO agreement') and the 'business cooperation and service
assistance agreement' (known as the 'Michelin Friends Club'), and objectively was likely to keep
retailers in a state of strong dependence, preventing them from choosing their suppliers fieely. Such
practices are prohibited by Article 82 of the EC Treaty. The infringement was committed by Michelin
between 1990 and 1998. It was, moreover, a repeat infringement. The objections raised by the
Commission against Michelin were essentially the same as those already condemned by the Court of
Justice, under the same conditions, in 1983 (including the 'progress bonus', the abuse directly
condemned by the Court). The EUR 19.76 million fine imposed on Michelin takes account of the
peculiarities of the infringement committed by the firm, the infringement's very long (nine-year)
duration, the repeat nature of the infringement, and certain mitigating circumstances: Michelin had
effectively brought the infringement to an end at a time when it was not yet absolutely certain that the
Commission would adopt a decision fining it (there remained pending the question of the dominant
position) and what is more the Commission had to show that it duly rewards cooperation by offending
firms (an aspect to which Michelin's attention had been drawn during the investigation).
Michelin has appealed against the decision.
IMS Health (Case COMP/38.044) (')
On 3 July, the Commission adopted an interim measures decision (o') under Article 82 ordering IMS, a
US company dominant on the mmket for regional pharmaceutical sales data reports in Germany, to grant
the other firms on the market, NDC Health (4'g) and AzyX ('o), licences to a copyrighted 'brick structure'
used to present these data. The Commission considered that only this measure could remedy MS's
illegal conduct and prevent serious and irreparable harm to the other two companies.
Reports on pharmaceutical sales by region are used by drug companies to develop and implement
incentive schemes for their sales representatives, and to monitor, for example, evolving market shares of
their products. 'Brick structures' are segmentations of a country into useful regions for sales reporting
pulposes, data-protection rules preventing transfer of information on individual pharmacies. Brick
structures have been in use in Germany since the early 1970s, with the whole pharmaceutical industry
moving to each newly created structure. The 1860 brick structure is the current standard.
In May 2000, IMS asked the German courts to find an infringement of its copyright in the 1860 structure
by PI, later bought by NDC. [n response, the German courts prohibited NDC from using this structure or
'derivatives'thereof. After IMS refused NDC's request for a licence to this structure, NDC complained to
the Commission. It argued that the refusal breached Article 82, and requested that an obligation to license
the 1860 structure be imposed on IMS by way of interim measures.
C') IMS Health stands for Intercontinental Marketing Services Health Inc. The case is also referred to as NDC Health/IMS
Health- See Part One, point 8 I .
e) oJ L 59. 28.2.2W2.
(on) National Data Corporation Health Information Services.('") AzyX Deutschland GmbH Geopharma Information Services.
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Working on the basis that IMS enjoyed a copyright in the structure, the Commission found that IMS's
refusal to license this copyright was an abuse underArticle 82. The case-law ofthe European Courts (")
makes clear that the exercise (as opposed to the existence) ofintellectual property rights is subjecl to EC
competition law.
First, the Commission found that IMS's refusal to license the 1860 structure was likely to eliminate all
competition from the relevant market. There was no realistic possibility for companies wishing to offer
regional sales data services in Germany to employ, instead of the 1860 brick structure, another strxcture
which would not infringe IMS's copyright. This conclusion followed from an extensive survey of the
German pharmaceutical industry, which almost unanimously considered the 1860 brick structure an
unavoidable industry standard. These companies contributed significantly, through the specialist
knowledge oftheir sales representatives, to creating the 1860 structure, and consider that it meets their
needs perfectly. Moreover, they have integrated the 1860 structure into many of their intemal systems
(for example databases, employment contracts), buy other data in the structure, and use other software
which is designed to be compatible with it. The result is an extremely strong economic dependence by
the industry on the 1860 structure.
Moreover, IMS's reasons for not licensing NDC, namely that NDC breached and continued to contest
MS's copyright, that the licence fee offered was too low and that criminal allegations against former
NDC employees existed, did not constitute an objective justification for the refusal.
Furthermore, there was no likelihood of competitors creating an alternative structure. The Commission
found that any potentially useful structure would be broadly similar to the 1860 structure and would be
subject to significant legal uncertainty, since it might therefore infringe IMS's copyright. Data-protection
laws also appeared to impose constraints on the creation of a second structure in Germany.
In addition to a finding of abuse, however, granting interim measures requires a finding that such
measures are urgently needed to prevent serious and irreparable damage to the undertaking applying for
them, or intolerable damage to the public interest. The Commission found both conditions to be met.
Without a licence to the 1860 brick structure, NDC could not continue supplying its customers with
regional sales data reports or attract new customers, and so was likely to cease trading in Ge.rmany.
Prospective intolerable damage to the public interest also arose, since IMS's refusals to license risked
eliminating the other competitor, AzyX, from the market and removed the prospect of any new entry on
the market for the foreseeable future.
The Commission therefore required IMS to grant a licence to the 1860 brick structure to NDC and AzyX.
The licence fee was to be set either by agreement between the parties or by the Commission, foltowing
the advice of independent experts. A periodic penalty payment was imposed in case IMS did not comply
with the terms of the decision.
On 6 August, IMS lodged an appeal against the decision before the Court of First Instance (CIII) and
asked for its suspension ("). The President of the CFI ordered the decision to be provisionally suspended
on 10 August, under Article 105 of the CFI's rules of procedure. On 26 October, the hesident issued an
order suspending the decision pending the CFI's judgment in the main action.
(") See, in particular, Magill (RTE and Others v Commission (Joined Cases'16189,77189 and 9ll89 R [1989] ECR I-114),
lndbroke (Case T-504/93 [1997] ECR II-923) and Bronner (CaseC-7/97 [19981 ECR I-7791).(") Cases T-1 84/01 and T-1 84/01R resoectivelv.
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Deutsche Post AG ll (Case COMP/36.915) (*)
On 25 July, the Commission, in response to a complaint by the British Post Office, decided that Deutsche
Post ('o) had abused its dominant position on the German letter post market by intercepting, surcharging
and delaying incoming international mail (for further details: see Part One, points 78 and 11 l-l l2).
De Post/La Poste (Belgium) (Case COMP/3V.859) (")
On 5 December, the Commission decided that the Belgian postal.operator De Post/La Poste had abused
its dominant position by making a preferential tariff in the general letter post service subject to
acceptance of a supplementary contract covering a new business-to-business ('B2B') mail service ('u) (for
further details see Part One, points 82 and I l3-1 l4).
1.4. Article 86(1) of the EC Tleaty
La Poste (France) (Case COMP/37.133) (*)
Pursuant to Anicle 86(l), in conjunction with Article 82, of the EC Treaty, the Commission adopted on
23 October a decision on the monitoring of relations between the French company La Poste and firms
specialising in the making-up and preparation of mail (").
In this decision. the Commission found that the French regulatory framswork pertaining to the
supervision of La Poste's contractual arrangements with mail-preparation firms was insufficient to ensure
that La Poste did not abuse its monopoly position in the downstream market for mail delivery. The
activities of mail-preparation firms range from a variety of services for the benefit of mail originators
(making up items, bundling and collecting them) and preparatory work on behalf of La Poste
(pre-sorting). La Poste is both active on the mail-preparation market through a number of subsidiaries
and at the same time the unavoidable partner for competing independent mail-preparation firms. Indeed,
for the performance of their activities, mail-preparation firms have no other choice than to resort to
La Poste's network, as soon as the mail items fall within the scope of the postal monopoly, which is the
case for the bulk of their activity. La Poste's activities and some of its tariffs may well be subject to
supervision by the Ministry of Finance, but the scope of the competences of the latter is not complete and
there is a risk that the controls exercised by its lack of neutrality owing to the fact that the responsibility
for managing the State's shareholding in La Poste falls within the powers of the same ministry. In these
circumstances, La Poste had the power to impose on its mail-preparation partners unfair or
discriminatory technical and financial conditions. Both LaPoste and the French ministry were deemed by
the Commission to be affected by a conflict of interest.
Beyond the assessment of the shortcomings of the existing regulatory framework, the Commission's
decision included comments on a draft decree instituting a postal ombudsman, which the French
authorities had submitted in the proceeding. The decision insists, in particular, on the right for the
ombudsman to publish his statements.
(") Also referred to as Bitish Post ffice/Deutsche Post.(*) oJ L 331. 15.12.2001.(") Also referred to as Hays/In Poste.
('o) Press release IP lO1. I l'1 38, 5.12.2C01 ; OJ L 61, 2.3.2W2.(") Also referred to as SNELPD/Itt Porte' See also Part One, point 84.
f*) oJ L 120,7.5.2002.
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2. Authorisations
2.1.. Horizontal agreements
P&O Stena Line 2 (Case COMP/D-2/37.939) (*)
On 26 January 1999, the Commission granted the joint venture between P&O and Stena Line, operating
cross-Channel ferry services, a three-year exemption under Article 81(3) of the EC Treaty (on). The
exemption came to an end on 9 March 2001 and the parties applied for a renewal of the exemption on
22December 2000.
The Commission published a summary of the notification in the Offlcial Journal on 8 March 2001 (d).
Under the procedure applicable to the maritime transport sector (6'), the Commission has 90 days from
the date of such publication to raise serious doubts and to continue its investigation into the case. If the
Commission takes no action within this period, the agreement is automatically exempted for six years.
The investigation concluded that since the time of the previous exemption, there had not been changes in
the market such that the conditions required for the grant of an exemption were no longer fulfilled. In
particular, the characteristics of the market were still such that the joint venture and Eurotunnel, the main
operators on the market, could be expected to continue to compete with each other, rather than to act in
parallel to raise prices. The Commission found that the joint venture had achieved the effrciencies and
benefits expected in the previous exemption and that consumers would continue to benefit from such
efficiencies if there was sufficient competition on the market.
The investigation also found that the price increases on the market were explicable for reasons other than
the operation of thejoint venture and did not in themselves constitute such a change in market conditions
as to warrant a refusal to renew the exemption.
Consequently, there was no factor that would have justified the Commission's raising serious doubts
about the continuing operation of the joint venture. In accordance with the mechanism in the maritime
transport regulation, the joint venture agreement is deemed exempted until 7 March 2007 (u.).
bmi British Midland, Lufthansa and SAS (Case COMP/D-2/A7.S|2) (64)
On I March 2000, the airlines bmi British Midland International (bmi), Lufthansa and SAS ('the parries')
notified to the Commission a cooperation agreement in accordance with Regulation (EEC) No 3975/87
for a decision applying Article 81(3) of the EC Treaty and Article 53(3) of the EEA Agreement. In close
cooperation with the UK competition authorities, the Commission's departments carried out an
investigation during which a large number of European airlines were consulted. On 12 June 2001, after
the parties had given a number of undertakings, the Commission informed them that they were being
granted a six-year exemption for their tripartite joint venture agreement (TPJVA).
(") See also Part One, point 160.(*) OJ L 163,29.6.19991press release IP/99l56,28.1.1999;1999 Competition Report, p. 152.
f') OJ C 76, 8.3.2001: press release IP/O11333,8.3.2007.
(6r) Council Regulation (EEC) No 4056186 of 22 December 1986 laying down detailed rules for the application of Articles 85
and 86 (now Articles 8l and 82) of the EC Treaty to maritime transport (OJ L 378, 31.12.1986).(') IP/01/806, 7.6.2c01(*) See also Part One, points 136 et seq. and Box 1.
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Under the TPfVA, the parties agree to coordinate their respective current and future scheduled passenger
air transport services within the EEA to and from London Heathrow and Manchester International
airports. Services that do not depart from or arrive at these airports fall outside the scope ofthe TPfVA.
Under the agreement, the parties decide jointly on capacity, the fare structure and flight schedules on
these routes. They share profits and losses for services covered by the TPJVA (6s)-
To define the relevant market in air transport, in a number of decisions and supported by case-law, the
Commission has developed the so-called point-of-origin/point-of-destination (O&D) pair approach (*).
According to this approach, every combination of a point-of-origin and point-of-destination should be
considered to be a separate market from the customer's point of view. The O&D approach allows the
Commission to take into account that a transport service can be carried out by different transport
modes (air, rail, road or sea) or that it can be offered by direct flights or indirect ones, i.e. flights which
include a stop-over. The Commission further distinguishes between 'time-sensitive' (business) and
'non-time-sensitive' (leisure) customers.
The TPJVA provides that Lufthansa is granted the exclusive right to operate flights on almost all routes
between London and Manchester on the one hand and German airports on the other. Similarly, SAS is
granted the exclusive right for the traffic between London/Manchester and Scandinavian countries. This
restriction was found to be problematic for the London-Frankfurt market, which, with 2.1 million O&D
passengers in 1999, is one of the busiest in Europe. The Commission concluded that bmi's withdrawal
from the London-Frankfurt route represented an appreciable restriction of competition on both the
market for non-time-sensitive passengers and the market for time-sensitive customers.
In its analysis underArticle 81(3), the Commission came to the conclusion that, in terms of efftciency
gains and competition, the overall effect of the agreement is positive. It leads to a reorganisation and
expansion of the parties' existing networks, and allows Lufthansa and SAS to compete for domestic UK
traffic as well as for traffic between the UK and Ireland and to carry passengers from any point in the
STAR network to regional destinations in the UK. It leads furthermore to an increase in network
competition. As a result of the agreement, bmi was able to start providing new services between London
and Barcelona. Lisbon, Madrid, Milan and Rome. On some of these routes, for example on the London-
Barcelona/Ivladrid route, there was only one alliance operating before bmi's entry. The agreement
therefore fosters competition between these incumbents and the STAR alliance on such routes (u').
These pro-competitive effects will generate benefits for the consumer in that customers will enjoy a
wider choice of air transport services to more destinations, better connections and convenient scheduling
and seamless travel. However, in spite of these positive elements, the Commission was concerned that the
agreement would lead to the elimination of competition on the market for point-to-point time-sensitive
customers on the London-Frankfurt route (u').
Following the withdrawal of bmi, only Lufthansa and British Airways (BA) remained on that market,
while as a result of the agreement with bmi, Lufthansa had become dominant on this market. In terms of
(9
("")
(ut)
(*)
For services not covered by the TPJVA, the parties coordinate their activities pursuant to separate bilateral alliance
agreements concluded between bmi and SAS, and bmi and Lufthansa respectively.
See Commission decision of 11.8.1999 (KI*I-AIitalia, OJ C 96, 5.4.2000).
Furthermore, given that bmi has a signilicant number of slots at Heathrow, the agreement also allows the STAR alliance
to develop Heathrow as a second hub. bmi's joining the STAR alliance will therefore foster competition between the
STAR alliance and the Oneworld alliance of British Airways.
The two low-cost carriers Ryanair and Buzz as well as British Airways ensure that the parties do not eliminate
competition in respect of a substantial part of the market for scheduled air services for non-time-sensitive customers'
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frequencies, Lufthansa had a market share of about 63 Vo onthis market. More importantly, BA was not
able to increase its frequencies due to a shortage of slots at Frankfurt airport. Lufthansa alone has 64 % of
all slots at its Frankfurt hub. Despite several requests, BA was unable to obtain further slots at FranKurt
in order to increase its frequencies on the London-Frankfurt route. By contrast, Lufthansa's position at
Heathrow is considerably stronger due to its cooperation with bmi. As a result, Lufthansa's only
remaining competitor was severely handicapped, and there was a risk that Lufthansa could eliminate
competition on this market.
With a view to addressing the Commission's competition concerns, the parties submitted a number of
commitments. In particular, they offered to make slots available at Frankfurt airport, which would allow
the entrant to operate four daily frequencies. In the event of the entrant requesting some, but not all, of
the four pairs of slots, the parties undertook to make the remaining number of slots available to any
airline currently operating services on the Frankfurt-London route. This would allow British Airways to
increase its frequencies on this route and compete on an equal footing with Lufthansa. In the light of
Lufthansa's position at Frankfurt airport, the parties offered to give those of bmi's Frankfurt slots which
were not taken up by competitors back to the slot pool. This would keep Lufthansa from further
strengthening its position at Franldurt airport as a result of the cooperation agreement (6').
By accepting these commitments, the Commission was able to secure the overall pro-competitive effect
of the cooperation agreement while at the same time preventing an elimination of competition on an
important market. The Commission carried out a market test to confirm that the slots made available by
the parties would actually be taken up by competitors. In the meantime, these slots have been taken up by
BA, which, as a result, has increased its daily frequencies on the London-Frankfurt market. On the basis
of these commitments, the Commission decided not to raise serious doubts with regard to the TPJVA so
that an exemption pursuant to Article 5(3) of Regulation (EEC) No 3975187 applies for a period of six
years (non-opposition procedure).
Grand Alliance/Americana Consortium (Case COMP/D-2/37.952)
In March, the Commission decided not to raise any objections to a consortium which operates weekly
liner shipping services between ports in northern Europe to and from ports in North America and
Mexico ('o). The consortium agreement had been notified on 10 October 2000. Pursuant to the regulation
on the application of Article 8l(3) of the EC Treaty to liner shipping consortia (''), the Commission has
six months from the date of notification to oppose an agreement. If the Commission does not take action
within this period, the notified agreement is automatically deemed exempted for the time the regulation is
in force (i.e. until 25 April 2005).
The Commission's investigation concluded that the consortium met the criteria for exemption set out in
the regulation. In particular, it was found that the consortium would remain subject to effective
competition from other shipping lines. The agreement is therefore deemed exempted until 25 April 2005.
("') FulldetailsoftheremediespackagehavebeenpublishedinOJCS3,I4.3.20OL.(') The parties to the agreement were, on the one hand, Hapag-Lloyd Aktiengesellschaft, Nippon Yusen Kaisha, Orient
Overseas Container Line and P&O Nedlloyd (companies forming the 'Grand Alliance') and, on the other, Lykes Lines
Limited and Mexican Line Limited (two subsidiaries of Americana Lines Ltd).(') Commission Regulation (EC) No 823120C0 of 19 April 2000 on the application ofArticle 81(3) ofthe Treaty to oertain
categories of agreements, decisions and concerted practices between liner shipping companies (consortia) (OJ l- 100,
20.4.2000).
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UEFA broadcasting regulations (Case COMP/C-237.576) (")
On 20 April, the Commission adopted a negative clearance decision conceming UEFA's broadcasting
regulations on the TV broadcasting of football, as amended in July 2000 (").
Starting with the 200012001 season, the new broadcasting regulations allow national football associations
to block the TV broadcasting of football matches within their territory during two and a half hours either
on Saturday or Sunday at hours that correspond to their main domestic fixture schedule. This represents a
significant improvement in terms of both scope and procedure compared with the regulations as
originally notified to the Commission.
The UEFA broadcasting regulations originally presented to the Commission in 1988 were highly
complex and very broad in scope. They opented with a time window system covering the whole week
and provided for different authorisation requirements. The authorisation system is abandoned under the
new broadcasting regulations. Football associations can therefore no longer veto transmissions into their
territory arbitrarily. UEFA also gave up an exemption for its own UEFA tournaments. Thus, there is no
longer a situation with market sharing between UEFA and the national associations.
The two-and-a-half-hour ban is considered to be adequate to protect stadium attendance from being
disturbed by the simultaneous broadcasting of football on TV while at the same time allowing football
fans, eager to watch the match also on TY time to get back from the stadium.
While football clubs very much welcome TV revenues, they also want to protect stadium attendance to
maintain the atmosphere there. The Commission's decision in the broadcasting regulations cases takes
these two conflicting interests into account, reconciling competition rules with the special characteristics
of sport.
The Commission took into consideration the fact that national fixtures are increasingly spread over
several days of the week and at varying hours. The combination of the actually blocked hours and the
various fixtures will therefore rarely result in situations where broadcasters would be prevented from
broadcasting football of a particular origin and viewers from seeing it. The Commission therefore
concluded that this effect cannot be qualified as constituting an appreciable restriction of competition
within the meaning of Article 8l(1) of the EC Treaty and Article 53(1) of the EEA Agreement.
The Commission also examined the emerging market for Internet streaming of football (Internet-TV) but
took the view that the broadcasting regulations would not at present appreciably restrict technological
and economic developments in the sector. However, the Commission reserves the right to intervene in the
future ifdevelopments are brought to its attention which indicate that the broadcasting regulations will
become a barrier to the development of new Internet services'
The Commission's decision on the UEFA broadcasting rules does not prejudice the assessment of the
joint selling of broadcasting rights by national football associations, which is still being examined under
Article 81(l) of the EC Treaty andArticle 53(1) of the EEAAgreement.
(') See also Part One, points 165 arfi'224.
c.) oJ L t'71,26.6.2001.
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Europe to Caribbean liner shipping consortium (Case COMP/D-2/7S.02|)
Similarly, in June, the Commission decided not to oppose another consortium which operates weekly
services between ports in northern Europe and the Mediterranean to and from ports in the Caribbean (and
which was notified on 13 December 2000) ('o). It was concluded that the requirements for exemption as
set forth in the regulation on liner shipping consortia were met and that the consortium would face
effective competition from other liner shipping companies. The agreement is therefore deemed exempted
until 25 April 2005.
I ntelsat (Case COM P/37.995)
On I June, the Commission issued a negative clearance comfort letter to Intelsat for its restructuring from
an intergovernmental organisation into a commercial company (for further details see Part One,
point 133).
ldentrus (Case COMP/37.462) (^)
On 3 I July, the Commission cleared agreements between a number of major European and non-European
banks creating a global network ('Identrus') for the authentication of electronic sisnatures and other
aspects of e-commerce transactions (?6).
Pro Europe (Case COMP/38.051) ()
Pro Europe was established by several national packaging recovery systems to control the use of the
Green Dot trademark outside Germany, where this trademark is controlled by Duales System
Deutschland (DSD). It has entered into principal licensing agreements with the following packaging
recovery systems from the EEA: ARA (Austria), Eco-Emballages (France), EcoEmbalajes Espaffa
(Spain), Valorlux (Luxembourg), Sociedade Ponto Verde (Portugal), Repak (Republic oflreland), FbST
Plus (Belgium) and Materialretur (Norway). It notified the relevant agreements to the Commission.
Pro Europe describes itself as 'a vehicle which allows its participants to operate on their respective
markets under the same trademark'. The relevant market, separate from packaging recovery markets, is
that of administering the use of a symbol to identify packaging taking part in a recovery sysrem or
solution.
The Commission's analysis concentrated in particular on whether the effect of the agreements is to(i) foreclose the market in providing producers with exemption services (market in systems for
recovering household packaging waste) to schemes which are not eligible to use the trademark and/or(ii) prevent undertakings with recovery obligations from following so called self-management or
individual solutions in certain territories and/or (iii) unduly partition the markets along national frontiers.
Pro Europe made some changes to its agreements at the Commission's request. Sublicences, which must
in certain conditions be granted to competitors by the principal licensees, shall ifneed be have the same
material and territorial scope as the principal licence. ho Europe also asserted that nothing in its
(7a) The parties to the agrcement were CMA-CGM SA, A.P. Moller Maersk Sealand, Marfret and Nordana Line.(') See also PartOne, point 132.
(76) oJ L 249, 19.9.2001.(') See also Part One, Box 3.
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agreements prevents its members from allowing packaging taking part in a self-management solution to
bear the Green Dot. It undertook, moreover, to intervene on behalf of a potential sublicensee where a
principal licensee unjustifiably denies a sublicence. Finally, it appears that current partitioning of the
markets along national frontiers results not from Pro Europe rules but rather from national regulatory
requirements.
Following the changes, a negative-clearance-type comfort letter was issued on 28 September.
\ATA cargo tariff consultations (Case COMP/D-?J36.563) ( )
The IATA cargo tariff conferences are a forum where air carriers met principally to agree tariffs for the
transport of freight. Until June 1997, this system benefited from a block exemption under Commission
Regulation No 1617/93 (?n), which effectively enabled European airlines to agree on tariffs for the
carriage of freight within the EEA. This block exemption was as of 30 June 1997 withdrawn by
Commission Regulation No 1523196 of 24 Jrtly 1996 (*).
The Commission's main reasons for withdrawing the block exemption were that the tariffs fixed by the
cargo tariff conferences appeared to be much higher than the market rates and that the system no longer
seemed essential for making intertining (8') work within the EEA'
Following the withdrawal of the block exemption, IAIIA notified the system under Council Regulation
(EEC) No 3975187 of 14 December 1987 (") and applied for an individual exemption. IAIA's main
argument in favour of the tariff conferences was that they facilitated cargo interlining. The cargo tariffs
fixed by the tariff conferences were indeed used at the wholesale level to calculate each carrier's
remuneration for its participation in an interline move.
In a starement of objections sent to IAIA in May, the Commission took the preliminary view that IATA
cargo tariff conferences fall under Article 8l(1) of the EC Treaty. In its analysis under Article 81(3), the
Commission accepted that cargo tariff conferences facilitate the provision of a comprehensive system of
interlining within the EEA. It considered, however, that IAIA had not succeeded in demonstrating that
this restrictive system was still indispensable as a means of providing customers with efficient interlining
services within the EEA.
The tariff conference system is 55 years old and dates from the time air transport markets were strictly
regulated. The current regulatory context within the EEA differs radically from that which presided over
the setting up of the IAIA tariff conferences. In addition, Community airlines are currently in the process
of building global networks. They often interline with their alliance partners or with other airlines on the
basis of bilateral agreements.
Following the sratement of objections, IAIA agreed to end the joint setting of cargo rates within the EEA.
Concretely, by the beginning of 2002, cargo rates fixed individually by each carrier should replace those
jointly set by the tariff conferences.
(73) See also Part One, points 143 et seq.
c") oJ L 155,26.6.1993.(9 oJL190,31.7.1996.
(*') Interlining occurs when cargo is carried for part or all of the journey by an airline other than the airline the customer has
contracted with.
c') oJ L 374, 31.12.198'7.
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As a result, the Commission decided to close the case. It also provided IAIA with a comfort letter
covering a number of other administrative and technical resolutions in the cargo sector which facilitate
interlining and are distinct from the setting of cargo rates.
2.2. Vertical agreements
Retu r p ack- P ET (C ases CO M P/gS. 65 6 an d CO M p/97. 224)
Retu rpack Al um i ni u m (Case CO M P/SS. 65S)
Returglas (Case COM P/3O.OO?)
On 24 April, the Commission approved by way of comfort letters the membership and operatlonal
agreements of three beverages-packaging waste-compliance schemes founded by Swedish breweries,
packagers and retailers (Svenska Returpack group and others). These three systems were set up in
Sweden to discharge the recovery and recycling obligations oftheir members and to ensure the recovery
and recycling of PET-plastic, aluminium and glass beverages packaging respectively, as required by
national law.
The Commission noted that the Swedish Competition Authority (the Konkunensverket) had granted
these systems exemption under national competition law until the end of 2004. The Konkurrensverket
had in fact considered that the requirement of using only the compacting method (and therefore
compacting machines) could restrict competition, as it excludes other methods and other machines, such
as shredding. Likewise, it considered that the restriction of not allowing members leaving the system to
use packaging that belonged or could be mistaken for belonging to the system could be anti-competitive.
It nevertheless found these restrictions justifiable and therefore granted exemptions.
The Commission accepted this analysis of the national authority and concluded that exemption-type
comfort letters could be issued. Review is possible if the market changes and in particular afterihe exiiry
of the national exemptions.
Yves Saint Laurent (Case COMP/F-|/A6.5g9)
On 16 May, the Commission exempted individually by comfort letter the selective distribution system
used by Yves Saint Laurent Parfums (YSLP) for its luxury products in the perfume, cosmetics and skin
care sector ("). The YSLP selective distribution agreement also meets the conditions for exemption under
Regulation (EC) No 2790/99 (*) on the block exemption from which selective distribution agreements
have been able to benefit since I June 2000.
In particular, YSLP authorises approved retailers already operating a physical sales outlet to sell via the
Internet as well. On the other hand, it imposes quality standards for use of an Internet site for the purpose
of selling its luxury products, just as it would in the case of a shop within the framework of its selective
distribution system.
In the guidelines on vertical restraints (t'), the Commission stresses the importance of the Internet to the
competitiveness of the European economy and encourages widespread use of this modern means of
communication and marketing. In particular, it considers that a ban on Internet sales by distributors 
-
("') Press release IPl01l713. 77.5.2M1.
('o) Regulation (EC) No 27 90199 of 22 December lggg (OI L 336, 29.12.1999).(3') Commission notice 2000/C 291/01, parugraph 5l (OJ C 2gt, I 3. 10.2000).
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even in a selective distribution system 
- 
is a restraint on sales to consumers and hence is not covered by
the regulation.
In 1992, the Commission had granted the YSLP perfume distribution system individual exemption under
Article 8l(3) of the EC Treaty for the period from 1 June 1991 to 31 May 1997 C'). By a judgment of
12 December 1996 (u), the Court of First Instance had largely upheld this exemption decision. In the
light of the Commission's decision-making practice and the judgments of the Court of First Instance
relating thereto, the Commission's authorisation also covers the period between the expiry of the 1992
decision and the entry into force of the new regulation, Regulation 2790199.
Eco-Emballages (Case COM P/34. 950) ("")
By decision of 15 June ("), the Commission approved the contracts concluded by the French company
Eco-Emballages SA conceming its system of selective collection and recovery of household packaging
waste. This decision is one of a series defining the Commission's policy in the packaging waste recovery
sector.
hoducers (including distributors and importers) of packaged goods pay Eco-Emballages a financial
contribution in return for having their legal obligations in the area of the recycling of packaging
discharged. Eco-Emballages redistributes the revenues it collects from them to local authorities, which
are responsible among other things for collecting household waste in their local area. Its contributions are
intended to compensate the local authorities for the extra cost of selectively collecting and sorting this
type of waste. The local authorities then sell the sorted materials to industrial firms which recover them.
These different activities in fact constitute the relevant and affected service markets on French territory.
Following a waming from the Commission, Eco-Emballages amended some of the clauses of its
contracts. This made it possible for the Commission to consider that there were no longer any
competition restrictions in place and to grant negative clearance to all the notified agreements.
The most important changes and undertakings concemed the duration and scope of the contracts and the
granting of sublicences for use of the Green Dot logo on packaging. Producers may now leave the system
after a year and at the end of every subsequent year. Local authorities may also immediately terminate
their contract with the system, whereas Eco-Emballages must honour the contract length of six years
except in case of default by the municipality. Producers may now conclude a contract for all or only some
of their packaging and local authorities may conclude a contract for all or only some of the packaging
waste materials they collect, i.e. for some or all of the categories of glass, paper/cartonboard, metals and
plastic.
Eco-Emballages has also agreed to offer the possibility of using the Green Dot logo to anybody who
legitimately needs to use this symbol to carry on business. A small competitor, Adelphe, has in fact
obtained from Eco-Emballages a sublicence to use the Green Dot in its system, and other potentially
competing systems would also be entitled to a sublicence. Furthermore, Eco-Emballages has agreed to
grant such sublicences even to undertakings which wish to make individual arrangements for some or all
of their packaging while calling on the services of a collective system for the rest either in France or in
another country. This permits such a sublicensee to use the same packaging bearing the Green Dot while
('6) Commissiondecisionof16.12.lgglinCaseIV/33.242YvesSaintlaurentParfums(OJL12, 18.1.1992).(") CaseT-19/92 Groupementd'achatEdouardLeclercvCommission U9961 ECRII-l851.
(**) See alsoPartOne,Box 3.
c) oJ L 233, 31.8.2001.
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paying for it only to the extent that the services of the exemption system are also used. The recovery
results of the other system or the self-management arrangement must nevertheless be comparable to
those imposed on collective systems.
Visa International payment cards (Case COMp/2g.g7S)
On 9 August, the Commission adopted a decision under Article 81 of the EC Treaty in the Visa
International case (no). (For further details see part One, points 200 et seq.)
Duales system Deutschtand (DsD) (Case coMp/u493 
- 
positive decision) (,)
By decision of 17 September ("), the Commission granted negative clearance for the notified statutes of
DSD and the guarantee agreements, and exempted the service agreements.
The two main competition concerns raised by the Commission in the past concerning systems for the
collection and recycling of packaging waste were the issue of free marteting of secondary material by
collectors and the duration of service agreements. Another major concem in this case was the unrestricted
access of DSD's competitors to the collection infrastructure of the DSD collectors.
DSD entered into service and guarantee agreements which originally provided that a collector was not
entitled to market the collected materials himself. The Commission objected to this restraint because it
allowed DSD and the guarantee companies to establish themselves ur u it ong or even dominant supplier
of secondary raw material and prevented collectors from marketing materiJs in competition with each
other. In the meantime, DSD abolished this constraint, except for plastics, where because of negative
market prices the collector has to transfer the collected plastii waste to a guarantee company appointed
by DSD.
The fact that under the service agreements, which were concluded for a period of up to 1 5 years, only one
collector was appointed exclusive partner of DSD per administrative diitrict amounted to a restriction of
competition underArticle 8l(1) of the EC Treaty, since access to the relevant market by domestic andforeign collectors was obstructed. The Commission examined whether such long-term exclusive
agreements were indeed necessary. The results of the economic analysis undertaken bythe Commission
suggested that collectors would have sufflcient time to achieve an economically satiifactory return on
their investment if the service agreements were to run until the end of 2003. The Commission informed
the notifying parties of this finding, who notified the service agreements accordingly. The Commission
therefore granted an exemption until the end of 2003.
The duration of the service agreements is closely related to access to the collection infrastructure. The
relevant market for the collection and sorting of packaging waste at households is characterised by
specific supply-side conditions (network economies, disposal traditions of consumers, container
instalment constraints), which makes duplication of the existing collection infrastructure at households in
many cases impossible or economically unviable. Therefore, unrestricted access to collection facilities is
a precondition for the occurrence of competition on the downstream market for organising the take-back
and recovery ofused sales packaging. The collectors own these facilities and there is no provision in the
notified service agreements preventing the collectors from offering these facilities to competitors of
(x) oI L 293, 10.11.2001.(") See also Part One, Box 3(,2) oJL 319, 4.12.2001.
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DSD. Given the vital competitive importance of unimpeded access to the collection infrastructure, the
Commission considered it necessary to attach obligations to the decision in order to ensure that
competition on the relevant markets is not restricted. In November, DSD lodged an appeal against the
obligations before the Court of First Instance.
Porsche (Case COMP/F-2/37.886) (*)
The German sports car manufacturer Porsche AG notified to the Commission its new distribution
agreements for the wholesaling and retailing of Porsche cars. These standard agreements provided for
selective and exclusive distribution of new Porsche cars and spare parts and contained an obligation on all
Porsche dealers to offer after-sales servicing to Porsche standards.
The Commission came to the conclusion that the new agreements restricted competition in the area of
sports cars to an appreciable extent, owing in particular to the combination of exclusive and selective
distribution with exclusive supply and purchasing obligations and to non-compete obligations which
forced Porsche dealers wishing to sell other makes to do so in a separate legal entity, under separate
management and in separate showrooms in a way which avoided confusion between the makes, and
owing to other restrictions. After certain modifications were made to the agreements, the Commission
concluded that, in their modified form, they could benefit from the block exemption provided for in
Regulation (EC) No 1475195 on motor vehicle distribution and servicing agreements ('o). One of the
modifications concerned sales targets agreed upon with Porsche dealers: targets will include all sales
regardless of the buyer's place of residence 
- 
an important amendment as it favours cross-border trade
in the single market. Another modification concerned online sales, which Porsche dealers are now
allowed to make if consumers wish to buy over the Internet. Porsche made clear, moreover, that it would
give independent repairers non-discriminatory access to all technical information. The file was
accordingly closed by comfort letter.
F6ddration lnternationale de I'Automobile 
- 
FIA (Case COMP/35.613) and
FIA Formula One World Championship (Case COMP/36.638) (*)
This investigation concemed a number of cases relating to the organisation of motor sport events and
their commercial exploitation.
On 22htly 1994, the F6d6ration Intemationale de I'Automobile (FIA) notified its regulations to the
Commission. Subsequently, the agreement between the FIA and Intemational Sportsworld Communicators
Ltd (ISC)relating to the markedng of broadcasting and media rights to certain FIA championships (except
Formula One) was also notified Cu).The commercial affangements relating to the FIA Formula One World
Championship were notified separately f) by the FIA and Formula One Administration Limited ('FOA '
which is the commercial rights holder for this championship) on 5 September 1997.
In 1997 and 1998, the Commission received three complaints conceming these notiflcations. The
complaints were lodged by (i) AE TV Cooperation GmbH ("), a television company whose complaint
('r) See also Part One, point 185.
ef oJ L 1,4s,29.6.799s.
f') See also Part One, points 221 et seq.(*) Case COMP/35.613.
C') Case COMP/36.638 
- 
FINFOA.
(o') Cases COMP/36.520 and COMP|37.379.
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focused mainly on the European Truck Racing Cup, and (ii) the GTR Organisation (nn), which organised
and promoted an international series for 'grand touring' (GT) cars. All three complaints were
subsequently withdrawn, and the cases closed.
The cases concerned the following services and products: (a) the organisation of cross-border motor sport
series; (b) the promotion of such series; (c) the certification/licensing of motor sport events' organisers
and participants; and (d) the broadcasting rights of the FIA Formula One Championship.
On 29 June 1999, the Commission issued a statement of objections according to which the FIA had a
'conflict of interest' in that it was using its regulatory powers to block the organisation of races which
competed with the events promoted or organised by the FIA (i.e. those events from which the FIA
derived a commercial benefit). The Commission objected to the FIA s claiming TV rights to motor sport
series it authorised and to certain clauses in the Concorde Agteement that sets out terms for the organisation
and running of the FIA Formula One World Championship and the voting structure for its conffol, by
reference to other agreements, confracts and FIA rules. Finally, certain notified contracts appeared to
contravene Article 8 I and/or Article 82 of the EC Treaty in that they raised further the barriers to entry for a
potential entrant: the promoters'contracts prevented circuits used for Formula One from being used for
races which could compete with Formula One for a period of 10 years; the Concorde Agreement prevented
teams from racing in any other series comparable to Formula One; and the agreements with broadcasters for
broadcasting grand prix imposed a financial penalty on them if they showed motor sports that competed
with Formula One series. Certain agreements between FOA and broadcasters appeared to restrict
competition within the meaning of Article 81 by granting the latter exclusivity in their territories for
excessive periods of time.
On 26 April 2000, the FIA and FOA submitted several proposals to modify substantially the notified
arrangements in order to meet the concems expressed by the Commission in the statement of objections.
The modifications had the following objectives:
- 
to establish a complete separation of the commercial and regulatory functions in relation to the FIA
Formula One World Championship and the FIA World Rally Championship, where new agreements
are proposed which place the commercial exploitation of these championships at arm's length;
- 
to improve transparency of decision making and appeals procedures, and to create greater
accountability;
to guarantee access to motor sport to any person meeting the relevant safety and fairness criteria;
to guarantee the FIA's approval to all events meeting certain safety and sporting criteria and ensure
that no resffiction is placed on access to extemal independent appeals;
- 
to modify the duration of free-to-air broadcasting contracts in relation to the FIA Formula One
World Championship.
The proposed changes to the regulatory framework and to the commercial arrangements appeared to the
Commission to introduce sufficient structural remedies minimising the risk of possible future abuse and
to set the basis for a healthy competitive environment in economic activities related to motor sport. These
('") Case COMP/36.776.
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modifications led the Commission to publish a notice pursuant to Article l9(3) of Regulation No 17 on
13 June ('').
On 29 October, the Commission concluded its investigation by issuing administrative comfort letters and
subsequently published an explanatory press release ('ot). The Commission will examine carefully any
changes in the commercial interests of the owners of the Formula One World Championship to determine
whether such changes negatively affect downstream television markets.
The Commission considers that this solution guarantees sports fans free-to-air coverage ofpopular races
and high safety standards across the EU. The sport will develop within a common regulatory framework
favouring the establishment of cross-border series in Europe. Finally, consumers will also benefit from an
increased variety of motor sport events as organisers and circuit owners will be free to invite
non-EU-established series to their venues.
3. Settlements
Bank charges for the exchange of euro-zone currencies 
- 
Belgium, Finland,
Portugal, Ireland, the Netherlands and Germany
( Cases CO M P/E - 1 /37. 7 87, CO M P/E - 1 /37. 7 88, CO M P/E- 1 /37.7 89'
COMP/E-| /37.790, COMP/E-| /37.791 and COMP/E-I /37.91 9)
The creation of the euro on I January 1999 irrevocably flxed the exchange rates of the I I (since
I January 2001, l2) EU currencies that are part of economic and monetary union, thereby eliminating the
buying and selling foreign exchange spread and with it a source of revenue for banks.
Shortly after this date, the Commission received complaints from consumers alleging that certain banks
had collectively fixed their charges for exchanging euro-zone currencies (in-currency banknotes).
Price-fixing cartels are hardcore violations of competition law, irrespective of whether they are aimed at
keeping prices artificially high or at minimising a drop in prices. Each bank should individually fix the
level of its exchange rates. Banks must not collectively agree on these rates. Such a practice would
constitute by its very natrue a very serious infringernent of competition rules and is liable to be severely
punished by the Commission.
In order to be able to ascertain all the relevant facts concerning possible anti-competitive agreements or
concerted practices, the Commission carried out surprise inspections at a number of banks and sent
requests for information to most euro-zone banks.
As a result of these investigations, the Cornmission gathered evidence which indicated that certain
national groups of banks may have colluded to maintain exchange charges at certain levels in order to
minimise losses caused by the introduction of the euro. On the basis of this evidence, in 2000' the
Commission started proceedings against a large number of banks and exchange bureaux in seven
Member States (Austria, Belgium, Finland, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands and Portugal).
('*) oJC 169, 13.6.2001.
('o') Press release lP l0ll 1523, 30. 10.2001.
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However' during the proceedings, between April and July 2001, with a view to settling the antitrust
proceedings with the Commission, some banks took the initiative in submitting to it unilateral prop6sals
consisting of (i) a significant reduction in the charges applicable to the exchange of in-cunency
banknotes and (ii) the elimination of all these fees by October 2001 at the latest, at least for buying
transactions by account holders.
Taking into account both the exceptional circumstance of the disappearance of the market concerned, i.e.
the exchange ofin-currency banknotes, as a consequence ofthe introduction ofthe euro in January 2002
and the fact that the proposals submitted were acceptable, the Commission decided to end the cartel
proceedings against more than 50 banks in Belgium, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands and portueal and
against some banks in Germany.
The Commission considered that the proposed change in the banks' commercial behaviour brought the
suspected infringement to an end. Its decision to close the proceedings in the public interest was taken
with a view to ensuring that consumers derived a direct, immediate benefit.
Consumers have indeed benefited significantly since May 2001 from a substantial reduction in the
charges applicable to the exchange of in-currency banknotes and during the last quarter of the year from
their complete removal. Moreover, the introduction of euro banknotes and coins on I January 2002 was
facilitated by this measure.
These cases clearly demonstrate the important role played by consumers both as defenders and as the
main beneficiaries of the effective enforcement of competition policy. Consumers and consumer
organisations can enhance their important role in competition matteri by iemaining alert and playing an
active part in the detection of illegal collusive behaviour.
Corrib (Case COM P/E-A/97.705)
The Commission closed its examination relating to the kish Corrib gas field following the decision of
Corrib's owners to withdraw their application for an exemption to jointly market the gas producecl at
corrib (10'?). This will give gas consumers in Ireland a wider ihoice between gas suppliers.
The Corrib gas field is a new discovery off the west coast of Ireland. The field was declared commercial
by its owners and will be the only indigenous gas field in Ireland in the years to come following the
depletion of the existing gas fleld at Kinsale unless new discoveries are made.
ln 1999' Corrib's owners, Enterprise Energy Ireland Limited, Statoil (Norway) and Marathon (United
States) applied for an exemption to market gas produced at Corrib jointly ior the first five years of
production. The companies argued thatjoint marketing would be necessary to balance the countirvailing
purchasing power of the incumbent Irish energy companies. These are Bord Gais Eirean (BGE), tG
State-owned gas company, and Electricity Supply Board (ESB), the State-owned electricity company
using large quantities of gas for electricity production.
The Commission 
- 
while recognising the strong market position of BGE and ESB 
- 
raised competition
concerns. It questioned in particular whether joint marketing brought economic benefits as rlquired
under European competition law. In this regard, the Commission also took into account that the ongoing
liberalisation process in the gas sector will make an increasing number of gas consumers .eligible;, i.e.
('a) IP t}l | 57 8, 20.4.2001.
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free to choose between suppliers. In keland, which is characterised by a rapid growth of its energy
markets, these eligible customers already include power generators and energy-intensive industrial
consumers.
The Corrib partners, which had refrained from implementing the joint marketing arrangements, withdrew
their application for an exemption following the concerns raised by the Commission. As a consequence
of the withdrawal, the Commission decided to close its examination. The case conllrms the
Commission's general policy not to tolerate joint selling in the gas sector any longer, unless compelling
reasons are provided as justification.
M a rath on (Cas e CO M P/ E -3/36. 246)
The Commission settled the Marathon case with the German gas company Thyssengas after it received
commitments from that company rendering access to its pipeline network more effective ('"). The case
concerned the alleged joint refusal to grant access to continental European gas pipelines by some
European gas companies, among them Thyssengas. The case was initiated following a complaint by the
Norwegian gas producer Marathon. The complaint was later withdrawn following a commercial
settlement between the parties. The Commission decided, however, that it was in the Community interest
to continue the investigation.
Of the companies concerned by the investigation, Thyssengas 
- 
the smallest of the European
operators 
- 
put forward substantial proposals aimed at rendering access to its network more effective.
Thyssengas's commitments relate to five areas.
. As regards balancing, Thyssengas undertook to assist shippers in avoiding high imbalancing charges
by introducing a free-of-charge online balancing system avoiding imbalances between nominated
and actual deliveries. Thyssengas also offered an 'extended balancing regime' which increases
shippers' flexibility margin from 15 to 25 7o. Additionally, shippers may compensate imbalances
within the following month either in kind (for example extra deliveries of gas) or by swapping
imbalances with other customers or by paying for the imbalance'
. Thyssengas's commitments as regards trade in capacity rights marked a first step towards the
development of a secondary market in which capacity holders can trade capacity rights acquired
from the pipeline owners. In this respect, it is also important to note that Thyssengas offers transport
contracts with a short duration 
- 
down to one day 
- 
and allows several shippers to bundle
transport contracts, thereby reducing costs.
. With respect to congestion management, Thyssengas committed itself to introducing a 'use it or lose
it' principle for capacity reservations of its own gas-trading branch. This commitment means that
thiid parties are entitled to use, upon request, unused transport capacity originally booked by
Thyssingas's trading branch in a valid manner. Thyssengas also committed itself to offering
interruptible contracts, which generally lead to continuous transport unless an intemrpting event
occurs, for example a drop in temperature.
. In order to improve the transparency of its access regime, Thyssengas promised to publish on its
Internet site a detailed map showing the available capacity at the main entry points to its pipeline
('o') hess release IPl}lll64l, 23.ll.200l
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system. Similarly, it undertook to create a computer system giving shippers simplified access to
information on its transmission tariffs.
' Lastly, Thyssengas gave a commitment to improve its handling of access requests. The company
thus promised to develop standard forms and contracts and to limit the number of reasons for
refusing to grant access to its pipelines. This increases planning security, reduces transaction costs
and prevents cases ofrefusal to grant access to the network from arising.-
Thyssengas's commitments- with some exceptions- entered into force on I December 2001. 1'hey
will remain in force until July 2005. During this period, the commitments will be monitored by a trustee,
who will report regularly to the Commission. A non-confldential version of the commitments ispublished on Thyssengas's Internet site (www.thyssengas.de).
As it is expected that the commitments will lead to an improvement in the gas transmission market inGermany, the Commission decided to discontinue the Mirathon case for ihyr."ngu, as long as the
commitments are respected. In this regard, the Commission also took into account Thyssengas's marketposition and contribution to the alleged infringement.
U l(/Fra nce i nte rco n n ecto r (C as e C O M p/ E - g/gg. 0 I S)
Following concems expressed by the Commission, the operators of the electricity submarine cablelinking the United Kingdom and France agreed to open up access to the infrastructure used fbr electricity
export and import between the two countries.
There is only one submarine interconnector between the UK and France. It has a total capacity of
2 000 Mw in either direction and is owned jointly by the transmission sysrem operarors (TSOs) ofEngland and Wales, National Grid, and France, EdF/RTE. The UK/France interconnector had been
operating on a fully commercial basis since 1986. Its operational costs are not recovered by transmission
charges but only through the fee paid for its use.
In practice' use of the interconnector had been reserved exclusively to EdF for exports into the UK, under
an existing agreement governing the management of the interconnector which exprred in March 2001.
The two TSos sought the Commission's views before agreeing on new rules for managing and allocating
capacity on the submarine cable after the expiry of the existing rules. Following remarks uy trr!Commission, they decided to open up access to the interconnector, without any reserve being made infavour of any particular company. As a result, capacity has been subject to open tender. This new regime
was implemented in early 2001. The results of the tenders have been published.
The French TSo also reviewed the system for the transit of electricity in France rn order to render 1heprocedures and duration of those transit rights compatible with the transmission rights in the
interconnector. As a result, operators established in other continental Member States wishing to transmit
electricity to the uK through the UK/France interconnector will no longer see their intentions hamperedby restrictive transit rights allocation in France. The French TSO offired, furthermore, to ensure thattransit rights from Spain match capacity allocated at auctions of the Spain/France interconnector,s
capacity. Finally, congestion costs and losses in France will be borne by EdF/RTE.
In the Commission's view, any restrictions on the allocation of transmission rights or discriminatory
treatment would have been contrary to EU competition law, as this would have amounted to a potential
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abuse of a dominant position (Article 82 of the EC Treaty). Granting a transmission priority right in
favour of a particular company would have allowed it to circumvent the rules on capacity allocation
applicable to other market operators. This could have been regarded as discriminatory treatment by the
TSOs, which are in a dominant position in the market for the transmission of electricity between the
continent and the UK, a substantial part of the common market. Such discrimination would have placed
those other operators at a competitive disadvantage vrs-ri-vis EdF.
4. Summary of decisions taken by the Comrnunity courts
NALOO (Case COMP/E-3/35.821 )
The Commission has lodged an appeal before the Court of Justice against the judgment of the Court of
First Instance (CFI) in Case T-89/98 NALOO v Commission This judgment, which was delivered in
February, annulled a Commission decision of May 1998 rejecting a complaint by the National
Association of Licensed Opencast Operators (NALOO).
Back in 1990, NALOO lodged a first complaint with the Commission relating to the UK coal market on
the basis ofArticles 63 and66(7) ofthe ECSC Treaty. It allegedin substance that the CentralElecticity
Generating Board and British Coal Corporation (BCC) had applied, on the one hand, discdminatory
pricing and, on the other, abusive royalties to coal extracted under licence by its members. This complaint
was rejected by Commission decision in 1991. The decision was appealed against by the complainant
and upheld by the CFI.
In 1994, NALOO lodged a second complaint basically on the same issue as in the first complaint. It
sought a Commission decision on the facts relating to the period 1973-90 that would allow it
subsequently to recover damages in court. The Commission rejected this latter complaint in 1998, as
mentioned above.
On 25 April 2001, the Commission lodged an appeal against the CFI's judgment annulling its 1998
decision. Each of the three other parties, BCC, International Power and PowerGen, appealed as well. The
appeal was still pending in June 2002.
British Sugar (Case lV/33.708), Tate & Lyle (Case lV/33.709), Napier Brown
(Case IV/33.710) and James Budgett & Son (Case lV/33.711)
On appeal by three of the parties, the Court of First Instance in its judgment of 12 July ('o') upheld the
Commission's decision, except for a reduction in the flne imposed on Tate & Lyle (for details see Part
One, points'11J4).
Asia Motor France SA (Case COMP/F-2/33.014)
The order ('o') of the Court of Justice upholds the Court of First Instance's judgment in Asia Motor
France IV ('*), by which the CFI had confirmed the Commission's rejection of complaint decision in the
('*) Joined Cases T-2OU98,T-204198,T-207198 Tate & Lyle, British Sugar and Napier Brown v Commission.
('o') Case C-l/01 P 
- 
Order of the Court (Second Chamber) of 20.9.2001.
('ou) Case T-154l98.
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light of new evidence, after two previous decisions in that regard had been annulled ('0') (for further
details see Part One, points 186-187).
B 
- 
New legislative provisions and notices adopted or proposed
by the Commission
c 
- 
Formal decisions pursuant to Articles g1,g2and g6 of the Ec rreaty
1. Published decisions
Draft guidelines on market definition and the assessment of
SMP coM(200 l ) 175, 28.3.2001
Commission decision of 23 May 2001 on the terms of
reference of hearing officers in certain competition
proceedings OJ L 162. 19.6.2001. p.2l
Commission Regulation (EC) No 1324/Z0Ol of 29 June
2001 amending Regulation (EEC) No 1617193 as regards
consultations on passenger tariffs and slot allocation at
airports OI L 177,30.6.2ffi1,p.56
Commission notice on agreements of minor importance
which do not appreciably restrict competition under
Article 8 I ( I ) of the Treaty establishing the European
Community (de minimis) 22.12.2001 OJ C 368, 22.12.2O0r, p. 13
Published decisions
UPS/Deutsche Post
(Deutsche Post I) OI L 125, 5.5.2001, p. 27
UEFA Broadcasting Regulations O1L171,26.6.2N1,p. 12
Duales System Deurschland (DSD) (Arricle 82) OJL 166, 21.O6.2001,p. 1
OJ L 302, 17 .11.2O0r, p. 1
oJ L233.31.8.2001
OJ L 143, 31.5.2002.p.2
OJ L262.8.9.2001, p. 4
NDC HealtMMS Health: intenm measures OJ L 59. 28.2.2002, p. 18
18.7.2001 OJ L 100, 16.4.2M2,p. 1
SAS/lVIaersk Air
Sun Air/SAS and Maersk Air
OJ L26s,5.10.2001, p. 15
DP/BPO (Deutsche Post II) OJ L 331, 15.r2.200r, p. 4O
31.7.2001 o1L249,19.9.20o1,p. 12
OJ L 293, 10.11.2N1, p. 24
("' ) Case T -'7 192 As ia M oto r F rdnc e I I, Case T -387 19 4 As ia M o to r F ranc e I I I
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34.493 Duales System Deutschland (DSD) (Article 81) 18.9.2001 rPto'/12'79
36.756 Sodium gluconate cartel 2.10.2001 tPtoU1355
36.264 DaimleChrysler 10.10.2001
37.133 SNELPD/France (La Poste 
- 
France) 23.1O.2001 OJ L 120, 7.5.2002,p.19
3'.7.5t2 Vitamin cartels 21.tl.2001 IPt0y1625
37.800 Luxembourg brewing industries 2.200
37.614 Interbrew + Alken Maes (Belgian breweies) 5. 2.200
36.604 Citric acid cartel f. 2.2N IPt0ll1743
37.859 La Poste Hays (De Poste/Ial Poste 
- 
Belgium) 5 2.200 OI L 61,2.3.2002, p.32
37.027 Zinc phosphate cartel n.12.2001 rPt01tr79'7
3'7.919 German banks cartel I1.12.200t [Pt01t1796
36.212 Carbonless paper cartel 20.12.2001 rP/o1n892
2. Other formal decisions ('o')
2.L. Rejections of complaints by decision
2.2. Other non-published decisions
('o') Not published in the Official Journal.
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Golstein/General Council of the Bar
Star/lrish Sun: rejection of complaint conceming alleged
and abuse of dominant position
VES-British Govemmenl
z0.t2.200l
21.12.2001
21.2.2001
North Sea Liner Conference
(Non-opposition decision)
Grand Alliance/Americana
( N on-o ppo s it ion de c i s ion )
31.5.200r
rP/01/806, 7.6.200r
P&OiStena Line 2
(Exemption, renewal)
Europe to Caribbean Consortium
( N on- o p po s ition de c i s i on )
British Midland/I-uft hansa.i S AS
( Exemption w ith c onditions )
12.6.2W1
rPl01/831, 13.6.2N1
37.8t2
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Case
NoCOMP/ Name Date
Ilpe ofcomfort
letter ('')
37.697
37.929
3e5n
British Gas
PPL + NIE
Shisid"
4.t.z00l
r012001
1tl200t
I
i
i
36.779
33338
34985
37An
3f-557
3e5A
35^871
RAG
Christian Diorffi
Ladbroke + PMU+2ffi
Difoak@
12.1.2001
12:.2ffi1
n.L2W1
26r2cf,l
222C/i1
2nw\
(-?;2cfl
2t
T
T
,
,;
-t
35.985 Kalmar + TIEF 6.2.2W1 2
36.935 Volvo Penta + ZF 9.2.2M1 I
37.994 Valeo + Ichikoh Industries 9.2.2001 1
37.694 NMG+ I 13.2.2M1 I
)J.tJt Guerlain SA rs.2.2001 J
34.558 Aseguradores Riesgos Nucleares 21.2.2W1
37.363 Svenska Atomfdrsiikringspoolen 21.2.2001
37.940 ClR+Osteneichische Electrizitlit+1 22.2.200r
37.562 Eutelsat 23.2.2001
37.435 CCA/Banque Italiennes 27.2.2W1
37.298 Renault + GM Europe + 3 28.2.2001
J /.U)t) UNESPA s.3.200r
37.873 Maxxium+3 s.3.2001 2
37.548 CCG Centrale fiir Coorganisation 6.3.2001
36.104 Philips+CCETT+6 7.3.2001
37.642 Digital Audio Broadcasting (DAB) 7.3.2001 I
36.712 Wastepack 19.3.2001 2
33.803 Eau de Cologne 471 1 to.4.2001
38.010 Primar ro.4.2001 z
36.460 FIFA Broadcasting Regulations 20.4.2001 I
35.669 Svenska Returglas + 16 24.4.2W1
35.658 Retursystem 24.4.2001 z
35.656 PET Recycling II 24.4.2001 2
37.368 Toyota + TRW 25.4.2001
36.943 Mobil +Akzo + 4 26.4.2@1
37.224 Svenska Returpack-PET 26.4.2001 2
37.693 Man B&W + JSC 27.4.2m1
36.533 Yves Saint Laurent 16.5.2001
-)
37.810 TKS + Usinor + Voest (Eurostrip) 31.5.2001 J
D 
- 
Cases closed by comfort letter in 2001
('') I 
= 
negative clearance 81(l) or 82;
2 = individual exemption 81(3);
3 = conformity with notice/block exemption
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37948 Prototum 15.6.2001
36.283 Lancaster 15.6.2W1 z
34.889 Parfums Azzaro 22.6.2001 J
36.6',72 Clarins 25.6.2001
37.145 MTU +Volvo 26.6.2001
3s.427 Alcatel Austria + AEG Ausnia 28.6.2001 I
37.272 Coredeal 4;t.2001 1
37.886 Porsche l;7.2N z
37.74'7 Stockhausen 
- 
Rohm + Haas 18.7.200 I
38.034 Goodyear/Michelin 20.1.2M
32.810 Groupement Carte Bleue 20.7.2N I
3t.914 Volvo+Deutz+2 25;t.200 I
38.064 Covisint+5 26.7.200
36.951 Stokke+10 3l;t.2w
38.095 ABI + PPIAB 6.8.2001 I
36932 Eisai+Pfizer 20.8.200
34.992 Danske Slasterier 20.8.2N t
38.1'16 DuBay 22.8.200 I
3'7.405 Grundig + 1 23.8.200 2
34.408 Rochas 269.200 3
38.051 ProEurope 28.9.2N t
38.143 MPEGLA 2.ro.200 I
34.182 ROC 2.1D.200 -)
36.O20 Expanscience+5 2.1o.200 J
37.888 Cembureau 3.10.200 I
35.288 Paco Rabanne 4.r0.200 J
37.99r Wirtschaft skammer Osterreich 17.10.2001 I
38.175 ARGE Euro Logrstik 17.10.2001 I
33.789 Nina Ricci 24.10.2001
35.163,
36.638 FIA/FOA 29.10.2001 1)
37.995 Intelsat 9.11.2001 t
37.840 Levantd Global t4. .2001 I
33.669 Chanel + Diprolux + G. Miiller + Luso Helvetica + 4 14. .2001 J
34.361 Chanel + Harwood Brothers 14, .200r J
36.589 Givenchy 14. .2001 J
37.893 and
37.894 Ceced 14.11.2001 2
?R ??O AMB Generali HoldingAG + CommerzbankAG Frankfurt 27 .2U I
38.r92 Cable & Wireless + Acma Parties 29 .200r I
37.216 Lancaster Group Coty France 29. .2001 z
38.091 Eutilia + I I 5.12.2001 I
38.092 Eudorsia + 5 5.12.2001 I
38.016 Nordiska Satellitaktiebolaget and Modern Times Group t2.t2.2001 L
33.366 Lancome 18.12.2001 J
33.424 Parfums Paloma Picasso t8.12.2001 J
33.425 Parfrrms Cacharel t8.12.2U J
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18.12.2001
18.12.2001
18.12.2001
t8.12.2001
18.12.2001
19.12.2001
21.12.2001
E 
- 
Notices pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty
l. Publication pursuant to Article 19(3) of Council Regutation No 17
2. Notices inviting interested third parties to submit observations
on proposed transactions
3. 'carlsberg' notices concerning structural cooperative joint ventures
OJ C 117, 21.4.2001,p.3
OJ C 226, 11.8.2001, p. 2r
OJ C 231, 17.8.2001. p. l8
OJC247.5.9.2001,p. 11
OJ C 250, 8.9.2001, p. 4
OJ C 250, 8.9.2OO1,p.2
Online Travel Portal Ltd OI C323,2o.rr.2001,p.6
OJ C 335, 29.11.2ffi1,p. 12
OI C 9, 12.1.2001, p. 4
OJ C 42,1.2.2C01,p. rl
BUMA, GEMA, PRS, SACEM OJ C 145, lt .5.20O1, p. 2
OJ C 174, 19.6.2001,p.6
OJ C 195, 11.7.2001, p. 8
Telenor Broadband Services
AS/Croupe Canal+ SA/Canal+
T61€vision AB/Canal Digital AS
OJ C 340, 4.12.2001,p.6
DaimlerChrysler AG/Ford Motor Company/General
Motors Corporation/Nissan Motors Co. Ltd/Renault 
-Covisint
OI C 49,15.2.2OO1,p.4
Electrabel/EDF/Endesa,/Enel,4berdrola,/National
Grid,iNuon/RWE/S cottish Power/United
Utilities/Vanenfall 
- 
Eutitia
OJ C 100, 3O.3.2Nr,p. 14
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OJ C 103, 3.4.20o1,p.7
Modern Times Group AB and Nordiska
Satellitaktiebolaget
OJ C 110, 11.4.2001, p.9
OJ C 122,24.4.2001,p.7SKF, Rockwell Intemational, Timken, INA, Sandvik,
Endorsia
OJ C 132, 4.5.2001,p.3
OJ C 153, 24.5.2M1, p. 4
Scottish Power + Northern Electric OJ C 177,22.6.20O1,p.2
DuBay+DuPont+Bayer OJ C 185, 30.6.2001, p. 60
AMB Generali Holding AG + Commerzbank AG
Frankfurt
OJ C 27 4, 29.9.2401, p. 12
OJ C 316, 10.11.2001, p. 15European Hydro Power (E[IP)
OJ C 319, 14.1r.2D1,p. 11CNH Global NV and Kobelco Construction Machinery
Co. Ltd
OJ C 321, 16.1 1.2001, p. I I
F 
- 
Press releases
Reference
IP/O1/1
TP/OU4
MEMO/OV4
IP/O1/30
MEMO/O1/11
rPtouS2
rP/01/84
MEMO/O1/l9
rPt}ur?0
Date
312001
tL2Wl
1012001
1112001
1912001
zLnWl
2l.:.j;Uil
u.nful
2r.:ljwl
Subject
competition rules
Commission publishes voice on Intemet communication
Spokesperson's statement on Adalat Court appeal
Increased scope for electricity imports competition in northern Europe 
- 
a step
forward towards an internal market for electricity
Commission endorses settlement agreement between Ladbroke and France's
PMU over the broadcasting ofFrench horse races in Belgium
Dutch fishermen allowed to land and auction catches in foreign ports following
Commission action
Commission welcomes progress towards resolving the long-running
FlA/Formula One case
IPt01l156 5.2.2001 Commission takes preliminary view that the agreements between SAS and
Maersk Air infringe competition rules
IPioll18r 8.2.2001 Commission publishes consultation paper on lAfA passenger tariff conferences
rPtoIt204 14.2.200r Commission hearing discusses the future of car distribution in the EU
rPt0t/209 14.2.200r Joint statement by Commissioners Monti, Reding and Diamantopoulou and
Presidents of FIFA Blatter and of UEFA Johansson
rPt0t/225 t7.2.2001 Outcome of technical discussion with FIFA/UEFA on transfer systems
tPt0U227 19.2.2001 Car prices in the European Union: still no clear trend towards a substantial
reduction of price differentials
rPt0v249 23.2.2001 Commission terminates infringement procedure against production and sales
license asreements between Philip Morris and Altadis
rPt0t/2'70 28.2.2001 Discussion with FIFA/UEFA on Eansfer systems
tPt0t/3t4 6.3.2001 Outcome of discussions between the Commission and FIFA^JEFA on FIFA
Resulations on International Football Transfers
rP/0r/320 6.3.2001 Commission President hodi welcomes outcome of football transfers talks
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IPt0r/333 8.3.2001 Commission seeks comments on P&O Stena Line's cross-Channel ferry
services
IPt0u341 12.3.2M1 UK-French electricity interconnector opens up, increasing scope for
competition
lP/o1t342 12.3.2001 Comrnission takes Luxembourg to the EU Court for failure to comply with
rules on rights of way in telecoms
MEMO/O1/76 12.3.2W1 Role of interconnectors in the electricity market. A competition perspective
rPt0|365 14.3.2001 Commission starts procedure against IMS Health in Germany, seeks interim
measures
tP/01/366 14.3.2001 Commission seeks comments on partnership between British Midland,
Lufthansa and SAS
rP/01/419 20.3.2ffi1 Antiffust proceedings in postal sector result in Deutsche post separating
competitive parcel services from letter monopoly
MEMO/01/104 23.3.2001 Statement on inspections relating to the copper tube market
IPtou456 28.3.2001 Commission clarifies the application of competition law principles to
telecommunications
MEMO/O1/129 6.4.2001 Intel: reaction to a press report on an antitrust investigation
tP/0u554 r1.4.200r Commission ends cartel proceedings against Dutch bank SNS after it changed
its tariffs for exchanging euro-zone currencies
rP/01t569 18.4.2001 Microsoft agrees not to inffuence technology decisions of European digital
cable operators
rP/01/578 20.4.2001 Enterprise Oil, Statoil and Marathon to market Irish Corrib gas ,"p-utely
rP/01/583 20.4.2001 Commission clears UEFA s new Broadcasting Regulations
rPtol/584 20.4.2m1 Commission acts against Duales System Deutschland AG (Green Ootfor *xi
abuse of a dominant position
MEI|.{O|OI/149 24.4.2W1 Statement on plasterboard cartel investigation
rPt0l/634 3.5.2001 Commission ends cartel proceedings against Bayerische Landesbank
Girozentrale after it changed its tariffs for exchanging euro-zone cunencies
IPt0t/635 3.5.2001 Commission ends proceedings against Ulster Bank after it chansed itslariffs-
for exchanging euro-zone currencies
IP/O1/650 7.5.2001 Dutch and Belgian banks change cash conversion charges, Commission drops
cartel proceedings
IP/01/661 8.5.2001 Commission prohibits GlaxoWellcome's dual pricing system in Spain
IPtou673 10.5.2001 Commission completes investigation into discriminatory landing fe-s at
European airports
rP/01/690 14.5.2001 Commission ends cartel proceedings against WestLB and Bank J. Van Breda &
Co. after they changed their tariffs for exchanging euro-zone cunencles
tP/01/694 1s.5.2001 Commission takes preliminary view that IATA cargo tariff consultations
infringe competition rules
tP/01/696 15.5.2001 Commission formally objects to partnership between Austrian Airlines and
Lufthansa
IP/01/7W 16.5.2001 Competition policy: revision of the 1997 notice on agreements of minor
importance lde minimis notice)
rP/0t/713 t7.5.2001 Commission approves selective distribution system for yves Saint Laurent
penume
MEMO/O1/187 7.5.2001 Statement by Commissioner Mario Monti on EDF's stake in Montedison
tP/0u760 30.5.2001 Commission imposes a EUR 30.96 million fine on Volkswagen AG fo, ,etail
price maintenance measures on the German market (rr )
rP/01/791 6.6.200r Commission opens antitrust proceedings against La poste (Belgium)
("u) For procedural reasons, the decision was readopted on 29.6.2001
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IP/O1/806 7.6.2001 Commission does not oppose the continuation of the P&O Stena Line cross-
Channel ferry sewice
IP/O1/830 13.6.2001 Commission objects to GFU joint gas sales in Norway
rP/01/831 13.6.2001 Commission approves partnership between bmi British Midland, Lufthansa and
sAs
MEMOt01t223 13.6.2001 Commission spokesperson's statement on F6reningsSparbanken and SEB
IP/O1/850 15.6.2001 The Commission defines the principles of competition for the packaging waste-
disposal market
rPtov872 20.6.2001 Commission confirms need to tackle cross-border investment restrictions and
energy market distortions
rPt0U873 20.6.zmr Commission fines Michelin for abusive commercial behaviour
rPt0t/941 3.7.2001 Commission imposes interim measures on IMS Health in Germany
rPt0t/962 5.7.2001 Commission warns Ferrovie dello Stato it must grant access to Italv's railwav
market
li'E]0|'{Ol0lt262 11;t.2001 Statement on inquiry regarding mobile roaming
rP/O1/1007 t7.7.2001 Press statement after the meeting of Commissioner Monti and State Secretary
Koch-Weser on l7 .7 .2001
IP/O1/1009 8.7.2001 Commission fines SAS and Maersk Air for market-sharins asreement
rPioli t0l0 8;t.z00.l Commission fines eight companies in graphite elecfiode cartel
IP/01/l0l I 8.7.2001 Commission launches debate on draft new leniency rules in cartel probes
IP/O1/1035 19.7.2001 Commission re-opens proceedings concerning the German system of fixed
book prices because of its effects on cross-border Internet bookselling
IP/0111043 20.7.2001 Commission opens proceedings against UEFA s selling of TV rights to UEFA
Champions League
VIEI|.4O/OV2TI 20.7.2001 The UEFA Champions League background note
rP/01/1051 23.7.2W1 Car price differentials in the European Union remain high, in particular in the
high-volume segments
rP/O1/1057 24.7.2001 Italy implements Commission decision on the provision of new postal services
in Italy
rPl01/1068 25.7.2001 Commission condemns Deutsche Post AG for intercepting, surcharging and
delaying incoming international mail
IP/O1/1 155 31.7.2001 Commission clears the creation of the Covisint Automotive Internet
Marketplace
rP/O1/l 159 3t;1.2001 Commission action results in reduced conversion charges for euro-zone
currencies
rP/O1/1 165 1.8.2001 Commission clems global network for the authentication of electronic
sisnatures and other e-commerce transactions
IPt0r/rr70 2.8.2001 Comrnission insists on effective access to European pipelines
for Norwegian gas
rPl0li I 198 10.8.2001 Commission clears certain provisions of the Visa intemational payment card
system
IPtolll2l2 20.8.2001 Commission closes inquiry into CD prices after changes to business practices
tPtol/1222 24.8.2001 Commission refers oil products part of ShelyDEA deal to Germany, deepens
probe into petrochemicals markets
rPtou1226 24.8.2001 Tariffrebalancing: Commission sends new warning to Spain
rP/0t/1232 30.8.200r Commission initiates additional proceedings against Microsoft
r!dBM00lt287 5.9.2001 Spokesperson's statement on plastic film inspections
rPtov1247 7.9.2001 Commission refers oil products part ofBP/E.ON deal to Germany, deepens
probe into petrochemicals markets
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rP/01^279 18.9.2001 The Commission defines the conditions for packaging waste disposal systems
to be compatible with the European competition law in the DSD case
IP/O1/13-s5 2.10.2c0r Commission fines six companies in sodium gluconate cartel
IPl0l/1394 10.10.2001 Commission imposes fine of nearly EUR 72 million on DaimlerChrysler for
infringing the EC competition rules in the area of car distribution
IP/01t14t5 15.10.2001 Commission warns Deutsche Bahn about discriminating against a private
competitor
rP/01/1438 18.10.2001 Commission refers to Bundeskartellamt review of Haniel,/Fels deal in German
building materials sector, deepens probe into Dutch market
IP/01^433 19.10.2001 IAIA agrees to end the joint setting of cargo rates within the EEA
rPlou1476 23.10.2001 The Commission adopts a decision on the monitoring of relations between La
Poste and mail-preparation firms in France
tP/01/152i 30.10.2001 Commission closes its investigation into Formula One and other four-wheel
motor sports
IP/01/1575 13.1 1.2001 Commission calls for the tax discrimination in favour of French mutual and
provident societies to be brought to an end
rPt0t/1592 15.1 1.2001 Commission clears 'bancassurance' cooDeration JV between Generali and
Commerzbank in Germany
rPt0l/1625 21.t1.2001 Commission imposes fines on vitamin cartels
rPt0t/1641 23.1r.200r Commission settles Marathon case with Thyssengas
tPt0l/1659 26.t1.200r Commission approves agreements to reduce energy consumption of
dishwashers and water heaters
tPtot/1672 28.11.2001 Commission extends State aid investigation into further restructuring of public
shipyards in Spain
rP/01/17t3 3.12.2001 Commission proposes to approve the revised TACA liner conference
IP/01/t738 5.12.2001 Antitrust decision against De Post/La Poste aims to protect competitive postal
service from the monopoly
IP/0t/1739
rPl}u1740
IPtOUr743
tPt}yr775
tPt}ut78l
rP/0u1r%
rP/01/r7n
rPl}utS?z
rP/O1/ts45
IPt}u18c2
Pio1l1898
rP/0v1899
IPIUA
5.12.2N1
ttL2Ml
t1nNl
10122001
10JL2o01
l:lL2c/il
rL12;200l
lp,JL2OO1
20.12.2ffi1
2A122Cf,1
21J2.2ffi1
2LIL2MI
3,L2N2
The Commission flnes brewers in market sharing and price-fixing cartels on the
Belgian market 
_
Commission fines Luxembourg brewers in market-sharing cartel
-
Commission clears the creation of Eutilia and Endorsia electronic marketplaces
-
Commission fines five Germa -
euro-zone currencies
-
Commission announces intenti
and Lufthansa
-
between Nordic Satellite AB and Modern Times Grouo
_
R-
H-
abusinq its dominant nosition
Commission approves the Eurex financial derivatives exchange
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G 
- 
Judgments and orders of the Community courts
1. Court of First Instance
EC Tbeaty
Weyl Beef hoducts v Commission OJ C 134,5.5.2001, p. 16
Exportslagerij Chris Hogeslag and Groninger
Vleeshandel v Commission OJ C 134,5.5.2001,p. 16
OJ C 150, 19.5.2001,p.24
Garage Trabisco v Commission OJ C 150, 19.5.2O01,p.22
OJ C 150, 195.2w1,p.24
OJ C 150, 19.5.2O01 p.21
OI C 227 , 11.8.2001, p. l8
Compagnia Portuale Pietro Chiesa
v Commission
OJ C 161, 2.6.2C01,p. 17
OJ C 227, 1 1.8.2001, p. l6lnstitut des mandataires agr66s v Commission
OJ C 303, 27 .lO.20Ol, p. 17
OJ C 317, l0.ll.200l,p.24Roberts & Roberts v Commission
Tate&LylevCommission OJ C3,5.r.200.2,p.2r
OJ C 3, 5.1.2ffi2, p.2lBritish Sugar v Commission
Napier Brown & Co. v Commission oI C3,5.1.2002,p.21
1184/01 R I
Mdtropole T6l6vision 
- 
M6 and Others v
Commission OJ C 44,16.2.2OO2,p. 11
M6tropole T6l6vision 
- 
M6 v Commission oJ C 44, 16.2.2002, p. 15
OJ C 144, t5.6.2O02, p. 45T-184/01 R 2
Der Griine Punkt 
- 
Duales System
Deutschland v Commission 15.11.2001 OJ C 68, 16.3.2N2,p. 11
?151/01 R I
OJ C 44, 16.2.2N2, p. 1l22.11.2001
Amministrazione Autonoma dei Monopoli di
Stato/Commission (AAMS) v Commission
5.12.2001 OJ C 84, 6.4.2N2.p.58T-2l6i0l R l
OJ C 84, 6.4.2002,p.585.12.2001T-219/01R 1
OJ C 156, 29.6.2O02,p.2520.12.2001T-213l01 R I
OJ C 156, 29.6.2002,p.25Bank fiirArbeit und Wirtschaft v CommissionT-214l01 R I 20.12.2001
ECSC
OJ C 161. 2.6.2001.p. 14
Wirtschaftsvereinigung Stahl and Others v
Commission OI C 212,28.7.2001, p. 22
10.10.2001
Corus UK (formerly British Steel Ltd) v
Commission OI C3,5.1.2O02,p.23
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OJ C 84, 6.4.2ffi2,p.55
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MERGER CONTROL: COUNCIL REGULATTON (EEC) NO 4064189
ANDARTICLE 66 OF TI{E ECSC TREATY
A 
- 
Summaries of decisions taken under Article 6(1Xb) and 6(2)
where undertakings have been given by the firms involved
United Airlines/US Airways ('.,)
The proposed acquisition by United Airlines Inc. (United) of US Airways Group Inc. (US Air) involved
two companies whose main area of operation is in the United States but which also have activities in
Europe. United is a member of the StarAlliance, which in Europe includes, among others, Lufthansa and
the Scandinavian carrier SAS. As well as belonging to the same alliance, United and Lufthansa also have
an extensive transatlantic cooperation agreement. These two factors meant that it was necessary to
examine not only the competitive impact of combining the services provided by United and US Air, but
also the competitive impact of combining US Air's services with those provided by Lufthansa and the
other members of the Star Alliance.
As a result of the reduced competition between US Air and Lufthansa that would have been broueht
about by this operation had it eventually proceeded ("2), competition concems would have arisen on lhe
four transatlantic routes that link the hubs of US Air and Lufthansa (namely Frankfurt-philadelphia,
Frankfurt{harlotte, Frankfurt-Pinsburgh and Munich-philadelphia).
To resolve these concems, United submitted undertakings in the form of slot divestitures at Frankfurt and
Munich which would have facilitated the entry of new competitors on those routes. Access to these slots
would have enabled entrants to overcome the substantial barriers to entry or expansion on these routes
that are caused by the congestion at Frankfurt and Munich airports.
The proposed acquisition was also reviewed by the United States Department of Justice.
Degussa/Laporte (113)
In March, the Commission gave the go-ahea<l for Degussa AG, a Germany-based company belonging to
E.ON AG, to acquire sole control of the British company Laporte plc. The parties' activities overlap in
several markets but the Commission only had serious concerns in the product markets conceming
persulfates, cationic reagents and hydroxy monomers.
Persulfates are primarily used as polymerisation indicators in the plastics industry. In this market the
parties would have a combined EEA-wide market share in excess of 70 Vo. Cationic reagents ne mainly
used for the production of starches for the paper industry and exist in two chemical forms that were
identified as separate markets, namely cationic reagents 151 and 188. The relevant geographic market for
those products was found to be at least EEA-wide, although that for catiouc rca1ent l5l may even be
worldwide. For both products, the panies would have combined market shares in excess of 50Vo.
Hydroxy monomers are mainly used to achieve properties such as hardness, fleribility and durability for
("') COMPA,I.2O4I 
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automotive paints, lacquers and industrial finishes. In a Europe-wide market, the parties would have
achieved a combined market share of over 60 Vo.
To resolve the concerns raised in these markets, Degussa committed itself to divesting its persulfates
plant in Rheinfelden, Germany, Laporte's cationic reagents plant in Zaltbommel, the Netherlands, and
Laporte's Hythe plant in the UK, which includes all of Laporte's hydroxy monomers business. In order to
ensure that the assets to be divested constituted a viable business, it was necessary to include activities
which were related to markets where the Commission did not raise competition concems.
Buhrmann/Samas Office Supplies ("0)
Buhrmann is a Dutch company active in the distribution of office supplies in the EU and the United
States, doing business under the name Corporate Express. This operation involved Buhrmann's proposed
acquisition of the office supplies division of Samas Groep NV, which is active in the Netherlands, the
United Kingdom and Germany.
The Commission's investigation focused on the likely impact of the proposed transaction on the Dutch
market for the distribution of offrce supplies. In the Netherlands, Samas and Buhrmann are respectively
the largest and third-largest 'contract stationers', the term used to describe distributors who sell a full
range of office products on a 'one-stop shop' basis. The investigation revealed that the two companies
were competing in a market for the provision of office supplies to customers employing a large number
of offrce workers. The Commission concluded that, as a result of the proposed transaction, Buhrmann
would have become the dominant distributor of office supplies to larger customers in the Netherlands.
The Commission accepted that these concerns would be fully resolved by Buhrmann's undertaking to
divest the Dutch office supplies activities of its Corporate Express subsidiary.
Pernod Ricard/Diageo/Seagram ('15)
This operation arose from a joint bid by Pernod Ricard SA and Diageo plc for the worldwide wine and
spirits business of Seagram Company Ltd. According to the framework agreement between them, each of
Pernod Ricard and Diageo would retain certain parts of Seagram while the remaining parts would be sold
to third parties.
The Commission's investigation confirmed that the spirits market could be segmented into individual
spirit categories. In the case of whiskey and brandy these categories could be further subdivided into
Scotch whisky and Cognac/Armagnac. The relevant geographic markets were found to be essentially
national.
The transaction raised competition concerns in two areas. First, in lceland, the addition of Seagram's
locally dominant 'Captain Morgan'rum brand to the already strong position held by Diageo might have
given rise to competition problems. Secondly, the acquisition by either Diageo or Pernod Ricard of 'Four
Roses' bourbon whiskey could have given rise to competition concerns in a number of national markets.
To address these concerns, the parties gave an undertaking that the distribution of the Captain Morgan
rum brand in Iceland would be separated from the distribution of other Diageo brands and that the Four
('*) COMPA4.2286 
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Roses bourbon whiskey brand would be divested. The parties also pledged to fulfil the framework
agreement.
The Commission examined the impact of the joint acquisition in close cooperation with the EFIA
SurveillanceAuthority. The case was also examined by the US Federal Trade Commission.
lndustri Kapital/Perstorp (l l) ("6)
This case involved the proposed acquisition by the Industri Kapital group ofthe chemical operations of
the Swedish company Perstorp AB. Perstorp is active in the chemical and the flooring sectors, and the
Industri Kapital group manages and controls a number of private equity funds, which in turn control
numerous undertakings, including Dynea oy, a company active in specialty chemicals.
Dynea Oy and Perstorp both produce specialty chemicals, in particular resins and formaldehyde. The
Commission's investigation focused on the markets for formaldehyde-based resins (in particular V-100
patticle board resins and insulation bonding resins), formaldehyde, formaldehyde technology and
catalysts. The operation as notified would have led to the creation of a dominant position in the market
for V-100 particle board resins in Germany, as well as in the markets for insulation bonding resins in
Denmark, Norway and Sweden. The operation would also have created a dominant position in the
lbrmaldehyde market in Denmark.
Industri Kapital offered commitments which fully addressed the concerns that the operation raised. These
were to divest Perstorp's resins business together with its merchant formaldehyde business in Perstorp,
Sweden. In addition, Industri Kapital undertook to divest its phenolic resins operation in Meerbeck,
which removed the competition concems in the market for V-100 particle board resins in Germany.
YLE/TDF/Digita JV ('')
This operation involved the acquisition by T6l6difftrsion de France (TDF) of a controlling interest in
Digita, a company previously controlled solely by Finland's national public broadcaster YLE. TDF is a
subsidiary of France T6l6com providing wireless solutions for broadcasters and telecom operators. Digita
is the national supplier ofdistribution and transmission services to radio and TV broadcasters in Finland.
TDF, through its subsidiary Telemast, was in competition with Digita in Finland as a result of its
activities in the distribution and terrestrial transmission of radio programmes using low-power
frequencies. The operation would therefore have resulted in the elimination of TDF/Telemast as an actual
competitor to Digita in the markets concerned where TDF/Telemast was found to be the only really
serious alternative to Digita. Furthermore, barriers to entry to this market were found to be high-
The Commission also found that, by creating a vertical link between TDF (as supplier) and Digita (as an
important purchaser) for the supply of radio transmission and distribution equipment in Finland, the
operation raised serious competition concerns. Although the geographic market for the supply of such
equipment may be worldwide for larger radio stations, the Commission's market investigation found that
a local presence was required by local radio stations for effective after-sales repair and maintenance
services and for linguistic reasons.
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To resolve the serious doubts identified in the horizontally and vertically affected markets, TDF off'ered
to divest Telemast, a remedy which neatly removed the Commission's concerns.
Al|ianz/Dresdner ("u)
This case involved the proposed acquisition by the Allianz insurance group of Dresdner Bank. Allianz
AG is the largest life and non-life insurance company in Germany. Dresdner Bank AG is Germany's
thirdJargest universal commercial bank. The merger will create Germany's largest 'bancassurance'
group. While Allianz would improve its competitive position as a result of the 'bancassurance' alliance
with Dresdner, there was no risk of a dominant position being created or strengthened.
However, in the course of its review the Commission noted a large number of structural and economic
links between the new Allianz/Dresdner group and the Miinchener Riick/Ergo group, a leading
competitor, which would be considerably strengthened by the merger. In view of the strong mzuket
position of the Miinchener Rtick/Ergo group, which, together with Bayerische Hypo- und Vereinsbank
AG, has also developed into a major 'bancassurance' group, the Commission had serious misgivings on
this score.
Allianz and Miinchener Riick had declared their intention to reduce their mutual holdings to around20 7o
as part of the planned merger. The Commission's concerns were removed by a legally binding assurance
given by Allianz and Dresdner to the effect that they would reduce their joint holdings in Miinchener
Riick to 20.5 Vo by the end of 2003 and would not in the meantime exercise more than 20.5 7o of their
voting rights at Mi.inchener Riick's annual general meetings.
N estl 6/Ral sto n P u ri n a ("s)
This case involved the proposed acquisition by Nestl6 (active in the production and sale of a large variety
of food products, including pet food) of sole control of Ralston Purina (principally active in the
manufacture and sale of pet foods).
The pet-food markets were found to be segmented into cat and dog pet food (dry and wet separately), and
to be national. Competition concerns arose in three national markets. First, Nestl6 would have obtained a
dominant position in Spain and would have eliminated its most prominent competitor in the markets for
dry dog food, dry cat food and snacks and treats for cats. The acquisition would have also created
competition concerns with regard to the markets for dry cat food in Italy and in Greece.
To address these concerns, the parties undertook to remove the overlap in Spain by either selling Ralston
Purina's 50 7o shareholding in Gallina Blanca Purina, the joint venture through which it is active in
Spain, or by divesting Nestl6's Spanish production plant and granting exclusive licences for the 'Friskies'
family brand for three years. A similar approach was adopted in Italy and in Greece. In each ofthe three
countries, the parties also undertook not to reintroduce or promote the licensed brands for nearly five
years after the expiry of the licensing period. Given the particular features of the markets involved in this
case, the Commission concluded that the remedy, including re-branding, offered a viable solution.
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The Commission examined the impact of the acquisition only in the European Union as pet-food
products are excluded from the application of the EEA Agreement. The case was also examined by the
US Federal Trade Commission.
Pi rell i/Edizione/OlivettilTel ecom ltal i a ("0\
The Commission approved the joint acquisition by Pirelli SpA and Edizione Holding SpA of Olivetti
SpA and indirectly of an undertaking controlled by the latter, namely Telecom Italia, which in tum owns
Italy's largest mobile phone operator Telecom Italia Mobile (TM).
The Commission's investigation, which was carried out in close cooperation with the Italian Competition
Authority (Autoriti Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato), revealed serious concerns in the markets
for transmission capacity and for mobile telephony, both in Italy.
In the transmission-capacity market, the operation will eliminate Autostrade Telecomunicazioni as an
important competitor, thereby strengthening Telecom Italia's dominant position. The Commission was
particularly concerned about the possibility that Autostrade and Telecom Italia might adopt a joint
commercial strategy towards their respective custsmers in the transmission-capacity market, reducing the
degree of competition in that market.
In the Italian market for mobile voice telephony, the investigation showed that the merger might
strengthen a possitrle dominant position enjoyed by TIM. Besides TIM and Blu, there are only two
second-generation mobile operators in Italy, Omnitel and Wind, and barriers to entry are high given the
need to obtain a licence.
To address these competition concerns, the parties undertook to remove the overlap in the transmission-
capacity market by transferring exclusive control of Autostrade Telecomunicazioni to one or more
independent third parties, maintaining at most a minority participation, which will be subject to
Commission approval. As regards the market for mobile voice telephony, Edizione undertook to sell its
direct and indirect shareholdings in Blu. The implementation of the latter commitment will ensure that
Edizione will be prevented from having a controlling interest in two of the four Italian second-generation
mobile operators.
N o rd b a n ke n/ Po stg i rot ("' )
The Commission approved, subject to conditions, the acquisition by the Scandinavian banking group
Nordea of sole control of Sweden's Postgirot Bank AB, a financial services provider currently owned by
Posten AB, the Swedish Post Offrce. Postgirot is a wholly owned subsidiary of State-owned Posten. It
owns and operates an in-house giro payment system, which it uses to supply distance payment services to
retail and corporate customers. Postgirot also provides giro-related technical services to other banks.
Having been awarded a banking licence in 1994, Postgirot provides banking services, including deposits,
lending, international payments, trade finance and card services, to private and corporate customers.
In its original form, the transaction would have given Nordea full control of the Postgirot payment system
in addition to its existing signiflcant shareholding in Bankgirot, the other main giro payment system in
("') COMPA4.257 4 
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Sweden. Nordea would thus have had significant influence over both of the main Swedish payment
systems.
However, Nordea undertook to reduce its stake in Bankgirot to l0 Vo, a level which will no longer give it
decisive influence over the company, and to withdraw from Privatgirot, a company which competes with
Postgirot in giro-related technical services. These undertakings enabled the Commission to clear the deal.
Gerling/NCM ("'l
The Commission approved the takeover of the Dutch credit insurance company NCM Holding NV
(NCM) by the German insurance company Gerling-Konzern Versicherungs-Beteiligungs AG (Gerling).
The Commission's review found competition concerns in the Dutch and Danish credit insurance markets
but the divestments proposed by Gerling removed these concerns. Gerling is an insurance group
specialising in services to companies. NCM, the Dutch export credit agency, is active in the receivables
management business, mainly through credit insurance. The companies' credit insurance activities are
almost equal in size and currently constitute the third- and fourthJargest European credit insurers after
the German Allianz group and the French Coface group. The merger of Gerling and NCM will create
Europe's secondJargest credit insurance company ahead ofCoface.
While the geographic scope of Gerling's and NCM's activities is complementary in most areas of
Europe, the Commission identified serious competition concerns in the Dutch credit insurance martet.
There, the new entity would probably have become the dominant supplier given among other things the
marginal position of the remaining players compared with GerlingA{CM in the Netherlands.
Strong concems were also raised with regard to the Danish market, where the NCM credit insurance arm
is vertically integrated with two NCM subsidiaries, Forenede Factors and BG Factoring. The activities of
these two factoring banks together represent by far the leading Danish factoring companies. Factoring
companies use credit insurance to cover their customers' receivables risks and are consequently largely
dependent on the conditions offered by the credit insurance companies. In Denmark, Hermes-Euler is,
apart from Gerling and NCM, the only established credit insurer. The Commission was therefore
concerned about the likelihood that competitors of the NCM factoring companies would have had to face
in the near future a situation where they would have only a single alternative source of credit insurance to
Gerling/t,lCM, the parent company of the main players in the Danish factoring market.
In order to remove the competition concerns raised by the merger in the Netherlands and Denmark,
Gerling undertook to divest its Dutch and Danish credit insurance branch oflices.
('r) COMPA4.2602 
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Summaries of decisions taken under Afiicle 8
of Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89
1. Summaries of cases declared compatible with the common market
underArticle 8(2) of the ECMR
Metso/Svedala ('2\
This merger between Metso Corporation and Svedala AB, two Nordic companies with worldwide
activities in the production and distribution ofmachinery for the rock- and mineral-processing industry,
was authorised in January.
Metso is a Finnish company, established in 1999 through the merger of Valmet Corporation and Rauma
Corporation. It is active in three main business areas: machinery including rock and mineral-processing,
automation and control technology, and fibre and paper technology. Svedala is a Swedish construction
and mineral-processing equipment company active in equipment for mineral recovery, processing and
handling equipment, rock-crushing equipment, transport systems, and compaction equipment.
The competitive impact of the operation would have been in the field of rock-crushing equipment, which
is primarily used for the production of aggregates and cement, and in the mining industry. In particular,
the operation would have led to very substantial market shares at national and EEA-wide level in the
cone-crusher markets (above 60 Vo atEE$-wide level and above 50 7o in most Member States), in the
primary gyratory market (above 60 Vo EEA-wide), and, to a lesser extent, in the jaw-crusher markets
(above 50 7o in most Nordic countries for aggregate and construction jaw crushers and above 35 Vo at
EEA-wide level for mining jaw crushers).
Furthermore, there are significant bamiers to entry into the rock-crushing equipment markets because
customers tend to be highly risk-averse and because local presence and quality of after-sales service are
essential factors in these markets. Potential competition would therefore not have been a credible
deterrent to prevent the parties from exerting their significant market power. The operation would thus
have resulted in dominant positions in all the abovementioned markets.
However, the overlaps befween the parties' activities in the markets where the Commission identified
competition concems will be entirely removed by the parties' undertaking to divest Svedala's cone and
jaw crushers businesses, as well as Metso's primary gyratory business.
On the basis of the bilateral agreement on antitrust cooperation between the European Commission and
the United States of America, the Commission collaborated with the Federal Trade Commission in the
analysis of this transaction. It also held discussions with the competition authorities of Australia, Canada
and SouthAfrica.
EdF/EnBW ("0\
In February, the Commission authorised, subject to conditions, the acquisition of joint control of the
German electricity company Energie Baden-Wtirttemberg AG (EnBW) by Electricit6 de France (EdF)
("r) COMP/M.2033 
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and Zweckverband Oberschwiibische Elektrizitiitswerke (OEW). EdF is a wholly State-owned French
company active in all fields of supply and transport of electricity in France. It also has shareholdings in
electricity companies in many European countries. OEW is an association ofnine public districts in the
south-west of Germany. Its main purpose is to hold shares in companies active in the energy sectors.
EnBW is a vertically integrated electricity utility active in all fields of supply and transport of electricity
mainly in the south-west of Germany.
The Commission assessed the deal's impact on the French market for the supply of electricity to eligible
customers, namely those industry clients which consume more than 16 gigawatt-hours a year and under
French and Community law are free to chose their electricity supplier.
The investigation concluded that EdF enjoyed a dominant position in the French market for the supply of
eligible customers, with a market share of approximately 90 Vo.FIBW is one of the most likely potential
competitors in the French market and would be one of the strategically best-placed companies to enter
the market for the supply of eligible customers. EnBW's supply area is in the south-west of Germany and
has a long cofirmon border with France. Two of the four Franco-German interconnectors are in the
EnBW supply area. Furthermore, EnBW has access to generation capacity situated in France under a
number of contractual long-tem agreements with EdF.
The Commission's investigation also showed that EnBW has a controlling stake in Watt AG, a leading
Swiss electricity producer, while EdF has traditionally enjoyed a close commercial relationship with
ATEL, another important player in the Swiss electricity market. This means that, through its shareholding
in EnBW, EdF would also have considerably strengthened its foothold in Switzerland and have
eliminated Watt as a potential competitor in the French market.
The Commission therefore concluded that the operation, as initially notified, would have led to a
strengthening of EdF's dominant position in the market for eligible customers in France. tn order to
eliminate these competition concerns, EdF will make available to competitors 6 000 megawatts of
generation capacity located in France, equal to 3OVo of the eligible market. Furthermore, EdF has
undertaken not to exercise its voting rights in the French electricity generator Compagnie Nationale du
Rh6ne (CNR) and to withdraw its representative from the CNR board of directors. Finally, the patties
have committed themselves to divesting EnBW's shareholding in Watt.
The Post Office/TPG/SPPL (l'?u)
In March, the Commission authorised the creation of two joint ventures with worldwide activities for
outbound cross-border mail by The Post Office (TPO) of the United Kingdom, TNT Post Group NV(TPG) of the Netherlands and Singapore Post Private Limited (SPPL). TPO, TpG and SppL are the
national public postal operators (PPOs) of the UK, the Netherlands and Singapore respectively. 'Ihe
companies planned to set up two joint ventures, named Delta and NewCo, which would be active in the
provision of outbound cross-border mail services and, to a limited extent, outbound cross-border parcel
services. Delta would be active worldwide with the exception of the Asia-Pacific region, which would be
covered by NewCo. The Commission's examination focused on Delta.
While the two joint ventures generally appeared to be pro-competitive, the Commission identified
competition concems in relation to the market for outbound cross-border business mail in the
Netherlands. There were relatively few operators in the Dutch market, and they were all relatively small.
e") COMPA4. 1 9 1 5 
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With the exception of TPO, which had been able to obtain a significant part of outbound traffic destined
for the UK, none of the foreign PPOs active in the Netherlands, including Deutsche Post, had achieved
sizeable market shares. The operation would therefore have eliminated competition between the
dominant player, TPG, and the most successful entrant into the Dutch market, TPO.
To remedy these concerns, the parties comnitted themselves to divesting the business that is currently
undertaken by TNT lntemational Mail in the Netherlands (TNT IM Netherlands). This is the part of TPG
in the Netherlands that was originally intended to be contributed to the Delta joint venture.
Furthermore, as the Commission considered that the success of the remedy depended to alarge extent on
the characteristics ofthe purchaser, the parties proposed an up-front buyer solution. [n other words, they
undertook not to complete the notifled operation until a binding sale and pwchase agreement has been
reached with a buyer approved by the Commission.
Bom b ard i e r/ADtranz (126)
On 3 April, the Comrnission authorised the takeover of DaimlerChrysler's rail business divisionADtranz
by Bombardier of Canada, subject to commitments. As initially notified, the operation would have led to
the creation of a dominant position in the markets for regional trains and trams in Germany. But the
companies offered a number of divestments and other undertakings which will ensure the emergence of a
strong competitor in Germany to compensate for the elimination of competition from ADtranz.
ADtranz (Germany) was created in 1995 through the pooling of the rail business activities of ABB and
Daimler-Benz (now called DaimlerChrysler). ADtranz makes rail rolling stock and signalling equipment.
Canada's Bombardier is active in the aircraft, rail transportation equipment and recreational product
industries.
The acquisition will make Bombardier the world's largest integrated producer of rulway equipment,
ahead of Alsthom of France and Germany's Siemens, these being the three heavyweights in the rail
equipment industry both in Europe and in the rest of the world.
The Commission identified problems resulting from the reduction of competition in the markets for
regional trains and trams/light rail vehicles in Germany that would have resulted from the operation.
However, the parties submitted commifinents which will result in the development of Stadler Rail, a
Swiss cornpany active in Germany, as a strong independent supplier of regional trains and tramsAight rail
vehicles. Stadler Rail will take over to a large extent the current market position of ADtranz. The
commitments will also ensure that two independent suppliers of electrical propulsion (Kiepe and ELIN)
remain active in both markets, which will allow for future consortia with Stadler and other non-integrated
mechanical suppliers.
MAN/Auwdrter ('2')
Following a thorough investigation, the Commission on 20 June granted regulatory approval to the
proposed takeover of Auwiirter, the German company which makes the Neoplan buses and coaches, by
the MAN group. The Commission concluded that, despite the acquisition, effective competition between
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MAN/Auwiirter and DaimlerChrysler's EvoBus, the two main players in the German city-bus market,
will prevail.
The Commission examined carefully the acquisition by MAN Nutzfahrzeuge AG, a truck and bus
producer located in Munich, Germany, of Gottlob Auwiirter GmbH, another German firm based in
Stuttgart which sells buses and coaches under the Neoplan brand name.
The Commission concluded that the German bus market sector will remain competitive even after the
acquisition, as the DaimlerChrysler group will continue to be the leading bus manufacturer.
DaimleChrysler group owns EvoBus, which produces buses and coaches under the Mercedes-Benz and
Setra brand names.
Auwiirter is a non-integrated bus manufacturer which sources engines and chassis from other companies.
The company is a relatively small player in the bus market, which is, in Germany, already largely
dominated by MAN and EvoBus.
The main impact of the merger will be on the city-bus market in Germany. MAN/Auw?irter and EvoBus
will each supply just under half of that market, leading the Commission to investigate in detail whether
the merger would pose the danger of joint market dominance in Germany by means of tacit coordination
between the two groups. Such coordination is in theory possible, despite the fact that Europe-wide
invitations to tender are required for city buses.
Following a close examination of the case, however, the Commission concluded that there was no such
risk. First of all, the Comrnission found that any tacit division of the market between EvoBus and
MAN/Auw?irter was unlikely as there would be no viable coordination mechanism. Secondly, significant
disparities between EvoBus and MAN/Auwiirter, such as different cost structures. will make it likelv that
the companies will compete rather than collude.
In conclusion, the Commission believed that there was effective competition in the German market and
that the disappearance ofAuwlirter as an independent supplier as a result ofthe merger would not alter
this.
BAS F/Pantoch i m/ E u rod i ol (128)
Following a thorough investigation, the Commission granted regulatory approval to the proposed
takeover of Eurodiol and Pantochim, two Belgian companies active in the chemical sector, by the
German company BASF. BASF will achieve high market shares in certain base chemical products.
However, the Commission concluded that the operation would have a less harmful impact on the market
than if the Belgian companies were closed down.
On 12 February, the Commission received notification of BASF's intention to acquire Pantochim and
Eurodiol, then in receivership.
The Commission's investigation focused on the merger's impact on the markets for the BDO-related
products THF, NMP and GBL in the European Economic Area, where BASF will have market shares in
excess of 45 Vo. These products are mainly used as solvents. The operation led to the combination of the
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market leader (BASF) with the third player Eurodiol, which by itself raised dominance concerns given
the small size of remaining competitors.
Given the financial difficulties of Eurodiol and Pantochim, the Commission analysed this case in
accordance with the rescue merger concept ('failing firm defence') originally developed in the
KaIi+ Salz/MdK decision (M.308).
The Commission found that Eurodiol and Pantochim had been placed under a pre-bankruptcy regime
('concordat judiciaire') by the Commercial Court in Charleroi, Belgium, on 18 September 2000. It was
established beyond doubt that, in the absence of a buyer, the bankruptcy of Eurodiol and Pantochim
would be an unavoidable and immediate consequence. Despite efforts by the court-appointed receivers to
find a buyer and the Commission's own search for an altemative solution, BASF was the only company
to have made a firm offer for the Belgian companies. Furthermore, the Commission ascertained that
without the merger the production capacity of Eurodiol and Pantochim would have definitely exited the
market.
In view of the above and given the exceptional conditions in these markets, which are characterised by
growing demand and tight capacity constraints, a bankruptcy would probably have caused supply
shortages and price increases which would have hurt customers more than if the merger was allowed. The
Commission thus concluded that the concept of a rescue merger was applicable and approved the
operation.
De Beers/LVMH ("n)
In July, the Commission authorised the creation of a joint venture between De Beers and LVMH. This
joint venture company, Rapids World, will be active in the retail of diamond jewellery to be sold under
the De Beers brand. However, while clearing the joint venture itself, the Commission at the same time
sent a statement of objections to De Beers on its 'supplier of choice' agreements, which had also been
notifled for regulatory approval, warning that the agreements violated EU competition rules.
Both the retail joint venture and the supplier of choice notification are part of De Beers's new strategy by
which it is seeking to replace its traditional monopolistic approach based on the control of supply with a
strategy based on demand-driven actions.
The Commission's investigation into the competitive effects of this deal highlighted the extent of De
Beers's dominance in the global market for the supply ofrough diamonds. But it did not reveal any causal
link between the combination of LVMH and De Beers at the retail level and a possible strengthening of
De Beers's position in the upstream markets.
De Beers is the self-confessed 'custodian' of the diamond industry, controlling around two thirds of the
world's supply of rough diamonds. De Beers's control over the world's production of rough diamonds,
together with the strategic use of its stockpile of rough diamonds, enables De Beers to determine the
quantity, the quality, and to a large extent the price of the rough diamonds that it releases on to the market
every year. The remainder of the market is highly fragmented and the incentives of some of the other
rough diamond producers to compete with De Beers are limited by the fact that they sell significant
proportions of their output under contract to De Beers.
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Despite this dominance upstream, the Commission's investigation did not establish that the creation of
the joint venture would lead to a significant structural change in the upstream rough diamond market.. As
a result, the Commission decided to clear the operation without conditions.
G r u p o V i I I ar M i r/ E n BWH i d roe I 6ct ri c a d e I C antdb ri co (' 3ol
The Commission authorised, subject to conditions, the acquisition of joint control over the Spanish
electricity company Hidroeldctrica del Cantribrico (Hidrocantr4brico) by Spanish Grupo Villar Mir and
Energie Baden-Wiirttemberg (EnBW), a German company jointly controlled by Electricit6 de France
(EdF). As initially notified to the Commission, the operation would have led to the strengthening ofthe
existing collective dominant position in the Spanish wholesale market for electricity. To eliminate these
concerns, EdF and the operator of the French electricity grid, RIE, undertook to increase substantially to
about 4 000 MW the commercial capacity on the interconnector between France and Spain, thereby
creating the conditions for greater electricity trade volumes to and from Spain to the benefit of Spanish
customers.
The transaction notified to the Commission on l0 April consisted of the acquisition by Ferroatl6ntica of a
majority of the shares in Hidrocant6brico, Spain's fourth-largest electricity company. Ferroatldntica is
currently owned by Spain's Grupo Villar Mir, but will be jointly controlled by Grupo Villar Mir and
EnBW after the completion of the transaction.
The Commission started an in-depth investigation in June over concems that the deal would strengthen
the existing collective dominant position in the Spanish wholesale market for electricity held by Enctesa
and Iberdrola. The Commission's investigation confirmed these initial concems. Having gained a
foothold in Spain and with access to Hidrocantabrico's significant electricity-generation capacity, EdF
would probably resist any increase in the commercial capacity of the interconnector which transmits
electricity across the Pyrenees. Commercial capacity on the French-spanish interconnector is already
scarce, creating a barrier to Spanish electricity imports and resulting in the market's isolation from other
continental electricity markets to the detriment of customers.
In order to solve the competition concems identified by the Commission, EdF and EdF/RTE committed
themselves to taking all the necessary steps in order to increase the commercial capacity on the
interconnector at the French/Spanish border to about 4 000 MW from an existing I 100 MW. 'Ihe
capacity increase will take place gradually over the short to medium term. EdF/RTE, the French
electricity transport system operator, is a division within EdF which operates the national electricity grid
and interconnectors with France's neighbouring countries.
M its u i/CV R D/C ae m i ("')
The Commission cleared, subject to conditions, the proposed acquisition ofjoint control ofthe Brazilian
iron ore mining company Caemi Mineragdo e Metalurgia SA (Caemi) by Companhia Vale do Rio Doce(CVRD) 
- 
another Brazilian iron ore producer 
- 
and the Japanese trading company Mitsui & Co. Ltd(Mitsui). Caemi's assets mainly consist of the Brazilian iron ore mining company Mineragao Brasilieras
Reunidas (MBR) and a 50 Vo stake in the Canadian iron ore producer Quebec Cartier Mining Company(QCM).
('') COMPA4.2434-Grupol\llarMir/EnBWHidruebctricadelCantdbrico,269.200l(') COMP|M.2420 
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The competitive impact of the operation was assessed in relation to the supply of 'seabome' iron ore, as
west European steel producers 
- 
owing to a shortage of local supplies 
- 
depend almost entirely on iron
ore imported from mines located far from Europe. kon ore transported by ship represents abolt 45 7o of
all traded iron ore, and the main sources of seaborne supply are to be found in Brazil and Australia.
Participation in the seaborne trade requires access to speciRc infrastructure such as dedicated railways
suitable for the transport of very large tonnages and deep-water harbours. CVRD is the world's largest
producer of seabome sinter fines and pellet iron ore, followed by the Australia-based mining companies
Rio Tinto and BHP.
The proposed transaction would have led to the creation, if not the strengthening, of a dominant position
in the market for the seaborne supply of iron ore pellets and the seabome market for direct reduction iron
ore due to the high market shares that would have been held after the operation and the likelihood that the
remaining competitors would have been unable to constrain Mitsui/CVRD/Caemi's behaviour.
On 5 October, the parties offered a commitment designed to remove the competition concerns identified
by the Commission. This consisted of an offer to divest Caemi's 50 7o interest in QCM, thereby
eliminating the overlap between CVRD's and Caemi's production of iron ore pellets. As a result, the
commitment removes the Commission's competition concerns in relation to the supply of these products
and in relation to the supply of direct reduction ore.
U P M - Ky m m e n e / H ai n d I a n d N o rs ke S ko g/ Pa re n co/VVal s u m (1 32)
Following a thorough investigation, the Commission cleared the proposed takeover of Haindl, a German
family-owned paper company, by Finland's UPM-Kymmene and the subsequent sale of two of the
Haindl mills to the Norwegian paper manufacturer Norske Skog, Parenco in the Netherlands and the
Walsum mill in Germany.
The main impact of the merger will be felt in the markets for newsprint and wood-containing magazine
paper, which the Commission considered to be of European dimension. Because UPM-Kymmene and
Haindl, together with Stora Enso and Holmen, would control more than two thirds of all newsprint sales
in westem Europe, the Commission investigated in detail whether the merger would create a position of
collective market dominance in Europe between the top four firms. A similar concern arose in the market
for wood-containing magazine paper, where the leading three suppliers, UPM-Kymmene, Stora Enso and
M-ReaVMyllykoski, would control more than two thirds of all sales in western Europe.
The Commission's initial concern was that the companies would tacitly collude in order to drive or keep
prices up. This would be achieved either by limiting investment in new capacity or by restricting
production levels through temporary closure of paper machines. However, a numtrer of characteristics in
the newsprint and wood-containing magazine paper markets led the Commission to dismiss its concems
about collective dominance in these markets.
The main factors that led to this conclusion were the limited stability of market shares, the lack of
transparency on capacity-expansion projects and the lack of symmetry in cost structures. Furthermore,
because of insufficient transparency on investments before they become irreversible, there would be no
viable coordination mechanism to curtail new investments.
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The Commission also took the view that the smaller firms in both markets would have the means to
defeat any price increase by the leading suppliers, particularly at those times when demand for paper was
low.
The Commission therefore concluded that the acquisition would not impede effective competition in the
Europe-wide markets for newsprint and wood-containing magazine paper.
Shell/DEA ('33\ and BP/E.ON ('g.)
The Commission approved the acquisition of the German oil and petrochemicals company DEA, which
belonged to the RWE group, by Royal Dutch/Shell (UK/I'.{L), and the combination of the petrochemicals
businesses of Britain's BP plc and the German company Veba, a subsidiary of the E.ON group. The two
operations would have led to the creation of a joint dominant position of ShelL/DEA and BP/Veba in the
market for ethylene on the pipeline network known as the ARG+, which links Belgium, Germany and the
Netherlands. The commitments offered by all the parties were, however, sufficient to rule out these
concerns. Shell has undertaken to grant access to its import terminal for 250 000 tonnes of ethylene
imports by third parties. BP has underlaken to divest two shareholdings in ARG, the company which
operates the pipeline network.
The two transactions together lead to an important restructuring of the market for ethylene, a core basic
petrochemical used for a variety of applications such as polyethylene and PVC. This market is already
highly concentrated, making it all the more essential to protect the remaining competition for the benefit
of ethylene users.
After carrying out an in-depth market investigation, the Commission found that the combination ol'the
respective petrochemical activities of Shell and DEA, on the one hand, and of BP and E.ON, on the other,
would result in the creation of a joint dominant position in the market for the supply of ethylene on the
ARG pipeline network. This pipeline network and its extensions link various production sites, sea
terminals and ethylene consumers in Belgium, westem Germany and the Netherlands.
Both transactions' major impact would be the elimination from the market of the only downstream
non-integrated ethylene producers, who are also the most important suppliers to the merchant market.
This would leave independent ethylene buyers only with suppliers who compete with their customers in
the downstream markets.
Both merged entities would control the largest part of the ethylene market, would not be exposed to
comparably strong competitors and would be in a unique position with regard to the ARG pipeline. In
particular, BP/Veba would exercise a decisive influence in the company operating the ARG, whereas
Shell owns one of the five import terminals on the North Sea coast, which is the only channel for imports
into the ARG pipeline network.
The Commission concluded that there was a high risk that competition between the two new entities
would lapse, and that ethylene buyers would not have access to competitive sources of supply after the
two mersers.
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In order to address these competition concerns, Shell committed itself to granting third-party access to its
import terminal facilities at Moerdijk, Netherlands, for a total ag$egate ethylene volume of up to
250 000 tonnes a year for a period of l0 years. This will strongly enhance the availability of ethylene in
the ARG market ftom competitive and independent sources and will enable third parties for the first time
to import ethylene on a long-term, structural basis at competitive prices. The volumes covered by the
commitment are sufficient to prevent the two merged entities from stifling competition. The amount of
250 000 tonnes corresponds to the annual capacity of a smaller-sized ethylene plant, and will enable an
increase in current third-party imports of nearly 400 Vo.The terms of access proposed by Shell will allow
for non-discriminatory long-tenn access to the terminal at competitive prices.
BP and E.ON committed themselves to divesting two of their three BP/Veba shareholdings in ARG. For
an interim period, until the shareholdings are divested, they undertook not to exercise their blocking
rights, in particular with regard to decisions on third-party access. BPIE.ON further committed
themselves to guaranteeing access to a connecting pipeline between the ARG network and ethylene
consumers located at Herne, western Germany, which is currently controlled by Veba. The divestiture of
the two ARG shareholdings will entirely eliminate BP/Veba's decisive influence in the ARG company.
The entry of new shareholders into the ARG company will also broaden the different shareholders'
interests and guarantee the common-carrier character of the ARG, without favouring any particular
supplier's or customer's interests.
The open access to the pipeline at a competitive cost will allow existing suppliers to compete actively for
customers over the whole of the ARG area and will make Shell's commitment to open the import
infrastructure fully effective as it ensures that the additional volumes can be ffansported economically to
locations all over the ARG.
BPA/eba's commitment to provide access to ARG supplies to ethylene customers at Herne will eliminate
the only bottleneck in the infrastructure that is under the control of BP/Veba. It removes any possibility
that BP/Veba might remain shielded from competitive constraints stemming from alternative ARG
suppliers with regard to these customers. There are no other ARG connecting pipelines under the control
of the two new entities which could be used to cut off ethylene consumers from competitive supplies over
theARG.
The assessment of both deals' impact on the downstream oil-products markets in Germany was referred
to the Federal Cartel Ot0ce. These decisions are described below.
S ud zucke r/S ai nt Lo u i s (' *)
The Commission approved the acquisition of Saint Louis Sucre SA, France's secondlargest sugar
manufacturer, by the German sugar market leader Siidzucker AG. Siidzucker's acquisition of Saint Louis
was the first major cross-border merger in the European sugar market, which is highly regulated at EU
level under the common agricultural policy with production quotas and intervention, i.e. minimum,
prices.
The Commission's investigation revealed that the operation as notified would have strengthened
Stidzucker's akeady dominant position in the markets for industrial sugar and retail sugar in southern
Germany and Belgium. Saint Louis would cease to exist as an independent and credible potential
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competitor to Siidzucker in these geographical areas, which are close to France, Saint Louis's home
market.
The Commission was also concemed that by gaining a considerable foothold on the French market, with
direct access to the second-largest production capacity, Slidzucker would be able to deter other French
producers from competing in southem Germany and Belgium by threatening to retaliate in France. The
effect of this would have been to perpetuate a partitioning of the European sugar market along national
lines.
Furthermore, it would have given Siidzucker, already dominant in southern Germany and Belgium and
with a monopoly position in Austria, the ability to gain also a strong position in France by being able, in
a quite unique manner, to offer 'pan-European deals'to large industrial customers, supplying them across
national borders.
In order to address these competition concerns, Siidzucker offered to divest its majority (68 Zo)
shareholding in Belgium's Suikerfabriek van Veurne SA and to place 90 000 tonnes of sugar a year at the
disposal of an independent trader in southem Germany. The divestiture of Siidzucker's 68 Zo stake in
Veume will reduce the Siidzucker group's Belgian sugar production quota by roughly l0 Vo andwill thus
have a significant pro-competitive effect on the Belgian sugar market.
Similarly, the commitment to make up to 90 000 tonnes a year of quota sugar available on the basis of EU
intervention prices will place an independent trader in a position to compete effectively in the southem
German sugar market. The amount of 90 000 tonnes corresponds to approximately 10 % of annual sugar
consumption in southern Germany. The fact that the independent trader will be charged the intervention
price will enable him to offer sugar at an attractive price, thus strengthening competition on that market
and suff,ciently compensating for the disappearance of Saint Louis as a potential competitor.
2. summaries of cases declared incompatible with the common market
underArticle 8(3) of the ECMR
SCNMetsii lrssue ("u)
On 3l January, the Commission blocked the proposed takeover of the Finnish tissue paper manufacturer
Metsii Tissue by its Swedish competitor sCA Mdlnlycke on competition grounds.
Hygienic tissue products can be divided into different categories, such as toilet paper, kitchen towols,
handkerchiefs and napkins. These products are either sold through retailers ('consumer products') or to
corporate customers, such as hotels, schools, hospitals, etc. ('away-from-home products'-AFH). the
parties and most other tissue manufacturers have developed their own branded products but also supply
supermarkets and other large consumers with private-label products.
The operation would have combined SCA s Edet toilet paper and kitchen towels with Metsa Tissue's own
well-known brands Lambi, Leni and Serla. The Commission found that Nordic supermarkets'
countervailing buyer power would be insufficient to restrain the merged entity's market poweiand that no
competitors would be ready to penetrate the market owing to very high investment costs, including the
costs of introducing a new brand.
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The operation would have led to the creation of single dominant market positions in 21 tissue paper
markets in Denmark, Norway and Sweden, to the creation of duopolistic dominant positions in two tissue
product markets in Finland between the merged entity and Fort James of the United States, and to the
strengthening of dominant positions in three product markets in Finland.
During the in-depth investigation, the parties re-submitted undertakings already offered during the first
phase. These undertakings, which included the divestiture of certain assets, had already been rejected in
the first phase as they did not address any of the competition issues identifled for consumer and AFH
tissue products in Finland or for pnvate-label consumer tissue products in Denmark. Furthermore, the
proposed divestment package contained insufhcient capacity in a number of product markets for the
buyer to compete effectively with the merged entity and to effectively restrain SCAs market power in
Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. In these circumstances, the Commission had no choice but to
prohibit the deal.
G e ne ral El ectric/H on ewe I I (13?)
The proposed acquisition by General Electric Co. of Honeywell Inc. was prohibited in July. The
Commission's investigation demonstrated that GE alone already had a dominant position in the markets
for jet engines for large commercial and large regional aircraft. Its strong market position combined with
its flnancial strength and vertical integration into aircraft leasing were among the factors that led to the
finding of GE's dominance in these markets. The investigation also showed that Honeywell is the leading
supplier of avionics and non-avionics products, as well as of engines for corporate jets and of engine
starters, a key input in the manufacture of engines.
The combination of the two companies' activities would have resulted in the creation of dominant
positions in the markets for the supply ofavionics, non-avionics and corporatejet engines, as well as to
the strengthening of GE's existing dominant positions in jet engines for large commercial and large
regionaljets. The dominance would have been created or strengthened as a result ofhorizontal overlaps
in some markets as well as through the extension of GE's f,nancial power and vertical integration to
Honeywell activities and of the combination of their respective complementary products. Such
integration would have enabled the merged entity to leverage the respective market power of the two
companies into one another's products. This would have had the effect of foreclosing competitors,
thereby eliminating competition in these markets, ultimately adversely affecting product quality, service
and consumer prices.
On 14 June, GE proposed a number of undenakings to address these concerns but they were considered
insufficient to remove the competition problems identified by the Commission. On 28 June, well beyond
the deadline for the submission ofundertakings, GE proposed a new set ofremedies. This new package
could not be accepted either, because it did not resolve the problems identified in a sufficiently clear way
at such a very late stage in the procedure.
S c h n e i d e r/ Le g ra n d (1 38)
The proposed merger between Schleider Electric and Legrand, the two main French manufacturers of
electrical equipment, was prohibited on 10 October. The Commission's investigation showed that there
were substantial overlaps between the activities of Schneider and Legrand in the markets for electrical
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switchboards (distribution boards and final panelboards, together with their components, where the
combined market share would have been between 40 and 70 Vo depending on the country), wiring
accessories (in particular, sockets and switches and fixing and connecting equipment, where combined
market shares ranged from 40 to 90 7o) and certain products for industrial use (industrial pushbuttons and
low-voltage transformers) or for more specific applications (for example emergency lighting).
In France, the merger gave rise to particularly serious problems over virtually the whole range of
products concerned and would, in most cases, have resulted in the strengthening of a dominant position.
Schneider and Legrand are by far the largest players in the French market, and the Commission's
investigation demonstrated clearly that there was little prospect of any significant development in the
activity of foreign competitors in the short to medium term. Furthermore, competition problems were
also identified in Denmark, Greece, Italy, portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom.
In an attempt to remedy these competition problems, Schneider submitted an initial series of
undertakings to the Commission on 14 September, the deadline for presenting undertakings. However,
the market investigation caried out by the Commission showed that these initial undertakinqs were not
such as to restore conditions of effective competition.
Schneider submitted new undertakings on 24 September, l0 days after the deadline for submitting
undertakings. These undertakings left serious doubts as to the competitive capacity ofthe entities to bi
sold off, notably as regards access to distribution in France and the economic risks associated with the
actual separation of these entities from the rest of the group to which they belonged. In addition,
Schneider's proposals did not provide any effective solution as regards a number of geographic and/or
product markets on which competition problems had been identified.
Schneider has lodged an appeal against the Commission's decision with the Court of First Instance (','n).
CVC/Lenzing ('ool
The Commission prohibited the planned acquisition by CVC Capital Partners Group Ltd (CVC) of
Lenzing AG, an Austrian man-made fibres manufacturer. CVC already controlled Acordis, Lenzing,s
principal rival in Europe and only rival in the United States.
The deal related to the fibres sector. Five relevant product markets were taken into account for the
competitive assessment, namely, commodity viscose, spundyed viscose, viscose for tampons, lyocell,
and lyocell production and processing technology. The Commission considered that all three viscose
markets were Europe-wide, since imports were very low (well below 10 7o), and that the market for
lyocell technology was worldwide. As regards lyocell production, it was not necessary to define the
geographic market.
The combined entity would have achieved very high combined shares in all three viscose markets (more
than 55 7o in commodity viscose and more than 85 7o in spundyed viscose and viscose for tampons), andit would have led to a worldwide monopoly in the lyocell production and technology markets. The
operation would have eliminated Acordis's strongest competitor in the viscose market in the EEA and
would have left only three smaller competitors: Sniace of Spain, Svenska Rayon of Sweden and Seteri of
C$) T-310/01 andT-77 102.('9 COMP/M.2l87 
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Finland. The Commission therefore concluded that the operation would have created a dominant position
in the commodity viscose and in the spundyed viscose markets.
As regards the viscose market for tampons, the Commission found that Acordis already held a dominant
position. The merger would have strengthened that position as the number of manufacturers in Europe
would have been reduced from three to two.
As regards lyocell, Lenzing and Acordis were at that time the only producers of lyocell worldwide and
the only two players in the market for lyocell production and processing technology currently able to
offer 'ready-to-operate'technology. Together, the parties held the vast majority ofall existing patents for
lyocell production and treafinent, and entry into this market was difficult. The Commission therefore
concluded that the operation would have created a dominant position in both the lyocell production and
the lyocell technology markets.
During the second phase of the review, the parties submitted the following commitments: (i) a
non-exclusive licence with regard to lyocell; (ii) a toll-manufacturing arrangement whereby the parties
would produce lyocell for the licensee; and (iii) a non-exclusive licence with regard to Galaxy tampon
fibre. The Commission took the view that these commitments were insufficient to eliminate the concems
raised by the merger.
This case was examined in close cooperation with the US Federal Trade Commission.
Tetra Laval/S i del (' o' )
On 30 October, the Commission prohibited the acquisition by Tetra Laval BV which belongs to the
Switzerland-based Tetra Laval group, the owner of the Tetra Pak packaging businesses, of the French
company Sidel SA. Tetra holds a dominant position in carton packaging with an overall market share in
Europe of over 80 7o. Sidel is the leading manufacturer of plastic PET packaging equipment and in
particular stretch blow-moulding (SBM) machines.
The Commission's investigation showed that the combination of the dominant company in cadon
packaging with the leading company in PET packaging equipment would lead to the creation of a
dominant position in the European Economic Area (EEA) in the market for PET packaging equipment, in
particular SBM machines used for sensitive products, and to the strengthening of a dominant position in
aseptic carton packaging equipment and aseptic cartons in the EEA.
The Commission found that, even though today carton and PET packaging equipment are distinct
relevant product markets, the two are closely related neighbouring markets and belong in the same
industry sector: liquid food packaging. PET and carton are technical substitutes as PET can be an
alternative packaging material for all products that are currently packaged in carton. Already PET and
carton are used as packaging materials for common product segments (liquid dairy products, juices, fruit
flavoured drinks and tea/coffee drinks).
The combination of Tetra's dominant position in carton packaging and Sidel's leading position in PET
packaging equipment would provide the merged entify with the ability and incentives to leverage its
dominant position in carton to gain a dominant position in PET packaging equipment. In addition, by
eliminating Sidel as a competitor in a closely neighbouring market, Tetra's existing dominant position in
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cartons would be strengthened. The merged entity's dominant positions in two closely neighbouring
markets were found to be likely to further reinforce one another, raise barriers to entry and reduci
competition.
On 9 October, Teha proposed a number of undertakings to address these concems, but thev were
considered insufflcient. Given the serious competition concems and the fact that Tetra was unubl" to
resolve them, the comrnission had no other choice but to prohibit the merger.
In view of the partioular circumstances created by the fact that Tetra Laval has already acquired virtually
all of Sidel's shares, the Commission is prepared to examine the practical arrangements for restoring
effective competition.
G 
- 
Decisions pursuant to Article 2(4) ot the ECMR
fioint venture cases) (14,)
Smith & Nephew/Beiersdorf JV ('03)
Both Smith & Nephew and Beiersdorf develop, manufacture and distribute medical products including
wound-management, casting and bandaging products. Smith & Nephew is based in London, whil!
Beiersdorf is based in Hamburg. This case involved the proposal to combine their activities in traditional
wound-care products, immobilisation products, bandaging products and phlebology products (r*) into a50-50joint venture.
The markets for these products were found to be national, rather than EEA-wide. on that basis, the
combination of the parents' activities would have led to competition concems in markets for professional
first aid dressings (plasters), fixation bandages, support bandages and plaster of paris casts in severalMember States including Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Italy, the Netirerlands, Spain and the UnitedKingdom' The concems were removed by the two companies undertaking to divest certain trademarks
and businesses either in specific countries, groups of countries or throughout the EEA, thereby removing
the problematic overlaps that would otherwise have arisen.
when evaluating the joint venture, the Commission also examined whether its creation might encourage
the parent companies to coordinate their competitive behaviour in their retained businesses. This wasparticularly important due to Smith & Nephew's strong market position in the advanced wound-care
market and Beiersdorf's equally strong position in the consumer markets for first-aid dressings, bandages
and orthopaedic soft goods. Despite these strong positions, the Commission concluded that there was no
such risk as the markets in which the parent companies would be active were clearlv distinct.
H utch i so n/R C P M/E CT (, ^)
On 3 July, the Commission approved the acquisition by Hutchison Netherlands BV (Hutchison) andRotterdam Municipal Port Management (RMPM) of the Rotterdam container terminal operator Europe
('n') Joint venture cases covered by Arlicle 2(4) of the ECMR must also involve the application of Article g I and are thereforegenerally dealt with by the operational units of the Competition DG rather than by the Merger Task Force.C') COMPiJV.54 
- 
Smith & Nephew/Beiersdorf/Jv,30.1.20OI('*) Phlebology products include compression, support and anti_embolism hosiery(") COMP/JV55 
- 
Hutchisory'RCpM/EcT, 3.7.2W1.
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Combined Terminals BV (ECT), subject to commitments. Hutchison belongs to the Hutchison Whampoa
Group (Hong Kong), which supplies stevedoring services worldwide. In Europe, Hutchinson controls the
container terminals at the deep-sea ports of Felixstowe and Thamesport. RMPM is responsible for the
development and management of the Port of Rotterdam in the Netherlands. ECT is the leading container
terminal operator in the port of Rotterdam, itself the largest port in continental Europe.
The acquisition combined the number one operator on the continent (ECT) and the number one operator
in the UK (Hutchison). Following the operation, Hutchison/ECT would have a market share of
approximately 50 Vo, over twice as large as that of each of its nearest two competitors (HHLA and
Eurogate). The parties' strong market position was also reflected in their high share of port calls by the
main shipping lines on the important northern Europe-Far East and transatlantic trades. Furthermore, the
parties' Felixstowe and Rotterdam terminals have several natural advantages which make them
particularly suited to serving larger vessels. The increasing use of everJarger vessels on the major trades
to and from Europe, accounting for a very high proportion of overall transhipment traffic, would
therefore further strengthen Hutchison/ECT's market position.
The Commission's investigation therefore concluded that the operation would lead to the creation of a
dominant position in the market for the provision of stevedoring services in respect of the north European
transhipment market. However, in the course of the investigation, the parties submitted commitments
which would result in the emergence of independent competition in the port of Rotterdam, one of the
main transhipment ports in northern Europe for deep-sea container vessels. Subject to the parties'full
compliance with these undertakings, the Commission was able to declare the operation compatible with
the common market.
Hutchison/ECT ('ou)
On t5 October, Hutchison notified the Commission of its intention to acquire sole control of the whole of
ECT. Given that the deadline for the undertakings imposed in the July decision in the
Hutchison/RCPM/ECZ case was still running and that most of the undertakings had not yet been
implemented, the Commission had to assess the new operation on the basis of a basically unchanged
market situation. The Commission's investigation confirmed that the operation would lead to the creation
of a dominant position in the market for the provision of stevedoring services for transhipment traffic in
northern Europe.
Hutchison would be bigger than its three closest competitors combined (Hamburger Hafen- und
Lagergesellschaft, Eurogate and Hessenatie). Hutchison/ECT's strong market position is also reflected in
their high share of port calls and the nattral advantages of their terminals, which are particularly suited to
serving the largest container vessels. These vessels generate an increasingly high proportion of
ffanshipment traffic.
In the course of the investigation, the parties submitted commitments that would favour the emergence of
independent competition in the port of Rotterdam. These commitments included the divestiture of ECT's
33.3 7o shad:e in the Maersk Delta BV (MDBV) container terminal, a joint venture with the A.P. Moller
group (Denmark), to an independent buyer. The parties also guaranteed that sufficient capacity would be
available to enable an independent terminal operator to emerge as a serious competitor to ECT in the port
of Rotterdam.
(r{) COMP/JV.56 
- 
Hutchison/ECT, 29.71.2001
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Subject to the parties' full compliance with the submitted undertakings, the Commission concluded that
the acquisition would not lead to a dominant position in the relevant market.
D 
- 
summaries of referrar decisions taken under Article 9 of the ECMR
E n e I /1A/ i n d/ I n fo st rad a (, o, )
The Commission decided to refer to the Italian Competition Authority (Autoritd Garante della
Concorrenza e del Mercato) the examination of the impact on the Italian electricity sector of the proposed
acquisition of Infostrada by Enel and France T6l6com. The electricity market is currently ieing
liberalised throughout the European union, but Enel still has a dominant position in Italy, teaiing thlItalian authority to fear that it might be able to protect its position in the eiectricity market by otrJringjoint utility services.
The authority had asked the Commission to refer the examination of certain aspects of the operation to
Italy. Article 9 allows for such referrals if a national Competition Authority is concerned that a merger
may present a th_reat to effective competition in its own market.
The authority argued that the acquisition of Infostrada would give Enel the possibility of defending or
strengthening its dominant position in the market for the supply of electricity. Enel, by jointly offeing
utilities and telecommunications services, and in particular uy using strategies such as ioint uitting anljoint promotion of the bundled services, would be able to 'lock in' its current electricity customers,
substantially reducing the impact of the liberalisation on the Italian electricity markets.
In referring the case, the Commission took the view that the Italian Competition Authority was bestplaced to carry out the investigation and has, therefore, not taken a final position on this issue.
The Commission's review of the case showed that other aspects of the operation 
- 
involving the
telecommunications and Internet markets 
- 
would pose no competition paobla-r. The Commission
therefore cleared those aspects.
M ets dl i itto O s u u s ku nta/Va po Oy (, ou)
on 8 February, the Commission referred to the Finnish Competition Authority (Kilpailuvirasto) part of
the examination of the impact of the proposed acquisition by Finhnd's Metsiiliitto osuuskunta of a stake
in vapo oy, which before the operation was wholly owned by the Finnish state.
The transaction created overlaps in the market for wood-based fuels, sawn timber and wood procurement.
The Commission cleared those aspects of the transaction which related to the markets for sawn timber
and wood procurement as no competition concems were raised.
The Finnish Competition Authority had asked the Commission to refer to it the examination of a part of
the transaction, namely the deal's impact on the market for wood-based fuels, the market for peaior the
combined market for wood-based fuels and peat in Finland. The Commission's findings in its hrst-phase
investigation supported the preliminary analysis made by the Finnish authority in its referral."qo"ri.
(.*') COMP/M.22I6 
- 
Enel,/Wind,/Infostrada, l9.l.Z}0l.(\ COMPIM.2234 
- 
Metsdtiitto Osuuskunta./Vapo Oy, g.2.2OOl.
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Govia/Connex South Central ('on)
On 20 July, the Commission agreed to a request from the UK authorities to refer to them the examination
of the acquisition by the Newcastle-based Go-Ahead group and Paris-based Keolis SA ofjoint control of
London-based Connex South Central Ltd (South Central).
The UK authorities made their request on the ground that the operation affected competition on specific
railway routes, particularly in the London-Gatwick-Brighton area where it would create overlap between
South Central and the parties' existing train-operating company Thameslink. They also argued that the
routes in question were local in scope in relation to the overall UK rail network, and that the operation
would have no impact in Member States other than the UK.
The Commission considered that, given the particular circumstances of the case, the conditions laid down
in the merger regulation were fulfilled, in particular that the affected market did not constitute a
substantial part of the common market and that it was therefore required to refer the case to the UK
authorities. This was the first time that a case had been referred under Article 9(2)(b) of the merger
regulation.
Shell/DEA ('uo\
On 23 August, the Commission referred to the German Competition Authority, the Federal Cartel Offlce,
the examination of the impact on the downstream market for oil products of a proposed joint venture
between Shell and RWE-DEA. Under an agreement notified to the Commission on l0 July, Shell and
DEA planned to combine their downstream oil and petrochemicals businesses in a joint venture.
On 3 August, the Federal Cartel Offrce had asked the Commission to refer part of the examination to it
under Article 9 of the merger regulation. It argued that the proposed operation threatened to create or
strengthen a dominant position in the market for motor ftrel retailing and several other oil product
markets. In its analysis, it took into account the proposed combination of the downstream oil and
petrochemicals businesses of BP and E.ON (Veba and Aral brands), a separate deal (see discussion of
case COMP/1vI.2533 below). As a preliminary conclusion, it found that the transaction risked creating a
situation where the new entity, together with a combined BP/Veba/Aral and the other oil majors, would
hold a collective dominant position in particular in the market for motor fuel retailing in Germany.
The Commission's findings in its flrst-phase investigation supported the preliminary analysis made by the
Federal Cartel Offlce. The Commission also considered that the latter was best placed to assess the
competitive impact of the case as it required investigation of local sub-markets and supply relations. In
addition, the German Competition Authority had only recently concluded an investigation into alleged
abusive pricing practices of the major oil companies in Germany, which gave it considerable expertise in
the sector.
BP/E.ON ('u')
The Commission referred to the Federal Cartel Ofnce the examination of the impact on the downstream
markets for refined oil products of a proposed joint venture between Deutsche BP and E.ON. The
C') COMPA,I.2446 
- 
Govia/Connex South Central,20;1.2001("') COMPA4.23 89 
- 
ShelUDEA, 23.8.2001.('") coMPA{.2533 
- 
BP/E.ON, 6.9.2W1.
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proposal was for BP to acquire a 51 7o shareholding in Veba Oel AG, curently a wholly-owned
subsidiary of E'ON active in the oil and petrochemicals business, both upstream and downstream (Veba
and Aral brands). E.ON had the option to sell the remaining shares to Bg transfening sole control over
Veba Oel, at a later stage.
On 20 August, the Federal Cartel Office had asked the Commission to refer part of the examination under
Article 9 of the merger regulation. It argued that the proposed operation threatened to create or strengthen
a dominant position in the market for motor fuel retailing and several other oil-product markets. t its
analysis, it took into account the proposed combination of the downstream oil businesses of Shell and
DEA (see discussion of case COMp/IVI.2389 above).
As a preliminary conclusion, the Federal Cartel Office found that the present transaction risked creating a
collectively dominant situation between the new entity, a combined Sn.UOga and the other oil majJrsin the market for motor fuel retailing in Germany. The Commission's findings in its first-phase
investigation supported the preliminary analysis made by the German Competition Authority.
Haniel/Fels (152)
On 17 October, the Commission referred to the Federal Cartel Office the examination of the impact ofpart of the proposed acquisition by Haniel Baustoff-Industrie Zuschlagstoffe GmbH of Fels-Werke
GmbH' namely that in the German wall-building-materials markets. At the same time, the Commission
decided that the deal's effect on the Dutch wall-building materials sector required further study and
started an in-depth investigation.
In its request for referral, the Federal Cartel Office had argued that the proposed acquisition threatened to
create or strengthen a dominant position in the German market for wall-building materials and asked theCommission to refer to it the examination of that aspect of the deal. According to the Federal CartelOffice's preliminary assessment, the transaction risked creating a situation where the new entity would
hold a dominant position in particular in brick building materials in several regional markets in Germany.
The Commission's findings in its firsrphase investigation were consistent with the preliminary analysis
made by the German Competition Authority.
The Commission believed that the Federal Cartel office was best placed to assess the competitive impact
of the case on the brick wall-building materials markets in Germany.
HanielNtong ('""1
Shortly after the decisions were taken to open a phase 2 investigation and to refer part of the HanieyFels
case to the Federal Cartel Off,ce, Haniel was parry to a case with Ytong which involved the same
combination of decisions. In this second case, the Commission referreJ that part of the proposed
acquisition of the German cellular concrete producer Ytong which related to Germany to the German
competitionAuthority on 30 November. on the same date, the commission decided that the deal's effect
on the Dutch wall-building-materials sector required further study and opened an in-depth investigatign.
On 13 November, the Federal Cartel Office had argued that the proposed acquisition threatened to create
or strengthen a dominant position in the German market for wall-building materials and asked the
C") COMPA4.2495 
- 
Haniet/Fels, t':..1O.200t.
e$) COMP/M.2568 
- 
HanieWtong, 30.11.2001
COMPETITION REPORT 2OO1
MERGERCONTROL 245
Commission to refer the examination of that aspect of the deal to Germany under Article 9 of the merger
regulation. According to the Federal Cartel Office's preliminary assessment, the transaction risked
creating a situation where the new entity would hold a dominant position in particular in brickwork
building materials in several regional markets in Germany. The Commission's findings in its first-phase
investigation were in line with the preliminary analysis made by the German Competition Authority.
The Commission believed that the Federal Cartel Ofnce was best placed to assess the competitive impact
of the case on the brickwork wall-building-materials markets in Germany, as this would require the
investigation of locat (sub-)markets and supply relations. In addition, the Federal Cartel Ofnce had
recently investigated this sector in Germany and was already investigating the proposed acquisition of the
German Fels-Werke GmbH bv Haniel in the same sector.
E 
- 
Summary of decisions taken by the Court of First Instance
RAG/Saarbe rgwe rke/P re u ssag Anth razit
On 31 January, the Court of First Instance (CFI) annulled the Commission's decision of 29 July 1998
(COMP/ECSC.1252)by which the Commission authorised the merger aspects of the restructuring of the
German coal industry. The CFI found that the Commission had not taken into account in its merger
analysis the commercial and financial effects of the possible State aid inherent in the price paid by RAG
for Saarbergwerke, which was then owned by the German State and the Saarland. The Commission will
have to issue a new decision on this case in which it will have to address the competitive effects of any
State aid received. Furthermore, the judgment appears to impose a general dufy on the Commission to
examine the effects on competition of State aid issues when adopting a merger decision.
F 
- 
Commission decisions
L. Decisions under Articles 6 and 8 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89
1.1. Decisions under Article 6(1)(a) and (b) as well as under Article 6(2)
of Council Regulation (EEC) No 4/l,64ft9
15.2.2001CVC/AdvenVCarlyle/Lafarge matdriaux de sp6cialit6s
Telef6nica IntercontinentaVSonera 3G
11.1.2001
Sofi nim/KBC Inves t/Mercator&Noordstar/VM
Tournesoleon/De Clerck/FOC
11.1.2001 15.2.2W1
11.1.2001
t2.1.2ffi1
16.1.2001 t5.3.2001Royal Vopak/Ellis & Everard
r't.1.2001 1322W1
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M.2259 Tena/Amadeus/ I travel. com 7.12W1 C 49 t5.2.zff)l
M.2264 Industri KapitaVFives-Lille 17.1.2001 C 48 14.2.2Ut1
M.2216 Enel/Wind.{nfostrada 19.1.2001 c 39 7.2.2N1
M.2270 Babcock Borsig/\rlG Technologies/Sal UarketrDerrtr"tre fZZ 1.ffilBank/VATECfVec4ec I c 207 25.7.2$l
M.2247 CU Italia./Banca Popolare di Lodi JV 24. 2001 C 46 13.2.2001
M.226s Ricoh/lanier Worldwide 24.r.2M1 C 159 1.6.2M1
M.2166 CSC Ploenzke/Dachser/E-Chain Loeistics 26. .2001 C 213 28.9.2001
M.2278 Lafarge/Blue Circle JV 29 .2W1 C 76 8.3.2001
M.2269 SASOl-/Condea 30. 2001 C 107 7.4.2001
M.2296 ENVLasmo 1.2.2W1 C
M.2262 Flughafen Berlin (II) 5.2.2Nr c 68 2.3.2001
M.2285 Schroder Ventures Limited/flomebase 5.2.2W1 C 49 15.2.2001
M.2234 Metsiiliirto osuuskunta./VApo oy JV 8.2.2001
M.2272 RewelBMl/Standa Commerciale 8.2.2001 C 9l 223.2001
M.2284 ABN Amro/Perkins Food 8.2.2W1 C 68 2.3.2W1
M.2228 C & N/Thomas Cook 9.2.2001
M.2185 Ocd-Technologies/Real Software/Oc6-Real Business
Solutions
12.2.2m1 C 68 23.2m1
M.2219 E.ON Energie/Energie Oberdsterreich/JCE+JME 2.2.2001 C 330 24.11.2001
M.2291 VNU/AC Nielsen 2.2.2001 c 74 7.3.2W1
M.2197 Hilton/Accor/Forte/Iravel Services JV 6.2.2W1 C 127 27.4.200r
M.2143 BT/VIAG Intercom 9.2.2001 c 207 25.7.2001
M.22',71 Cargill/Agribrands 9.2.2001 C 74 7.3.2001
M.2310 Hutchison/InvestorAII3G 19.2.2001
M.2290 SFK99-RahastolFortumA.{aps Systems 22.2.zffi c 180 26.6.2001
M.2292 AEA Investors/DLJMB Funding IIUBF Goodrich
Performance Materials
22.2.2c01 c 74 73.2ffi1
M.2306 Berkshire Hathaway/Johns Manville 22.2.2W1 C l8l 27.6.2001
M.2280 BASF/Bertschi/Hoyer/Vlag JV 23.2.2001 c z+J 31.8.2001
M.2302 HeinziCSM 23.2.2001 C 83 14.3.2W1
M.2324 Sanmina Corporation/AB Segerstrd,m & Svensson 23.2.2001 c 74 7.3.200r
M.2208 Chewon/Iexaco 28.2.2001 C 28 28.4.2001
M.2294 Etexgroup/Glynwed Pipe Systems 28.2.2001 c 94 24.3.2W1
M.2312 Abbott/BASF 28.2.2m1 c 49 9.5.2001
M.2335 Michel Mineral6lhandeUThyssen-Elf Oil 28.2.2c01 c 140 2.5.2001
M.2336 Thomson Multimedia/Iechnicolor 28.2.2001 C 206 24.7.2W1
M.23t7 Lafarge/Blue Circle (II) 1.3.2W1 C 80 26.6.2001
M.2256 Philips/Agilent Health Care Solutions 2.3.2001 c 292 18.10.200t
M.2305 Vodafone Group plc/Eircell 2.3.2001 C 128 28.4.2001
M.2340 EDP/Caj astur/Caser/llidroel6ctrica del Cantdbrico s.3.2001 c t28 28.4.2001
M.2309 Ericsson/Skandia/Alleato JV 8.3.2001 C 89 20.3.2001
M.2330 Cargill,iBanks 9.3.200r C 107 7.4.2001
M.2277 Degussa/Laporte 12.3.2001 C 30 1.5.2001
M.2341 Banco Popular Espaflol/Fortior Holding 2.3.2ffi1 C 27 27.4.2001
M.2356 Hermes/Codan JV 2.3.2001 cl 99 29.3.2001
M.2346 Telef6nica/Portugal Telecom/Brazilian JV 3.3.2W1 C lt 2.4.2W1
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M.23s7 Vattenfall/Flamburger Elektrizit2itswerke/l.lordic
Powerhouse
13.3.2001 C 90 21.3.2001
M.1976 Shell/Halliburton/lVell Dynamics JV 5.3.2001 C r27 27.4.2W1
M.2343 Toro Assicurazioni/Llovd Italico 5.3.2001 c t2'7 27.4.2001
M.2282 BT/Esat Digifone 6.3.2001
M.2368 Gilde/Capvisi Soudronic 6.3.2ffi1 c t05 5.4.2001
M.226'7 Siemens/JaneUJV 9.3.2001 C r28 28.4.2M1
M.2353 RWE/Hidroel6ctrica del Cantfbrico 9.3.2001 c t43 16.5.2001
M.2364 Deutsche Banlc/Banque Worms 9.3.2001 C 32r t6.11.20a1
M.2227 Goldman Sachs/l\{esser Griesheim 20.3.2W1 C r27 27.4.2001
M.2240 CVC/Mascotech 20.3.2001 C 2't4 29.9.2W1
M.2257 France Tdl6comlEquant 21.3.2001 C 187 3.7.2W1
M.2375 PAI + UGI/Elf Antargaz 21.3.2001 C 347 8.12.2001
M.2377 Sydkraff/ABB/German Power Trading JV 2t.3.2001 C 8I 27s2ffi1
M.2249 Marconi/RTS JV 21.3.2001 C 07 1.4.2001
M2308 Northroo Grumman/Litton Industries 23.3.2ffi1 c 9'l t 1.7.2001
M.2344 Xchange/BAE Systems JV 23.3.200r c 27 27.4.2W1
M.2275 Pepsico/Quaker 21.3.2001
M.2323 HSBC-CCF/Banque Hervet 27.3.2001 c to7 7.4.2001
M.2339 Conforama/S alzam Mercatone 27.3.2001 c 107 7.4.2M1
M.2348 OutokumpuA.{orzink 2',1 .3.2001 C t'75 20.6.2$
M.2366 Denso/MMC 27.3.2001 C 242 30.8.2ffi
M.236'l Siemens/E.ONiShelVSSG 2'7.3.2W1 c 172 16.6.200
M.20'79 Raytheon/Thales/JV 30.3.2001 c tz'r 2't.4.2W
M.2231 Huntsman InternatonaUAlbright & Wilson Surfactants
Europe
30.3.2001 C 165 8.6.2001
M.2334 DMDATA/Kommunedata/e-Boks JV 30.3.2001 c 12'l 2't.4.2c01
M.2223 GeEonics/Hagemeyer W 2.4.200
M.2350 CampbelUECBB (Unilever) 2.4.200 C r40 t2.5.2001
M.2384 Ratos/3i Group/Atle 2.4.200 C t45 t't.5.2w1
M.2365 Schlumberger/Sema 5.4.200 c 137 9.5.200r
M.2313 Teka/Finatlantis/Holdivat 6.4.2N
M.2354 Enichem/Polimeri 6.4.200
M.2355 DOWiEnichem Polyu€thanes 6.4.2ffi c 38 11.5.2001
M.2358 Flextonics/Ericsson 6.4.2W1 C 59 1.6.2001
M.2360 SGS/R & S/Freeslass JV 6.4.2001 C 40 12.5.2001
M.2383 VNU/RCS Editori 6.4.2001 C 27 27.4.2001
M.2263 Philips/LG Elecfronics fV 9.4.2M1 c 80 26.6.2001
M.2349 E.ON/Sydkraft 9.4.2W1
M.2286 Buhrmann/Samas Offi ce SuPplies 11.4.2001
M.2281 Endesa/CDF/Snet (see ECSC 1352) l'1.4.2w1 C 79 23.6.2041
M.2347 Mannesmann ArcorA'{etcom Kassel 17.4.2W1 C 65 8.6.2001
M.2328 Shell/Beacon/3 i/TWister t9.4.2W1 c 38 11.5.2001
M.2222 Ucc/Liberty Media 24.4.2001 C 72 16.6.2001
M.2279 Nortel/Mundinteractivos/Broad Media JV 25.4.2Wr C 90 6;t.2001
M.2394 SCI SystemsA{okia Networks 25.4.2001 C 172 16.6.2001
M.2398 Linde/Juneheinrich JV 25.4.2001 c 160 2.6.2001
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M.2345 Deutsche B P/Erd6lchemie 26.4.zmr c 174 19.6.2U)1
M.2218 Thomas Cook Holdings/British Airways JV 30.4.2001
M.2414 VattenfalI/HEW 2.3.2M1 C r40 12.5.2U)1
M.2374 Telenor/ErgoGroup/DNB/Accenture W 2.5.200r C 160 2.6.2m1
M.2268 Pemod Ricard,rDiageo/Seagram Spirits 8.5.2001
M.2373 Compass/Selecta 8.5.2001 C 160 2.6.2001
M.2395 Morgan GrenfelVWhitbread 8.5.2001 c 172 16.6.2M1
M.2391 CVC/Cinven/Assidomiin 0.5.2001 c 189 5.7.2001
M.2396 Industri Kapital./Perstorp (II) l1.5.2001 c zt4 29.9.200r
M.2405 Dow ChemicaUAscot 1.5.2001
M.2407 Bertelsmanr/RTl Group 1.5.2001 C 291 l7.t0.2wl
M.2435 EDS/Systematics 1.5.2001
M.2315 The Airline GroupA.{ats 4.5.2001 C 160 2.6.2001
M.2419 Apax/ScheringiMetagen 4.5.2W1 C 196 12.7.2001
M.2329 Soci6t6 G6ndrale/Deufin 7.5.2N1 c 308 1.11.2001
M.2342 Techint/VAVJV 7.5.2001
M.2406 Cepsa Gas Comercializadora./Total Fina Elf Gas & power
Espaffa
t7.5.2001 C 180 26.6.200r
M.2409 Rail Gourmet Holding/I.{arvesen r7.5.2001 C 171 15.6.2001
M.2426 INEOS/Phenolchemie 17.5 2001
M.23'70 Thales/Airsvs-AfM 21.5.2W1 c 237 23.8.2001
M.2418 ORFA.{etway/Adworx 21.5.2001 c 201 l7.7.2001
M.2433 Barclays BankMinimax 2t.5.2W1 C 180 26.6.2001
M.2445 NIB Capital,/Intematio-Muller Chemical Distribution 21.5.2m1 C t7l 15.6.200I
M.2359 International Fuel Cetls (UTC)/SOpC (Shell) JV 29.5.2001
M.2386 MEVPhilips 29.5.2001 C JJZ 27.11.2U)1
M.2401 Industri Kapital/Telia Enterprise 29.5.2001 C 272 27.9.2001
M.2424 Tlco/CIT 29.5.2001
M.2442 NOBIA,/Masnet 29.5.2001
M.2408 REWE COM/HenkeUTEN UK/TEN DE 31.5.2W1 C 308 I1.200t
M.2451 Hilton/Scandic 31.5.2001 C 238 24.8.2001
M2190 LSG/OFSI 1.6.2001 c 238 24.8.2W1
M.243'1 NEC/Toshiba 5.6.2001 C 89 5.7.2001
M.2397 BC Funds/Sanitec 6.6.2001 C 207 25.7.2001
M.2458 Bertelsmann/WC JV 6.6.2001 c 190 6.7.2001
M.2466 Sodexho/Abela (II) 8.6.2001 C 206 24.7.2A01
M.2421 Continental,/Temic 11.6.2ffi1 c 250 8.9.2001
M.2441 Amcor/Danisco/Ahlstrom l1.6.2001 c 273 28.9.2W1
M.2393 Skanska Sverige/Posten/FlOOC 13.6.2W1 c 81 27.6.2001
M.2403 Schneider/Thomson Multimedia W 13.6.2001 cl 251 11.9.2001
M.2430 S chroder Ventures/Grammer 3.6.200r cl 325 21.1r.z00r
M.2303 CiaowebAVE Cube 4.6.2001 | 79 23.6.2001
M.2400 Dexia./Artesia 4.6.2w1 | cl 325 r.r1.2001
M.2413 BHP/Billiton (see ECSC. t356t 4.6.2mr 
I cl 238 24.E.2001
M.2463 Speedy Tomato 4.6.2001 | cl 279 10.2001
M.2448 Dexia./Banco Sabadell/Dexia Banco Local 19.6.2ffi1
M.2449 Goldman Sachs/SJPC/SCP De MiloA.{ascent e.6.2mr 
I l9 4.11.2001
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M.2459 CDC/Charterhouse/Alstom Contracting 19.6.2Nr c 188 4.7.2001
M.2460 IBlWlnformix t9.6.2001 c 198 13.7.2001
M.2415 Interpublic/ffue North 21.6.200r C ?<l 11.9.2001
M.2300 YLE/TDF/Digihrv 26.6.2W1 c 272 27.9.2ffi1
M.2369 CNTVFTIE 26.6.2001
M.2404 Elkem/SAPA 26.6.2ffi1 c 251 11.9.2001
M.2469 Vodafone/Airtel 26.6.2001 c 20'l 25.7.2001
M.2490 Knorr-Bremse SFSAVebasto Thermosvsteme JV 26.6.2ffi1 C 243 31.8.2001
M.2411 Autologic/TNTAilallenius/Cat JV 27.6.2001
M.2427 Infi neon/Cryptomathic JV 27.6.2001 c r99 14.7.2001
M.2468 SEAI Paeine Gialle/Eniro 27.6.2ffi1 C 198 13.7.2001
M.2478 IBM ltalia/Business Solutions W 29.6.2W1 C 278 2.10.200t
M.2479 Flexnonics/Alcatel 29.6.2W1 C 2',18 2.10.2001
M.2494 Debitel/Debitel Nederland 29.6.2N1
M.2402 Creditanstalt/RZB JV 7.7.2001 c 238 24.8.2001
M.24f9 Ilitachi/STMlcroelectronicVSuperH JV 3.7.200r c 252 12.9.2001
M.2464 Nomura International/k M€ridien H6tels 3.7.2001 C 198 13.7.2001
M.2493 Norske Skog/Abitibi/Papco 3.7.2W1
M.2452 Belgacom/BAS Holding/Securitas 5.7.2001 C 238 24.8.2001
M.2461 OMGroup/DMC2 5.7.2001 c 250 8.9.2001
M.2476 Blue Circle/Michelin JV 5.7.2ffi1 c 284 10.10.200r
M.2432 Angelini/Phoenix JV 6.7.200r c 281 5.10.2001
M.2488 Alcatel/Alcatel Space 6;1.2001 c 321 16.11.2001
M.2387 Heineken/Bayerische Brauholding JV 2.7.2001 c 327 22.rt.2001
M.2453 GKN/Brambles 2.7.2ffi1 C 238 24.8.2001
M.2465 CV9Amstelland 6;7.2001
M.2501 Eureko/Interamerican 6.1.2W1 c 243 31.8.2001
M.2489 Bore Warner/Hitachi 7.7.2001 C 242 30.8.2001
M.2473 Finnforest/IVloelven Industrier 8.7.2W C 239 25.8.2c01
M.2382 Usinor/Arbed/Aceralia (see ECSC 135 l) 9.7.2001
M.2431 Allianz/Dresdner 9.7.2001 C 316 10.11.2001
M.2s12 EQT Northern Europe/Electrolux 20.7.2W1 c 251 11.9.2c01
M.2438 SES/Stork/Fokker Space 24.7.2W1 C 239 25.8.2001
M.2425 Coop Norden 26.7.2M1 C 242 30.8.2001
M.2471 Accenture/Lagardbre W 26.7.2001 c 327 22.11.2001
M.2480 Thomson/Carlton JV 26.7.2001 c 238 24.8.2001
M.2337 NestlClRalston Purina 27.7.2001 C 239 25.8.2001
M.2352 SWB/Stadtwerke Bielefeld JV 27.7.2001 c 321 16.11.200t
M.2491 Sampo/Storebrand 27.7.2001 c 290 16.10.2001
M.2514 Mazda Motor CorporationdVlCl 27;1.2001 c 251 11.9.2001
M.2456 Preussag/TUl Belgium 2.8.2001 c 238 24.8.2c01
M.2513 RWE"/Kiimtner Energie Holding 2.8.2001 c 286 n.rc.2001
M.2518 GFBShell Hydrogen/HQC 2.8.2001 c 242 30.8.2001
M.2503 IIBG/Ballast Nedam/Baggeren JV 3.8.200r C 284 10.10.2001
M.2MO SiemenVYazaki JV 6.8.20/i1 c 264 29.9.2001
M.2516 RPBE/Britax 6.8.2001
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M.2531 Sara LeelEarthgrains 6.8.2001 c 250 8.9.2001
M.2534 SCI Systerns/t{okia Networks 6.8.2001 c 281 s.10.2001
M.2399 Friesland CobercoA.{utricia 8.8.2001 C
M.2447 Fabricom/GTl 9.8.200r
M.2517 Bristol Myers Squibb/Du Pont 9.8.2001
M.2536 Fabricom/Sulzer 9.8.2001 C 330 24.11.2W1
M.2506 Autostrade/Saba 10.8.2001 c 274 29.9.2001
M.2508 Fortum/OM JV 10.8.2001 c 3n 22.1r.2001
M.2474 RZBlCentrobank 21.8.2W1 C 321 16.11.2001
M.2422 Hapag-Lloyd/llamburger Hafen- und Lagerhaus/HHlA-
CT 22.8.2001 C 272 27.9.2001
M.2362 Dalkia Holding/Clemessy 23.8.200 c 315 9.11.2001
M.2487 Bertelsmaff/Arnoldo Mondadori JV 23.8.200 c 279 3.10.2001
M.2548 Cinven/Castrol 23.8.200 c 350 t|.12.2001
M.2539 EQT Northem Europe/Duni 27s.z$ c 272 27.9.2001
M.2509 DOWReichhold JV 28.8.200 C 251 11.9.2001
M.2532 Fiat/Italenergia/Montedison 28.8.200 c 284 10.10.2001
M.2538 3i VM-Data/Atea 30.8.200 C 315 9.11.2w1
M.2563 Edf/Fenice 30.8.200 c 251 11.9.2001
M.2573 A & C/Grossfarma 30.8.200 c 271 26.9.2001
M.2575 Liberty MutuaVGrupo RSA Espaffa 31.8.200 C 282 6.10.200r
M.2540 Fidis/SEIJV 4.9.Z00r c 274 29.9.2W1
M.2553 Endesa/Enel-Elettrogen 4.9.2001 c 28r 5.10.200r
M.2556 HUK CoburgryViener Stadtische^{MA 4.9.200r c at5 28.9.2M1
M.2558 Havas/Tempus 4.9.2001 C 319 14.11.2001
M.2583 Insys/Hunting Engineering 7.9.2001 C 296 23.rO.2001
M.2566 Shell-Cinergy/EDA/EPA fV 13.9.200 C 32r 16.tt.2001
M.2260 HitachVLG Elecffonics JV 14.9.200 C 296 23.10.2001
M.2486 Itochu/lVlarubeni JV 14.9.2M c 270 25.9.2001
M.2529 JCDiRCS/Publitransport/IPG 4.9.2W c 300 26.10.2001
M.2560 APAXA,IPM 4.9.200 C 272 27.9.2001
M.2580 Collins & Aikrnan Product/Iextron Automotive Trim 4.9.200 C 274 29.9.2001
M.2541 RWA./Verbund JV 7.9.2W
M.2586 CE/Yorkshire Electric 7.9.200
M.2588 Rheinbraun Brennstoff/SSM Coal 7.9.200 C 327 22.11.2001
M.2587 RabobanVAutoolastics 19.9.200 c 308 1.11.2001
M.2549 Sanmina/SCl Systems 20.9.200 c 296 23.10.2001
M.2554 IF Holding/FCl JV 20.9.2M c 298 24.r0.2001
M.2571 Johnson Conkols/Sagem 20.9.200 c 281 5.10.200r
M.2574 P trellilEdrzione I Olivetti/Telecom Italia 20.9.200 c 325 21.11.2001
M.252',7 Telenor East/ECO Telecom/Vimpel-Communications 21.9.2N C 298 24.10.2W1
M.2510 Cendant/Galileo 249.200 c 321 16.11.2001
M.2276 The Coca-Cola Company/Nestl6 JV 27.9.200 c 308 l l1.2001
M.2462 EricssorlSony JV 27.9.2N C 281 5.10.200r
M.2481 Ba1li,/Kl6ckner (see ECSC. 1359) 27.9.200 c 288 13.10.2001
M.2526 GE Insurance Holdins/National Mutual Life 27.9.2W c 323 20.112ffi1
M.2559 USG/Deutsche Perlite 2'7.9.200 c 296 23.10.2001
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M.2542 Schmalbach-Lubeca/Rexam 28.9.zffir
M.2576 Telefonica/Sricsson JV 28.9.2ffi1 c 328 23.11.2M1
M.2546 EADS/Nortel 1.10.2001 c 296 23.tO.2Wl
M.2552 Norske Skog/Peterson 1.10,2001 C 3r6 10.11.2001
M.2584 Tlco/Sensormatic 1.10.2001 c 308 1.11.2001
M.2505 Tlco/CR BARD 4.10.2001 c 298 24.10.2001
M.2595 Stora Enso/Stora Enso Timber 4.10.2001 c 296 23.1O.2ffi1
M.2598 TD0CMG/IvIigway fV 4.r0.2ffi1
M.2545 Degussa/Ausimont 8.10.2001 c 298 4.10.2w1
M.2592 3ilEqvitec/Pohjola/Suomi/ION Blast l 1.10.200 c 358 15.12.2001
M.2593 3ilOko BanVUniglass Engineering 11.10.200
M.2572 fime/Irc 12.10.200 c 321 16.11.2001
M.2507 Xchange/BAE Systems/Procur 15.10.200
M.2528 Maersk IT/LM Ericsson/WAC 15.10.200 c 319 14.tI.2001
M.2537 PhilipVMarconi Medical Systems r7.102N c ltt l6.r 1.2001
M.2562 Bertelsmann/France Loisirs 17.t0.2N C 3E 6.r1.2ffi1
M.2608 INA/FAG 18.10.2001
M.2601 WPP/Ibmpus 22.10.200 c 3r6 10.11.2001
M.26rt Schroder Ventures/Goldman Sachs/Cognis 22. 0.200 c 342 5.12.2W1
M.2477 Atle/Pricerunner W 23 0.200 C 322 17.11.2001
M.2577 GE CapitaVHeller Financial 23. 0.200
M.2590 Solecfron/C-MAC 23 0.200 c 308 I .2ml
M.2613 Alcoa/BIIP Billiton JV 23. 0.200 c 322 t7 r.200
M.2626 Merloni/Foster Wheeler Italiana JV 24. 0.200 c 323 20. r.2ffi
M.2569 InterbrcdBeck's 26. o.200 C 320 15. 1.200
M.2297 BP Chemicals/Solvay (PP) 29. 0.200 c 327 1a 1.200
M.2299 BP Chemicals/Solvay/HDPE W 29. 0.240 c 327 22. 1.200
M.250/. Cadbury Schweppes/Pemod Ricard 29. 0.200 c 321 t6. 1.200
M.2535 Sogefi,/Filtrauto 29.10.200
M.256r PrudentialrBPB 6. 2001 c 323 20.11.2001
NL.2623 ABNAMRO/Finaref-PPR W 6. 2W1 c 339 t.t2.2001
M.2614 ThyssenKrupp/Camom/Eurig .2W1 c 327 22.t1.2001
M.2567 Nordbanken/Postgirot 8. .2ffi1 c 347 8.12.2401
M.2578 Banco Santander Central Hispdnico'/AKB 12. 1.2001 c 339 t.l2.2ml
M.2ffi5 Mead/Westvaco 12. 1.2001 c 328 23.11.2001
M.2628 KocMI(osa 12. 1.2001 c 339 r.n.2w
M.2629 Flextronics/Xerox t2. 1.2001 c 339 t.r2.2ffi1
M.2483 Groupe CanaI+/RTIJGJCD JV l3 1.2001
M.2ffi4 ICA Ahold/Dansk Supermarked t3 1.2w1 c 342 5.r2.2ffi1
M.2603 ZF ltriedrichshafenlr{annesmann Sachs 19. 1.2001
M.2620 Enel/Viesgo 20. 1.2001
M.2570 BRFKredit/Codan/Boligtorvet W 2l 1.2001 c 339 1.12.2W1
M.2417 Skanska/SfIA 23. t.2001 C 3M 6.r2.2001
M.2443 E.ON/Powergen 23. t.2w1
M.2523 Siemens/AEM/E-Utile t.2wl c 3U 6.12.2001
M.2&3 Blackstone./CDPQ/Deteks BW )? 1.2001 c 358 15.12.2001
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M.2652 Blackstone/CDPQ/Deteks NRW zJ. .2001 C 358 15.r2.2001
M.2&l Posten/DSV 26. 200r
M.2616 Deutsche Bank/TDC JV 27 20ol
M.2565 PPC/\\{IND/'JV 28, 2001
M.2630 SiemenVWiener Stadtwerke/Master Talk 28 2001 C 358 15.t2.2001
M.2635 DMVII 28 2001
M.2524 Hydro/SQM/Rotem JV f. .2N
M.2550 Mezzo[Mnzzlk 6. 200
M.263'l Nutricia/B axter/2.HSC 6. ,?TO c 358 15.r2.2001
M.2645 Saab/WM-Data AB/Saab Caran JV 6. .2N
M.2646 Rhenus/VIA Verkehr holding (SNCF)/Rhenus-Keolis 7. .200
M.2656 Cinven/Kl(rckner Pentaplast 7. .200
M.2638 3ilConsors/100 World 10, 2.2001
M.2660 NPTWABN AMROA.Iorit Personal Care Holdins t0, 2.2001
M.2602 Gerling/NCM 2.2001
M.297 IVECO/hisbus 2.2001
M.266r Winterthur/Prudential Assurance t2, 2.2001
M.z.85 Verbund/ESTAG 14. 2.2001
M.2@2 BT/Concert t7 2.2001
M.265r AI&T/Concert l7 2.2001
M.2654 Flexffonics Network Services/Ielaris Stidra t7 2.2W1
M.2676 Sampo/Varma Sampo/IF Holding JV 18. 2.2001
M.2627 Otto Versand/Sabre/Travelocity JV t9 2.2001
M.2653 Voestalpine/Polynorm t9 2.2001
M.2677 Anglogold/Normandy l9 2.2W1
1M.2663 |
V2674-l
@2671
tr26?slw,
CU Vrta/Rrsparrruo Vrta
S.*"/CNP
EDF/TXU Europe/West Burton Power Station
Sonae/CNP-Assurances/Inparsa JV
2U.
n.
n.
n.
n.
tz.2w1
t22ffil
t22wl
t22c,|.1
tzzwt I
JV.54 Smith & NephedBeiersdorf JV 30.1.2001 c 89 20.3.2001
w.56 Hutchison/ECT 29.11.2W1
1.2. Decisions underArticle 8 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 4O6q89
('') Not yet published, but available on the Competition DG's web site (http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/
mergers/cases/).
o1L57,27.2.2W2
o1L29.28.2.2002
M.1915
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M.2139 Bombadier/Adtranz 3.4.2W1 oJL69. r2.3.2W2,
M.2mt MAN/Auwibter 20.6.2W1 oJL 116,3.5.2ffi2
M.222n Gcncral Elcdricnloneyseil 3.7.2W1 c")
M.23t4 BASF/hntochio/Enrodiol I1.7.2001 orLl32.t7.s.2w2
M.2333 DcBocrslLVMH 25.7.2@r c')
M.24.34 ftryo Yillsr Mir/EN8$f/Hidtoel€ctrha del
Cantfhico
2f.9.2Wr (o,)
M.2283 Schneider/Legrand 10.r02m (,o)
M.2t87 CVCII-enzing t7.10.2m (r55)
M.2416 TerrakvaUsidcl 30.10.200 (r5!)
M24.20 Mitsui/CVRD/Cacmi 30.10.200 /ls)
M.2498 UPM-Kyomene/llaindl 2l 1.2001 ('55)
M.2499 Norskc Skog/Prrcrco/Walsum 2l 1.2@l (r15)
M.2389 SbcIVDEA m. 2.zmr (r55)
M.2530 Siidanckcr/Saint-L,onis m. 2.2ffi1 /r551
M.2533 BPrEOlrl m.12.2w1 (trr)
il55 lHulchison/RCPWECT 3.7.2001 | OJC76,8.3.2001
2. Decisions pur$ant toArticle 65 of the ECSC lheaty
Cs) Not yet prblis@ but avafubtrc m the Competition DG's web sitc (htp://europa.eu.inUcomm/competition/
rnergerdcases/).
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Press releases
1. Decisions under Artides 6 and E of Council Regulation (EEC) No 406{E9
1.1. Decisions underArticle 6(1) and (2) of Council Regulation (EEC) No MlEg
Reference Ilate Subject
rPt0u34
trt0u35
t2.t.2ffir
r2j.2ffil
Comnission clears SmithKline Beecham acquisition of Block Drug
Novia
rPl0lt48 15.1.2001 Commission clears merger between United Airlines and US Airways subject to
conditions
rPtlv57
wtong
16.r.2001
tgJ.2wl
Cornmission authorises Vopak purchase ofEllis & Everard
Commission allows Italian CompetitionAuthority to examine the inpact of
IPtol/1B
Pto:'/126
P/01/l3s
Ptou164
25.1.2001
3LL2NI
3112001
6nwl
Enel's acquisition of Intbstrada on ltaly's electricity market
Commission clears Ricoh acquisition of LanierWorldwide
Commission clears joint venture between Smith & Nephew and Beiersdorf
subject to a package of divestrnents
Commission clears the acquisition ofCondea by Sasol
Commission approves take-over ofBerlin Brandenburg Flughafen Holding by
Hochtief and IVG consortium
tPt0U183 9.2.2001 Commission refers part of transaction between Mets:iliitto and Vapo to the
Finnish Competition Authority
rP/o1/188 12.2.2ffi1 Commission clears acquisition of Thomas Cook Holdings by C&N Touristic
IPtOUt92 12.2.2ffi1 Commission clears merger between VNU and ACNielsen
rPt0lt2t7 t5.2.2001 Commission initiates detailed investigation into merger between MAN and
Auwiirter
rPl0l/223 16.2.2ffi1 Commission authorises acquisition of E.ON's stake in VIAG Interkom by
British Telecom
IPl0v230 19.2.2W1 Comrnission clears two joint ventures specialised in travel services combining
Accor Forte and llilton
rPtou232 20.2.2001 Commission authorises Cargill to acquire Agribrands Intemational
rP/0r/250 26.2.2W1 Commission apprcves acquisition of the food division of CSM by Heinz
IPt0y287 1.3.2001 Commission clears acquisition of Glynwed's Pipe Systems Division by Etex
IPl0U288 1.3.2001 Commission clears merger between Chewon and Texaco
IPt01t289 1.3.2001 Commission approves acquisition of the pharmaceutical business of BASF by
Abbott
rPl0u29o 1.3.2001 Commission authorises Michel Mineraldlhandel to purchase two Thyssen Elf
Oil sales agencies
IPt01t29s 1.3.2001 Commission opens in-depth inquiry into the acquisition of ECT by Hutchison
and the Rotterdam port authority
IPl0u298 2.3.2001 Commission opens full investigation into the General ElectricAloneywell
merger
IP/o1/300 2.3.200 Cornrnission clears acquisition of Blue Circle Industries by Lafarge
rP/01/306 5.3.2N Commission clears Philips acquisition of Agilent Healttrcare Division
IPt01t3M 5.3.200 Commission clears acquisition of Eircell by Vodafone Group
rPt01t312 6.3.200 Commission authorises EDP-Cajastur-Caser joint bid for Hidrocantibrico
rPlot/340 12.3.2001 Commission clears CargilUBanks joint venture in agricultural merchanting
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rPtolt352 12.3.2ffi1 Commission cl€ars Degusse prnchase of Laporte subject to a divestment
packagc
IP/o1/3E1 r6.3.2001 Commission clcars the joint venture betwcen Shell and Halliburton
rPtolt376 15.3.2001 Commission clears purchase ofltalian insurer Lloyd Italico by Toro
Assicurazioni
IP/01/,{08 l.93.2W Commission authorises acquisition of Telenor's stake in Esat Digifone by
British Telecom
rPnu4fl 20.3.200r Commission authorises RWE acquisition of control over Hidrocant6brico
rPlov424 21.3.2W1 Commission clears acquisition of Messer Griesheim by Goldman Sachs
rPtou423 2r.3.2001 Conrmission clears purchase of MSX Intenational and Delco Remy
International by Citicorp venture capital
rPtoll426 22.3.2001 Commission clears France Tclecom purchase ofEquant
ptou429 22.3.2W1 Commission gives g+.ahcad to purchase of Elf Antargaz by Paribas Affaires
Industrielles (PAI) and UGI
rPtolt438 263.2001 Commission authoriscs Northrop Grumrnan to acquire Litton Industries
rPt0y450 28.3.2ffi1 Commission authoriscs acquisition of Quaker by Pepsico
rPtoy452 28.3.zmr Cornmission laurches in-depth investigation into acquisition of Pantochim and
Eurodiol by BASF
rPt0lt45l 28.3.2W1 Commission clears Outokumpu purchase of Norzinc
rPtoy4/j9 28.3.20n1 Commission clears the acquisition of Magteti Marelli Ctmatizzazione by
Japan's Denso Corgnration
tPtoy453 28.3.2001 Commission authorises participation of Shell in Siemens Solar
tPt0u478 30.3.2001 Commission authorises jobt venture between Thales and Raytheon
rPtou486 2.4.zmr Commission clears Huntsmatr Intemational's buy of Albright & Wilson's
European surfacants
rPl0ll48l 2.4.200t Commission opens detailed investigation into the acquisition oflrgrand by
Schneider Electric
IP|0U485 2.4.2001 Commission clears electronic mailbox joint venture in Denmark
tPtou492 3.4.20o1 Commission clears joint venture between Getronics and Hagemeyer in the field
of ICT wholesaling
rPtou493 3.4.2ffi1 Commission clears takeover of Atle by Ratos and 3i Group Plc
IPtou494 3.4.2W1 Commission clears Campbell Soup purchase of Unilever's European Culinary
Brands Businesses
rP/01/518 6.4.2401 Commission clears Flextronics takoover of Ericsson's mobile operations
rPtou520 6. .?ffir Commission clears acquisition of Sema by Schlumberger
rPtOlts2s 6.4.20{J1 Commission clears Dow Chemical purchase of Enichem's polyurethanes
business
rPtou529 10.4.2001 Commission clears acquisition ofjoiDt control over Belgium's Holdivat by
Spanish company Teka
rPtou531 10.4.2r01 Commission authorises acquisition of sole control over Sydtraft by E.ON
rPtou532 10.4.2001 Commission clearsjoint venturc between Philips and LG Electronics
rP/o1/555 tt.4.20,Jl Commission authorises Buhnnann's acquisition of Samas's office supplies
business, subject to a divestihre
rPt0u573 19.4.2W1 Comnission opens inde.pth probe into De Beers joint venture with LVMH
rPt0u574 t9.4.2001 Commission launclres in-depth investigation into acquisition of Addtek by CRH
in the construction s€ctor
IP/o1/601 25.4.2001 Commission clears Liberty Media's purchase of a controlling stake in
UnitedGlobalCommunications
IPtoy6tl 26.4.2001 Commission approves Linde and Jungheimich's joint Internet market place
rP/o1/618 26.4.2W1 Commission authorises BP's acquisition of sole control over Erd6lchemie
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IPt01t629 2.5.200r Commission clears joint venture between Thomas Cook Holdings and British
Airwavs
IPt01t638 3.5.200r Commission clears Norwegian office supplies Date B2B joint venture
IP/01/668 8.5.2001 Commission clears the acquisition of Selecta Group Compass Group PIc
rPt0U669 8.5.2001 Commission clears the acquisition by Pernod Ricard and Diageo of the spirits
and wine business of Seagram
wnu670 8.5.2001 Commission opens in-depth probe into fiaveljoint venture between T-Online,
TUI andNeckermann
rPt0u676 10.5.2001 Commission clears purchase by CVC Capital Partners and Cinven of two
AssiDomiin units
IP/o1/683 14.5.2001 Commission clears joint control of UK air trafflc control provider NATS
rPt0U686 14.5.2001 Commission clears acquisition by Industri Kapital of the chemical business of
Perstorp Ab, subject to commitnents
rPt0U687 A.5.240 Commission clears acquisition of Systematics by Elechonic Data Systems
IPt0U726 22.5.200 Commission clears de-merger of Thales and Siemens ATM joint venture
wmn27 22.5.200 Commission clears Austrian Internet ioint venture Adworx
IPtoUTg 30.5.2001 Commission clears Industri Kapital's acquisition of a controlling stake in
Telia's business armThor
tPt0U765 30.5.2001 Commission clears acquisition by Matsushita of sole control over two battery-
manufacturing factories in Belgium and Poland
IP/01t772 1.6.2Wt Commission clears acquisition of Scandic Hotels by Hilton
IPntnT3 5.6.2001 Commission opens in-depth probe into the acquisition ofjoint control of
Hidrocantdbrico by GrupoVillarMir and EnBW
IPl01l774 5.6.2001 Commission clears acquisition by Lufthansa Service Holding ofsole control of
Onex Food Services
IPl01n98 6.6.2001 Commission gives green light to NEC's space joint venture with Toshiba
rP/01/804 7.6.2N1 Commission clears acquisition of Sanitec by BC Funds in the bathroom
products sector
rP/0r/810 8.6.2001 Commission clears acquisition by Sodexho of a number of Albert Abela
companies
IPtolt822 t2.6.2001 Commission clears merger of European flexible packaging activities of Amcor,
Danisco andAhlsfrom
IPt0u823 12.6.2ffi1 Commission approves Continental's takeover of DainrlerChrysler subsidiary
Temic
rP/or/838 14.6.2001 Commission authorises joint venture between Schneider and Thomson
Multimedia
IPt0u839 4.6.2N Commission clearsjoint venture by Skanska and Posten
tPt01t847 5.6.200 Commission clears takeover of ArGsia bv Dexia
IPtO1t841 4.6.2N Commission authorises merger between BHP and Billiton
rPlo1/848 t5.6.2001 Commission clears Speedy Tomato Italian lnternet portal joint vennre with
Olivetti
IPl01l870 20.6.2001 Commission clears acquisition of Informix Software by IBM, both Arnerican
rPl01/886 22.6.2001 Comrnission clears acquisition ofTrue North by Interpublic in the marketing
communications sector
rP/o1/890 22.6.2001 Commission initiates detailed probe into CVC's acquisition of Austrian fibre
company I"enzing
rPt0lt904 27.6.2001 Commission clears acquisition of conhol of Fiat Hitachi Excavators by CNH
Global
IP/O1/905 27.6.2001 Commission clears acquisition of sole control over Airtel by Vodafone
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rPtoug06 27.6.2Wr Commission clears with undertaking T6lddiftrsion de France's acquisition of a
contolling stakc in Finland's Digita
rPt0lt907 n.6.2ffi1 Commission clers acquisition of Sapa by Elkem
rPt0U9ll 2E.6.2ffi1 Commission clears joint acquisition of Renault's CAI
rPtolt912 28.6.2W1 Commission clears acquisition of Swedish phone directories firm ENIRO by
SEAT
rPtol1926 2.7.2Wr Commission clears Flextronics buy of Alcatel's mobile phones plant at Laval,
France
rP/o1t928 2.7.2W1 Commission clEars IBM Italia joint venture with Fiat
rPtou936 3.7.zmr Commission approves joint venture between Creditanstalt and
RaiffeisenZentralbank
rP/o1/938 3.7.20n1 Commission initiates dctailcd investigation into merger between Brazilian iron
ore poducers
rPt0u952 4.7.2W1 Commission clears joint venture between Hitachi and STMicroelectronics to
license and develop RISC nicmprocessor cores
IPt0v953 4.7.2ffi1 Commission clears purcbase of Hansol's stake in Singapore's PanAsia Paper
by Norske Skog andAbitibi
rptolt965 6.7.2mr Commission opens in{epth probe into Tetra Laval's proposed acquisition of
French company Sidel
rPtou966 6.7.2W1 Commission clears acquisition by OM Group (US) of Degussa's chemicals and
catalvsts unit
rPtou973 9.7.2001 Commission clears ltalian pharrnaceuticals wholesale venture between
Angelini and Phoenix
rPtoug?4 9.7.2ffi1 Cmmission clears acquisition by Alcatel of full control of Alcatel Space
IPt01t993 r2.7.2001 Comrnission opens indepth probe into Swedish bank merger between SE
Banken and FdreningsSparbanken
IPt01,t9,4 13.7.?ffi| Commission clears joint acquisition by Heineken of Bayerische Brauholding's
beer activities
IPtolt ffiz 17.7.2ffi1 Commission clearc acquisition by CVC of a division of Amstelland
IPtOU 034 r9.7.20or Commission clears acquisition of Norwegian company Moelven by Finnforcst
IPtou 040 19.7.2W1 Commission clears acquisition of Dnesdner Bank by Alliaaz AG
rPtoyl04l t9.7.2Wr Commission initiates detailed probe into rnerger between steel producers
Usinor and Arbed/Aceralia
rP/01/1053 23.7.2001 Commission opens daailed inquiry into takeover of German paper
manufachrrer Haindl by LJPM-Kgnrnene and Norske Skog
rPl0ll106T 25.7.2001 Commission clears acquisition ofjoint control by Saab Ericsson Space
(Sweden) and Stork (the Netherlands) ofFoklrer Space (the Netherlands)
rPt0utt22 n.7.zml Commission authorises joint venture betwe€n Accenture and Lagardere
rPtoutt23 27.7.2ffi1 Commission clears the retail joint venture Coop Norden
IPl0lll136 27.7.2001 Commission gives conditional cleararrce to the acquisition of the pet-food
company Ralston Purina by Nestld
IPl0llrrST n.7.2ffi1 Commission clears Finnish Sampo Oyj's take-over of Norwegian Storebrand
ASA
rP/01/1138 n.7.20ol Ford authuised to take over wholesale distribution of Mazda in the UK
IPt0llll79 3.8.2(n1 Commission gives go.ahead for heussag to acquire entire capital of TUI
Belgium
rP/01/1181 3.8.2001 Commission clears joint control of RWE and Bundesland Kiirnten in K?irntner
Energie,holding Betoiligungs GmbH
rPtollllST 6.8.2001 Commission clears joint ventur€ between Hollandse Beton Groep N.V. and
Ballast Nedam N.V. in the dredging s€ctor
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Pt0ytr94 7.8.200r Comrnission approves automotive components joint venture of Siemens and
Yazaki
IPtOU1t97 9.8.2001 Commission clears acquisition of Nutricia by Friesland Coberco in the dairy
sector
rPt0y1t99 10.8.2001 Commission clears acquisition of sole control by Fabricom over Sulzer
rPtOU1200 10.8.2001 Commission clears acquisition of sole control by Fabricom over GTI
rPtOU120r 10.8.2001 Commission clears acquisition of Du Pont Pharmaceuticals by Bristol-Myers
Squibb
rPt0ut22r 23.8.2W1 Commission authorises the creation of a joint venture by HHLA and Hapag-
Lloyd to run the newAltenwerder container terminalAltenwerder at the Port of
Hamburg
IP/01/1223 24.8.2001 Commission launches detailed investieation into the takeover of St Louis Sucre
by Siidzucker
IPtOlt 224 24.8.2001 Commission clears Bertelsmann ioint venture with Arnoldo Mondadori
IPtOu 225 24.8.2001 Commission clears Dalkia acquisition of sole control of Clemessy
tPtOu 229 28.8.2001 Commission authorises Fiat's acquisition of Montedison through Italenergia
rPtou1235 3.9.2001 Commission clears Angelini and Phoenix acquisition ofltalian pharmaceuticals
wholesaler Grossfarma
rPtout239 5.9.2001 Comrnission clears acquisition of Tempus by Havas Advertising
rPtolnz4r 5.9.2001 Commission clears Italian car-rental ioint venture between Fidis (Fiat) and Sei
(Enel)
rPtol/Lu7 7.9.2001 Commission refers oil products part of BP/E.ON deal to Germany, deepens
probe into petrochemicals markets
rPt01n273 t't.9.2ffi1 Commission clears joint venture between Hitachi and LG Electronics
rPt01lr274 17.9.2N1 Commission clears Italian venture between JCDecaux, Rizzoli Corriere della
Sera and Publitransport in the field of outdoor advertising
Ft01^277 18.9.2001 Commission clears purchase of Yorkshire Power Group by CE Electric
rPt01n278 18.9.2001 Commission clears acquisition of SSM Coal by Rheinbraun
rP/o1n299 20.92ro1 Commission gives conditional approval to the acquisition ofjoint conrol of
Olivetti and Telecom Italia bv Pirelli and Edizione
rPtoln307 249.2001 Commission clears acquisition of sole control over Gali'leo by Cendant (both
US based)
rPt01n333 27.9.2001 Commission clears modified iced tea, coffeejoint venture between Coca-Cola
and Nestl6
rPtOU1335 28.9.2001 Commission clears acquisition of Kld'ckner by Balli
rPt0y1344 1.10.2001 Commission clears acquisition of Sensormatic Electronics by Tyco
Intemational
IPt01n345 2.r0.2001 Commission approves Telefonica/Ericsson joint venture
rPt01t1346 2.10.2001 Commission clearsjoint venture between Norwegian companies Norske Skog
and Peterson in greaseproofpaper
IPt01n347 2.r0.2w1 Commission clears purchase by Schmalbach-Lubeca of two beverage can
plants ofRexam
rPtoy1369 5.10.2001 Commission clears venture htween Tele Danmark Mobile International and
CMG Wireless Data Solutions
IPtovt370 5.10.2001 Commission clears purchase of US medical device maker C.R. Bard by Tlco
Intemational
IPt01n4t4 12.10.2W1 Commission clears acquisition of UK magazine publisher IPC by Time (AOL
TimeWarner)
rPt01n438 18.10.2001 Commission refers to Bundeskartellamt review of HanieVFels deal in German
building-materials sector, deepens probe into Dutch market
IPtotn439 t7.102001 Commission clears Philips acquisition of Marconi Medical Systems
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IP|OUt455 19.10.2001 Commission clears takeover of Gcrman industrial bearings maker FAG
Kugelfischer by rival INA
IPl0ll1462 22.10.2001 Commission clears acquisition of Ternpus by WPP
rPt0ut466, u.10.2ffi1 Commission clears acquisition of Heller Financial by GE Capital
IP|0U1467 23.tO.2001 Commission clears sale of Henkel's Cognis to Schroder Ventures and Goldman
Sachs
IPtoln499 26.tO.2ml Commission clears acquisition of Beck's by Interbrew
tPtolt1509 29.10.2ffi1 Commission clears HDPEjoint venture between BP and Solvay and BP's
acquisition of Solvay's polypropylene business
rP/o1/1510 29.tO.20ol The Comnission authorises the takeover ofFilfrauto, a French manufacturer of
automotive filters, by its ltalian rival Sogefi
IP/01/1511 30.10.2001 Commission authorises Cadbury Schweppes acquisition of Pemod Ricard's soft
drinks business
IPloy1552 8.11.2001 Conrmission clears Nordea acquisition of Postgfuot
IP/o1/1565 13.11.2001 Commission approves SCH's acquisition of AKB
IP/o1/1559 t3.tl.2N Commission authorises lfuch Industries to acquire sole control of KoSa
IPtOvts6/, 13.tt.2N Commission clears Flextronics buy of Xerox's ofrce-equiprrent business
IP/o1/1578 r3.11.200 Commission clear$ a joht venture between ICA Ahold and Dansk Supermarked
IPtoy1579 I4.tt.z0or Commission clears sports rights ventue between Canal+, RTL and Groupe
Jean{laude Darmon
IP/01/1609 19.11.2001 Commission approves takeover of Mannesmann Sachs by ZF Friedrichshafen
IPt0u16t5 20.11.2001 Conrmission authorises acquisition by Enel ofEndesa's subsidiary Viesgo
IPtOulffi 26.11.2ffi1 Commission authorises the acquisition of Powergen by German energy
company E.ON
rP/01/166r 26.tt.z00l Commission clears purchase oftwo Deutsche Telekom cable units by
Blackstone and CDPQ
IPtoln69l 29.tt.2ffi1 Commission clears Creet telecomsjoint venture between electricity utility PPC
(Greece) and Italian operatorWind
rPloy1692 29.1t.2ffi1 Commission authorises takeover of DMV by Mannesmannrdhren-Werke
rPtoln697 29.lt.z0ol Commission clears change from joint to sole contol of ECT, subject to
conditions
rPt0ul709 30.1 1.2001 Commission refers review of Haniel/Ytong deal in German building-materials
sector to Bundeskartellamt, deepens probe into Durch market
tP/0111736 5.12.2ffi1 Commission deepens probe into Bayer's acquisition ofAventis Crop Science
IPl0ll1753 6.12.2001 Commissiqa glears joint venture between Norsk Hydro, and NutriSI in the field
of specialty fertilisers
TPNUNffi 7.12.2jo1 Commission approves merger of French music channels Muzzik and Mezzo
rPtoul767 7.12.2W1 Commission clears Swedish joint venhre between Saab andWM-Data for the
provision of aerospace and automotive consultrng services
rP/o1/1805 12.12.?Nl Commission clears acquisition of credit insurcr NCM by Gerling
IPlo1/1838 17.12.2N1 Commission clears the aoquisition ofjoint conrol of Austrian utility Steweag
byVerbund and ES'TAG
rPtoln&M 17.12.2W1 Commission approves split-up of Concert telecoms JV between British
Telecommunications and AT&T
IP/01/1846 18.12.2001 Commission clears takeover bv Flextronics of Telaris Siidra
IP/01/1881 20.r2.2ffi1 Commission clears Internet travel agency joint venture between Otto Versand
and Sabre
IP/OUIqX) 21.12.2001 Commission authorises EdF's acouisition of oarts of TXU Eurooe
IP/01/1901 21.r2.2ffi1 Commission clears non-life insurancc venture htween Sampo, Varna-Sampo,
Skandia and Storebrand
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1.2. Decisions underArticle 8 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 4WlE9
H 
- 
Judgments of the Community courts
Court of First Instance
Subject
Commission clears the merger between Metso and Svedala subject to
conditions
Commission blocks acquisition of Metsii Tissue by SCA31.1.2001
Commission clears purchase by EdF of a stake in German electricity flrm
EnBW subject to conditions
Commission clears joint ventures between British, Dutch and Singapore postal
operators with conditions
Comrnission clears takeover ofADtranz by Bornbardier, subject to
commiunents
Commission clears MAN's takeover of Auw?irter (Neoplan)
The Commission GE's acquisition of Honeywell
Commission clears acquisition of ECT by Hutchison and the Rott€rdam port
authority, subject to commifinents
t1.7.2001 Commission clears BASF's takeover of Eurodiol and Pantochim
Commission clears venture between De Beers and LVMH but warns De Beers
on supplier of choice agreements
Commission clears acquisition ofjoint conrol over Hidroel6ctrica del
Cant6brico by Grupo Villar Mir and EnBW subject to conditions
Commission of conhol of Irgrand by Schneider Electric10.10.2001
Commission prohibits CVC's acquisition of Austrian fibre company Lenzing17.10.2001
Commission clears merger between Brazilian iron ore producers subject to
undertakings
IP/o1/1515
IP/01/1516 Commission prohibits acquisition of Sidel by Tetra Laval Group
2t.11.2001 Commission clears take-over of Haindl by UPM-Kymmene and Norske Skog
Petrolessence and SG2R v CommissionOrder of 17.1.2001
Judgment of 31.1.2001
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III 
- 
STATEAID
A 
- 
Overvlew of cases
1. Regional aid
Dewnark
Regional gowth enviwnmants ('50)
On 3 July, the Commission decided not to raise any objections to a scheme forming part of the Danish
authorities'.dk2l strategy, which sets out a vision for business development in Denmark over the next
5-10 years. A regional growth environment is a regionally-based cooperation project. The
environments are intended to meet the need to intensify and develop cooperation between non-profit
private and public training institutions and research and tecbnological institutions, on the one hand,
and companies, on the other, with a view to improving the quality of the training and advisory services
provided in the region. The State pays a grant to participating non-profit organisations coveing50Vo
of their costs, while participating companies have to cover their own costs in full.
Although the scheme is intended to benefit the regi,ons as such, the Commission found that it could
confer particular advantages on all participants in the projects, mainly because they had access to new
information ahead of their potential competitors. The aid was found compatible under Article 87(3Xc) of
the EC Treaty since it did not affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest.
Greece
Natuml gas ('s')
On 6 June, the Commission decided to apgove State aid in the fonn of grants and accelerated
depreciation to three newly fonned natural gas distribution companies in Attica Thessaloniki and
Thessaly. The aid is intended to promote the introduction of gas as a mainstre^m energy source. The
Commission did not concur with Greece's arguments that the government's intervention was a general
measure as it was part of aa infrastructure project or that the measurres did not affect trade between
Member States. The Commission examined the grants and tax arrangements under the State aid rules of
the F,C Treaty and exempted them as regional aid on an ad hoc basis. Desprte their limitation to one
economic sector, the Commission fouad that the State aid measures had clear and obvious benefits for the
whole region. The aid intensity (Attica 17 7o, Thessaloniki ll.3 Vo and Thessaly 25.9 %) remains well
below the maximum aid intensities allowed under the Greek regional aid map. The Commission in its
decision stressed Orat the introduction of natural gas in Crreece will provide an additional energy source
which will enhance competition and result in lower pdces for consumers. It is also expected that new
direct and indircct job oppornrnities will be ceated and that there will be a positive impact on the
environrnent.
('*) Case N 126/20ol (OJ C 328, 23.11.2001).('') Casc NN 90/2000 (OJ C 333, 28.1 1.2001).
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Spain
(a) Construction of a combined-cycle electricity production plant (Bahfra de Bizhaia Electricidad)
and a regasifrcation plant (Bahia de Bizhaia Gas) in Bilbao (ts')
The Commission decided on 6 June to initiate a formal investigation underArticle 88(2) of the EC Treaty
into a Basque Govemment aid project notified by the Spanish authorities on 26 January. The investment
project concerns the construction of a combined-cycle electricity production plant (Bahia de Bizkaia
Electricidad 
- 
BBE) and a regasiflcation plant (Bahia de Bizkaia Gas 
- 
BBG) in the Bilbao port area.
The aid consists of grants of EUR 30 million to BBE and EUR 23.2 million to BBG, to be paid between
2000 and 2003, representing a gross intensity of t0 7o of the investment cost. The aid recipients are the
companies BBE and BBG, in which BP-Amoco, Repsol, Iberdrola and EVE each hold a25 7o stake.
The Commission noted that the project did not form part of any existing Commission-authorised aid
scheme, but was a one-off. This being the case, under the regional aid guidelines, the Commission is
required to check that any distortions of competition which the aid may entail are offset by beneficial
effects of the project on the region concerned. In the Commission's view, the Spanish authorities have yet
to demonstrate adequately that the project is warranted from the regional development point of view.
Moreover, the Commission considers that the project falls within the scope of the multisectoral
framework on regional aid for large investment projects. Under this framework, the maximum aid
intensity permitted for a given project depends on a series of factors, such as market trends for the
product in the relevant geographic market, the capitaUjobs ratio and the regional impact, i.e. the ratio of
direct jobs to indirect jobs. In this respect, the Commission sees a need for a more thorough examination
of the market situation in electricity in Spain to see whether it is in decline. The Commission also
considers that the Spanish authorities will have to provide better supporting evidence regarding the
number of indirect jobs projected and the eligibility of some of the costs.
(b) Research and ilevelopment aidfor the Zamailin plant (Basque Country) ("n)
On 20 June, the Commission decided to initiate proceedings under Article 88(2) of the EC Treaty in
respect of a Basque Govemment aid project notified by the Spanish authorities on 15 December 20fi).
The aid is for research and development at Zamudio (Basque Country) aimed at developing two new
types of low-pressure turbines and for tangible investment at the same site. The recipient is the firm
Industria de Ttrrbo hopulsores SA (ITP).
In the case of the research project, the Spanish authorities claim that the activities to be supported
constitute 'precompetitive development activities' within the meaning of Annex I to the Community
framework for State aid for research and development. The project is to run for four years (1999 to 2002).
The aid is in the form of an interest-free loan of ESP 4 000 mitlion (EUR 24.04 million) torrards total
eligible costs amounting to ESP l0 422 mlllion (ELIR 62.64 million), representing an intensity of
19.34Vo gge.
The Commission expressed doubts as to whether some of the activities planned as part of the project
could be classed as 'precompetitive development activities' within the meaning of Annex I to the
framework, whether some of the eligible costs could be allowed under Annex tr to the ftamework and
finally whether the aid would have the incentive effect required by point 6 of the framework.
("") Case N 84/2001 (OJ C 231,2.6.2001).("') Case N 850/2000 @l C 274,29.9.2001)'
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The investrnent project has a present worth of ESP 8 358 million (EIIR 50.23 million) and is to cover a
three-year period (2000-O2). The aid is in the fonn of a grant worth ESP I 102 million
(ELJR 6.62 million) at current prices, representing an intensity of 13.18 Vo gge and9.80 Vo nge.
The Commission noted that the investment project did not form part of any existing Commission-
authorised aid scheme, but was a one-off. [n such circumstances, under the regional aid guidelines the
Commission is required to check that any distortions of competition which the aid may entail are offset
by beneficial effects of the project on the region concerned. The Commission took the view that it was
unable, at that stage in the examination, to verify the arguments put forward by the Spanish authorities
concerning the justification for the project on regional development grounds, such as its knock-on effect
and contribution to economic development in the Basque Country. It also expressed doubts as to whether
certain eligible costs were allowable under point 4.5 of the regional aid guidelines.
2. Sectoralaid
2.1. Shipbuilding
Spain
On 28 November, in Case C 40/00, the Commission decided to extend a formal investigation into the
restructuring of Spanish shipbuilding to include all transactions that led to the creation of the ZAR
shipbuitding group. The Commission doubted whether the prices paid by the State-owned military
shipbuilding group Bazan (which then changed its name to ZAR) for a number of shipyards bought from
the State-owned civil shipbuilding group Astilleros Espafloles (AESA) and from the State holding
company Sociedad Estatal de Participaciones Industriales (SEPI) were genuine market transactions and
considered that they night therefore constitute aid to ttre new ZAR group. The Commission also
doubted whether such aid would be compatible with the shipbuilding aid rules. It therefore decided to
extend the investigation already initiated in respect of a transaction whereby AESA sold two shipyards
and an engine factory to SEPI.
France
On 25 July, in Case C74199, the Commission decided to declare unnotified State aid to investors in a ship
naned Iz Izvant incompatible with the common market. The ship had been financed by private investors
whose property it still was. It was operated by the frm CIL, which was also to become the eventual
owner. The investors had been entitled to deduct their invesfinent costs from their taxable income in
accordance with a tax scheme (Loi Pons). For this kind of operation, the Corrmission must veriff the
development content of the project. In this case, it took the view that the vessel would not contribute in
any significant way to the development of Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon. As the unlawful aid had already
been granted, it had to be recovered. The Commission considered that the investors, as the direct
beneflciaries and current owners ofthe ship, should repay the aid.
2.2. Steel
A summary of the decisions adopted by the Commission in 2001 is given in the Commission report of
18 March 2002 (COM(2W2) r45).
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2.3. Motor vehicles
On 13 November, the Commission decided to extend the period of validity of the Community framework
for State aid to the motor vehicle industry ('t).All Member States agreed to the extension. The extension
is valid for one year, i.e. until 31 December 2002, unless the new multisectoral framework on regional aid
for large investment projects, replacing the specific sectoral framework for the motor vehicle sector,
enters into force before that date.
Germnny
On 18 July, after conducting a formal investigation, the Commission decided to reduce planned regional
investment aid in favour of Volkswagen for a new car plant in Dresden (16'). The assembly of the new
model and the intermediate storage centre were planned to be located in Dresden and the new bodyshop
and paintshop in nearby Mosel, both assisted areas within the meaning of Article 87(3Xa).
As for the necessity of the aid, the Commission concluded, on the basis of the documents received during
the procedure, that production in the Czech Republic (in Prague and Kvasiny) had been considered by the
company as a credible commercial alternative. The Commission based its assessment of the
proportionality ofthe aid on two separate cost-benefit analyses: for the Dresden and Prague sites on the
one hand and for Mosel and Kvasrny on the other. As regards the investnent in Mosel, the planned aid
intensity was lower than both the regional handicap and the regional aid ceiling. The Commission
therefore authorised the planned aid for Mosel, amounting to DEM 65 million. As regards the investment
in Dresden, the aid intensity planned by Germany exceeded the regional handicap. Consequently, the
Commission authorised aid of DEM 80 million but found an excess amount of DEM 25.7 million to be
incompatible with the common market.
On 20 December, after conducting a formal investigation, the Commission decided that Germany had to
reduce planned regional investment aid in favour of DaimlerChrysler for the construction of a new engine
plant in Kcilleda (Thuringia), an assisted area within the meaning of Article 87(3)(a) ("').
As for necessity, Germany stated that the investment could be carried out at an alternative site in Hungary
(at Nyergesujfalu). On the basis of the documents received, the Commission concluded that the site in
Hungary was a credible commercial alternative. As regards the proportionality of the aid, the assessment
of the cost-benefit analysis resulted in a regional handicap ratio for Kdlleda of 31.93 Vo, which is lower
than initially indicated by Germany. Owing to the significant increase in production capacity, the
allowable aid ratio was further reduced by one percentage point to 30.93 Vo. Consequently, the
Commission could only authorise aid amounting to 30.93 Vo of the eligible investment of
ELJRl85million (net present value), namely EUR57.22 million (net present value). The remaining
ELIR 6.58 million in notified aid was considered incompatible with the coilrmon market.
Italy
On 28 February, after conducting a formal investigation, the Commission cleared regional investment aid
of ITL 78 billion (EUR 40 million) for the production of the new Punto model at the Fiat plant in Melfi
(southern ltaly) ('6). The Commission studied the geographic mobility of the project and concluded that
(t6) oI c 279, 15.9.7997.
('"') Case77l99 (OJ L 48, 20.2.2nD.
('o') Case C 6LlOl (OI C263,19.9.2001).
(163) Case C 7 5199 (OJ L 177, 3O.6.2N1).
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the Fiat goup's plant at Tlchy in Poland would have been a viable alternative. To assess the
proportionality of the aid, a cost4enefit analysis was carried out. The cost-benefit analysis compared the
costs of the project at Melfi with those of the alternative location. As the planned aid intensity was below
botb the regional aid ceiling and the regional handicap intensity, i.e. the exFa cost for locating the
production in Melfi rather than in Ttchy/?'oland, the Commission concluded that the rules of the
Community framework for State aid to Ore motor vehicle industry had been respected and that the
proposed aid was compatible with the Treaty.
On 6 June, the Commission took a negative final decision on research and development aid that the
Italian authorities were proposing to gant to lveco SpA, a subsidiary of the Fiat group engaged in the
design and production of commercial vehicles (t*). The planned aid amounted to EUR 16 million in
nominal terms towards a EllR 111 million invesftnent project for the renewal and expansion of Iveco's
range of light vehicles.
The Commission concluded that the planned aid was not necessary for Iveco to develop the new light van
range. While the projert would lead to an improved product compared with the previous model, the
innovative character of the invest[rent was limited towhat was corltmon in the motor vehicle industry in
the context ofthe development and launch ofnew models. According to the rules governing State aid for
R&D, aid can be granted only if it serves as an incentive for firms to undertake R&D activities in addition
to their normal day+o-day operations.
Spain
On 23 October, the Commission authorised a capital injection carried out in 1999 in favour of the
Spauish motor vehicle manufacturer Santana Motor, having found that the measure did not constitute
State aid ('6). It also partially approved investrrent aid to Santana in relation to its 198-2006 strategic
plan.
Applying the rules on capital injections into companies that involve public resources, the Commission
concluded that Santana's profitability prospects were good enough tojustify the capital injection ftom the
point of view of a narket economy investor. It therefore decided that the capital injection did not
constitute aid. It also concluded that the regional investrrent aid was compatible with the common market
up to a maximum of ELJR 8.68 million.
United Kingdon
On 17 January, in Case C 5ll2ffi0, the Commission cleared regional investment aid of GBP 40 million
for Nissan Motor Manufacturing Ltd. The aid is for conversion of the car plant in Sunderland to produce
the new Micra model. The Commission's initial doubts, which had prompted it to initiate formal
investigation proceedings in September 2([0, had not been borne out.
2.4. Muttisectoral framework
Belgium
On 6 June, in Case C 361204t, the Commission decided to initiate a formal investigation into a measure
taken by the authorities in the Walloon Regron of Belgium involving the Beaulieu group, one of the
('4) Case C 41100 (ex N 670/99) (OI L 292, 9.1 1.20f1).
('6) Case C 49/00 (ex NN 2,V99) (OJ L92,9.42W2).
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leading manufacturers of carpets in Europe, which is based in the Flemish Region of the country. In the
course of its enquiries in the Verlipack case, the Commission became aware of possible State aid to the
Beaulieu group. This was a fresh measure taken by the Walloon region, and the Commission accordingly
asked the Belgian central govemment for information to enable it to assess the measure in the light of the
rules in force. From the information supptied, the Commission learnt that in December 1998 the Beaulieu
group had settled a debt of BEF Il3 712 000 owed to the Walloon Region by transferring 9 704 shares in
Holding Verlipack tr, the nominal value of which was BEF 100 million but the real value of which must
have been significantly lower, given the assets position of the company at the time.
Germany
On 8 May, in Case C ll2001, the Commission authorised a subordinated loan from the State-run
Kreditanstalt ftir Wiederaufbau (KfW) of EUR 76.7 million (DEM 150 million) and an 80 7o fedenl
guarantee for a loan of EUR 63.9 million (DEM 125 million) to the German construction company
Philipp Holzmann AG. The Commission came to the conclusion that the restructuring measures were
appropriate to restore the company's long-term viability and to deal with past mistakes. In that context,
the Commission took into account modifications to the original plan and authorised a one-year credit line
of DEM 125 million (ELIR 63.9 million) provided by KfW at the end of 2000.
On 8 May, in Case N 783/2000, the Commission decided not to raise any objections to proposed aid
amounting to EUR119080000 for Wacker Chemie GmbH Niinchritz, for the extension and
modemisation of the former Hiils AG silicone plant. The Commission concluded that the proposed
26.77 Vo gge intensity was below the maximum aid intensity allowable under the multisectoral
framework for this particular project. [n assessing the compatibility of the aid, the Commission took into
account the market situation, the number ofjobs directly created by the project and the beneflcial effects
of the investment on the economies of the assisted regions ('*).
On 18 July, in Case N 184/2000, the Commission approved EUR27.6 million in investrnent aid for
Kartogoup in Leuna, Saxony-Anhalt. The investment concerned the setting-up of a tissue plant to
produce toilet paper and kitchen towels. The total investment costs amounted to EUR 85 million
(DEM 166 million) and the aid approved represented 35 Vo of the eligible investrnent costs. The
investment project creates 154 permanent jobs in an area suffering from high unemployment. The
Commission found the aid compatible with the multisectoral framework on regional aid for large
investrnent projects ('u').
Spain
On 19 September, in Case C 6912001 (ex NN 4ll200l), the Commission opened a formal investigation
on account of its doubts as to whether State aid for Porcelanas Principado SL was compatible with the
common market. Following a complaint from a competitor, Spain informed the Commission on 8 May
that Sociedad Regional de Promoci6n del hincipado de Asturias (SRPPA), a State-controlled company,
had on 18 January granted a subordinated loan withparticipation inprofits to Porcelanas Principado SL,
a limited liability SME active in the porcelain and china sector and established in Gij6n (Asturias), an
Article 87(3Xc) area.
('*) The ceiling for regional aid in the assisted area concerned is 35 % gross for large companies.("') oJ c 107.7.4.1997.
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On the same date, in Case N 29512001, the Commission decided to raise no objection to the Spanish
authorities'intention to glant investnent aid to GE Plastics SL. The new polycarbonate factory to be
built in Cartagena (Murcia), will be assisted to the tune of EUR 152 million.
Again on 19 September, in Case C 7ll2ffil (ex NN 80/2001), the Commission decided to open a formal
investigation into aid allegedly granted to porcelain manufacturer Grupo de Empresas Alvarcz (GEA),
which is established in Vigo (Galicia). The Commission recalls that it decided back in 1997 to authorise
certain aid measures for the group on condition that no further support be provided to GEA during the
implementation of its reshucturing plan. The Commission has serious doubts as to whether this condition
has been met.
Netherlands
On 13 February, in Case C lll9, the Commission adopted a decision on several aid measures for SCI
Systems in connection with its investment in a factory for the assembly of Hewlett Packard desktop PCs
in Heerenveen. The Commission approved investment aid and aid for job creation linked to investment as
the combined aid did not exceed the applicable regional aid ceiling. The expected eligible cost amounted
to EUR 31.1 million and the aid would amount to about EUR 6.2 million. Approval is conditional on the
jobs created being maintained for five years. The Commission also found against several ad hoc
measures. SCI had been able to buy land cheaply; the aid element in the transaction was calculated by the
Commission at EllR 753 000. Other aid elements were linked to the rent for and the renovation and
security of temporary production facilities provided by a public regional development organisation. This
involved total State aid of ELIR 756 000. The Commission considered that the free transport provided for
SCI's employees to and from the temporary facilities benefited the individual employees and did not
constitute State aid. SCI had neither under the relevant collective employment agreement nor under the
individual contracts with its employees any obligation to provide such public transport. Finally,
EUR 100 000 granted for the temporary housing of staff was below the de minimis threshold.
2.5. Financial services
Germany
On 8 May, in Case E 10/2000, the Commission adopted a formal recommendation proposing that the
German Government adopt appropriate measures in order to bring the system of State guarantees for
public-law credit institutions (Anstaltslast and Gewdhrtrdgerhaftung) into line with the State aid rules of
the EC Treaty.
Anstaltslast may be translated as 'maintenance obligation'. It means that the public owners (for example
federal government, I)inder, municipalities) of the instiotion are responsible for securing its financial
base and continued operation throughout its existence. Gewiihrtriigerhaftung m^y be translated as
'guarantee obligation'. It implies ttrat the guarantor will meet all liabilities of the bank which cannot be
met from its assets. Both guarantees are unlimited in both time and amount. Nor do credit institutions
have to pay anything for them. The German publicJaw credit institutions which benefit from these
guarantees ue the Land.esbanlcen, a number of special-purpose banks and around 580 savings banks of
widely varying size.
The adoption of the recommendation followed intensive contacts between the Commission and the
German authorities on the future of the system of State guarantees forpublic-law credit institutions.
COMPETITION REPORT 2OO1
268 APPLICATION OF THE COMPETITION RULES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
The recommendation adopted on 8 May 2001 stipulates that the guarantee system is to be considered
State aid within the meaning ofthe Treaty: the measures are based on State resources and favour certain
groups of undertakings and they distort competition and affect trade within the Community. However,
since the system already existed when the EC Treaty entered into force in 1958, the aid qualifies as
'existing' aid regarding which the Commission can only demand changes for the future but cannot act
retrospectively.
According to the Commission recommendation, compatibility with the EC rules should be achieved by
31 March 2002. However, the recommendation expressly provides that the Commission may decide to
agree to a later date if it considers this objectively necessary andjustifled in order to allow an appropriate
transition for certain public banks to the new situation. The Commission is aware of the need to protect
existing creditors who have provided funds to the public-law credit institutions on the strength of the
guarantee system.
On 25 July, in Case NN 53/2001 (Bankgesellschaft Berlin (BGB), the Commission approved rescue aid
of some EUR 2 billion to bring the bank's own funds ratio back to its pre-crisis level of 9.7 Vo.T\ebank
had incurred substantial losses in 2000 mainly through real-estate operations which went wrong. The
approval of rescue aid was based on the undertaking given by the German authorities that they would
present a restructuring plan within six months and was limited to this period or to the time the
Commission needed to take a decision on the restructuring plan. Under this second examination, the
Commission will have a close look at the necessary volume of the aid and will ask for compensatory
measures to offset the competition-distorting effect of the aid if this is found to be appropriate.
2.5. Services
Spain
On 3 July, in Case C 33198, the Commission took a partly negative decision regarding aid granted to
Babcock Wilcox Espaffa (BWE). In April 1998, the Commission had initiated a formal investigation
under the State aid rules of the EC Treaty into two capital injections, both of EllR60.l million
(ESP l0 000 million), that Sociedad Estatal de Participaciones Industriales (SEPI) had made in 1994
and 1997 into its wholly owned subsidiary BWE. In July 1999, the Commission decided to extend
the procedure to include in the investigation a further capital increase of EUR'246.4 mllbon
(ESP 41 000 million) notified by the Spanish authorities. Finally, in July 2000, the Commission extended
the procedure again to cover aid totalling EUR 463.5 million (ESP 77 110 million) proposed under the
privatisation arrangements between SEPI and Babcock Borsig AG. The Commission decided to prohibit
EUR2L.44 million in aid which the Spanish authorities intended to grant to the ongoing business for
future investments in the equity of joint ventures through which it will contract future orders. The
Commission judged that, unlike other assisted invesftnents included in the industrial plan, this
disbursement was very close to the market, formed part of the commercial pohcy of the company and,
consequently, its assistance by the State could seriously distort competition to an extent contrary to the
common interest.
France
On 13 November, in accordance with the procedure provided for in Article 88(1) of the EC Treaty and
Article 18 of Regulation (EC) No 65911999, the Commission proposed that France adopt appropriate
mea$ures in Case E 461200l, namely that it put an end to the exemption from the tax on health insurance
contracts enjoyed by mutual and provident societies. Altematively, the French authorities may also grant
the exemption in return for the performance of a service of general economic interest, ensuring that the
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aid resulting from the exemption does not exceed the costs imposed by the constraints assumed for this
purpose.
Italy
On t9 September, the Commission concluded that any State aid involved in ENI's 1994 capttal injection
of EIIR 1.5 billion (ITL 3 000 billion) into Enichem complied with the guidelines on restructuring aid
and was therefore compatible with the cornmon market.
On l l December, the Commission decided that the tax measures for banks introduced by Italian Act
No 461/98 of 23 December 1998 and the related Legislative Decree No 153/9 of 17 May 1999 were
incompatible with the State aid rules laid down in the EC Treaty. The measures in question conferred a
discriminatory competitive advantage on the banks that participated in the operations being assisted. Italy
must now recover the amounts that the banks benefiting from tax exemptions avoided having to pay. The
Commission's investigation into State aid to banking foundations (as distinct from banks themselves)
continues. The status of these measures still needs to be defined. The Commission also examined whether
the special tax fteament could be considered to be restructuring aid. However, the conditions for
applying the Community guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty were
not met. The aid was not notifled individually to the Commission; the banks that benefited ftom the aid
were not in difficulties, nor was the aid intended to restore the flrms'long-term viability; finally, the
guidelines require measures to be taken to mitigate as far as possible any adverse effects of the aid on
competitors (usually this takes the form of a reduced market presence of the company after its
restructuring). No such situation was envisaged in the present case.
Portugal
On 13 November, the Commission initiated formal investigation proceedings in respect of a number of ad
hoc measures granted to the Portuguese public broadcaster RTP, since it had doubts as to whether or not
the Portgguese State had overcompensated RTP's reimbursable public-service costs during the period
l9g2-98 to the tune of ELJR 83.6 million. The initiation of proceedings followed three complaints that
the Commission received in 1993, 1996 and 1997 ftom the Portuguese private broadcaster SIC.
On 7 November 1996, the Commission already took a decision on the first and part of the second
complaint, which was annulled by the Court of Ffust Instance (1s).
2.7. Agriculture
Overuiew of cases
Overall, the Commission received 379 notifications of planned State aid measures in the agricultural and
agfi-industrial sector.in 2001. It also started the examination of 39 aid measures which had not been
notified before under Article 88(3) of the EC Treaty. The Conunission raised no objections to
212 measures. The procedure provided for in Article 88(2) was launched in respect of 15 cases in which
there were serious doubts as to the compatibility of the measures with the cortlmon market. The
Commission terminated the Article 88(2) proceedings in five cases, taking a negative final decision in
two of them.
('*) Judgment in Case T46197.
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The overview of cases which follows includes a selection of those which raised the most interestins
issues of State aid policy in the agricultural and agri-industrial sector in 2001.
Exceptional occurrences; BSE crisis 
- 
income aid
In accordance withArticle 87(2Xb) of the EC Treaty, aid to make good the damage caused by exceptional
occurrences is compatible with the common market. The concept of exceptional occurrence is not
defined in the Treaty and the Commission applies this provision on a case-by-case basis, after appraisal
of the specific event concerned.
The ongoing crisis in the beefmarket, which had been caused by a BSE scare at the end ofthe previous
year, was recognised by the Commission as such an exceptional occrurence.
The Commission accordingly authorised Austria, Belgium, France, Germany Italy and Spain to pay
income aid to beef farmers who had suffered losses between November 2000 and June 2001 because of
the consequences of the BSE crisis. No requests to pay such aid were received from other Member States.
In all the cases, the Commission established that there was no overcompensation at sectoral level or at
individual farm level. These aid measures can be summarised as follows:
Austria
On 25 July, the Commission authorised income aid amounting to approximately ELJR 2.9 million (some
ATS 40 million) granted in the province of Carinthia ('u').
Belgiun
On 7 November, the Commission authorised Belgium to pay out the second instalment of direct aid to
beef farmers, totalling approximately EUR 29.7 million (BEF 1 200 million) ("0). An equivalent amount
was already authorised by the Commissionon25 July under CaseN 43712001. The aid is targeted at beef
farrners who have been particularly affected by the consequences ofBSE because ofthe dependence of
their income on beef production.
France
The combined value of the income aid ("') cleared by the Commission on 25 July is approximately
EffR 259 million (FRF I 700 million), comprising direct aid of approximately EIJR 152.4 million
(FRF 1 000 million), reimbursement of interest payments involving aid estimated at EUR 60.9 million
(FRF 400 million), and consolidation loans involving aid estimated at approximately EUR 45.7 million
(FRF 300 million).
Germany
On 25 July, the Commission autlorised Germany to grant income aid in the kinder of Bavaria ('7'):
approximately EUR 28 million (DEM 55 million); Thuringia ("'): approximately EUR 4 million
('@) Case NN 5812001.
("") Cases N 43712001 and N 65712001.("') CaseNN46/2001.("') CaseN l93l200l.("') Case N 17012M1.
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(DEM 8 million); Lower Saxony ('?a): approximately EUR 5 million (DEM 10 million); and Saxony ('75):
approximately EUR 2.05 million @EM 4 million) pr year for 2001 and 2002.
On 2 October, the Commission authorised Germany (Land of Baden-Wiirttemberg) ("u) to pay income
aid worth some EUR5.I million (DEMIO million) to beef farmers who suffered losses between
November 2000 and June 2001 because of the consequences of the BSE crisis.
On 30 October, the Commission authorised Germany (Innd of Hessen) ("t) to pay ud to beef farmers
who suffered losses between November 2000 and December 2001 because of the consequences of the
BSE crisis. In particular, the Hessen emergency progfirrnme for BSE grants income aid totalling
DEM 15 million (EUR 766 937.82)inthe form of subsidised loans to farmers affected by the BSE crisis.
haly
On 25 July, the Commission authorised income aid to beef famrers of up to approximately
EUR 77 million (some ITL 154 000 million) ("8).
On 30 October, the Commission authorised Italy (Lombardy) (t?e) to grant aid of approximately
EUR 2.32 million to beef farmers suffering from liquidity problems due to the reduction of their income
during the BSE crisis period. The aid, in forrr of subsidised short-term loans, consists in a contribution
by the region of 3.5 percentage points towards the loan interest, the rest (at least 1.5 percentage points)
being charged to farmers.
Spain
The income aid authorised by the Commission on 25 July relates to two regions: Asturias ("0):
approximately EUR 6 million (ESP 1 000 million); and Cantabria (18'): approximately EUR 5.98 million
(ESP 994 million).
Other BSE-related aid measures
Pursuant to Article 87(3Xc) of the EC Tteaty, the Commission authorised a series of other BSE-related
aid measures, notably in Austria, Italy and Germany. These measures relate to issues such as the costs of
BSE tests, compensation for slaughterhouses, compensation for the value of desfroyed animals, the
restocking of herds on farms where BSE has been found, and the costs of storage, transport and disposal
of processed animal proteins and animal feed. In most of these cases, the Commission considered that the
measure complied with the rules on State aid granted under programmes for fighting animal diseases, as
laid down in point ll.4 of the Community guidelines for State aid in the agriculture sector(l82). For
example:
("') Case N 16412ffi1.
('?') CaseN248/2001.
("u) Case N ls0tBt20ol.("') CaseN249/2001.
('n) Case N ll3lN2001.
('D) CaseN4ll/2001.('*) CaseN269/2001.("') CaseN377/20O1.
Ce) OJ C 28, 7.2.2Co0; conigendum OI C 232, 72.8.2000.
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Austria
On 2 October, the Commission authorised Austria to grant various BSE-related aid measures with a
budget of more than EUR 29 million ('83). Various types of aid are involved: aid is given to compensate
for the fall in the value of processed animal proteins and animal feed additives in feedingstuffs and
premixed feed which contain such processed animal proteins. Aid can also be given for tlte costs of
stoftrge, ffansport and disposal ofprocessed animal proteins and animal feed, additives in feedingstuffs
and premixed feed which contain such processed animal proteins, risk material and milk which could not
be used or products produced on the basis thereof. Finally, aid can also be given to compensate for the
loss of income on farms blocked because of BSE. and lastlv for test costs.
Germany
On 7 September, the Commission authorised Germany (Land ofBaden-Wiirttemberg) ('s) to pay aid for
BSE tests, for compensating slaughterhouses for the value of destroyed animals, and for farms where
BSE had been found. The three aid measures are all limited in time: until the end of 2002 for the BSE
tests and the compensation for BSE-affected farms and until the end of 2001 for the measure pertaining
to slaughterhouses. At the end of 2002, the aid for BSE tests and the compensation for BSE-affected
farms will be reviewei in the light of the strategy applied at that time for combating BSE.
By decision of 25 October, the Commission authorised the payment of State aid under two measures, one
in the I'and of Bavaria ("s) amounting to approximately EUR 10 million (DEM 20 million) to
compensate for the value of animal feed which had to be destroyed, as well as approximately
EUR 6 million (DEM 12 million) in compensation for farmers on whose farms BSE had been found. The
second relates to the Innd of Saxony ('8u) and represented approximately EUR 2 million (DEM 4 million)
to pay for the costs ofrestocking herds on farms where livestock had been culled on the instructions of
public authorities.
On 30 October, the Commission authorised an emergency progr,mrme for BSE in the Land of
Hessen ('8). Among the measures listed in the programme, Hessen will compensate up to 100 Vo of the
costs of transport and disposal of animal feed containing MBM produced before 2 December 2000; the
costs of BSE tests for cattle of more than 24 months and for sheep; and destruction of the animals and the
economic value of the carcasses and the milk in suspected or confirmed BSE cases. The total aid granted
within the approved scheme amounts to EUR I 955 689.
haly
The scheme authorised on 25 July ("') comprises State aid other than income aid 
- 
for example
compensation to farmers where BSE has been found, restocking aid, and national part-financing for the
'purchase for destruction scheme' 
- 
bringing the total volume of aid, including the EUR 77 million
income aid, up to EUR 150 million (some ITL 300 000 million).
('33) Case N 1,1412001.('*) Case N l50tBl200l.("') CaseN 17412001.('*) CaseN248/2001.
(r8') Case N Z9l2001.("') Case N 1,131N2001.
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Animat diseases: foot-and-mouth disease in the United Kingdom
Most of the aid notified by the United Kingdom to the Commission during the year provided for
measrres designed to help fartrers overcome the financial and economic difficulties caused by the
outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease which affected most of the country with strong repercussions on the
agricultural sector.
In this respect, two major aid schemes were approved by the Commission: on 3 April, it approved the
outgoers mark 2 scheme ("t), which was designed to help pig producers hit by FMD who wished to leave
pig farming perrranently to do so. The aid scheme had a planned budget of GBP 5 million. Shortly
afterwards, on 6 June; the Commission also authorised the livestock welfare disposal scheme (''), which
was designed to address the animal welfare problems arising from the movement resfiictions put in place
to control FMD. The aid scheme, which had a planned budget of GBP 6 million a week, included
payment towards the costs ofthe ransport, slaughter, rendering, incineration and disposal ofcarcasses,
veierinary costs, and compensation to livestock producers subject to movement restrictions, who were
offered the possibility of disposing of their animals where State-contracted veterinarians confirmed that
the welfare of the animals was compromised by the movement restrictions.
Opening of format investigations: compensating energy prices
Spain; aidto compensate farmers for high fuel prices
On 11 April, the Commission decided to initiate a formal State aid investigation into a series of tax
."**"r in favour of agriculture introduced by Spain in the wake of the rise in energy prices in
2000 (Dr). The Commission questions the compatibility with the coillmon market of the measures
introduce.d by the Spanish Government. At this stage, the Commission cannot rule out the possibility that
the measures under investigation may constitute pure operating aid ganted to compensate the
agricultural sector for the higher price of fuel. As a general rule, such operating aid cannot be authorised
Uy tfre Commission. In so far as aid of this type has already been granted, and if the investigation
confrms the Commission's doubts, the Commission would have to ask the Spanish authorities to recover
the aid from the recipients.
Italy (sardinia): aid to compensate farmers for the high price of gas oil
On 25 July, the Commission initiated the formal investigation procedure with respect to aid to
compensate fanners in Sardinia for the higher price of gas oil compared with that of natural gas ("'). The
mezrsure is contained in a comprehensive law for Sardinia called Testo Unico, which regulates the
granting of a large number of different aid measures to the agricultural sector. The Commission does not
have objections to the rest of theTesto Unico.
According to the Sardinian authorities, the island lacks a natural gas pipeline network' This obliges
farmers to use much more expensive gas oil. The aid aims to overcome this structural handicap and thus
restore what the Sardinian authorities regard as nonnal conditions of competitiveness. However, the
Commission considers at this stage that State aid which exclusively and artificially reduces farmers'
Ce) CaseNN2ry200l.
('*) Case NN 2512001.
('n') Case C 22001 (ex NN 19/2001) (OJ C 172,16.6-2ffi1).
(r4) Case C 60/2001 (ex N 4712001).
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production costs is operating aid. Such aid does not normally bring about any lasting improvement for
the sector. As soon as the aid is stopped, the old problem reappears. Problems of this type should be
solved by other means. For example, Commission rules for State aid for environmental protection
provide for possibilities to grant aid to locally available renewable energies. The proposed aid, however,
would not create any incentive to shift from fossil fuels to renewable energy sources. It would rather
appear to inhibit such structural changes.
Italian finance act for 2001
On 3 October, the Commission opened a formal investigation ('n') into additional financing of
EURll9million (nLn00O0million) for an exceptional aid package of EURl00million
(ITL 200 000 million) which was approved by the Council in 1997 on the basis of the third subparagraph
ofArticle 88(2) of the EC Treaty. In that instance, Italy applied to the Council for exceptional approval of
the aid measure by unanimous vote after the Commission had initiated the formal investigation procedure
with respect to the aid. The measure in question provided for the assumption of responsibility on the part
of the State for payment of sums due by members of agricultural cooperatives who had personally stood
surety in favour of the cooperatives in the event of established insolvency of the latter.
In initiating the procedure, the Commission considered that the purpose of the measure was to ensure
retrospective payment of aid for the operation of cooperatives and that the operation itself would entail
the retrospective expunging of cooperatives' liabilities. Because of its exceptional nature, the Council's
approval of this aid measure could not be regarded as a de facto authorisation for further refinancing of
the same aid measure, especially on account of the serious doubts expressed in the first instance by the
Commission. The Commission therefore believes that the new flnancial appropriation needs to be
assessed on its merits on the basis of the applicable Community provisions.
The Commission also opened, as part of the same proceedings, a formal investigation into aid for
rescuing and restructuring companies in difficulty and aid for promotion and research and development.
The last measure is to be partly financed through a parafiscal charge levied on both domestic and
impoded products. The Commission followed its established practice in the field as well as the Court's
caseJaw, according to which aid financed from parafiscal charges which also apptes to imported
products is in principle incompatible with the coflrmon market in that imported products cannot benefit
from the aid scheme in the same way as domestic ones. Unless the Member State is able to prove that this
is not the case, aid flnanced in this way is likely to result in a clear distortion of competition.
This will be examined in the course of the investigation. The Commission took the view, however, that
some of the R&D measures envisaged do not constitute State aid in that they will be conducted by public
institutions in the public interest.
AIMA programme: aid for the poultry industry in ltaly
On25 Jttly, the Commission decided to open a formal investigation into the AIMA prografllme ('*). The
Italian intervention agency AIMA intends to grant compensation to Italian poultry producers for loss of
income due to the dioxin crisis in Belgium in 1999, which is claimed to have caused a substantial fall in
production and trade and a sharp drop in the consumption of poultry products in Italy. The amount of the
aid,nL20 000 million (EUR10323 138), is the difference between average prices in countries not
('n') CaseC73l2001 (ex N 824lA/2000).
("0) CaseC 59l200l (ex797/1999).
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affected by the crisis and prices in Italy in June and July 1999 (the period to which the compensation
relates). The Commission takes the view that market disruption as a result of consumer concerns about
dioxin does not in itself constitute an exceptional event. Consequently, if Italy cannot demonsfiate that
the disruption was exceptional, the aid cannot be authorised.
Support for improving the processing and marketing conditions
for agriculturalproducts in ltaly (Veneto)
On 2 April, the Commission decided to open a formal investigation into investrnent aid notified by the
Italian authorities ("'). Under Article 35 of Regional Act 5120fJi0 ('u), the Italian authorities wish to
introduce aid with an intensity of up to 407o for investnent in the processing and marketing of
agricultural products by 36 agro-industrial firms which submitted a financing request pursuant to
Regulation (EC) No g5lt97 (t'7) during the 1994-99 progtamming period ('"), began the work but did not
receive any co-flnanced public aid owing to the lack of funds.
On the basis of the information available, the Commission cannot rule out the possibility that the scheme
may consist of aid gfanted retrospectively for activities already begun by the recipient, which would
therefore not display the requisite incentive effect and would have to be regarded as operating aid since
its sole purpose would be to relieve the recipient of a flnancial burden.
Framework aid schemes in ltalY
During the year, the Commission approved a number of large-budget framework schemes covering the
entire range of activities involved in the processing/marketing of agricultural products.
One of them, relating to both the processing and the marketing of agricultural products (1e), has a budget
of EUR 500 million. The Commission also approved the 'sviluppo ltalia' scheme (m), a publicly owned
company replacing the former RIBS and Itainvest and also financing projects in the field of the
processing/marketing of agricultural products. The budget earmarked for this scheme amounts to around
ELIR l billion.
The Commission also approved the agricultural section of a major investment aid scheme (o') open to
any firm located in the Italian regions eligible for the derogations in Article 87(3Xa) and (c) of the EC
Treaty. The scheme applies to firms in the agricultural sector (the aid to sectors other than agriculture was
dealt with in separate decisions). The measures pursue regional development objectives. The scheme,
which is to operate until 31 December2006, has an annual budget of around EUR4.6billion
CITL 9 000 billion), which als6 covers sectors other than agriculture. The aid is granted in the form oftax
credits.
(1'5) Case C 1712001 (ex N 98/2000) (OJ C r40, 12.5.2N1)-
(r$) The act is entitled 'General measure refinancing and arnending regional acts relating to the establishment ofthe region's
annual and multiannual budgets'.(t') Regulation on improving the processing and marketing conditions for agricultural pfoducts (Ol L 142,2.6.1997).('*) Tbi operational programme for Veneto was approved by Commission Decision 96/2598/EC of 2 October 1996.('') Case N 558/2000, Commission decision of27.3.2001 (OJ C 107' 7.4.2001).
(m) Case N 559/20(X), Commission decision of 27.3.2001 (OJ C 107' 7'4.2001).
('o') Case C 46/2000, Commission decision of 13.2.200f (OJ L 144, 30.5.2001)'
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Aid to wine producers in ltaly (Sicily)
On 17 October, the Commission adopted a negative final decision in Case C 61196 (a'), concerning aid
which the Region of Sicily intended to grant to wine producers (up to EUR 1 million), to compensate
them for plantation rights they could not use because of a drought, and to handicraft companies (up to
ELIR 5 million) in the form of short-term loans. Since aid to wine producers was meant to compensate for
non-valid rights, in conhast with the wine CMO rules, and subsidised short-term loans could have been
granted also to handicraft companies engaged in the production, marketing and processing of agricultural
products, the Commission concluded that the measures had to be regarded as operating aid which is
prohibited in the agricultural sector.
Aid to fruit and vegetable producers in Greece
On 31 January, the Commission adopted a positive flnal decision under Article 87(3Xc) of the Treaty on
Greek aid to fruit and vegetable producers ('o'). The aid, totalling EIJR 265 000, consisted of financial
compensation for producers in Thessaloniki whose watermelon and melon crops had been seriously
damaged by f,eld mice in the summer of 1997. The Commission found that the criteria for plant diseases
were applicable in this case because, although attack by fleld mice did not constitute a plant disease, the
effects were identical, i.e. destruction of the crop by live external agents. The criteria were therefore
applied by analogy.
Programme to controlagricultural pollution in France
On 30 October, the Commission authorised a French measure renewing aid for invesftnent in agricultural
holdings under the programme to control agricultural pollution (*). The programme is a response to the
need to improve water qualiry by incorporating environmental concems in farming practices. The aid
scheme, which has a budget of EUR 886 million for the period 2001-{6, is aimed at promoting
investments to reduce pollution caused by livestock manure.
One of the programme's aims is to speed up compliance with Council Directive 9ll676lF.EC of
12 December 1991 C9, attaching priority to vulnerable areas where livestock farming has been
responsible for pollution by nitrates. In authorising the aid, the Commission took into consideration the
fact that some of the provisions of the directive require investments on the holding, such as the
construction of additional storage capacities, and the obligations irnposed on livestock farmers can be
regarded as new rules for the purposes of the guidelines for State aid in the agricultural sector. While
concluding that the directive could not be regarded as anew rule per se, the Commission took account of
the fact that France's initial action progrzmlme for implementing the directive had not been adopted
until 1997 and that the flrst actual obligations as to results imposed on livestock farmers under that
progftlmme were even more recent. The directive furthermore does not contain specific obligations with
which operators must comply without prior action by the Member State.
The Commission accordingly concluded that the aid served to finance investments aimed at improving
the environment and enabling agricultural holdings to adjust to new rules within the meaning of
point 4.1.1.3 of the agricultural guidelines. In the Comrnission's view, any other interpretation would be
C") Caae C 61 196, Commission decision of 17. 10.200 I, OI L @, 7 .3.2C{Jl2
c') oJL 93. 3.4.2Mr.
Cg) Case N 355/2000, OJ C 350, 11.12.2007.
c*) oJ L 37 5, 31,.t2.1991.
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tantamount to penalising livestock farmers for a Member State's failure to take action on the legal front.
The Commission also considered that the human and financial scale of the programme (around
100 000 beneficiaries) and the challenge for the environment in France and Europe were factors not to be
overlooked in its assessment.
Agrimonetary aid
The United Kingdom notified several requests to grant agrimonetary compensation in the beef, sheep and
dairy sectors (ffi). Some of the requests concerned the payment ofthe second tranche of aid for which the
United Kingdom had decided not to pay the national conftibution to the first tranche.
For the requests conceming the payment of fust tranches notified during the year, the United Kingdom
decided, given the serious problems created by animal diseases in the country, also to grant the national
contribution to the financing of the aid.
2.E. Fisheries
Italy, Netherlands
Rise infuel costs ()
The Commission initiated forrral proceedings to investigate Italian and Dutch aid schemes to
compensate fishermen for increases in fuel costs in 20CI. In the case of Italy, three types of measure are
invoived: payment of flat-rate compensation calculated according to the power ofthe vessel, reductions
in social sicurity contributions and tax credits. In the case of the Netherlands, the measure takes the form
of a grant to share-fishermen to reimburse the social security contributions they paid in 2000. The
Commission takes the view that the ltalian and Dutch measures constitute operating aid and are therefore
incompatible with the common market. During the preliminary examination, neither Italy nor the
Netherlands provided the Commission with any information justifying an exception to that principle'
Inly
(a) Aid for fishermen and producers of shellftsh (*)
The Commission authorised an aid scheme for flshermen in the Adriatic who had to suspend fishing in
2000 as a result of the spread of mucilage, a naturally-occurring gelatinous substance which appeared
during spring 2000 and developed until June before starting to disappear in July. The phenomenon had an
adverse impact on both fisherrren and shellfish producers. As it sticks to flshing nets, mucilage hinders
norrral flshing activities, rendering them impossible when the phenomenon is most acute. It also has an
effect on sedentary species, such as shellfish, as it reduces the amount of oxygen in the water, leading to
the death of both wild and farmed shellfish. The authorisation covers a period of only one month. The
Commission initiated the formal investigation procedure as regards the aid granted fol the period after
1 July since the suspension of fishing activities after that date could not be linked to the presence of
muciiage. Italy justifled that stoppage on the grounds of the need to allow fish stocks to develop.
Howevir, it did not present a recovery plan as required by the Community rules allowing such aid
ffi situ2oot,N r57lB/2001, N 158/A/2001, N rsgtBt2wt and N 565/2001.
c9 0J c 179,23.6.2W1.
(N) O1C25.29.1.2N2.
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schemes. The aid granted by Italy over the period concerned consequently displays the characteristics of
operating aid which, according to the guidelines for the examination of State aid to fisheries and
aquaculture, is incompatible with the cofllmon market.
The compensadon for shellfish producers was fixed at a maximum of 30 Vo of the loss recorded in
relation to the income of previous years. However, the Commission did not have the evidence required to
show that the amount concerned did not represent more than the actual losses incurred by shellflsh
producers, and it therefore opened a formal investigation into that aspect of the measure.
(b) Temporary cessalion of fishing activilies in the Ilnhenian anil Ionian Seas fl
The Commission also initiated forrnal investigation proceedings in respect of a scheme providing
compensation for temporary cessation of activities in the Tlnhenian and Ionian Seas. These stoppages
were intended to encourage the development of fish resources and concemed vessels using pelagic
trawls. On the basis of the information provided by the Italian authorities, this cessation did not meet the
necessary conditions for the allocation of aid as it did not appear to be related to any specific recovery
plans. The Commission therefore took the view that the compensation constituted operating aid.
United Kingdom
Purchase and leasing of fuh quotas (2'0)
The Commission opened a formal investigation into two State aid schemes in the United Kingdom
relating to the flnancing by the Shetland and Orkney Islands Councils of the purchase and leasing to local
fishermen of fish quotas. The objective of these schemes was to reserve track records giving entitlements
to annual quotas for local fishing fleets. According to the UK authorities, this was done because local
vessel owners have difficulties in obtaining the necessary funding to acquire such track records, which
are seen as intangible assets that cannot be used as security for loans from financial institutions. Under
certain conditions, these track records can be sold independently from the vessel to which they have been
allocated. A de facto markeLin these track records has developed and it is in this context that the Shetland
and Orkney Islands Councils acquired track records with a view to leasing them to their vessels. In the
light of the information transmitted by the UK authorities, the Commission believes that the purchase and
leasing of track records by these authorities represent preferential conditions for local fishermen and, as
such, constitute operating aid.
France
oil spill following the sinking of the E;nka and damage caused by a storm in the Bay of Biscay ('?lt\
The Commission authorised parts of a French aid scheme involving compensation for shellfish farmers
and flshermen affected by an oil spill following the sinking of the Erika and damage due to a particularly
violent storm in the Bay of Biscay.
Additional aid was subsequently allocated to fishermen and shellfish growers in the whole of France and
in the overseas departments. This aid, according to the French authorities, was designed to compensate
('') oJ c 25,29.1.2002,
c') oJ c 38, 12.2.2M2.
c,,) oJC39, 13.2.2002.
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businesses for the losses incurred due to the deterioration of the market in fisheries products as a reaction
to their bad image in consumers' minds following the pollution caused by the Erila incident.
Tkee types of aid allocated to shellfish farmers were deemed compatible with the rules of the internal
martet. itrey comprised aid from a special fund designed to compensate losses occasioned by natural
disasters in the agricultural sector, aid to restore equipment and stocks and an advance on the
compensation to be paid by the International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund (IOPCF).
Three types of aid allocated to fishermen were also cleared by the Commission. These measures
comprised aid to restore vessels and fishing gear lost or damaged during the storm, an advance on
compensation from the IOPCF and a one-off payment to compensate for the loss of income caused by the
storm.
The Commission analysed these aid measures pursuant to Article 87 of the Treaty, which provides that
aid designed to make good the damage caused by natural disasters or other exceptional occurrences is
compatible with the internal market. Both the oil spill and the stonn represented such events. The
Commission therefore checked that there had not been any overcompensation of the losses incurred
following these events and found that aid recipients had not been overcompnsated-
On the other hand, the Commission decided to open a formal investigation into the aid introduced for
shellfish farmers in the form of an exemption from social security contibutions for the first three months
of 2000, a rebate on their financial charges and an exemption from charges for the lease of the seabed-
Also subject to the investigation are the rebates on social security contributions, adopted in April 2000
and applicable from 15 April to 15 July for shellfish farmers. These rebates, which were also allocated to
fishermen, applied to the whole of France and to the French overseas territories because, according to the
French authorities, the operators concerned had suffered losses of earnings following a fall in the sale of
fisheries products as a result of the oil spill.
These aid measgres constitute operating aid which is, in principle, incompatible with the internal market
rules.
The rebate on social charges for fishermen applied over the period from 15 April to 15 October 2000.
According to the French authorities, fishermen had also suffered from losses of eamings due to a
reduction in sales and an increase in withdrawals from the market of unsold flsheries products. Pointing
out that these rebates were applied to all fishermen including those from overseas, the Commission
considered that the measrues iould not be linked to the oil spill from the EriLa.It also noted that these
rebates may in fact have been designed to compensate fishermen for the increase in the price of fuel
which had begun a few months previously.
Dewnark
Scrapping of massel trawlcrs ("')
The Commission authorised a scheme providing grants for the scrapping of commercial fishing vessels in
Denrnark. The notified scheme is open to Danish vessel owners wishing to abandon commercial fishing:
grants may be awarded to owners who scrap their flshing vessel or assign it to uses other than commercial
cD) oJ c 172,16.6.2001.
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fishing or the processing, transshipment or ffansport of fisheries products in Denmark. The scheme can
be applied to not more than l0 vessels. Its aim is to bring about a permanent reduction in the number of
mussel trawlers in Limfjorden and thus to limit the environmental pressure on the fjord bottom while
exploiting the resources in a sustainable manner. The specific scheme for the scrapping of mussel
trawlers forms part of a management plan aimed at ensuring the future of fishing in Limfjorden, drawn upjointly by the Ministry of Food, the Minishy of the Environment and Energy and the three districts
adjoining the fjord.
Greece
Damage in the shellfuh and mussel-farming sector (2'3)
The Commission authorised a scheme for partly compensating mussel-farmers for the damage and losses
incurred as a result of the contamination of their production by a toxic phytoplankton whose development
was facilitated, between September 1999 and January 2000, by the lack of wind (non-renewal of the
water), as well as shellfish fishermen who were required by the authorities to suspend fishing as a result
of the contamination, which occurred in the prefectures of Thessaloniki, Hematheia and Pieria.
Mussel farmers and shellfish flshermen who incurred a loss of at least 30 Vo are ekglble for aid under the
scheme. The level of loss was calculated by comparing the reduced production recorded during the year
in which the event took place with average production over the preceding three years (normal
production). Compensation may cover up to 30 Vo of the value of lost production.
Mussel farmers suffered the followins losses:
loss/mortality of mussels from cultures ready for sale (nearly 40 % of production) following the ban
on the movement and marketing of mussels;
impossibility of removing and introducing young mussels for the following production period as a
result of the long stay of stocks in the units and the constant decontamination efforts made with a
view to preserving them (depuration of surviving individuals, spacing out, etc.);
- 
increased expenditure on additional management measures (spacing out, etc.) over a five-month
period during the application of the ban;
- 
loss of income as a result of the fall in prices after the ban was lifted.
This contamination, which was recognised as exceptional and wide-ranging by the National Centre for
Marine Research (large area affected 
- 
three prefectures 
- 
and more than a I 000 producers affected),
occurred because of the abnormal presence of toxic phytoplankton caused by the toxin of the alga
Dinophysis acuminata and the accumulation of very high levels of biotodns in the flesh of the shellfish.
The phytoplankton cell count performed by the National Centre for Marine Research in the Gulf of
Salonika revealed the presence of biotoxins in the area. The analysis of mussel tissue to detect biotoxins
having proved positive, the veterinary authorities in Thessaloniki, Hematheia and Pieria placed a ban on
the fishing, harvesting, movement and marketing of shellflsh for human consumption. The prohibition
period was staggered according to the marine area and type of shellfish concerned.
c") oJ c 330,24.1t.2007.
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The ban fell in the middle of the shellfish development phase and the marketing period. The losses,
estimated at 40 Vo of production, include the production that was ready for sale. The fact that it had to be
kept at sea owing to the presence ofbiotoxins meant that it was gradually lost, chiefly through natural
mortality and predators (other marine species).
hoducers were furthermore unable to restock with embryos for the next production year: the fact that
production had to be kept at sea following the marketing ban meaot that all the available space was taken
up, in both the mussel-growing areas and the areas where natural shellfish stocks are located. This
prevented any restocking with embryos for the next production year.
2.9. Thansport
On 8 May, the Commission adopted a conditional, partly positive and partly negative decision on
restructuring aid to the company Brittany Ferries, which operates essentially in the western/central
Channel. This decision was taken on the basis of the Commission's rules on restructuring aid. These
focus on the submission of a resffucturing plan and require account to be taken of, among other things,
market structure and regional development aspects.
On 11 July, the Commission opened a formal investigation into maritime transport subsidies gfanted by
the Netherlands to Dutch tugboats operating in EU ports and inland waterways. In order to reduce the
potential damage to competitors, the Commission requested the Dutch authorities to suspend the relevant
aid payments until it reached a final decision on the matter.
On 2 October, the Commission approved the Support for Maritime Training 
- 
SMarT scheme notified
by the United Kingdom.
2.10. Other industries
Tourism
Spain
Tena Mttiea theme pok (Benidorm) ("0)
The Commission decided on 20 June partly to initiate the formal investigation procedure laid down in
Article 88(2) of the EC Treaty in respect of presumed aid to the Terra Mitica trmusement park in
Benidorm. The decision came in response to a complaint addressed to the Commission in 1997, followed
by many letters up to May 2fi)0 adding new facts to the file as the work on the park, which finally opened
in July 2000, advanced. The Spanish authorities provided explanations on these allegations on a number
of occasions.
The Commission found that some of the complainant's allegations were unfounded; on these objections
it therefore concluded that the park had not received State aid. These allegations concerned the
acquisition at a low price ofthe land on which the park is buill expenditure on the park borne by Parque
Temdtico de Alicante SA (a public company involved in the project), failure to comply with the private
investor princrple, syndicated loans and capital contributions to Terra Mltica SA (the private company
which is the owner of the park), staff training aid and direct regional aid.
("n) Case NN 1,1/2001 (OJ C 30O, 26.10.2001)
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On various other points raised by the complainant, however, the Commission was not able to rule out the
possibility that the park received beneflts from the public authorities. It therefore decided to initiate the
formal investigation procedure to check whether or not the measures constituted State aid and, if they
did, to see whether they were compatible with the cornmon market. The Commission voiced doubts on
the following points: the financing ofthe infrastructure necessary for the operation ofthe park. On this
point, the Commission must investigate whether the infrasffucture built exclusively or principally for the
park was actually financed by the park itself; the value of the assets transferred to Terra Mitica SA by the
public company Parque Tem6tico de Alicante SA. The Commission will check whetler these assets, and
in particular the land and the trade mark 'Terra M(tica', were valued at their true price and not at a lower
price, which would have been an advantage for the private company; the terms of a shareholder's loan
granted by the public company to the private company. The Commission will investigate whether this
ESP 8 000 million (EUR 48.8 million) loan was provided on market terms; and, lastly, a contribution of
ESP 6 000 million (EUR 36 million) to Terra Mitica SA which, according to some information, may
have been made by the Valencia tourist agency.
Finally, the complainant contested a95 7o rcdtrction in the municipal tax on buildings granted to the park
by the Benidorm municipality. The Commission found that the park was indeed granted this reduction,
worth around ESP 88 399 400 (EUR 531 291), and it will therefore consider whether it is compatible
with the EC Treaty.
Italy
Aid to Pompei Tech World SpA for a leisure park project (")
On 7 August, the Commission approved an investment project for a theme park near Pompei. The project
was notified under the multisectoral framework and involves a non-reimbursable grant of
EUR 33.4 million. The aid intensity is 34.44 Eo nge, conrpared with a regional ceiling for Campania
which, for large enterprises, is 35 7o nge. Tlae beneficiary 
- 
Pompei Tech World SpA * is a large
enterprise whose capital is controlled by two large companies.
The investment project consists in a theme park 
- 
i.e. a leisure park with a cultural and scientific
focus endowed with high-tech facilities such as simulation experiences and virtual reality attractions
- 
which will be built in the area of Torre Annunziata (Naples), near the archaeological site of
Pompei-Herculaneum. The specificity of tlre proposed project lies in the following elements: its direct
link with the archaeological site of Pompei-Herculaneum and that particular branch of tourism which can
be labelled 'cultural'; its high-tech multi-media facilities linked to the history of Roman Pompei, which
include: (1) three giant screen IMAX theatres; (2) Shuttle Park, a showcase for the Ewopean space
industry; (3) a multiplex cinema, intended for the local public, with a capacity of around 2 000 seats and
endowed with restaurants and a shopping centre; (4) a virtual game centre, for a 'virtual'journey into
Pompei's past; and (5) a 'virtual'museum ofthe archaeological flndings; and its intertwined educational
and entertainment objectives.
The park is expected to receive an annual influx of2 160 000 visitors 
- 
which positions it in the league
of major theme parks in Europe 
- 
and creates around 305 new jobs, both directly (126) and
indirectly (179). According to the plan, it should be completed by the end of 2005 and become fully
operational in 2008-09.
C") Case N 22912001 (OJ C 33O, 24.11.2C01't.
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Based on the evidence supplied by the Italian authorities, the Commission considered that the market
affected by the new project is a rcgional one (LaziolCampania/Basilicata/Apulia), even taking into
account the eristing international flow of tounsts attracted to the area by the Pompeian wonders. In fact,
the park is not likely to affect intra-Eu trade to an extent which is incompatible with the conditions of
competition in the internal market, as its impact is likely to be limited to the local tourist basin, which has
at its core the archaeological site of Pompei-Herculaneum, the Vesuvian area and the Sorrento Peninsula.
Fur sector
Dewnark
The Far Sector Fund (216)
On 28 March, the Commission decided not to raise any objections to a scheme whereby the Fur Sector
Fund contributes to the financing ofinternational workshops on uses ofpelt aimed at designers from all
over the world and organised by SAGA Furs of Scandinavia. The facts about the international workshops'
such as participation being free of charge, actual participation from a majorify of Member States, the
dissemination of results, and the types of furs used being produced in most Member States, were
sufficient to rule out any distortion of competition between Member States, and Article 87(1) was
therefore not applicable.
The scheme also covers the Fur Sector Fund's contribution to the financing ofresearch carried out by the
Danish Fur Breeders'Association, partly in cooperation with pubtc non-profit-making higher education
and research establishments. Any potential aid in the research field would in any case be compatible with
the Community framework for State aid for research and development, which allows an aid intensity of
100 7o of eligible costs for agricultural products. Fur is not a product listed in Annex I to the EC Treaty'
but the Commission found it reasonable to apply the R&D framework as it applies to the agricultural
sector by analogy in this case.
3. Horizontal aid
3.1. Environmental protection and energr saving
Dewnark
(a) ElectriciU refonn 
- 
new power plants ("')
On 20 June, the Commission decided to raise no objection to a scheme in favour of power plants using
renewable energy sources and installed in the period 200H3. Such power plants will no longer receive
direct government grants. A comparable income level is ensrued through fixed consumer prices over a
period of l0 or 12 yeils. Once the RE certificate system is implemented, part of the guaranteed income
will emanate from the sale of such certificates on the market.
The Commission assessed the presence of State aid in the light of the judgment of the Court of Justice in
PreussenEleldra. It found that State aid could be involved but that, if so, it was compatible with the
Case N 12112000 (OJ C 185, 30.6.2001).
Case N 27812001 @J C263,19.9.2001).
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common market in the light of the new Community guidelines on State aid for environmental protection.
The aid element is determined as the difference between the guaranteed income and the market price of
electricity at erch point in time. The present value of the aid will not exceed the present value of the
investment costs for each type of RE-based power plant.
(b) Grants to large energ) consarn?rs ("t)
On 6 June, the Commission decided not to raise any objections to notified modifications to the Danish
green til( scheme. The modifications were the result of a review of the effects of the scheme undertaken
by the Danish authorities. The most important modification was the introduction of a possibility for
companies with high energy consumption for space heating and hot water to conclude voluntary
agreements and receive a refund of the CO, and energy taxes. This new aid could be granted an
exemption based on point 51 of the Community guidelines on State aid for environmental protection
regarding operating aid in the form of tax reductions or exemptions.
Further modiflcations concerned various aspects of the voluntary agreements concluded with regard to
energy consumed in production processes. They were not such as to alter the Commission's previous
favourable assessment of the scheme.
Germany
Regeneration of waste oils ("n)
In a number of cases the Commission, following the case-law of the Court of Justice, had decided that
compensation for the costs of dealing with waste oils as part of a public service did not confer an
advantage on the undertaking ("0) and Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty therefore did not apply. On the basis
of the judgments in FFJA ('2'), Portuguese Television ("t) and CELF ("3), the Commission followed the
Court and decided on 19 September that such measures did constitute aid. The German system provides
for gtants to operators of facilities for waste-oil regeneration in order to compensate them for losses they
incur when regenerating waste oil into base oils. The losses are calculated by comparing the production
costs with the revenues for base oils. tn ttre case in hand, the Commission exempted the measures under
the guidelines on State aid for environmental protection, in particular the section on operating aid for
waste management.
Netherlands
Dutch waste-disposal systemfor PVC fagade elements
On 31 January, in Case N 484/00, the Commission decided not to raise any objections to the Dutch
waste-disposal system for PVC facade elements. The Commission considered that the arrangements did
not distort competition or threaten to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the
production of certain goods: they did not therefore constitute State aid within the meaning of
Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty. The system ensures that the companies selling PVC fagade elements take
(") Case N 840/4/2000 (OJ C 358, 15.12.2001).
C'") Case N 387/2001 (OJ C 1O8, 4.5.2M2).
("0) CasesNNl24l90,N520193(OJC287,23.1O.1993)andN304/1997(OJC228,21;7.1998\.
C") Judgment of 27 February 1997 in Case T-106/95, confirmed by the Court in CaseC-7'14197.
C") Judgment of l0 May 2000 in CaseT-46197.("') Judgment of 22lane 2000 in Case C-332198.
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responsibility for the recycling ofthese elements, in accordance with the 'polluter pays'principle. The
system is based on a voluntary agreement between several organisations in the PVC production,
consumption and recycling chain. The agreement stipulates a fixed payment for PVC frames and facade
elements marketed in the Netherlands, to be paid by the PVC fagade element producers and importers.
These resources are used for the cost of collecting and recycling the facade elements, including transport.
United Kingdom
Enhanced cqital allowanees for energrefuient hwestmene (*)
On 13 March, the Cornmission decided that a UK tax scheme intended to encourage investrnents by
businesses in energy-saving technologies was a general measure and therefore not caught by the State aid
rules of the EC Treaty. The scheme offers enhanced capital allowances for purchasing certain energy-
efficient technologies in the areas of lighting, pipe insulation, boilers, motors, variable speed drives,
refrigeration and combined heat and power. The equipment must meet certain energy-saving criteria
which are laid down in an energy technology criteria list. The use of such technologies will help
businesses to reduce their energy use, leading to lower carbon emissions. This is part of a larger raft of
measures introduced to ensure that the United Kingdom will meet its target for reducing carbon
emissions under the Kyoto Protocol as well as assisting the EU to achieve its target and to work towards
the domestically set target of 20 Vo reduction in CO, emissions.
3.2. Researcl and development
Denmark
Mikro ela ctro nik C c nte r ('")
On 8 May, the Commission decided not to raise any objections to a scheme allowing for private and
public financing of an advanced prototyping facility in ttre field ofmicrotechnology, to be built at a public
research institution. Companies of all nationalities and sizes will be able to rent space in the facitty and
thereby have access to equipment, and this will help them to undertake precompetitive development
activities. The aid wil be granted in the form of a building site provided free of charge, an interest-free
loan and a rent guarantee for the benefit of the private co-investors in the facility. This aid will be passed
on to the tenants in the form of lower rent, which will allow them to finance thet research.
The Commission found that the tenants were clearly in receipt of aid, and that part of the aid resulting
from the various benefits offered by the State, in particular the rent guarantee, might possibly remain with
the investors. The aid to the tenants was granted an exemption in the light of the Community framework
for State aid for research and development. As the project is in line with Community policy for R&D and
the promotion of SMEs, the Commission granted an exemption under Article 87(3Xc) for the aid to the
investors.
(u) CaseN797D000 (OJ C 160,2.6.?ffi1).
(2') Case N 8022000 (OJ C 19, 14.7.2N1)'
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Germany
(a) EUV lithography (n\
Lithography is one of the most important steps in the fabrication of integrated circuits. It uses a high
frequency light flash to print on silicon wafers a multiplied and downscaled image of the integrated
circuit pattern models designed by the engineers. The resolution of the circuits so printed is driven by the
wavelength of the light used in the printing process. The present generation of lithography uses
ultraviolet light, the wavelength of which is about a few hundred nanometres.
On 18 July, the Commission approved a German aid measure intended to promote German participation
in a joint Eureka project aimed at the development of EUV lithography technologies in Europe which
could act as a counterweight to activities in the United States and the Far East and strengthen the position
of European semiconductor industry suppliers through the development of know-how and intellectual
property.
The aid project covers industrial research and precompetitive development. Taking into account a
scientific evaluation of the measure, the Commission assessed each of the project's work packages. None
of the products or processes that will be developed during the project will be in a position to be usable or
convertible for a commercial or industrial application. As all the conditions set out in the R&D
framework were fulfilled, the Commission was able to declare the notified project compatible with the
conrmon market.
(b) 
'Heahh research 
- 
research for people' programme ("t)
The 'Health research 
- 
research for people'prograrnme supports research and development activities
aimed at promoting health and treating illness more effectively. It seeks to make greater use of the
possibilities opened up by recent research in biomedicine, in particular molecular medicine. Special
emphasis will be placed on using knowledge on the structure and function of the human genome.
Research and development is also to be used as a way of stimulating more effective coordination between
the different bodies working in German health research. Structures and mechanisms are to be set up to
encourage the various players to cooperate. The programme also seeks to develop ways of bringing about
lasting improvements in cooperation between research establishments and industry. tn addition, it will
support research which he$s to tackle the public-health challenges facing us today.
On 25 April, the Commission approved the programme, which is designed to help develop and boost
national research capacity in strategically important areas of health research, thereby allowing Germany
to make a significant contribution to the objectives of the fifth EU framework progftrrnme in the health
field (quality of life and management of living resources) and at the same time improving the potential
effectiveness of Community support.
Depending on the aid recipient, the Commission distinguished between the situation where no aid within
the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty is involved and where aid needs to be examined in order to
assess its compatibility with the corlmon market. Approximately 80 Vo of the aid is earmarked for
research projects carried out by public non-profit-making higher education or research establishments.
The project results will be published and hence made available to Community industry on a
non-discriminatory basis. Such activities therefore do not constitute State aid. Approximately 10 Vo of lhe
("u) Case N 801/2000 (OJ C 333,28.11.2M1)("') CaseN 69412000 (OJ C 185. 30.6.2001).
COMPETITION REPORT 2OO1
MERGERCONTROL 287
aid will go to projects carried out by public non-profit-making higher education or research
establishments on behalf of or in collaboration with industry. Where work is commissioned, the public
non-profit-making establishments will be paid for their services by the industrial firms at the market rate.
Where collaboration takes other forms, the firm will either bear the firll cost of the project or will pay its
partner at the market rate for any intellectual property rights which it holds as a result of the research
project. Results which do not give rise to intellectual property rights will be widely disseminated to
interested third parties. These conditions satisfy the tests ofthe third paragraph ofpoint 2.4 ofthe R&D
framework. The Commission therefore accepts that there is no State aid. Less than I Vo of the aid will be
used by the Federal Ministry of Education and Research to commission R&D from firms or to buy the
results of R&D from them. Contracts will generally be awarded by open tendering procedure or, in the
circumstances set out in Article ll of Council Directive 9A50BEC, by restricted tendering procedure.
Compliance with the rules on tendering will ensure that contracts me awmded in line with mmket
conditions. The Commission therefore takes the view that no State aid within the meaning of
Article 87(1) is involved in line with point 2.5 of the R&D framework.
Around l0 7o of the aid will be granted to commercially-oriented bodies, with no involvement of
non-profit-making establishments. The Commission examined this situation in the Lght of the
Community State aid rules and declared the project to be in line with the R&D framework and therefore
compatible with the common market.
For R&D projects in fundamental research, the rate of assistance may be up to 100 9o of the eligible
costs; for R&D projects in industrial research, up to 50 Vo; and for precompetitive development, up to
25 Vo.For technical feasibility studies preparatory to industrial research or precompetitive development,
the assistance may be up to 75 or 50 70 respectively of the eligible project-related costs.
On top of these aid intensities, the following bonuses may be allowed: lO Vo if the aid recipient is an
SME; 10 7o if the research project is carried out in an area falling under Article 87(3Xa); 5 7o if it is a
regionally assisted area under Article 87(3Xc): l0 Vo if the research project involves effective
cross-border cooperation between at least two independent partners in two Member States; 10 Vo 1f the
research project involves effective cooperation between firms and public higher education or research
establishment: and l0 Vo if the results of the research are to be widely disseminated and published, patent
licences are granted, or other appropriate steps are taken under conditions similar to those for the
dissemination of the Community research and technical development results.
The incentive effect is presumed for SMEs. For large companies, the German authorities will assess the
incentive effect in each case and explain their assessment in the annual report to be submitted to the
Commission.
Netherlnnds
(a) Extatic lithography ("8)
On 30 October, the Commission decided not to raise any objections to a grant from the Dutch central
govemment to the company ASML for a joint research and development project in the field of
tithogfaptry technology. The objective of the aid is to stimulate research on system aspects and
fundamintal optic systems for the use of extreme ultraviolet light for lithography applications. The
Commission assessed the project as falling under the categories of industrial research or precompetitive
f") Case N 430/2001 (not yet published).
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development. The gross aid intensity of 16.7 Vo is far below the allowable aid intensities set out in the
R&D framework. The Commission considered it unlikely that without the financial support of the State
the proposed research prograflrme would take place with the same speed and the same scope, and
therefore took the view that the aid had an incentive effect.
(b) Fluor lithography ("')
On 30 October, the Commission decided not to raise any objections to a grant from the Dutch central
govemment to the company ASML for a research and development project in the field of lithography
technology. The project is called Fluor and its objective is to find a total solution for the application of
157 nm lithography. This means the development of a photolithographic tool, reticles, a resist and a
process. 157 nm lithography is regarded as an important intermediate technology between the current
193 nm technology, which will be abandoned in four to six years time, and future EUV technologies,
starting after 2010. ASML will cooperate with various partners and subcontractors in this project such as
Air Liquide (France), IMEC (Belgium) and Infineon Technologies (Germany).
The project is funded via the Dutch Medea+ prograrnme. Medea+ is an industry-initiated pan-European
programme for advanced cooperative R&D in microelectronics. It has been set up and labelled within the
framework of Eureka. The Dutch Medea+ prograrnme was approved by the Commission by letter dated
13 February (SG (2001) D/286189). As the total costs for the Fluor project are more than EUR 40 million
and the aid equivalent is more than EUR 10 million, the project was notifled separately ('). The Ftuor
project received its Medea+ label on I January.
The Commission found that the project fell within the category of precompetitive development and that
the aid intensity of 39.5 7o was rn compliance with the R&D framework. It considered it unlikely that
without support the proposed research progranrme would take place with the same speed and the same
scope, and therefore took the view that the aid had an incentive effect.
3.3. Rescue and restructuring
Portugal
Aid to firms in dfficulty ("')
Although the Portuguese authorities accepted the appropriate measures proposed under the new
Community guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring f,rms in difficulty, they did not make
the necessary amendments to their one existing scheme before the required deadline (30 June 2000).
However, they notified a new scheme on 30 July 2001 based on the previous one. On 20 December, the
Commission decided not to raise any objections on the ground that the new scheme was compatible with
the above-mentioned guidelines. It involves the award of restructuring aid to firms in difficulty through
pafticipation by public funds in the capital of the firms acquiring the enterprises in dfficulty and has a
global budget of EUR 117 million.
C") Case N 43312001 (not yet published).
(2'0) According to the Commission decision on Medea+, communicated by letter dated 13 February 2001 (SG (2001)
D1286189, Case N 82712000), the Dutch authorities must notify separately all projects of more than EUR 40 million with
an aid equivalent of more than EUR 10 million. See also Commission letter to the Member States SG (97\ Dt3466 ot
2May 1997.
€') Case N 537/2001 (OJ C 127,29.5.2002').
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3.4. Employnent and trahing
Belgium
Aiillor employment anit SIIIEs thtough start'up cheques (\
The Commission decided on 6 June not to raise any objections to an aid scheme to promote
self-employment and the setting-up of cornnrercial micro-firms in French-speaking Wallonia. The aid is
grante.din the forn of start-up cheques financing individual or collective training activities aimed at
enabling recipients to draw up and initiate their business start-up plan and/or monitor it during the first
six months after start-up. The scheme involves only small amounts of aid (the average available is
ELIR 5 000 per recipient and the total available is not more than EUR 18 000 over a two-year period)'
most if not all of which is granted before the commencement of any professional activity and/or the
creation of any commercial structure. The aid involved in the scheme is therefore extremely limited and
complies with the guidelines for MemberStates'employment policies in 2001. The Commission
therefore deemed the measure compatible with the requirements of the accelerated clearance procedure
for aid to SMEs and with the rules on such firms.
Spain
Aidfor vocatbnal training in Catalanb (u'\
The Commission decided on 31 January not to raise any objections to a vocational training aid scheme in
Catalonia. The scheme provided grants for vocational training activities between 1997 and 1999'
Although it was initially notified to the Commission in December 1997, it tumed out that the regional
authorities had already started granting the aid from the beginning of 1997 and continued to do so until
the end of 199.
The total amount of aid ran to some ESP 9 326 million (around EUR 56 million). Most of the aid went to
public and private bodies such as municipal authorities, trade unions and professional organisations,
non-profit entities and the like, and only around 5 7o was ganted to companies for employee training.
The intensity of the aid ganted to companies varied between 25 and 75 Vo, depending on whether the
training was general or specific, or the company was large or small or was located inside or outside an
assisted area.
The Commission took the view that the grants for the public and private non-profit entities did not
constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 87 of the EC Treaty, which thus caught only that part of
the scheme involving grants made to conpanies. Regarding that part, the Commission considered that the
Comrnunity ftamework on faining aid, in force from November 1998, did not apply and that, since no
ftameworkexisted prior to that date, the scheme had to be assessed in the light of Community practice in
the field at the time. This led to the colclusion ttrat all the aid granted was compatible.
("') Case N 871?ffi1 (Ol C268,22.9.?fr01).
(r3) Case NN 6d1999 (OJ C ll7, 21.4.2ffi1).
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4. Recoveredaid
Germany
On 28 March, in Case C 41199, the Commission closed investigations into one of the biggest and most
difficult cases of State aid in eastern Germany. In March 1996, the Commission allowed aid to be given to
the Lintra holding company and its eight subsidiaries. A plan to privatise the group subsequently
collapsed. The Commission now concluded that DEM 623 million in aid had nevertheless been granted
in accordance with the restructuring plan for the group and complied with the Commission decision
authorising assistance. However, a sum of DEM 35 million had been misused and had to be recovered
from the recipients, the Lintra holding company and its subsidiaries. State aid to several of the Lintra
subsidiaries is being exarnined in separate proceedings.
On 30 October, in Case C 6U2W0, after a thorough investigation which started in June 2000, the
Commission took a negative final decision on aid to the German porcelain manufacturer Graf von
Henneberg GmbH, located in Thuringia. The Commission ordered recovery of some EUR 71.3 million
(DEM 139.4 million), which was found to constitute incompatible and illegal aid. In line with its
practice, the Commission decided that the currently existing Graf von Henneberg is jointly liable with its
predecessor for the recovery of all the incompatible aid.
B 
- 
New legislative provisions and notices adopted or proposed
by the Commission
Communication of the Commission to Member States amending the
communication pursuant to Article 93(1) of the EC Treaty applyrng
Articles 92 and 93 of the Treaty to short-term export-credit
insurance (Text with EEA relevance) OI C2r7,2.8.2001,p.2
Community guidelines on State aid for environmental protection OI C37,3.2.2Nr,p.3
EFIA Surveillance Authority Decision No I5?01/COL of
23May 200l rcvising the guidelines on the application of the EEA
State aid provisions to aid for environmental protection and
amending for the 28th time the Procedural and Substantive Rules
in the Field of State Aid O1L237,6.9.2001, p. 16
Communication of the Commission to Member States:
Multisectoral framework on regional aid for large investrnent
projects OJ C 368, 22.r2.20r,p. 10
Commission communication on State aid and risk capital OI C23s,21.8.2001, p. 3
Community guidelines for State aid for advertising of products
listed in Annex I to the EC Treaty and of certain non-Annex I
products OI C252,12.9.20o1,p.5
OJ C 320, 15.11.2001, p. 5
Communication from the Commission on the application of State
aid rules to public-service broadcasting.
This communication sets out the principles to be followed by the
Commission in the application of Articles 87 and 86(2) of the EC
Treaty to State funding ofpublic-service broadcasting and will
make the Commission's policy in this area as transparent as possible
Adopted by the Commission on
26.7.2W1
Commission communication relating to the methodology for
analysing State aid linked to stranded costs
OJC 19,2O.1.2N1,p.7
Guidelines for the examination of State aid to fisheries and
aquaculture
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C 
- 
List of State aid cases in sectorc other than agriculture,
fisheries and the coal industry
1. Measures which the Commission considered compatible with the common market
without opening a formal investigation underArticle EE(2) of the EC Tteaty
orArticle 6(5) of Decision 249ff96lECSC
Aastria
N 23sn999
N 589/2m0
N 81 1/2000
N 4312001
N 6452000
N 2572001
N 772000
N 811/1999
N22u2000
Nztvzmr
N 2s8l2001
N 530/2001
N 688b/2000
N 688e/2m0
N 688c/2000
N 688ft2000
N 688a/2000
N 688d/2000
Belgiam
N 298/2000
N 87/2001
NN 922000
N 77912000
N 3712001
N 360/2001
N 550/2000
N 531/2001
N 46912001
N 54412001
N 52112001
31.1.2001 Tax-rale increases in relation to the rinse waler exemption, the
exemption for de-inking residue, the green electricity zero tariff
and the exemption for waste-incinention plants
13.2.2001 Environmental aid for repair ofpast damage in favour of
Vereinigte Chemische Fabriken (VCD
27.4.2A01 R&D scheme (Cainthia)
1L6.2001 Tourism2fi)lscheme
20.6.2001 Grants for biornass (Vorarlberg)
20.6.2001 Environmental aid o Bohler Edelsahl GmbH & Co KG (ECSC
steel)
3 .7 .2ffi1 Envircnmental aid !o Voest Alpine Stahl Donawitz GmbH
9.7.2001 GuaraDt€e schenres 
- 
Carinthia
18.7.2001 Environmental aid in favour of Glanzstoff 
- 
Deponie Nord
13.9.2001 Toptourismprogramme
z.l0.z00l Envimnmental aid to voest-Alpine Stahl Linz GmbH
6.11.2001 Ausnian guidelines for environmental aid 2001
7 .Il.2OOl Amendment of the wiBAG rules on the award of non-repayable
grants 
- 
research md d€velopment
7 .11.2001 Amendrnent of the WiBAG rules on the awad of non-repayable
grants 
- 
improvement of the economic structure of SMEs in
Burgenland
7 ,ll .2Wl Amendment of the WiBAG nrles on the award of non-repayable
grants 
- 
environmental Protection
7 .II.2OOL Amendment of the W1BAG mles on the award of non-repayable
grurts 
- 
infrastructure
7 .ll.2}Ol Amendment of the WiBAG rules on the award of non-repayable
grants 
- 
suengthening ofeconomic development
7 .ll .2OOl Amendment of the WiBAG rules on the award of non-repayable
grants 
- 
intemationalisation
28.3.2001 R&Dfinancingdecree
6.6.2001 kree to promote self-employment through start-up cheques
6.6.2W1 Aid scheme for group training
20.6.20o1 Environmental aid to Sidmar (ECSC steel)
17.7 .2OOl Order on promoting and financing scientific rereach and
technological imovation
18.7.2001 R&D aid to Sidmar NV (ECSC steel)
25.7.2001 Grcenelectricitycertificates
28.9.200I Retech 
- 
Extension of the aid scheme for the Meuse-Vesdre
Objective 2 area
6.11.2001 Draft decree on aid to promote the hiring of unemployed job-
seekers by local, rcgional and community authorities and by
certain ernployen
2O.L2.20{JI Ford Genk- training aid
2l .I2.2OOI Modification of an invesunent aid scheme
oJ c 318, 13.11.2001
oJ c 330, 24.1 1.2001
oJ c 199, 14.7.zffir
ot c234,18.8.2001
ot c 234,18.8.2001
ot c 226,1 1.8.2001
oJ c 318, 13.11.2001
oJ c268,22.9.200r
oJ c 333, 28.1 1.2001
oJ c 358, 15.122001
oJ c38,12.2.2002
oJ c38,12.2.2002
ot c 38, 12.2.2002
ot c 38, 12.2.2002
oJ c38,12.2.2W2
or c 38, 12.2.2002
oJ c 199, 14.7.zmr
oJ c2s8,22.9.200r
oJ c226,11.8.2001
or c234,18.8.2001
oJ c 318, 13.11.2001
oJ c 330, 24.1 1.2001
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Denmark
N 73612000
N 12112000
N 149/2001
N 82212000
N 802/2000
N 840a/2000
N 27812001
N 486/2001
Finland
N 104/2001
N 643/2000
N,165/20fi)
NN 13412001
N777nml
France
N324t2000
N 31V20m
N 32512000
N l47al2000
N 320/2000
N 32612000
N 837/2000
N 69712000
N,164/2000
N377t2W0
N 316a/2000
N,14912000
N 447n000
N 66/2001
N 37612000
N 378/2000
N 298/2001
N32A2m0
N 32112000
N 1 15i2001
N 43412001
N zl48l2000
N 32312000
N 319/2001
N 393al2001
N 77b/2001
29.1.2001 The Growth Fund
28.3.2001 The Fur Sector Fund
18.4.2001 Differentiated excise duties on petrol
2.5.2m1 Centre confacts for tourism
8.5.2001 MikroelektmnikCenter
6.6.2001 Memures in favou of large energy consumers
20.6.2001 Electricity refom 
- 
new RE-based power plants
13.11.2001 Film venture funds (risk capital fund for film production)
1.6.2001 AmendmentoftheRegionalTransportSubsidyAct
1 1.6.2001 lncreased tax deductions for certain resions 2001-03
3.7.2001 Entrepreneurloms
13.11.2001 Training aid in Almd Islmds
20.122001 State aid scheme for cinema in Finlmd
3.1.2M1 R€union 200G46 
- 
energy conseroation and development of
renewable forms of energy
3.1.2001 R6mion 2000-46 
- 
industrial investrnent projects
10.1.2001 Rdmion 200G46 
- 
environmentallv friendlv waste
management
3 I . 1 .200 1 Framework act for the overseas departments and ieritories
5.2.2001 R6union 2000-O6 
- 
enhancing business skills
5.2.2001 Rdunion 2000-06 
- 
opening up of the economy
13.2.2m1 Medea +
27.2.2001 Aid for constructing private lmding stages in Martinique
12.3.2001 Guyma 200G-06 
- 
freight support
15.3.2001 Martinique 200G{6 
- 
lmal initiative platforms
25.4.2001 Notification of aid schemes covered by the single progming
document for R6union
8.5.2001 Frmework scheme: guarantee fund
23.5.2001 Framework scheme: fund to provide business start-ups with
loms on trust
1.6.2001 Rdunion 2000-O6 
- 
FISAC/FLACR
14.6.2001 Martinique 200H6 
- 
rcgional Guamtee Fund
28.6.2001 Martinique 2000-O6 
- 
interest-rate subsidy
3.7.2001 Tlx exemptions for orphm drugs
17.7.2001 R6union 200O46 
- 
aid for invesfnent in infomation md
commications technologies
19.7.2001 R6union 2000-{6 
- 
laboratories and technology nansfer
centres
24.7.200r
25.7.ZWl
25.7.2001
31.7.2001
I 1.10.2001
1 1.10.2001
Air- fixed sources aid scheme
Aid to Atmel Rousset SA
Frmework scheme 
- 
investment capital fund
Support for the production of new goods md seruies in the
infomation md communication technologies strtor
Guadeloupe 2000-O6 
- 
support for freight
Extension of the temporary aid scheme for fims affected by
severe weather and oil slicks 
- 
Brittmv md Picudv
oJ c1r7,21.4.2W
oJ c 185,30.6.2001
oJ c263,19.9.2001
oJ c 199, r4.7.2ffi1
oJ c 199, 14.7.2001
oJ c 358, rs.r2.2001
oI c263,19.9.2001
oJ c 199, 14.7.2001
ot c263,19.9.2N1
oI c328,23.rr.2001
oI c 160,2.6.2001
oJ c 160,2.6.2001
oJ c 160,2.6.2001
or c244, r.9.2001
oI c263,19.9.2001
oJ c 263, 19.9.2001
oJ c 1t7,21.4.2001
oJ c 160,2.6.2001
oJ c 160,2.6.2001
oJ c 160,2.6.2001
oJ c 185,30.6.2001
oJ c 199, 14.7.2001
ot c 234, 18.8.2001
oJ c 199, 14.7.2001
oJ c 330, 24.1 1.2001
oI c244,1.9.2W
oI c263,19.9.200r
oJ c 333,28.11.200r
oJ c 318, 13.11.2001
oJ c 318, r3.11.2001
oI c244,1.9.2001
oJ c 358, 15.12.2001
oJ c342,5.12.2001
oI c24,26.1.20026.11.2001 Guadeloupe 2000-06 
- 
premium for business start-ups
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N 77al2001
N67A2000
N 354/2001
Gcrmany
N 133t2000
N 7072m0
N 420/2000
N 405b/2000
N 405al2000
N 405c/2000
N &42000
N 370t2000
N 796/2000
N 427l20m
N42tn0n0
N 718/2000
N 634l2m0
N 52312000
N 680/2000
N 551/2m0
N 67111999
N744n0[0
N 4762000
N 653/2000
N 5212000
N 21212000
N 6042m0
N 635/2000
N 78412000
N 701/2000
N rulzffir
N 694/2000
N 783/2m0
N 79312000
NN 9,f/20U)
N76711999
N 438a/2000
N 340b/2000
N 8192000
N 289/2001
N 118/2001
N 8082000
27.ll.2ffil Guadeloupe 2000-O6 
- 
employment gant
28.ll.200l Tax aid scheme for overseas investment
m.l2.2j0l Fideme
10.1.2001 Promotionof raining measures (Bremen)
17 ,1,2m1 Innovation Fund of Innovations- und Betsiligungsgesellschaft
mbH Saxony-Anhalt
17.1.2001 Land of Betlin-ESF 200M 
- 
aid to employment in favour
ofworkers without qualification covercd by the wage subsidy
scheme pursuant to Section 18(4) BSHG
17 .l.zC0l Measures to encourage the hiring of unernployed people
17.l.2OO1 Promotion ofbusiness startups by formerly unemployed people
17.1.2001 Regional progmmes to encourage the hiring of unemployed
people
22).2ffi1 SME inlerest subsidy programne (Sarland)
22.1.20oL Regional aid for SMEs in Saarland
25.1.2fr01 Guarant€e guidetinesforequityparticipation(Suony-Anhalt)
29 .l .2OOl lznd of Berlin 
- 
ESF 200H6 
- 
'Integation through
employrnent' programme and qualification measues (Section
19(l) BSHG)
29.1.2C01 Ia nd of Berlin-ESF 20(X)'{6 
- 
employment and
qualification aid programme for unemployed people (wage-
subsidy scheme 
- 
Setion l8(4) BSHG)
29.l.2OAl Measures in favourofthe Bonn region, interest rebates forjob-
creating investment in SMEs
5,2.2001 Regional programme to promote job placements
5.2.2001 Scheme of the land of Bmdenburg for long-term employment
of single parents
27 .2.2AOl Grants for biomass projects in rural areas (Schleswig-Holst€in)
28,2.2001 Venture capital for small t€chnology enlerprises
28.2.2001 Chmge to the tax allowanc€ for investment
73.2C{J1 Aid to SMEs in Saadand
7.3.2N1 Emcient energy use and renewable energy sources
13.3.2001 lteal estate sale by city of Rostock to Sixt
15.3.2001 Wind energy (Bremen)
15.3.2001 Scheme ofthelazlofBrandenburg to promote safety and
health at work
20.3.2ffi1 Grants for R&D and technology transfer (Schleswig Holstein)
21.3.2.A01 Aid for tourism in assisted regions in Saarland
283.2W Micrclectronics R&D *herne
283.2n01 Financial assistane for Fa. Wemal Aluminim Tectnik GmbH'
Neumtinst€r
Ll.4.aOOl Hightechnologies(Bavaria)
25.4.2W Healthresearch
8.5.2001 Aid to Wacker Chemie GmbH, Niinchritz (Saxony)
16.5.2001 Grans for R&D (Lower Saxony)
215.2n1 Futour 2000 progamme
30.5.2001 29th framework programme for thejoint action programme
1.6.2001 Regional programe of the land of North Rhine-Westphalia
1.6.2001 Grantforbusinessstartups
65.2W Biology R&D scheme
14.6.200l Biotechnology and gene ttrhnology
20.6.200L R&D aid to Stahlwerke Bremen GmbH (ECSC st€el)
20.6.?AU State aid in favour of Drewren Spezialpapiere GmbH & Co KG
o1c30,2.2.2W2
oJc30,2.2.2102
oJ c 117,21.4.2001
oJ c 149, 19.5.2001
oJ c 149, 19.5.2001
oJ c 149, 19.5.2001
oJ c 149, 19.5.2001
oJ c 149, 19.5.2001
oI c 117,2r.4.200r
oJ c 160,2.6.2001
oI c 179,25.6.200r
otc94,u3.2w
ot c94,24.3.2ffir
o1 c 117,21.4.2001
oI c r49, 19.5.2001
oJ c 149, 19.5.2001
ol c rt7,2l.4.200l
ot c 117,2r.4.2mr
ot c r66,9.6.2ffir
oJ c 160,2.6.2001
oJ c 149, 19.5.2001
oJ c 160,2.6.2001
oJ c 149, 19.5.2001
oJ c 160,2.6.2001
oJ c 149, 19.5.2001
otr c 185,30.6.2001
oI c330,24.11.2001
oJ c 185,30.6.2001
oJ c 185,30.6.2001
oJ c21r,28.7.200r
or c226,11.8.2001
oJ c 219,4.E.2001
ot c38, r2.2.2ffi2
oJc 318, 13.11.200t
oJ c263,19.9.2001
oI c263,r9.9.z00r
oJ c2s8,22.9.2001
oI cu4,r.9.200r
oJ c2.53,19.9.2W1
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N 303/2001
N 302/2001
N 813i2000
N211t20M
N 427^999
NN 100/1999
N 42420ffi
N 800/2000
N 80y2000
N 184/2000
NN 921999
N,140/2001
N 135/2001
NN 53/2001
N 51712000
N 138/2001
N 439/2001
N 387/2001
N 17612001
NN 89/2000
N 364/2001
N 61212001
N 2s1l2001
N 228t2wr
N 814/2000
N 605/2001
N 727t2001
N 701/2001
N 693/2001
NN 12412000
N 618/2001
N 767 t2001
N 25612001
N 78212001
N 76312001
N 288/200r
N 435i2001
5.7.2001
r7.7.2001
18.7.2001
18.7.2001
18.7.2001
25.7.200r
25.7.2001
25.7.2M1
25.7.2001
31.7.2001
19.9.2001
19.9.2001
19.9.2001
3.7.2001 New micro-components for new systems
3;1.2001 Integratedchipssystems
3.7.200I Aid under the multisectoral framework in favour of Kronoolv
3.7.2001 Low-energyhouse
3.7.2001 Guarantee progrmme 
- 
Hessen
3.7.2001 lnndprogrunmeofclimate-chmgeprotecdon
(Mcklenburg-Westem Pomerania)
Aid to employment for participants in the proglamme '501/301'
lnnd progtafime to promote renewable energy sources
(Mecklenburg-Westem Pomerania)
EUV lithogmphy
State aid in favour of Kartogroup Deutschland GmbH
Aid for Zentrum Mikoelektronik GmbH
Support for film and audiovisual production in the Geman
Uinder 
- 
Mitteldeutsche Medienftirderuns GmbH
Guarantees in reform countries
Bankgesellschaft Berlin AG 
- 
rescue aid
Aid in favour of Glunz AG
Berlin guarantee progrmme for firms in difficulty
Support for film and audiovisual production in the Geman
kinder (Bavaia)
Subsidies for the regeneration of waste oils
R&D proje€t 'Integrating bus te{hnologies into shipbuilding',
by Flensbuger Schiffbau-Gesellschaft & Co. KG
oI c268,22.9.200r
oJ c268,22.9.2001
oJ c226,11.8.2001
otcu,26.1.2M2
oI c268,22.9.2W1
oI c 263, 19.9.2001
ot c 234, 18.8.2001
oI c330,24.11.200r
oJ c 333,28.11.2001
oJ c 328,23.11.2001
oJ c 318, 13.11.2001
oJ c 333, 28.11.2001
oJ c263, r9.92ffi1
oJ c24,26.r.2002
oI c 342, s.12.2001
oJ c 342, 5.t2.200r
oJ c 358, 15.t2.200r
or c347,8.12.2ffi1
oJ c30,2.2.2ffi2
oJ c 32, 5.2.2002
oJ c32,5.2.2n2
or c32,5.2.2002
19 .9 .zffil Scheme of the laad of Thuingia for the promotion of
employment and qualification projects in favour ofunemployed
persons, in particultr long-term unemployed, older md
handicapped workers
2.10.200I Resetrch for construction and sustainable urban develonment
R&D programme
17.10.2001 Shipbuildingdevelopmentlndonesia
25.10.2001 Programme to support reseach, development md imovation
for SMEs in the new Zrnler
25.10.2001 Futue Fund Berlin
6.11.2001 Progrmme of the Zznl of Mecklenburg-Westem Pomerania for
promoting technology and innovation
7 .11.2001 Programme to promote continuous labour contracts for
unemployed persons (Suony)
Support for film production in the Gemm Uinder 
-Y'FF eY
Support for film and TV production in the Germn lihder 
-Berlin and Brandenburg
Support for film and TV production 
- 
Hamburg
Aid in favour of Telux Spezialglas GmbH, Weisswasser (Telux)
Employment of innovation assistants in SMEs (Berlin)
Nordmedia Fonds GmbH 
- 
support for film and audiovisual
production (hwer Saxony md Bremen)
11.12.2001 Trchnology and innovation progmme (TIP)
20.12.2001 Support for film md television production in the Geman
Irnd€r 
- 
Baden-Wiirttemberg
20.12.2001 Rescue aid for Hermann Heye KG, Obemkirchen (Lower
Saxony)
20.12.2001 Development of a polymer on the basis of vegetable raw
matenats
27.12.2001 Progrme in favour of technology-orienled nrms in
Saxonv-Anhalt
28.11.2001
28.11.2001
28.11.2001
28.Lt.zml
3.12.2001
tt.t2.zwl
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Greece
N 788/2000
NN 90/20m
N 7/2001
NN 6/2001
N 374200r
N 32312001
N 545/2001
N 760/2000
N776n001
Ireland
N 77012000
N 209/2001
N 551/2001
N 6al2001
N 710/2000
Italy
N 284al2000
N 816n99
N 710/1999
N 284bl2000
N 646al2000
NN 13t2000
N 79912000
N 3212000
N 250/2001
N 6682000
N 5242000
N 229t2001
N 429DM1
N 308/2001
N 746al2000
N 72012000
N 569/2001
NN 77al2001
N 400/2000
N 510/2001
283.2001 Shipbuildingaidscheme 1999-2000
6.6.2001 Natural gas @PA)
18.7.2ffi1 State aid in favour of Ellinika Petrelea Ae
25.7.2001 Investment aid to Ae Ellinika Solinourgeia
25.10.2001 Schemeemployment200M6
l1.l2.200l Aid for investment in sustainable energy
21.12.2001 R&D demonstration prcjects programme (PEPER)
21.12.2001 Programme for the promotion of R&D in recendy created
enterprises (PAVE-NE)
28,12.2001 Intemational cooperation in industrial research and
precompetitive development activity
17.4.2001 Marine tourism grant scheme
3.7.2c01 Housing finance agency bonowings guarantee
12.10.2001 Marine tourism grant scheme
30.10.2001 Public-seryice obligations imposed on the Electricity Supply
Board conceming electricity generated out of peat
7.11.2ffi1 Regional aid schemes in the tourism sectol
17.l.2OOl Refinancing,throughFinanceActNo8/2000,ofthe
employment aid scheme under Article 9 of Regional Act
No 27r'91
17.1.2001 Regional scheme for improving seruice networks in industrial
districts in Sardinia
Aid for women entrepreneurs
Refinancine. thmueh Finance Act No 8/2000, ofthe tourism aid
scheme uder Aniile 16 of Regional Act No 27196
Tax credits for investment in assisted areas
Tlu aid for all businesses in less favoued regions and for SMEs
outside less favoured regions 
-Article 8 of Act No 266197
Piedmont 
- 
training in favou ofuneniployed people
Development of non-volatile flash memories
Aid for the hotel indusay (Sardinia)
Bolzano 
- 
amendments to Act No 15/72 on the rcform of
housing policy (incentives for the purchase of land)
Aid for research and technological development
Aid to Pompei Tech World SpA for a leisure park
Aid to businesses hit by the heavy rain in October 2000 (Valle
d'Aosta)
30.10.2001 Aid for employing disabled people (Friuli-Venezia Giulia)
6.11.2001 Aid to SMES granted throughFriulaLis SpA (Friulivenezia
Giula)
7 .11 .2001 Liguria 
- 
amendments to Regional Act No 1 8/99 
- 
Aid in
favou of altemative energy sources and energy saving
13.1 1.2001 Sardinia 
- 
measures to assist young entrepreneurs 
- 
DraftAct
No 20112001 (operating aid)
13.11.2001 Sardinia 
- 
urgent measures to plomote employment (Regional
Act No 28/1984)
28.11.2001 State aid in favour ofBionasse Italia SpA
20.12,20A1 Inveshtent aid to Tecnologie Diesel Italia SpA
r7.t.200r
5.2.2ffi1
13.3.2001
283.2001
11.4.2W1
r1.4.2001
11.6.2001
17.7.2001
3r.7.2001
7.8.2001
t7.10.2001
ot c 172,16.6.2@1
oJ c 333, 28.1 1.2001
oJ c 333,28.11.2001
oI c268,22.9.2001
oI c30,2.2.2002
oJ c38,12.2.2002
ot c32,5.2.2N2
ot c r72,16.6.2001
oJ c 358, 15.12.2001
oI c32,5.2.2ffi2
oJ c 149, 19.s.2001
oJ c 149, 19.5.2001
oJ c 1r7,2r.4.200r
oJ c 149, 19.5.2001
oI c 149,19.5.2001
oJ c 149, 19.5.2001
oJc 199, 14.7.2001
oJ c 199, r4.7.200r
or c263,19.9.2001
oJ c 330, 24.1 1.2001
oJ c263,19.9.2001
oJ c 330. 24.1 1.2001
oJ c30,2.2.2002
ot c30,2.2.2002
oJC30,2.2.2W2
oJ c 38. 12.2.2002
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Luxembourg
N 842i2000
Netherlands
N244t20M
N2:a20m
N 230/2000
N 82712000
N 833/2000
N 101/2000
N 91/2001
N 483/2000
N 627n0UJ
N 131/2001
N 651/2000
N 271t2001
N 315/2001
N 314/2001
N 220/2001
N 59711998
N 533/2001
N 433t2wr
N 430/2001
N 168a/2001
N 651/2001
Portagal
N 71912000
N 806/2000
N 74012000
N 136/2001
N 563/2000
N 223t2001
N 613/2001
N 19712001
N 537i2001
Spain
N 666/2000
N 664/2000
N 79112000
N 706/2000
N 507/2000
NN 66/1999
N 684/2000
N 62412000
17.10.2001 hemium to encourage the use ofelectricity produced from
wind or hydro power, solr energy and biomass
31.1.2001 Development aid to Sri Lanka 
- 
one dredger
31.1.2001 Development aid to Bangladesh 
- 
one tug
31.1.2001 Development aid to Syria 
- 
two tugs
13.2.2m1 Eureka project Medea +
27.2.2001 Technicaldevelopmentprojectssheme
28.2.2ffi1 BerendsenTextielServiceBV/CofitonBV
13.3.2001 Modifications to the collaborative reseuch md development
scheme
283.2W State aid for South Holland Engineering Office GBZH)
11.4.2001 Freedepreciation2000-O6
3.5.2001 Stimulus
3.7.2001 High speed experimental md simulation technology
lO.7.2Ml Investment Premiun Scheme Flevolmd 2000
18.7 .2001 Development aid for Yemen
18.7 .200l Development aid for Vietnam
25.7.2W1 R&D aid to Corus Trchnology BV (ECSC steel)
25.7 .z00l Memures in favou of the electricity market for shanded costs
17.10.2001 R&D aid to Corus Trchnology BV (ECSC steel)
30.10.2001 Fluorlithography
30.10.200t Extaticlithogaphy
28.11.2W1 Modifications energy tu 2001
11.12.2001 Promotionsustainableheat
15.1.2001 Small business initiatives (SIPIE)
29.1.2001 Memure 1.3 of the operational progrme forthe infomation
socrety
29 .1 .2001 Extension of the monitoring period for Siderurgia Nacional
11.4.2001 Aid scheme for commercial town-planning prcjects
25.4.2001 Aid scheme to promote regional development in the Azores
19.9.2001 Tax aid scheme for inland regions
30.10.2001 Aid in the motor vehicle sector for Ford Electronica Visteon
(Palmela, Setfbal)
28.1 1.2001 Chmge to aid scheme for promoting regtonal products
20.12.2ffi1 ModiRcation of the aid scheme for the modemisation of
enterprises (SIRME)
17 .l .2001 Shipbuilding 
- 
development aid for four rugs for Algeria
17 .1.2001 Shipbuilding 
- 
development aid for seven tugs for Algeria
29.1.2001 Investmentaid(Extremadura)
29.1.2N1 Valenciaelectrificationplm
31.1.2001 Investment and employment aid Iinked to investment md SMEs(Andalusia)
31.1.2001 Trainingaid(Catalonia)
5.2.2N1 Aid to promote corporate management imovation (Rioja)
5.2.2001 Aid to promote stable employment (Rioja)
oJ c 149, 19.5.2001
oJ c 149, 19.5.200r
oJ c 149,19.5.2001
ot c r17,2r.4.200r
oJ c 160,2.6.2001
oI c342,5.12.2001
oJ c 160,2.6.2001
oJ c 185,30.6.2001
oI c328,23.1t.2001
oJ c263,19.9.2001
oJ c 333, 28.1 1.2001
oJ c 333, 28.1 1.2001
oJ c 318, 13-11.2001
oJ c268,22.9.2001
oJ c347,8.12.2001
ot c30,2.2.2002
oJ c 149, 19.5.2001
oJ c 149, 19.5.2001
oI c 149,19.5.200r
oJ c 199, r4.7.z00r
oI c 342, 5.t2.200r
or c30,2.2.2002
oI c 127,29.5.20[.2
oI c 149,19.s.2001
oJ c 149, 19.5.2001
oJ c r49,19.5.2001
oI c 117,21.4.2W
oJ c263,19.9.200r
oJ c 117,21.4.2001
oI c tt7,21.4.2001
oJ c 117,21.4.2001
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N 544t2000
N 4t2bl2000
N 7512001
N 75712000
N 62512000
N 750/2000
N 1272001
N 1012001
N 84712000
N 683/2000
N 182t2001
N 685/2000
N 1872001
NN 78/2000
N 62612000
NN 142001
N 498/2000
N 588/2000
N792nO00
N 686/2000
N723t2000
N 4482001
N 8342000
N 79512000
N 32t2001
N 29512001
N 836/2000
N 60tl2001
N 4602001
N 459/2001
N 47612001
N 585/2001
N347l2ml
N 630/200r
N 698/2001
Sweden
6.2.2ffi1 Plann€d guarantee scheme for SMES (Aragon)
n.2.200l Aid to agricultural coopratives (Valencia)
15.3.2001 Aid for iNestment in activities not covercd by Annex I to the
EC Tleaty (Basque Country)
28.3.2N1 Shipbuilding 
- 
modification of aid rcgime
28.3.2001 Aid for the non-pmfit sector (Rioja)
11.4.2001 SME consolidation and competitiveness plan
1 1.4.2001 Regional aid scheme to promot€ restructuring of SMEs @asque
Country)
25.2m1 Employment aid scheme (Valencia)
2.5.2001 Aid !o promot€ training and employment (Rioja)
14.5.2001 Aid for invesunents in SMEs in the indusfiial and services
sectors (Rioja)
18.5.2001 Aid to promot€ conversion ofassisted rcgions
18.5.2001 Aid for financial support to investsnent in the reform of
commercial structures and services by SMEs (Rioja)
6.6.2001 Regional aid programme to promote R&D (Andalusia)
6.6.2001 ErwironmentalptotectionaidforseveralECSCfirms(Basque
Counry)
14.6.2001 Employment aid for the disabled @ioja)
20.6.2m1 Tena Mitica Park
2O.6.2W Framework regional aid rcheme (IGAPE) (Galicia)
25.6.2c01 Quality promotion programme @ioja)
3.7.2m1 Regional aid to finance investnent (Exu€madua)
17.7 .2001 Plan to promote SMES (Rioja)
9.7.2m1 Regional aid schemes to promote quality, &sign, resemh and
innovation and competitiveness
2,8.2ffi1 Amendment to regional investment aid scheme N 7520m
(Asffrias)
Enployment aid scheme for enterprises in the non-profit sector(ExtremadM)
Employment aid scheme (Extremadura)
Regional aid rchene to promote md develop runl areas
@REIN programme)
Aid to Ge Plastics SL
Regional employment aid scheme to promote the
mutuaL/non-pront sector
17.10.2001 Modification to aid scheme N 67612000 
- 
gasification plan for
srnall and medium-sized cities (Valencia)
20. I 1.2001 Photovoltaic solar energy
20.11.2001 Aidforthermalsolarenergy
27.Lt.?frOl Aid scheme !o promote rcdevelopment of mining regions OI C 30'2.2.20[2
28.ll.200l Aid for roral electrification 
- 
Murcia
28.11-2001 Aid for open-ended contracts
l1.l2.20Dl Capitalisation aid for technology based firms Ol C 32,5.2.2ffi2
2O.I2.2C0I Aid for audiovisual production (Extremadura)
ot c tt7.zt.4.2wl
6.9.2001
6.9.2001
14.9.200r
19.9.2001
2.10.2001
oI c rr7 , 2l .4.2mr
ot c38,12.2.2ffi2
oJ c 160,2.6.2001
oI c 172,16.6.2001
oJ c 185,30.6.2001
oJ c 185,30.6.2001
oJ c 318, 13.11.2001
ot c21.1,28.7.z0{)r
oJc 199, r4.7.200r
oJc 318, 13.11.2001
oJ c 199, r4.7.200r
ot c234,18.8.2001
oJ c 318, 13.11.200r
oJ c2rr,28.7.vnr
ot c263, r9.9.2ffi1
oJ c 300, x.10.2001
otc30,2.2.2N2
oI c263,19.9.2001
aI c263,19.9.2001
oJ c 318, 13.11.2001
oJ c 318, 13.11.2001
oI c 263,19.9.200r
oJ c 333,28.11.2001
or c 328,23.11.2001
oJ c 333,28.11.2001
oJc30,2.2.2002
N 74912000 5.2.200r
United Kingdom
NN 130/2000 r7.1.200r
N747a/1999 28.2.2001
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Measures in favow of SMEs
Shipbuilding 
- 
social aid related to paftial closure at Harlmd OJ C ll7,21.4.2001
&Woolf
Partnership support for regeneralion No 1 
- 
suPport for
speculative developments
oJ c 160,2.6.2001
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N747bn999
N 19712000
N 12312000
N 73112000
N 606/2000
N 15212001
N 660a/2000
N 210/2001
N 822001
N 73412000
N 385/2001
N 527t2001
N 120/2001
N 497/2001
N 416/2001
N 504/2000
N 1242000
N 7l8al2001
N 481/2001
28.3.2001
28.3.2001
25.4.2001
14.6.2001
18.7.2001
18.7.2001
28.2.2WI Partnership support for rcgeneration No 2 
- 
support for
bespoke developments
Climate-change levy (ECSC steel)
Climate-change levy
Regional selective assistance
Highlands & Islands Enterprise scheme for initial investment
andjob creation
MG Rover: training aid
Exemption from climate-chmge levy for natural gas in
Northem Ireland (industry and services)
24.7.2001 Viridim Growth Fund investments in medium-sized compmies
25.7.2001 English Cities Fund
3 1.7.2001 South Yorkshire productive inyestment scheme
6.9.2001 Highlands & Islands Enterprises R&D innovation scheme for
SMEs
13.9.2001 Highlands & Islmds Enterprise scheme for initial investment
and job creation
30.10.2001 Trent 600 and Trent 900 projects
13.11.2001 Grmts for owner-occupation scheme
28.11.2001 Emissionstradingscheme
28.11.2m1 Renewables obligation md capital $ants for renewables
technologies
20.12.2001 Coalfieldsenterprisefund
28.12.2001 Buying-timeAssistance(Northemlreland)
28.12.2001 Northem Ireland R&D Challense Fund
oJ c 160,2.6.2001
o1C191,7.7.2001
oJ c 2r1,28.7 .200r
oJ c 226,11.8.2001
oJ c 333,28.11.2001
oJ c263, r9.9.200r
ot c263,199.2W1
oI c263,19.9.2Wr
oJ c 263, 19.9.2001
or c 32, 5.2.2002
ot c30,2.2.2002
oJ c38,12.2.20[2
2. Cases in which the Commission found, without opening a formal investigation,
that there was no aid element within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Theaty
or Article 1(2) of Decision 2496l96lECSC
Austria
N 64512000
N 3411999
Belgiam
N 23U2001
N 415al2001
Denmark
N 12612001
N 23612001
N 246t2001
Frqnce
N I 18/2000
20.6.2001 Grmts for Biomass (Vorrlberg)
25.7.2001 Compensation for strmded costs
3.7.200\
28.11.2001
3.7.2001 Regionalgrowthenvironments
25.7.2001 Job rotation
19.9.2001 Grants to compmies with working environment certificates
Reduction in employer's scial strurity contributions in the OI C 268,22.9.2001
event of the introduction of a 38-hour workins week and in the
evenl of m overall reduction in working time
Draft decre promoting gren electricity 
- 
grcen cefiificate OJ C 30, 2.2.2002
scneme
oI c328,23.11.2W1
oJ c 268,22.9.2001
oJ c 333, 28.1 1.2001
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Germmy
N 70712000
N 694t2000
N 8042000
NN 13712001
Idv
N 730/2000
N 434/2000
N 6742001
Nethcrlands
N 484/2000
NN 87/2000
N 698/2000
N 358/2001
NN 30b/2000
N 6782001
N 23912001
Spain
NN 4911999
Uniled Kingdom
N 7972000 13.3.2001
N5,t6b/2000 13.3.2001
N 546a/2N0 283.2M1
N 12312000 28.3.2001
N 140/2001 5.7.2001
Belgiam
NN 7312000(c 36/2001)
N 816/2000
NN 7612001(c74nmr)
Finbnd
NN 982000(c 5s2001)
17 .1.2OOl Innovation Fund of the Innovations- und
Berciligungsgesellschaft mbH Sachsen-Anhalt
25.4.2001 Healthresearch
20.6.2001 Sale of business shares of the GSG by the Innd of Betlin
11.12.2ffi1 Provisions for the closure of nuclear power plants and the
disposal ofwaste
31.1.2001 Valle d'Aosta: acquisition of NedoGen SpA and NewCoDist
SPA by Finaosta
31.1.2001 Cogne Acciai Speciali 
- 
R&D (ECSC steel)
13. I 1.2001 Scheme to promote the regularisation of businesses in the
informal economY
31.01.2001 Wastedisposal scheme for PVC fagade elements
20.6.2001 Wastedisposal systen for paper and cardboard
2.10.2001 Energy-savingschemeforlow-incomehouseholds
13.11.2N1 StichtinglnfrastructuurKwaliteitsborging Bodembeheer
28.1 1.2001 Zero rate for green electricity
28.11.2001 Environmentalprotection
ll.12.20}l Exemption from energy tax forwaste-processing units
25.7.2001 Scherne for competition transition costs
oJ c 149, 19.5.2001
oJ c 185.30.6.2001
oJ c r17,2r.4.2n1
oJ c 133, 5.5.2001
oI c30,2.2.2002
oJ c 358, r5.r2.2m1
oI c30,2.2.2ffi2
oI c30,2.2.2002
ot c32,5.2.2002
ot c268,22.9.200r
oJ c 160,2.6.2001
oJ c 199, 14.7.2m1
oI c263,1992001
oI c328,23.11.2001
Enhanced capital allowances for energy-emcient investments
Partnership support for rcgeneration 5: Community/voluntary
(neighbourhood) regeneration
Partnership support for regeneration (4): Support for
environmental regeneration
Climate-change levy
R&D for renewables md sustainable energy
3. Aid cases in which the Commission initiated proceedings under Article 88(2)
of the EC Tleaty in respect of all or part of the measune
6.6.2001 Aid to Verlipack
18.7.2001 Promotinginnovationthroughcollaboration
17.10.2001 Social fund for the diamond prcessing industry
I 1.7.2001 Aland (slands 
- 
captive insurance
oJ c 313, 8.1 1.2001
oI c 363, 19.12.2N1
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France
NN 4112000(c 46t200r)
NN 39/2000(c 4sl2001)
NN 232001(c79t200r)
Gennany
N 702n000(c23t2001)
NN 156/1999(c 31/2001)
N 595/2000(c33t2ffi1)
NN 28/2001
rc$n0or)
NN 2312000(c41anl\
NN 14711998
NN 4?2000(c 47t2c01)
N 226/2001(c 61/2001)
NN 4512001
NN 8/2000
G62nmr)
NN 3/2000
NN 22000(c66t2N1)
N 361/2001
Q72n00r)
NN 6/2000
N 33412001(c 86/200r)
N 4912001
NN 55/2001
NN 7i2000
Greece
N 201n001
Ireland
NN 55/2000
rc s4n0or)
NN 2212001(c78n00D
11.7.2001 Centralcorporatetreasuies
I 1.7.2001 Headquarters md logistic centres
30.10.2001 Exemption from excise duty for the production of alumina in
Gardmne
11.4.2001 Invesfinent aid to Flender Werft. Liibeck
23.5.2001 Schmitz-GothaFahrzeuewerkGmbH
6.6.2001 Sale of Grtiditzer Stahlwerke
20.6.2001 BVS aid measures to Chemische Werke Piesteritz GmbH
20.6.2001 Aid to Klausner Nordic Timber GmbH & Co KG (KNT),
Wisma
3.7.zml T&hnische Glaswerke Ilnenau GmbH
11.7.2001 Control and coordination centres offoreign companies
25.7.2001 Daimler/Kdlleda
25.7.2W1 IndustrieprkWiirth
25.7.2001 State aid to Neue Erba liutex GmbH Weberei und Veredlung,
Saxony
19.9.2001 HIG Hah- und Ingenieurbau GmbH, Gera
19.9.2001 IGB Ingenieur- und Gewerbebau GmbH, Grossenstein
2.102001 Aid to HmburgerA6
30.10.2001 Aid in favou of Eisenguss Torgelow GmbH 
- 
EGT,
Mecklenburg-Western Pomermia
28.11.2001 State aid to Innneon
11.12.2001 Small business prograrnne of the lnnd of Saxony
20.12.2ffi1 Measures to promote trade md exports for goods produced in
the Land of Menhenburg-Westem Pomerania 
- 
incorrwt
application of the da minimis rules
20.12.2001 Aid in favou of Hwkert Chemitzer Werkzeuqmaschinenbau
GmbH. Suonv
oI c30,2.2.2002
oI c 191,7.7.2001
or c211,28.7.2w1
oJ c 199, 14.7.200r
oI c226,11.8.2001
oJ c 2r9, 4.8.200r
oJ c263,19.9.2ffi1
oJ c 280,4.10.2001
oJ c 310,7.11.2001
or c330,24.rr.2001
oJ c 342,5.12.2001
oI c 368,22.12.2001
18.7.2001 State aid in favour of G. Polychronos spiming mills SA
11.7.2001 Foreignincome
30.10.2001 Exemption from excise duty for the production of alumina in OJ C 30,2.2.2M2
Shannon
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Italy
NN 11012000 31.1.2001 AidtoPertusolasudspA oJc 149,19.5.2001(c 8/2001)
N 613t2000 13.2.2001 R&D aid to Lucchini spA (Ecsc steel) oJ c 166, 9.6.2001(c l0/2ool)
NN 2612001 30.10.2001 Exemption ftom excise duty for the production of alumina in OJ C 30,2.2.2002
(C 8012001) Sardinia
N 44112001 2O.l2.2C/|l Iveco Foggia OJ C 53' 28'2'2m2
(c92r2OO1)
Itxenboarg
NN47/2000 ll.7.200l Financecompanies(c sol2ool)
NN.t62000 11.7.20pl Coordination centses
(c4912001)
Nethcrbnds
N 194/2000 31.1.2001 Developnent aid for Djibouti 
- 
one tuc oJ c 172,16.6.2W1
(c 62001)
N629/2000 28.2.2c/i1 Extensionof wastedisposalsystemforcarwrecks oJc 111, 12,4.2001(c 112001)
NN48/2000 ll.7.2}Ol Intemationalfinancingactivities(c 51/2001)
NN 5712001 25.7.2c/|1 Privatisation and restructuring of Koninklijke Schelde Croep OJ C 254' 13.9.2001(c 64/2001)
Poftugal
NN l33b/2001 13.1 1.2001 Aid for the public-service telwision broadcaster RT?
NN g5b/2001 13.1 1.2001 Aid for the public-seruice rclevision broadcaster RTP
NNg4bn99gl3.ll.20olAidforthepublic.senicetelevisionbroadcasterRTP
Spain
N g4l2001 6.6.2001 Constsuction ofa combined cycle power station and a OJ C 231' 17.8.2001
(C 352001) regasification plant (Bilbao)
N 838/2000 6.6.2001 FordAlmusafes OJ C 219' 4'8'2001(c 342001)
NN 1.12001 20.6.200| Terra M(tica Parlc OI C 300' 26'10'Vnl(c4uzffil)
N 11/2001 20.6.2@l Restruchrring aid to Minas d€ RioTinto sAL ot c367,21.12.2001(c39t2ffir)
N 850/2000 20.6.2001 R&Daidforthe Zamudio site (BasqueCountry)
NN43/2000 l1.7.2OOl Coordinationcentres(BasqueCountry)
(c 482001)
NN 80/2001 19.9.2001 Aid in favour of Grupo de Empresas Avarez (GEA), Vigo OJ C 336' 30'11.2001(C7tl20{]l) (Galicia)
NN 65/2001 19.g.2ffit Alleged State aid in favour of Hilados y Tejidos Puigner6 SA OJ C 339' l-12.2001(c 7012001)
NN41/2001 19.9.2001 AidtoPorcelanasltircipado OJC336'30'11'2001(c69t2mr)
N 839/2000 13'11.2001 Renaultvalladolid oI c33'6'2'2o02(c 822001)
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4. Aid cases in which the Commission initiated proceedings underArticle 6(5)
of Decision 2496l96nCSC in respect of all or part of the measure
United Kingdom
N 12312000 28.3.2001(c l8/2001)
NN 5212000 11.7.200r(c 53/2001)
NN 5112000 r1.7.2N1(c 5u200r\
Belgium
N 77912000
G37t2m1)
Gennany
N 665/2000(c 1212001)
N 595/2000
N 9412001
Spain
NN 7712000
(c2012001\
NN 7ll2001(c 95/2001)
aniled Kingdom
N 19712000 283.2m1(c 19t2oor)
Climate-chmge levy
Gibraltar exempt offshore companies
Gibmltar qualifying offshore companies
20.6.2001 Environmental aid to Sidmar GCSC steel)
28.2.2001 R&D aid to EKO-Stahl GmbH
6.6.2M1 Sale of Gr0ditzer Stahlwerke
20.6.2001 R&D aid to Stahlwerke Bremen GmbH GCSC steel)
oJ c 185, 30.6.2001
oI c26,30.1.200.2
oJ c26,30.0r.20[.2
or cn4,18.8.200r
oJ c 166.9.6.2001
oJ c 191,7.7 .2001
proceedings under Article 88(2)
283.2m1 R&D aid to several ECSC underakings in the Basque Counrry OJ C 185,30.6.2001
20.12.2001 Alleged aid in favour of Sidenirgica Afr6n OJ C 33,6.Z.ZN2
Climate-chmge levy (ECSC steel)
5. Aid cases in which the Commission extended
in respect of all or part of the measure
Germany
c28nun
c36t2N0
c 31i2000
c62/20N
c 15t2001
Spain
c 40n000
17 .1.2M1 Aid in favou of Hirscbfelder Leinen und Textil GmbH (Hilrex)
25.4.2001 Aid to Graf von Hemeberg Pozellan GmbH, Ilmenau(Thuringia)
17.10.2001 Aid to Neue Hauer Werke GmbH, Blankenburg
(Saxony-Anhalt)
28.11.2001 ThuringenPozellmGmbH (Kahla/Thiiringen)
20.12.2M1 Aid in favour of Ambau GmbH
or c 87 , 17 .3.2001
ot c 2r1,28.7 .2001
oI c32,5.2.2m2
oJ c26,30.r.2002
28.1 1.2001 Aid_to shipbuilding 
- 
further restructuring of public yards in OJ C 2l,24.|.ZOO2
Soain
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5. Interim decisions requiring the Member State to supply the information needed
by the Commission
Germany
17 .1.2001 Aid in favour of Hirschfelder Leinen und Textil GmbH (Hiltex)
28.2.2001 Aid toJahnke Slahlbau
13.3.2001 Aid to Pollmeier GmbH
13.3.2001 Aid to Ambau GmbH
25.4.2001 Aid to Graf von Henneberg Porzellan GmbH, Ilmenau(Thuringia)
23.5.2001 Schmitz-GothaFahrzeugwerkGmbH
23520o1 GothaerFahzeugtechnikGmbH
20.6.2W BVS aid neasures to Chemische Werke Piesteritz GmbH
20.6.2001 Aid to Klausner Nordic Timber GmbH & Co KG (KNT)'
Wismar
lg.9.2C0l Aid to SKL Motoren- und Systemtechnik GmbH
19.9.2001 IGB Ingenieur-undGewerbebauGmbH'Grossenslein
17.10.2001 Aid to Neue HazerWerke GmbH, Blankenburg(Saxony-Anhalt)
28.11.2001 Thiiringen Porcllan GmbH (Kahla/Thfingen)
7.lI.2OOl Aid for the public-sewice televisionbroadcaster RTP
7.ll.zCfl Aid for the public-service television broadcaster RT?
7.ll.zc{Jl Aid for the public-service television broadcasier RTP
2JO.200l Aid to Sniace SA
m.l2.z}Ol Alleged aid in favour of Sidenlrgica Afl6n oJ c33,6.2.2W2
7. Cases in which the Commission considered that the aid was compatible
with the common market and terminated pnoceedings underArticle E8(2)
of the EC Tieaty by way of a positive final decision
c28t2.M
NN 9/2000
NN 1612000
NN 1li2m0
c36t20N
NN 156/1999
NN 64n998
NN 2812001
NN 2312000
c44nNO
NN212000
c3tn0/]0
c6a2W
Portugal
NN 133al2001
NN 85a/2001
NN 94al1999
Spain
c20t2wo
NN 7112001
oJ c 160,2.6.2001
oJ c 166,9.6.2001
oI c 179,25.6.2001
oI c 211,28.7.2001
oJ c211,28.7.200r
oI c211,28.7.amr
oJ c226,11.8.2001
oI c219,4.8.2W1
oJ c 330,24.11.2001
oI c32,5.2.2N2
Finbrul
c21t2000
France
car999
Germany
c9nw0
c72/1998
cU2000
csazffio
c 35/2000
c6711999
25.4.2001 Investment aid to Ojala-Yhtyme Oy in Haapajiirvi
25.4.2m1 Aid to ACH Construction Navale (ACHCN)
l3.2.2OOl Second privatisation of Katalruna GmbH Catalysts
28.2.2001 Act conceming the 1999 tax premium for the new German
Ilind.e r, tncbtdtng B erlin
8.5.2001 Modification of aid to Philipp Holzmann AG
3.7 .2OOl KHK Verbindetechnik GmbH, Brotterode
18.7.2001 Aid to Saalfelder Hebereugbau GmbH, Thuringia
25.7 .2001 Aid in favour of Dampfkesselbau Hohenturm GmbH
oJ L 304,21.11.2001
oJ L 47,19.2.2M2
oILU5,r4.9.2W1
ot L248,18.9.2001
oJ L3t,1.2.2002
oJ L 308,27.11.2001
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C 55/2000 17.10.2001 Mesacon Messelektronik GmbH, Dresden
C 2712000 17 .lO.2O0l Aid in favour of Deckel Maho Seebach GmbH, Thuringia
C7811998 30.10.2001 Aid to Neue Maxhiifte: recovery ofillegal aid (initiation of
proceedings under Article 88 ECSC)
Itoly
c75/1999 28.2.2mr Fiar Sata SpA, MelR oJL 177,30.6.2001
C 64/1998 25.4.2001 Aid granted to Istituto poligrafico e Z€cca dello Stato md its
controlled companies
c 47nm 3.7.2001 Aid to Ilva Lmiere e Ttrbi srl and siderumbra oJ L 43. 14.2.2002
C 43/1999 19.9.2001 Aid in the chemical sector to Enichem SpA
C 54lZ0O0 11.12.2001 Tax measures for banks and bankins foundations
Netherhnds
C1U2M 7.2.2ffi1 DevelopmentaidforChina OJL 189, 1t.7.2cf1
C 612001 19.9.2C01 Development aid for Djibouri 
- 
one tug
C lll200l 30.10.2001 Extension of waste disposal system for ca wrecks
Spain
C33l2W 31.1.2001 Aid to Fesa-Enfersagroup (Fertiberia SA)
C 33n998 3.7.2M1 Aid for the restructuring of Babcock Wilcox SA (BWE)
Uniled Kingdom
C 51/2000 17.1.2001 Nissm MM (Micra) prcjat Ot L 140,Z4.S.ZOO|
c 4612000 13.2.2C01 viridian crowth Fund (Northem Irelmd) oJ L 144,3o.5.2Cfj
C 5612000 6.6.2n1 Regional venture capital funds
8. cases in which the commission considered that the aid was compatible
with the common market and terrdnated proceedings underArticle 6(5)
of Decision A96|96|ECSC by way of a positive final decision
Austria
Cul2NU 25.4.2001 A-Voest Alpine Stahl Linz GmbH 
- 
investmenr aid for water OI L235.4.g.ZOOl
purifi cation facilities
Belgium
C 37 n0O1 20.12.2001 .Environmental aid to Sidmil (ECSC steel)
9. cases in which the comiseion considered that the aid was incompatible
with the common markst d terminated proceedings under Article 88(2)
of the EC Tbeaty by way ofe negative or patrty negative decision
Belgium
C7611999 23.5.2W1 Employment aid ro Cockerill Smbre SA (ECSC steel)
C37/2Wl 20.12.2001 Environmental aid ro Sidmar GCSC stel)
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Francc
C7Ul99 25.7.2001 Development aid to Saint-Piene et Miquelon
Germany
oJ L327. 12.12.200r
C4111999 28.3.2001 AidtoEfbeVerwaltungsGmbH&CoManagementKGLintra O1L236,5.9.2ffi1
Beteiligungsholding GmbH
C I9DWO 12.6.2ffi1 Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau GmbH
C77t1999 18.7.2001 AidtovolkswagenAG,Dresden OIL48,2O.2.2OOZ
C28120ffi 19.9.2001 Aid infavourofHirschfelderLeinenundTextil GmbH (Hiltexr
C 66/2000 10.10.2001 Aid to Zei r Maschinen-, Anlagen, Geriite Zemag GmbH(Saxony-Anhalt)
C 31l2NO 17.10.2001 Aid to Neue Harzer Werke GmbH, Blankenburg
(Saxony-Anhalt)
C 36120A0 30.10.200l Graf von Henreberg Porzellan GmbH, Ilmenau (Thwingia)
Italy
C 4512OOO 28.3.2ffJ1 Ewironmental aid to Feriere Nord SpA (ECSC steel) OJ L 310, 28.11.2001
C 4lt2.MO 6.6.2001 Aid to Ive€o 99 Ol L292,9.11.2001
C54l20N ll.l2.2fiOl Tinxmeasuresforbanksandbankingfoundations
Netherlands
C 1ltl999 I3.2.2OOI lnvestnrnt aid in favour of Hewles Packard 
- 
SCI Systems OJ L 186, 7.7.2001
C 57t2W 18.7.2001 Aid in favour of Nolte BV (Valmont Nederland) OJ L 48'20.2.2M2
Spain
C 3311998 3.7.2001 Aid for the restructuring of Babcock Wilcox S.A. (BWE)
C 5411999 11.7 .2OOl 45 % tax credit in the Province of Vizaya
C 5311999 ll.1.2frOl 45 % taxcredit
C 5211999 11.7.2001 Reduction in the tax base for ertain newly created businesses
CSLll999 11.72fi01 50 % taxrelief
C 50/1999 I1.7.2001 Reduction in the tax base for certain newly created businesses
C 49t1999 1l.7,2OOl Reduction in the tax base for certain newly created businesses
C 4A999 Il.7.20Ol 45 % tax ctedit
C4gn11p 73.Jq2OO1 SmtanaMoror O1L92,9.4.2N2
c 60/2000 20.12.200r #:,HJ::1,P,ftfrH#t:*tsx for certain newry created
c sencfl,D 20.t2.2nr 
,!ff#3rgl*",ft"f#;*"Jrtfr 
for certain newry created
C 58/2000 mJ2.2O0l Exemption from corpomtion t4x for certain newly crcated
businesses in the Province ofAlava
10. Cases in which the Cornmission considercd that the aid was incompatible
with the common market and terminated proceedings underArticle 6(4)
of Decision 3t55l9l/ECSC orArticle 6(5) of Decision249696ncsc
by way of a negative decision
France
C 6ll2m0 2l.ll.200l Provisions for locating ECSC firms abroad with tax exemption(Atticle 39 octies A to D of the General Tax Code)
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Germany
C 34|2UJO 28.3.2001 Enviromental aid to Stahlwerke Bremen OI L35,6.2.2002
ClA2M1 28.11.2001 R&DaidtoEKO-StahlGmbH
11. Aid cases in which the Commission terminated proceedings under Article 88(2)
of the EC Theaty after the Member State withdrew the proposed measure
Belgium
C 572m1 20.12.2001 Promoting innovation through collaboration
Germany
C63/1999 28.2.2001 Imprctof newelectricitytaxonfeed-inpriceunder OJC ll7,21.4.2001
S t rome i n s p e is un I s I e s e t z
C 67 11999 25 .7 .2001 Aid in favour of Dmpfkesselbau Hohentum GmbH
C 4012001 2.10.2001 R&D aid to Stahlwerke Bremen GmbH (ECSC steel)
Greece
C 5812001 30.10.2001 State aid in favour ofG. Polyctuonos spinning mills SA
Italy
C35/1999 28.3.2M1 Environmental aid to Feriere Nord SpA (ECSC steel) OJ L 310, Z8.l1.2OQl
c 2onees 8.s.20or 
3,:l1ffi1':"r3gtf;t;j u ouott" unu"rtaking for the ot c 330.24.rr.2wr
C l9ll999 3.7.2001 Aid to Ilva Lamiere e Tirbi Srl and Siderumbra OI L 43, 14.2.2002
12. Cases in which the Commission noted the Member State's agreement
to ensuring the compliance of existing aid awards following the proposal
of appropriate measures underArticle 88(1) of the EC lheaty
Germany
E 5/1998 28.2.2001 Act conceming the 1999 tax premium for the new Geman
Uinde r, includlng B erlin
13. Aid cases which the Commission decided to refer to the Court of Justice
under the second subparagraph ofArticle 88(2) ofthe EC Theaty
Germany
C23/1997 25.7.2001 Aid to Lautex GmbHWeberei undVeredelung (Saxony)
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14. Cases in which the Comrnission found, without opening a formal investigation,
that there was no aid element within the meaning of Article 4 of the ECSC lfeaty
Belgium
NN 12112000 25.7.2001 Financial participation by the Walloon region in Duferco Ol C268,22.9.2001
Belgium SA (ECSC steel)
United Kingdom
N 197/2000 28.3.2@l Climate-change levy (ECSC steel)
15. Int€rim decisions requiring the Member State to order the recipient (s)
to reimburse aid iltegally granted
Gemuny
cff,t2oo} 10.10.2001 
3*f"fi1ft1l*chinen-, 
Anlagen, Gerate zemas GmbH
C 36/2000 30.10.2001 Gmfvon Henneberg Porzellan GmbH, Ilmenau (Thuringia)
Spain
C 54t1999 11.7.2001 45 % tax credit in fte Pmvince ofVizcaya
C5311999 11.7.2001  s%raxcredit
C 5U1999 11.7.2001 Reduction in the tu base for certain newly created businesses
C5lll999 11.7.2001 So%taxrelief
C 50n999 I1.7.2001 Reduction in the tax base for certain newly created businesses
C 49t1999 11.7.2001 Reduction in the tax base for certain newly created businesses
C4811999 ll.7.200l 41%taxcredtt
16. Interim decisions rcquiring the Member State to suspend payment of aid
Spain
C 5411999 11.7.2ffi1 45 % taxcrdiaintheProvirce of Yncaya
C 5311999 ll.7 .2OOl 45 % tax credi,t
C 5AD99 11.7 .2001 Reduction in the tax base for certain newly created businesses
C 5l/1999 11.7.2Nl 50 % tax relief
C 50/1999 ll.7.20}l Reduction in the ta base for certain newly crated businesses
C 49t1999 ll.1.2ml Reduction in the tax base for certain newly created businesses
C 4AD99 11.7.2001 45 % t^r' $edrt
17. Cases in which the Commission terminated proceedings underArticle 88(2)
of the EC Tfeaty having found that there was no aid element
within the meaning of Article E7(1) of the EC Theaty
Germany
C 33n00l 2O.l2.2C0l Sale of Grtiditzer Stahlwerke
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Italy
C 1V2000 20.6.2001 Investment aid to Rivit SpA (non-ECSC steel)
Netherlands
C 3311999 25.7 .2001 Reebok, Rotterdam
18. Other Commission decisions
Austria
N 23511999 6.9.2001 Tu-rate increases in relation to the rinsewater exemption, the
exemption for de-inking residue, the green electricity zero tariff
and the exemption for waste incineration plmts
Denmark
N 840a/2000 17.10.200I Memures in favour oflarge energy consumers
France
oJ c 234, 18.8.2001
oJ L25.29.t.2002
C 38/1998 28.2.2001 Aid to the Kimberly Clilldscott $oup, Frmce OJ L 12,15.1.2ffi2
N 47212000 3.5.2001 Renewal under identical conditions of the parafiscal chrge on
the leather goods industry
Gemuny
N 653/2000 8.5,2001 Real estate sale by city ofRostock to Sixt
N ,140/2001 9.9.2ffi1 Support for film md audiovisual production in the Geman
Uinder 
- 
Mitteldeutsche Medienforderuns GmbH
Italy
C 1612ffi0 20.6.2ffi1 Regional aid map for the period 200GO6
Netherlands
N 101/2000 11.4.2001 BerendsenTextielSeniceBV/Co8tonBV OJC342,5.12.2001
N 131/2001 24.7.2001 Stimulus
Spain
N 73911999 l7 .1.2001 Aid to the retail sector (Valencia) OI C 149, 19.5.2001
N 738/1999 17.1.2001 Aid to the tourism sector (Valencia) OJ C 149, 19.5.2m1
N7l7ll999 17.l.2OOl Regionalaidschemetopromoteinvestment,diversificationand OJC 149, l9.5.2OOl
innovation (Valencia)
N 683/2000 l7 .7 .2001 Aid for investments in SMEs in the industrial and sewices
sectors (Rioja)
United Kingdom
C 19/2001 3.4.2001 Climate-chmge levy (ECSC srel) OJ C 191,7.7.2c01
N 19712000 3.4.200'l Climate-change levy (ECSC steel)
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D 
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List of State aid cases in other sectors
1. In the agricultural sector
1.1. Cases in wbich the Commission found, without opening a formal investigation,
that tlere was ao aid element within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Tbeaty
Italy
Rural developmentplan (Valle d'Aosta) OJ C 71,3.3.2001
Amendment of Regional Act No 37f2@0 
- 
agricultural and OI C 234,18'8.2001
rural development (Tiscany)
2.lO.2OOl Annualandmultiannualbalancesheets-Articles12l, 123and OJC21'24.1.2$2
126 ofAct No 388/2000
1.2. Measures whictr the Commission considered compatible with the conrmon market
without opening a formal investigation underA,rticle 88(2) of the EC Treaty
Aastria
oJ c 102, 31.3.2001
oJ c 102,31.3.2001
oJ c 128,28.4.2001
oJ c 133,5.5.2001
oJ c 160,2.6.2001
oJ c 199, 14.7.200r
oJ c 219,4.8.2001
ot c247,5.9.200r
oI c 323,20.11.20fJ1
ot c374,29.12.2001
oI c 374,29.12.2001
oJ c 5, 8.1.2001
ot c26,30.1.2002
oJ c26,30.r.20[.2
oI c20,23.r.2M2
oJ c 102,31.3.2001
oJ c 140, 12.5.200r
oI c247,s.9.2001
ot c268,22.9.200r
oI c323,20.11.2001
oJ c2r,24.r.2m2
oJ c 350, 11.12.2001
oJ c 133,5.5.2m1
ot c t72,16.6.2001
N 368/2000
N 3692001
N 824al2000
N 845/2000
N 652t2000
N 53712000
N 631/2000
N 778/2m0
N 14712001
N 5/2001
NN 58/2001
N 1142001
N 583/2001
N 165t2001
N 658v2001
N 640/2001
N 6822001
N 188t2001
Belgtum
N 6992000
N 143/2001
N 437t2001
N 480/2001
N 50V2000
N 786/2000
N 65712001
Denmarh
N 45912000
N 90/2001
17.1.2001
17.7.2M1
26.2.2c0r
26.2.2001
22.3.200r
3.4.7,001
9.4.2001
7.6.2001
3.7.2W
25.7.2001
2.10.2001
n.rr.200r
27.tt.2m1
5.12.2001
Insurance premiums (Vienna)
Subsidised loans in the horticultue sector
Aid in the livestock s@tor (Cilinthia)
Forestry prognmme
Maintenance of rural heritage (Carinthia)
Anirnal health (Vorarlberg)
Nature protection programme'l,ebensraum Acker' (Vienna)
Measures related to the BSE crisis (Carinthia)
Measures related to the BSE crisis
Aid towards transition from cage-rearing to floor management
or ftee-range production in poultry-keeping (Vorarlberg)
Directive conerning the provision of senics
Aid towards compensation for the drought damage to harvest in
2001 (Carinthia)
2O.l2.2C0l Compensation for losses due to the BSE crisis (Burgenlmd)
20.12.2001 Compensation for losses due to the BSE crisis (Vorarlberg)
21.12.2ffi1 Quality and cleanliness of milk and milk Products (Bugenland)
26.2.2001 Draft decre€ on herd rcduction
9.4.20fJ1 Funding of anti-BSE measures
25.7.2m1 BSE and fmt-and-mouth crises
22.8.2001 Registrationoflaboratoriesforthedetectionof organisms
hamful to plants and Plant Products
10.10.2001 Support for investments and setting-up in farming (Flanders)
17j0-2fr01 Aid to glass-house cultivation (Flurders)
7.11.2ffi1 BSE crisis
3,4.2AA1 Aid for irmovation, research ild developnent
15.5.2001 Ceiling on local land taxes
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N 331/2000
N 307/2000
N 22412001
N 356/2001
Finland
N 42912000
N 189/2000
N 825/2000
N 64912000
France
N 686/1999
NN 2/2001
N 829/2000
N 37512000
N 14?/2001
N 190/2001
N 296t2001
N 307/2001
N 191/2001
N 31212001
N 311/2001
NN,16/2001
N 206/2001
N 316b/2000
N 255/2001
N 479/2N1
N 478/2001
N 29312001
N 388/2001
N 386/2001
N 381/2001
N 355/2000
N 484/2001
N 665/2001
N 57312001
N 570/2001
N 66412001
N 57112001
N 607/2001
15.5.2001 Protectionoffamanimals
31.7.2001 Compensationfordisemeeradication
1 1.10.2001 Extension of the act on administration of the Eurooean
Community regulations regarding market organisation and
agricultural products, etc., to cover aid for ecological
Production
11.12.2001 Aid to organic production
22.3.2001 Organicproducts
15.5.2001 Agriculturalholdings
18.6.2001 Financing of sustainable forestry
21.12.2001 Exemption of tax on lmd purchme
19.2.2001 Aid for the fruit and vegetable sector
11.4.2001 Programme to conhol agricultural pollution
11.4.2M1 Aid for olive growing
15.5.2001 Maninique 2000-O6 
- 
agricultural guarantee fund
7.6.2001 Measures to assist the meat industry, excluding wholesale/retail
25.6.2001 Aid in the oilseeds, protein crops and textile crops sectors
25.6.2001 Aid to improve quality in the cereals sector
3.7 .2001 Aid for the advertising md promotion of fresh md processed
fruit md vegetables
17 .7 .2001 Aid for the development of organic cereals, oilseed and protein
plants fming
18.7.2001 Aid for the advertising md promotion of quality wines
'VQPRD'and 'vins de pays'
18.7.2001 Aid for the advertising and promotion of milk products
25.7.2W1 BSE crisis
31.7.2001 Parafiscal chrge for the Fruit md Vegetable Tmde Technical
Centre (CTIFL)
14.8.2001 Rdunion 200O46 
- 
commercial parks and strategic
development areas
20.8.2001 Parafiscal charge for the National Intertrade Organisation for
Prunes (BNIP)
22.8.2001
22.8.2001
22.8.2001
Aid to technological development md innovation in the meat
products and egg products sector
Aid for testing in the tobacco sector
Aid to fms supplying breeding mima.ls to the French overseas
departments
6.9.2001 Aid to ommental horticulture
10. I 0.2001 Renewal of the paafiscal chrge for the National Institute for
the Lnprovement of Viticulture (ENTAV)
10.10.2001 Aid to improve the quality ofpigmeat produced in mountain
treas
30.10.2001 Progrmme to control agricultural pollution (PMPOA)
5.11.2001 Aid to the wine-growing sector
27.1 1.2001 Aid to grouping centres
5.122001 hocessing of fresh fruit
18.12.2001 Fresh fruit and vegetables programme 
- 
ile-de-France
20.12.2001 Defrayal ofthe costs ofBSE tests
20.12.2N1 Parafiscal charge to assist md promote the cider fruit sector
21.12.2001 Aid to agricultural holdings in theYvelines
oI c 172,16.6.200r
oJ c247,5.9.2001
oJ c323,20.1t.2c01
oJ c 18,22.1.2002
ot c 128,28.4.2001
oJ c 172, 16.6.2001
oJ c 211,28.7 .2001
ot c20.23.1.2002
oJ c94,'4.!2001
ot c r79,25.6.2Nr
oJ c 160,2.6.2001
oJ c 172,16.6.200r
oJ c 199, 14.7.2001
oI c 2t1,28.7 .zml
oJ c 2l l, 28.7.2W1
oJ c 219,4.8.2001
oJ c234,18.8.2001
oI c234,18.8.2001
oI c234,18.8.2001
oJc247,5.9.2001
ot c247,5.9.200r
oJ c 258, 15.9.2001
oI c268,22.9.2001
ot c268,22.9.2W1
ot c268,22.9.200r
or c268,22.9.2ffi1
oJ c321,16.11.200r
ot c323,20.11.200r
oJ c323,20.11.2001
oJ c 350, 11.12.2001
oI c 18,22.1.2002
oJ c 374,29.12.2001
oJ c 5, 8.1.2001
oI c 18,22.12002
or c26,30.r.2002
oJ c26,30.1.2002
oJ c20,23.1.2M2
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Germany
N76U2Affi
N 11V2000
N 5812000
N 36/2001
N 16212001
N 566i2000
N 561/2000
N 1832001
N 844/2000
N 205/2001
N 24812001
N 193/2001
N 17412001
N 170/2001
N 164/2001
N 218/2001
N 560/2000
N20A2Wl
N 214t200r
N 150a/2001
N l50b/2001
N 23912000
N243n001
N 596/2001
N r50di200l
Nz9a00r
N 2451200r
N 855/2000
N 25412001
N 23312001
N 646/2001
N,K4l200l
N 11v2001
N 42112001
N724nW0
N 645/2001
Greece
N 158/2000
N 814/1999
25.7.2001
8.8.2001
22.8.200r
24.8.2ffir
n.8.2001
7.9.2001
2.rc.2W
2.10.2001
10.10.2001
17.10.2001
23.tO.200l
30.10.2001
30.10.2001
7.tl.2001.
13.1 1.2001
oJ c 71,3.3.2001
oJ c 87, 17.3.2001
oJ c 102,31.3.2001
oI c 128,28.4.2001
oI c I60,2.6.2W1
oJ c 185,30.6.2001
oJ c 185,30.6.2001
oJ c 199, r4.7.2M1
oJ c 199, r4.7.zmr
ot c234,18.8.2001
ot c247,5.9.200r
oJ c247,5.9.zffir
ot c247,5.9.200r
oI c247,5.9.2001
oJ cu7,5.9.200r
oJ c 258, 15.9.2001
or c 268,22.9.200r
oJ c274,29.9.2001
oJ c274,29.9.2001
oJ c 313, 8.1 1.2001
oI c323,20.11.2001
oI c323,20.11.200r
oJ c 323, 20.1 1.2001
oJ c 339, l.l7.2mr
oJ c 350, 11.12.2001
oJ c 350, rL.l2.2001
oJ c 350, 11.12.2001
oI c 362, 18.12.2001
oJ c374,29.12.2001
oJ c 1, 3.1.2002
oJ c 5,8.1.2001
oJ c 5, 8.1.2001
oI c r8,22.r.2w2
oJ c r8,22.12002
oI c26,30.r.2002
7.6.2001
7.6.2001
18.7.2001
31.1.2001 Improvements in farm structures and coastal protection
13.2.2001 Compensationinwater-protectionreas (Baden-Wurttemberg)
26.2.2001 Bio.diesel tank on agriculture undertakings
22.3.2001 Inprovements in falm structures and coastal proiection
11.42.AU Destruction of meat and bone rneal and animal feed containing
meat and bone meal
27 .4.2N1 Directive on the grant of subsidies for the construction and
improvement of irrigation and drainage systems
(Mecklenburg-Westem Pomerania)
n.4.2001 Support for performance testing and other memures in mimal
breding (Brandenburg)
Animal diseases
R&D in environmental protection
Promotion ofconsultancy in favour of agricultural and
horticultural holdings (Thuingia)
25.7.2001 Aid for combating BSE (Saxony)
25.7.2001 BSE preventive measures (Bavaria)
25.7.2001 Emergency aid for stock farmen (BSE) (Bavaria)
25.7.2001 Programme to assurc survival ofagricultural undertakings(Ihuringia)
Aid to stockfarmers (BSE) (Irwer Suony)
Upgrading the skills of farmers md their fmilies (Bavaria)
Promotion of environmentally friendly agricultue (Saxony)
Aid for BSE tests conducted in slaughterhouses (Bavuia)
Aid scheme for resfiucturing measures (Silony-Anhalt)
BSE tests 
- 
compnsation for the loss of revenue on
BSE-infected farms (Baden-Wiirttemberg)
BsE-related measures (Baden-Wiimemberg)
Compensalory payments in water protrction arem (Saxony)
Rescue aid for the firm Voigt-Jacob (Thuringia)
Removal of risk material (Irwer Silony)
BsE-related measures (Baden-Wtirttemberg)
Emergency aid for combating BSE (Hessen)
Rescue aid for the firm Die Thiiringer (Thuringia)
Agricultural fafu s (Rhineland-Palatinate)
Aid for destruction of animal cucasses (Mecklenbug-Westem
Pomerania)
27.ll.zuJl Setting up a computerised inforrration system forhorticulture
28.1 1.2001 Disposal of old industrial stmks of feedingstuffs
5.12.2001 Aid towards the payment of hail insurance premims in fruit
culture (Baden-Wurttemberg)
5.12.2001 Aid to umbrella organisations for sales promotion measures(Bavria)
11.12.2W Special programme for State aid when there is a BSE cae in a
slaughterhouw (Bavaria)
11.12.2001 Compensation in water-protection areas md flood plains
(Schleswig-Holstein)
2O.l2.2OOl Special programme to combatthe effects ofBSE (Saxony)
26.2.2001 Damage to raisin crcps
31.7.200L Aid for farmers whose crop and livestock holdings were
damaged by exceptional occmences during 1999
oJ c 102,31.3.2001
oI c 247,5.9.200l
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N 364/2000
N 57712000
N 603/2000
Ireland
N 29512000
N 461al2000
N 36V2000
N 599/2000
N46Z/2m
N 828/2000
N 461bl2000
N,K3n001
N 483/2001
N42U2W
Italy
N 705i2000
N 789/2000
NN 128/2000
N 250/2000
N 559/2000
N 558/2000
N729a12000
N 52311998
N 63/2001
N 129/2001
N742/20ffi
N 157/2000
N 826/2000
N22y2m1
N l10/2001
N 830/2000
NN 29al2000
N 14412001
N 17312001
NN 109/2000
N 113a/2001
N 391/200t
18.7.2001
25.7.200r
31.7.2m1
14.8.2001 Aid for farmers whose crop and livestock holdings were OJ C 258, 15.9.2001
dmaged by adverse weather conditions in April 2000
27.11.2001 Aid to support cooperation between farmers OJ C 374,29.12.2C01
27 .12.2001 Aid for farmers whose crop and livestock holdings were OJ C 26, 30.1.2002
damaged by adverse weather conditions during the period frcm
July to Drcember 1999
10.1.2001 Installation aid for young farmers
25.1.2001 Aid in addition to regional operational progmes (items l-4
mdG10)
3 1.1.2001 Investrnent aid for the marketing and processing of agricultural
products
19.2.2001 Training
19.2.2001 Aid for employment and humm resources development (items
1l and 12)
28.2.2001 Transitionalagrimonetaryaid
15.5.2001 Aid in addition to regional operational programmes (irem 5)
30.10.2001 lnvestment aid for the control offam pollution
7 .ll.2001 Improvement of equine-breeding infmstructures
27.ll.z00l Aid for planting trces
10.1.2001 Eradicationof 'gra;rvineflavesencedorde'invineyrds
(Friuli-Venezia Giulia)
23.1.2001 Interbranch agrement on potat@s
13.2.2001 Promotion of quality products
19.2.2001 Regional Act No 15/2000 (t azio)
28.2.2001 Promotion of the processing and marketing strtor for
agricultual and forestry products
28.2.2001 Aid to enterprises processing md marketing agricultural products
13.3.2001 Extension of instruments provided for in agreed progrmming
mqrsures to agriculture, forestry and fisheries
2O3.zml Aid for rural and agricultual development (Tuscany)
29.3.2001 Aid for monitoring and certification ofproducts (Tuscany)
9 .4 .2001 Infomation md tehnical assistance measures relating to waste
collation md elimination (Lombardy)
27.4.2001 Salvi Senices Strl prcject
15.5.2001 Aid in the agdcultural, agri-food, agro-industrial and forcstry
strtors
23 .5 .2001 Economic promotion of agricultural activities for the year 200 I
(Tuscany)
5.6.2001 Mrketingofagriculturalproducts(Lombardy)
5.6.2001 Operatingarangementsoflsmea
5.6.2001 Dnftregional act on a regional fm rccountancy network(Valle d'Aosta)
20.6.2001 Draft regional act on a regional financial contribution to
solidarity fmds (Emilia-Romagna)
17 .7 .2001 Aid for investments in the purchase of agricultural machinery
18.7.2001 Aid to holdings to compensate for losses due to stoms(Smdinia)
Aid for gmbbing-up and replacing fruit trees hit by sharka virus(Veneto)
Aid for the BSE crisis: Act No 4912001
Leader II 
- 
increase in the rate of aid fu a oromotion memue(T[scany)
oI c 52, t7.2.2001
oI c71,3.3.2001
oJ c 78, 10.3.2001
or c94,24.3.2|01
oJ c94,24.3.2001
oJ c 107,7.4.2c01
oI c r72,16.6.2W1
oJ c 339, r.12.2001
oJ c 350, tl.12.2001
ot c374,29.12.2001
oI c 52, 17.2.2001
oJ c60,24.2.2001
oJ c 87, 17.3.2001
ol c94,24.3.2.N1
oI c to7,7 .4.2001
oI c 107,7.4.2001
oI c 117,21.4.2001
oJ c 128,28.4.2001
oJ c 133,5.5.2001
oJ c 140, r2.5.2ffi1
oJ c 185, 30.6.2001
oJ c 172,16.6.2001
oJ c 185,30.6.2001
or c r9r,7.7.200r
oJ c 191,7.7.2001
oJ c 191,7 .7 .2001
oJ c21r,28.7.2001
oJ c234,18.8.2001
oI c 234, 18.8.2001
oJ c247,5.9.2001
otc247,5.9.2001
ot c247,5.9.200r
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N27z200l
N 62/2001
N 7l V1999
N274t2N1
N 26112001
N2442001
N 41 l/2001
N 112001
N 4542001
N 447t2001
N l8l/2001
N 408/2001
N 33712001
N 99/2001
N 759/2m0
N 6042001
Netherlands
N 486n998
N 7912001
N 8l/2000
N279nOOl
N 146/2001
N 145/2001
N266n001
N 566/2001
N 656/2001
N 634/2001
N 750/2001
N 683/2001
Portugal
N 208/2001
Spain
NN 14n999
N777nO00
N 346/2000
N 435/2000
N 31/2001
N 34712000
N 108,/2001
N 3/2001
N 60912000
31.7.2001 Preventive measurcs for BSE (lnmbardy)
8.8.2001 hocessing and marketing of agricultural products (Piedmont)
14.8.2001 Financial aid in the agli-food industry (Piedmon!
26.9.2001 Aid for producer associations
269.2M1 Reserch, testing and demonstration (Lornbudy)
1 L 10.2001 Production and marketing of agricultural products (Mantua)
30.10.2001 Income support to beef fams in crisis due to BSE (Lombady)
5.1 L2001 Aid to hill farming (Friuli-Venezia Giulia)
7 il.2m1 Aid for the developnent of local wine productions and for the
forestry sector (Friuli-Venezia Giulia)
7 .11.2001 Aid for technical assistance services to stocKarmers (Calabria)
7.lI.2O0l Aid to dairy sector (Va[e d'Aosta)
27 .1l.2OOl Aid for voluntary reparcelling in mountain areas (FriuliVenezia
Giulia)
27.11.2001 Income aid to milkbovine stoclf,arms affectedby BSE
(Emilia-Romgna)
n .1l.20{Jl Aid for the promotion of typical products and for sening up
services to farms (Friuli-Venezia Giulia)
27.112fr01 Promotion of fmdstufrs in non-member countries
20.12.2001 Processing mdmarketing of agriculturalproducts (Lombardy)
l7.l.200l Guamtee Fund
19.3.2001 Tax measures for enviromental protection
19.3.2001 Exports offruit and vegetables to Japan and Thiwan
25.6.2A01 Increasing knowledge conceming management of minerals
L8.7.2OOl Aid and pamfiscal charges in the seed potato strtor
18.7.2001 Aid and parafiscal charges in the seed potato sector
10.10.2001 Measrcs to combat foot-and-mouth dise6e
5.11.20/ll Project NIMF (N-impulse: environmental and financial effects)
ll.lz.2ffil Exemption of energy lax ganted to the glasshouse horticulture
sctor
l8.l2.200l Environmental investmentdeductions 2002
2l.l2.200l Extension of finance for a mushroom advertising campaign
20.12.2001 Compensation for keeping sows for which a fertilisation md
insemination prohibition applied
5.11.2001 Aid towards the payment ofinsurance premiums in the
livestock sector
L7.1.2OOl Aid to the firm Clas (Asturias)
2\1.2W Aid for the transport and destruction of risk material (Basque
CountrY)
23.1.2001 Aid to agdcultural cooperatives (Castile-La Mancha)
31.1.2001 Aid to groups of stock famers
26.2.2001 Aid in the forestry sector (Asturias)
23 .3 .z00l Aid for the marketing of agricultural products (Castile-La
Mancha)
29.3.2.A01 Aid for livestock culling (Galicia)
9.4.2001 Aid to young famers
n.4.2001 Aid to businesses in the non-prcfit sector (Andalusia)
oJ c247,5.9.2001
oJ c 258, 15.9.2001
oJ c 258, 15.9.2001
oJ c 313, 8.1 1.2001
oJ c 313, 8.11.2001
ot c323,20.11.200r
oJ c 350, rr.12.2001
oJ c 350, rr.r2.200r
oJ c 350, r1.t2.2mr
oJ c 350, 11.12.2001
oJ c374,29.12.2001
oI c374,29.12.200r
ot c374,29.t2.2001
oJ c374,29.12.2001
at c26,30.1.2402
oJ c 78, 10.3.2001
oI c 117,21.4.2ffi1
ot c 117,21.4.2001
oJ c211,28.7.2001
oJ c247,5.9.2001
oI c247,5.9.200r
oJ c 350, rr.12.200r
ot c 18,22.1.2m2
oI c r8,22.r.2W2
oJ c26,30.r.20[2
oI c26,30.1.2m2
oJ c 350. 11.12.2002
oJ c 71,3.3.2001
oJ c ffi,24.2.2W1
otc60,u.2.2001
ot c 71,3.3.2ffi1
oJ c 102, 31.3.2001
oJ c 128,28.4.2001
oJ c 133,5.5.2001
oJ c 140, 125.2w1
oJ c 185,30.6.2001
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N 608/2000
N 12312001
N 64i2001
N 200/2001
N 23512001
N 107/2001
N 198/2001
N 37712001
N 269/200r
N 238/2001
N 26512001
N 12212001
N 39212001
N 252/2001
N 109/2001
N 36712001
N 438/2001
N 600c/2001
N 465/200r
N 49612001
NN l7l2000
N 580/2001
N 390/2001
N 167/2001
Sweden
N 27512001
ot c r72,16.6.2mr
oJ c 199, 14.7.z00l
oJ c21t,28.7.2W1
oI c 2r9, 4.8.2001
ot c 234, 18.8.2001
oJ c234,18.8.2001
oJ c 234, 18.8.2001
oI c247,5.9.2001
otc247,5.9.200r
oJ c247,5.9.2001
oJ c 258, 15.9.2001
oJ c 258, 15.9.2001
oJ c323,20.rr.2001
oI c323,20.11.2001
oJ c323,20.11.2001
oJ c 323, 20.1 1.2001
oJ c 350, 11.12.2001
oJ c 350, 1r.12.2001
oJ c 350, 11.12.2W1
oJ c374,29.12.200r
oJ c 1,3.12ffi2
ot c 18,22.1.2W2
or c26,30.1.2002
oI c26,30.1.2002
oJ c247,5.9.2001
ot c94,243.2Mr
oJ c 140, 12.5.2001
oJc 140, 12.5.2001
oJ c 140, t25.2W1
oJc 140, 12.5.2001
oJ c 140, 12j.2001
oJ c 140, 12.5.2001
oJ c 172,16.6.200r
oJC 199, 14.7.zmr
oJ c 199, r4.7.200r
o1 c247,5.9.2001
oJ c 258, 15.9.2001
oJ c 268, 22.9.2N1
oJ c 313, 8.1 1.2001
oJ c 323.20.11.2001
15.5.2001
7.6.200r
25.6.2001
3.7.2001
17.7.2001
Aid to repair damage caused by natural disasters (Castile-Leon)
Promotion of agri-food products (Asturias)
Maketing of agricultual, forestry, fisheries and aquaculture
prodrcts (Basque Country)
Aid to strcldmers (BSE) (Asturias)
Measures to assist producer groups using integrated pest control
in agriculture (Aragon)
17.7.2001 Aid to the dairy sector (Asturias)
18.7.2001 ARTE/PYME II programme
25.7.2m1 Aid to stock famen (BSE) (Cmtabria)
25.'l.20Ol Measures to prevenvcombat BSE (Asturias)
31.7.2001 Aid to the food industry (Madrid)
8.8.2001 Aid to stmkfarmers (BSE) (Galicia)
14.8.2001 Measures to assist fmers hit by drought 1999-2000 (Murcia)
10.10.2001 Aid for tomato growers
10.10.2001 Aid for tomato growers (Murcia)
10.10.2001 Aid for animal health-protection groups (Asturias)
11.10.2001 Aid for mrketing livestock (Extremadua)
5.1 1.200 t Aid for the advertising md promotion of flowers and plants
7.11.2001 Employmentaid(Asturias)
7 .11.2001 Aid to promote the agri-food industry
27.11.2001 Aidtohorse-breeders' assmiations (Cantabria)
28.1 1.2001 Measures to offset the effects ofdrought
18.12.2001 Livestockrehabilitation(Cantabria)
27 .12.2001 Withdrawal of meat and bone meal from the market (Galicia)
28.12.2001 Aid to stock fmers (BSE) (Castile-Leon)
25.7.2W1 Monetdycompensatorymounts
United Kingdom
N 4/2001 19.2.2001
N 158a/2001 3.4.2001
N 157al2001 3.4.2001
National scrapie plan 
- 
genotyping scheme
Agrimonetry aid 
- 
shrepmeat sector (diect aid 20Ol 
- 
fist
tmche)
Amendment to agrimonetary compensation scheme 
- 
beef md
dairy sectors (maket suppon 2001)
Amendment to agrimonetary compensation scheme 
- 
beef and
dairy sectors (milket support 2001)
Amendment to agrimonetary com[rcnsation scheme 
- 
dairy
sector
Amendment to agrimonetary compensation scheme 
-sheepmeat sector
Pig industry restructuing scheme
Mmagement agreement schemes
Filst tmche of agrimonetary aid 
- 
beef md veal sector
Livestock welfae disposal scheme
Amendments to countryside stewardship scheme
Payment of costs assmiated with the BSE testing of bovine
animals
Scottish Red Meat Cmpaign
Agriculture Development Scheme 2001 (England)
Agrimonetary aid 
- 
bef and veal setor
N l57bl2001
N 156/2001
N 155/2001
NN 2412001
N 812n999
N 158b/2001
NN 2512001
N 49412000
N 442t2001
NN 49l200r
N 472i2001
N 565/2001
03.04.2001
3.4.200r
3.4.2001
3.4.2001
15.5.2001
6.6.2001
6.6.2001
24.7.2001
14.8.2001
20.8.2001
26.9.2001
2.10.2001
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1.3. Interim decisions requiring the Member State to supply the information needed
by the Commission
Italy
c 6ut996
Netherlands
NN 2212000
17.10.2001 Regional Act No 8l/95: application to the marketing of
products in Armex II to the EC Treaty (Sicily)
17.l.200l Aid to conpensate the agriculture sector for increased energy
pnces
17.1.2ffiI Aid to compensate stock breeders for damage caused by blue
tongrre (Sardinia)
17.1.2001 Compensation for damage caused by drought in 2000 (Sardinia)
28.3.2ffi1 Aid to improve processing and marketing conditions for
agricultural products (Veneto)
25.7.2001 Aid to agricultu€ 
- 
rural infrdtruchrres md forestry
(Sardinia)
25.7.2001 AIMA programme 
- 
poultry industry
19.9.2001 Draft regional act on a regional finmcial confibution to
solidaity funds (Emilia-Romagna)
9.9.200L Emergency measures in the agricultural s€ctor (Sicily)
2.lO.2OOl Annual and multiannual balance sheets 
-Articles 121, 123 and126 ofAct No 388/2000
13. I 1.2001 Finance for agricultural businesses to improve product quality
and living conditions for operators (Province of Campobasso,
Molise)
11.12.200I Rescue and restructuring ofagricultural businesses il difficulty
(Marche)
2O.l2.2Wl Pigs 
- 
improvement of abattofus
17.I.z/Jl0l Aid for the purchase ofmilk quotas (Asturias)
I 1.4.2001 Aid following the fuel price increase
11.4.2001 Aid following the fuel price increase
o1LU,7.3.2002
o1 c 327 ,22.1r.2ffi1
ot c263,19.9.2001
oJ c 140, 12.s.2M1
oI c23,23.r.20p2
oJ c254,13.9.200r
oJ c 315,9.11.2001
oJ c 315,9.11.2001
oJC2l,U.r.zffi2
oJ c 354, 13.122001
or c 143,15.6.2@2
oJ c 37 ,9.2.2002
oJ c 87, 17.3.2001
oI c 172,16.6.2001
1.4. Aid cases in which the Commission initiated proceedings underArticle E8(2)
of the EC Tbeaty in reqrect of all or part of the measure
Germany
N 83Vr997(c v2001)
Italy
N 7752000(c s/2001)
N 74512000(c 4/2001)
N 98/2000(c r7t20ol\
N 4712001
N 79711999(c s9l2001)
NN 29bl2000(c6a2N1)
N 795n999(c 65/2ml)
N 824al2000
N 781/2000(c 8l/2001)
NN 163/2001
Netherlands
N 568t2001
Spain
NN 13/1999(caz0nrt
NN 19/2001
N 68la/2000(c2a2N1)
31. l.20Ol Guarantee for a company processing vegetables (Thuringia) OJ C 320, 15.1 1.2001
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1.5. Cases in which the Commission consldered that the aid was compatible
with the common market and terminated proceedings under,A.rticle 88(2)
of the EC Thaty by way of a positive final decision
Greece
C 6Y1998 31.1.2001 Aid in the fruit and vegetables sector (1997)
1.6. Cases in which the Commission considered that the aid was incompatible
with the common market and terminated proceedings underArticle 88(2)
ofthe EC Ttrcaty by way ofa negative or partly negative final decision
Italy
c6t/tse6 17'10'2001 [H$#r1"f,?:i{i:',i:t#s"+:J,!?3i"iiff*u* " otL64'7'3'2002
C 83n998 13.1 1.2001 Regional plm for restructuring agricultural businesses
(Sardinia)
1.7. Aid cases in which the Commission tenninated proceedings underArticle 88(2)
of the EC Tbeaty after the Member State withdrew the proposed mea$rne
Germany
C 8/2000 18.7.2N1 Aid for vocational training (Bavaria)
Itoll
C 911996 19.9.YJA\ Act No 23195 on lending syndicates for pooling guumtees OI C l,4.1.2C[.2
among SMEs, agricultual sector (Sicily)
1.8. Other Commission decisions
Spain
NN 19/2001 25.4.2001 Aid following the fuel price increase
N 681a/2000 25.4.2001 Aid following the fuel price increase OJ C 172,16.6.2001
2. In the fisheries sector
2.1. Measures which the Commission considered compatible with the common market
without opening a fonnal investigation under Articte 88(2) of the EC lheaty
Austria
N 74312001 21.12.2001 Implementation of Community structual measures in the
nsheries sector (Bugenland)
Denmark
N 596/2000 9.1.2001 Draft act on the Dmish Fisheries Bank OJ C 133,5.5.2001
N 419/2000 17.1.2N1 Aid for scrapping mussel trawlers (Limfjorden) Ol C 172,16.6.2001
N 532/2000 2.4.2N1 Structual measures in the fisheries sector OJ C 133,5.5.2001
oJ L93.3.4.2001
ot c236.22.8.2001
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Fmnce
NN 5/1998
N 862001
N 147bl2000
NN 1ll197
Germany
N 8s4/2000
N 54/2001
N 853/2000
N 199/2001
N 342/2001
N 281/2001
N 55/2001
N 320/2001
N 518/200r
Greece
N 62112000
N 332000
Ireland
N 527t2000
N 529l2un
N 528/2m0
N 525/2000
N 54712000
N 52612000
Italy
N 6712001
N 729bl2000
N 746bl2000
NN 92t2001
Netherbnds
N 80/2001
N 49712000
N 5392001
N 603/2001
28.2.2001 Aid to non-industrial fishine
1 1.6.2001 Ofimer operations
3.7.2C01 Framework act on the overseas departments 
- 
fisheries and
aquaculture
30.10.2001 Aid forbuilding and purchasing fishing vessels
26.2.2N1 Thuringia: subsidies towards invesfirents in the inlild
fi shiDgy'aquaculture seclor
U.4,2001 Subsidies towards invesfinents in the cutler fleet and coast4l
fishing in MecHenburg-Westem Pomerania
5.6.2001 Aid for fishery invesment in inland waters and for aquaculture
in Schleswig-Holstein
28.6.2001 Measures to improve aquaculturc (Saxony)
14.8.2001 Aid for fishery invesunent in inland waters in
Merklenburg-West€rn Pomerania
n.9.2001 Aid for fishery investment in inland waters in Lower Saxony
27.9.2001 Support for structural measures for fisheries irl inland waters in
Brandenburg
27.9.2fr01 AquacultureinMecklenburg-WestemPomerada
10.10.2001 Support for impmving facilities in fishing ports in Lower
Suonv
2622frO1 Fisheriesoperationalprogmme2000-06
8.8.2001 Damage in the shellfish and mussel-farming sector
l9.2.2OOl Seafoodmarketingprogramme
19.2.200I Supporting measures in the fisheries sector
10.5.2001 Rerewal and modernisation ofthe fishing fleet
8.6.2001 Adjusnnent ofthe fishing effort
28.8.2001 Aid for aquaculture
28-8.2001 Assistance to the seafood processing sector
oI c lu,7.4.2W1
oJ c263,19.9.2001
ot c 59, 6.3.2002
ot c25,29.1.2002
orctu,7.4.2w
oJ c 160,2.6.2001
oJ c219,4.8.2001
oJ c 219,4.8.2001
oJ c 102,31.3.2001
oJ c 330, 24.1 1.2001
or c94,a.3.200r
oJ c94,24.3.z00r
oI c263,19.9.2001
ot c263, t9.9.2ffi1
o1C59,6.3.2W2
oJ c59,6.3.2002
7 .3.2.NI Temporary suspension of rctivity 
- 
fisheries sector 
- 
Sicily OJ C 117,21.4.2W
8.5.2001 Extension to the fisheries sector of the instruments provided for OJ C 263, 19.9.2001
under negotiated progrmming
17.7 .2.AM Aid to SMES granted through Friula Lis SpA @riuli-Venezia OJ C 59, 6.3.2002
Giula)
30.10.2001 Pemaaent withdrawal of fishins vessels oJ c 77 ,28.3.2002
10.4.2001 Structural measules in the Rsheries sector Ol C 149, 19.5.2001
10.10.2001 Modifications !o various aid schemes rclating to fish production
10.10.2001 Fund for research on mussels
2l.l2.2UJl Order on funding the promotion of plaice 2002
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Portugal
N 89/2001
N 695/2000
N 107/2000
NN 12512000
Spain
N 67512000
N 87b/2000
N 657/2000
N 61412000
N 7ll2001
N 616/2000
N 95/2001
N 76412000
N 175/2001
N l7ll2001
N 72t2001
N 260/2001
N 25912001
N 40/2001
N 768/2000
N 76712000
N762t20ffi
N 76312000
N 769t2000
N 76512000
N 618/2000
N 33212001
N 331/2001
N 410i2001
N 39/2001
N 508/2001
N 75312000
N 751/2000
N 75412000
N752120M
N 620/2001
N 611b/2001
N 506/2001
18.4.2001
31.5.200r
8.8.2001
30.10.2001
Temporary suspension of sardine fishing 
- 
fisheries sector OJ C 160, 2.6.2001
Wages compensation fund for the fisheries sector Ol C328,23.11.2001
Sipesca 
- 
aid for local and coastal fishing OJ C 328,23.11.2001
Fisheries operational programme 2000-O6 OJ C 358, 15.12.2001
3.1.200r
5.2.200r
23.2.2001
23.2.2W1
16.3.2001
2r.3.2001
2.4.2001
18.4.2001
17.5.2001
17.5.2001
Socioeconomic measures (Galicia)
Valencia 
- 
food quality 
- 
fisheries sector
Aid for the fitting-out of fishing ports
Investment subsidy for aquaculture (Galicia)
Prcessing md mrketing of fisheries and aquaculture products
(Basque Country)
Aid for the fitting-out of Rshing ports
Structual assistance in the fisheries srctor (Ceuta and Melilla)
Aid for small-scale coastal fishing
Structural aid in the fisheries sector (Navme)
Processing and marketing of fishery md aquaculture products(Madrid)
I 1.6.2001 Processing md marketing of forestry md fishery products(Valencia)
ll.7 .2001 Prmessing and marketing of fishery products (Aragon)
11.7.2001 Structural aid in the fisheries sector (Astuias)
11.7.2001 Structural aid in the fisheries sector (Basque Country)
11.7.2001 Aid for finding and promoting new commercial outlets
Galearic Islmds)
Muketing and processing of fishery and aquacultue products;
port facilities (Balearic Islands)
Aid for aquaculture (Baleuic Islands)
Aid for building md modemising fishing vessels (Balearic
Islands)
18.7.2001 Smimonomicmeasures(Balericlslands)
18.7 .2ffi1 Aid for the permanent cessation of fishing
18.7.2O0I Structural aid in the nsheries sector
24.7.2001 Investments in aqwultue (Galicia)
24.7.2001 Prmessing and maketing of fishery and aquaculture products
(Extremadura)
7.8.2001 Aid for aquaculture (Aragon)
14.8.2001 Structural imorovement and modemisation ofthe fisheries
sector (Murcia)
I 1.10.2001 Prmessing and marketing of fishery and aquaculture products
(Castile-l-a Mancha)
13. I 1.2001 Renewal of the fishing fleet (Cmtabria)
I 3.1 1.2001 Aid for fishery and aquaculture products and for fitting-out of
fi shing ports (Cantabria)
27.11.2001 Modemisation andconversion of fishing vessels (Cantabria)
30.1 1.2001 Aid for small-scale cotrtal fishing (Cantabria)
20.12.2001 Stopping ofhake fishing (Basque Country)
20.12.2001 Praessing and muketing of agricultuml, fishery md food
prooucts
20.12.2001 Aid for aquculture (Castile-la Mmcha)
oI c 44, t0.2.2ffi1
oJ c 102, 31.3.2001
oI c 117,2t.4.2M1
oJ c 117,2r.4.2N1
ot c160,2.6.200r
oJ c 133, 5.5.2001
oJ c 166,9.6.2001
oJ c 149, 19.5.2001
ot c328,23.11.2001
oJ c328,23.11.2001
or c328,23.11.2001
oJ c328,23.1r.200r
oJ c328,23.11.2001
oJ c226,11.8.2001
or c 226,11.8.2001
oJ c226,11.8.2001
ot c226,11.8.2001
oJ c 234, 18.8.2001
oJ c 234, 18.8.2001
oJ c234,18.8.2001
oJ c330,24.1r.2001
ot c328,23.r1.2N1
oJ c330,24.t1.2001
oJ c328,23.1r.200r
oI c330,24.11.2ffi1
or c 342, 5.12.2001
oJ c 59,6.3.2002
ot c59,6.3.2W2
oJ c 59, 6.3.2002
oI c30,2.2.2002
oJ c 59,6.3.2002
oJ c 59,6.3.2M2
1r.7.2001
11.7.2001
n.7.zml
COMPETITION REPORT 2OO1
MERGERCONTROL 319
United Kingdom
N 17912001 31.5.2001
N 1772001 31.5.2001
N 490nA01 28.8.2001
N 1802001 11.10.2001
Projects in the fisheries md aquacultue sector part-finilced by OJ C 263, 19.9.2ffi1
the FIFG in Scodand
Projects in the fisheries and aquaculture sector part-financed by OJ C 263, 19.9.2001
the FIFG in England
Fishing Vessels (Scotlmd) Scheme 2001 OJ C 59,6.3.2002
Projects in the fisheries and aquaculture sector part-financed by OJ C77,28.3.2ffi2
the FIFG in Northem Leland
oJ c 25,29.r.2002
17.1.2001 Aid for fishermen following the rise in fuel prices oJ c 78, 10.3.2001
2.2. Interim decisions requiring the Member State to supply the information needed
by the Commission
France
NN l111997 30.10.2001 Aid for building and purchasing fishing vessels
2.3. Aid eases in which the Commission initiated procs6lings underArticle EE(2)
of the EC lheaty in respect of all or part of the measure
Belgiam
N 6322000(c 3/2001)
France
NN 1r112000(c 9/2001)
NN l111997(c76r2nr)
NN 802000(c91nmt\
Italy
NN 2ll2001(c29nmr)
NN 15/2001(c 84/2001)
NN 12001(c 83/2001)
Netherlands
N 159/2001
Spain
NN 108i2000(cTnml)
31.1.2001
30.10.2001
11.r2.2ml
Masres for fishemen to compensate for the rise in firel costs OJ C 78, 10.3.2001
Aid for building and purchasing fishing vessels Ol C 25 , 29 .l .20f2
Compensation for aquaculture producers and fishermen harmed OI C 39 , 13 .2.2002
by the oil pollution and storm
8.5.2001 Measures for fishermen following the rire in fuel costs
13.1 1.2001 Technical measures suspending fisheries
13.11.2001 Pollution by mucilage in the Adriatic Sea
8.5.2001 SFM-Premielasten
31.1.2001 Exemption from social security contributions
oJ c r79,25.6.2m1
oJ c25,29.1.20[2
oJ c25,29.r.2002
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United Kingdom
NN 109/1999 28.11.2001 Aid for purchase and leasing of fish quotas (Shedand Islands) OJ C 38, 12.2.2M2(c 88/2001)
NN 108/1999 28.11.2001 Leasingof fishquotastofishermenbytheOrkneylslands OJC38,12.2.20[.2(C87/2001) Council
2.4. Aid. cas€s in which the Commission tenninated proceedings under Article EE(2)
of the EC Tbeaty after the Member State withdrew the proposed measure
Itall
C 5411997 l7.l.z00l Provisions conceming fisheries (Sicily)
2.5. Other Commission decisions
Belgium
N632/2000 31.1.2001 Aidforfishermenfollowingtheriseintuelprices OJC78,10.3.2001
Spain
N 95/2001 25.4.2001 Structural assistmce in the fisheries sector (Ceuta and Melilla) OJ C 166,9.6.2001
3. In the transport sector
3.1. Cases in which the Commission found, without opening a formal investigatiorl
that there was no aid element within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Tleaty
Ireland
NN 86/2001 5.10.2001 Air Rianta 
- 
Irish aimorts
Italy
N 58/2000 13.3.2001 Promotion ofPiedmont airport system
N 73312000 25.4.2001 Regional Act No 7/2000 
- 
upgrading of the public taxi seroice
3.2. Measures which the Commission considered compatible with the cornmon market
without opening a formal investigation under Article 88(2) of the EC Tbeaty
or Article 6(5) of Decision 24961'96{ECSC
Austria
N 2r9t2utt 20.6.2{nr 
:*[1ftr".#ffirt;:the development of intermodal trmsport OJ C 244, r.9.2001
NN 153/2001 20.12.2001 State gumtee scheme for the aviation industry Ol C 59,6.3.2002
Belgium
N 636/2001 17.102m1 Bridging loan for Sabena
NN 141/2001 11.12.2001 Temporary aviation insurance scheme OJ C24,26.1.2002
N 550/2001 11.12.2001 Loading md mloading facilities for inlild watemays OI C 24,26.1.2002
or L62,2.3.2001
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Denmark
NN 12712000
NN 16112001
NN 146/2001
Finland
N 856/20m
Fmnce
N 766/2000
N 639/2000
N 638/2000
N 88/2001
NN 1222000
N 32112001
N299t200r
NN 15712001
Gennany
NN 9712000
N723.nO01
NN 1622001
Italy
N292t20N
Inxembourg
NN l,l0/2001
Netherlands
N 59712000
N 583/2000
Portugal
NN 14412001
Spain
NN 48/2001
NN 143/2001
28.3.200r
20.12.2001
zo.t2.2m1
31.1.2001
1.3.2001
1.3.2001
30.4.2001
23.5.200r
20.6.200r
2.r0.200r
20.12.2001
233.2001
Restructuring aid to Combus A/S OJ C 133, 5.5.2001
Temporary third-pafty liability insurance cover for Danish OJ C30,2.2.2002
aircraft and airports
Temporary third-party liability insume cover for Danish OJ c30,2.2.2402
aiuaft and ahports
Reirnbursement to shipowners of employen' saial security
contributions
Reimbursement to shipping companies of employers' social
security contributions
Conica 
- 
Lyon air service
Conica 
- 
Montpellier air seryice
Reimbu$ement to shipping compades of contributions to the
family allowances and unemployment insurmce funds
Semam
Extension of the duration of the motorway concession granted
to SFTRF
Aid plan for Frcnch inland watemay cariers 2001-O3
System of aviation insume cover with Stat€ guarantee
28.3.2001 Maritine training aid 2000
20.12.2m1 Aid to IjIU Lufttransport-Unlernehmen GmbH
2O.l2.2OOl State guamntee for the aviation sctor
25.4.2001 RoadhaulageinTrento
28.ll.2ml State gumtee for airlines
31.1.2001 Aid for inland wateruay hansport
3.7 .2001 Reduction of CO, emissions
28.1 1.2001 Temporary emergency measures to enable the aviation industry
to ope with the exceptional consequences ofdecisions taken by
the insurance comPanies
25.7.2.001 Trumed 
- 
1998 contract
20.12.2001 Stale re-insumce for the risks linked to war and tenorism that
may affect air trmsport
oJ c 199, 14.7.2W1
oJ c2r1,28.7.2001
oJ c342,5.12.2001
oJ c 166,9.6.2001
oI c 59,6.3.2M2
oJ c 160,2.6.2001
oJ c 102, 31.3.2001
oJ c234.18.8.2001
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Anited Kingdom
N 687/2000 13.2.2001 Competition for innovative solutions in rail-based logistics
N 500/2001 19.9.2001 Network gmnts to licensed heavy rail infrdtructure mmagers OJ C 333, 28.11.2001
N499i2001 2.10.2M1 SupportforMaritimeTraining(SMrT) scheme O1C347,8.12.2N1
NN 90/2001 23.10.2001 Airline insurance OJ C 108,4.5.2002
N 649i2001 20.12.2001 Freight facilities grmt OI C 45, 19.2.2002
3.3. Interim decisions requiring the Member State to supply the information needed
by the Commission
France
NN 1 122000 17.4.2m1 Measuresinfavourofroadtransportundertakingslinkedtothe OJC160,2.6.2001
oil price increase
3.4. Aid cases in which the Commission initiated proceedings underArticle 88(2)
ofthe EC Tleaty in nespect ofall or part ofthe measure
Sweden
N 785/2000
N 54212001
NN 139/2001
France
NN 16/2001(c r4t2m1)
NN 11212000(c2st2w1)
Italy
NN s6l2000(c 24t2001)
N 9312001(c97t2N1)
Netherlands
NN 115/2000(c26t2001)
NN 4312001
Italy
c 8ln998
c 27t1993
28.2.2001 Training of seafarers OJ C 107 ,7 .4.2001
30.10.2001 Exemption/reduction of taxes md smial secuity contributions OJ C 347 ,8.12.2001
11.12.2001 Aviation insurmce cover OI C24,26.1.2002
28.2.2001 Aid to Socidtd Nationale Maritime Corse-M6diterrande OI C 117,21.4.2001
17.4.2001 Measures in favour of road trmsport undertakings linked to the OJ C 160,2.6.2001
oil price increase
11.4.2001 Measures in favou of road trmsport undertakings linked to the OJ C 160,2.6.2m1
oil price increase
20.12.2001 Safety of maritime transport OI C 5O,23.2.2OO2
3.5. Cases in which the Commission tenninated proceedings underArticle 88(2)
of the EC Tieaty having found that there was no aid element within the meaning
of Article 87(1) of the EC Tleaty
11.4.2001 Aid to road trmsport
11.7.2001 Tug boat operations
18.7.2001 Measures to assist the port sector, Articles 24 to 29 inclusive
18.7.2001 Me6ures to promote employment in the port sector
oJ c 160,2.6.2001
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3.6. Cases in which the Commission considered that the aid was compatible
with the common market and terminated proceedings underArticle EE(2)
of the EC Theaty by way ofa positive final decision
Belgium
c 6911999
France
c 31/1998
c 141200r
Italy
c6411999
c 54t1996
France
c 31/1998
Italy
c 81/1998
c2711993
18.7.2001 Training aid to Sabena
8.5.2001 Brittany Fenies 
- 
further rcstructuring measues
(FRF 80 milion)
30.10.2001 Aid to Socidt6 Nationale Maritime Corse-Mdditerran6e
20.6.2001 Tineniagroup
18.7.2001 Airtransport
8.5.2001 Brittmy Fenies 
- 
further restructuring measures
(FRF 80 million)
18.7.2001 Measures to assist the port sector, Articles 24 to 29 inclnsive
18.7.2001 Me6ues to promote employment in the port sector
oI L249,19.9.2001
ot L 50 2002, 2r .2.2002
oJ L 305, 4.12.2001
3.7. Cases in which the Commission considered that the aid was incompatible
with the common market and terminated proceedings underArticle E8(2)
of the EC Tieaty by way of a negative or partly negative final decision
3.8. Aid cases in which the Commission took note of the Member State's agneement
to bring existing measures into line with the Community rules after the Commission
had proposed appropriate measures under Article 88(1) of the EC Tbeaty
Netherlands
E45t2000 3.7.2001 Tu exenption for Schiphol Group (Ansterdam airport)
E 
- 
Judgments of the Community courts
1. Court of First Instance
oJ c 31,
2.2.2ffi2,p.7
Mitteldeutsche Erddl-Rafhnerie GmbH
v Commission
22.tt.2001
oJ c 331,
24.11.?.00l,p.18
UK Coal plc v Commission
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OJC 3,
5.1.2002,p.22
ESF Elbe-Stahlwerke Feralpi GmbH
v Commission
Aenana Zucker und S&irke AG y Comrnission oI c259,
ls.9.2001,p.^7
Regione Friuli Venezia Giulia v Commission
21.3.2001
Hamburger Hafen- und Lagerhaus
Aktiengesellschaft , Zentralverband der
Deutschen Seehafenbetriebe eV and
Untemehmensverband Hafen Hamburs eV v
Commission
oJ c 161,
2.6.2001,p. 13
Soci€te chimique Prayon-Rupel SA v
Commission
oJ c 150,
19.5.Zffir,p.20
31.1.2001RJB Mining plc v Commission oJc 134,
5.5.2OO1,p. 17
2. CourtofJustice
Case Parties Date Publication
c-53/00 Ferring SA vAgence centrale des organismes de
s6curit6 sociale (ACOSS)
22.11.2ffir oJ c 17,
19.1.2ffi2,p.6
c-r43t99 Adria-Wien Pipeline GmbH and Wietersdorfer
& P eggatet Zementwerke GmbH v
Finanzlandesdirektion fiir K2imten
8.11.2001 oJc3,
5.1.2ffi2,p.6
c-276t99 Germanv y Commission 25.r0.2001 oJ c 369,
22.12.2002,p.2
c-400t99 Italy v Commission 9.1o.2001 oJ c 348,
8.12.2Nr,p.4
c-390/98 H.J. Banks & Co. Ltd v The Coal Authority and
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry
20.9.2001 oJ c 17,
19.1.2N2,p.2
c-378t98 Commission v Beleium 3.7.2001 oI c227,
I l 8.2001, p. 5
c-280t99P 
-
c-28U99P
Moccia Irme SpA, Ferriera Lamifer SpA and
Ferriera Acciaieria Casilina SpA v Commission
21.6.2001 oIcLn,
11.8.2001, p. 3
c-204t97 Portugal y Commission
State aid 
- 
Aid for producers of liqueur wines
and eaux-de-vie 
- 
aid granted by the France in
the context of an increase in internal taxation 3.5.2001
oJ c 200,
14.7.20O1, p. 8
c261t99 Comrnission y France.
Failure of a State to fir1fil obligations 
- 
State
aid incompatible with the common market 
-recovery 
- 
no absolute impossibility of
implementation 22.3.z00r OJ C 200, 14.7.20O1, p.3
c-t1t99 France y Commission
22.3.2W1
oJ c 200,
14.7 .2001. p. 3
c-379t98 PreussenElektra AG u Schleswag AG, in the
presence of Windpark Reu$enkcige III GmbH
and Iand Schleswig-Holstein 13.3.2001
oJ c 173,
16.6.2001, p. 18
c-99/98 Austria y Commission 15.2.2001 oJ c 173,
16.6.2001,p.7
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Report from the Commissian to the Council anil the European Parliament on the application of the
agreements between the European Communities anil the Govemment of the United States of America
anil the Gwernment of Canada regariling the application of their competition laws 
- 
I January 2001
to 3I December 2001
1. United States
1.1. Introduction
On 23 September 1991, the Commission concluded an agreement with the Govemment of the United
States of America regarding the application of their competition laws ("0) (the '1991 Agreement'), the
aim of which is to promote cooperation between the competition authorities. By a joint decision of the
Council and the Commission on 10 April 1995 ('?3s), *re agreement was approved and declared applicable
from the date it was signed by the Commission.
On 4 June 1998, another agreement, which strengthens the positive comity provisions of the 1991
Agreement, entered into force ("u) (the '1998 Agreement'), after having been approved by a joint
decision of the Council and the Commission of 29 May 1998.
On 8 October 1996, the Commission adopted the first report on the application of the 1991 Agreement
for the period of l0 April 1995 to 30 June 1996 (""). The second report completes the 1996 calendar year,
covering the period of I July 1996 to 31 December 1996 (tt"). The third report covers the whole calendar
year 1997 ("'), the fourth the year 1998 ('*), the fifth the year 1999 ('') and the sixth the year 2000 ('o').
The current report concerns the calendar year from 1 January 2001 to 3l December 2001. This report
should be read in conjunction with the first report which sets out in detail the benefits, but also the
limitations of this kind of cooperation.
In summary, the l99l Agreement provides for:
- 
notification of cases being handled by the competition authorities of one party, to the extent that
these cases concern the important interests of the other paffy (Article II), and exchange of
information on general matters relating to the implementation of the competition rules (Article Itr);
- 
cooperation and coordination of the actions of both parties' competition authorities (Article IV);
("0) Agreement between the Covernment of the United States of America and the Comrnission of the European Communities
regarding the application of their competition laws (OJ L 95,27 .4.1995' pp. 47 and 50).
f") See OJ L 95, 27.4.1995, pp. 45 and 46.
('16) Agreement between the European Communities and the Government of the United Sta0es of America on the application of
positive comity principles in the enforcement of their competition laws, Ol L 173,18.6.1998, pp. 26-31.("') COM(96) 479 final, se )O(VIth Report on Competition Policy, pp. 299-311.
es) COM(97) 346 final, sen )O(VIth Report on Competition Policy, pp. 372-318.
C') COM(1998) 510 final, see l}{Vllth Repott on Cornpetition Policy, pp. 3fi 4n.(e) COM(1999) 439 final, see )O{VilIth Report on Conpetition Policy, pp.313-j28.
C") COM(2000) 618 final, see )frIXrft Report on Competition Policy, pp. 319-332.
('4'1) COi|'l(}C02) 45 final, see )N{th Repon on Competition Policy, pp.29l:3U1.
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a 'traditional comity'procedure by virtue of which each party undertakes to take into account the
important interests of the other party when it takes measures to enforce its competition rules
(ArticleVI);
a 'positive comity' procedure by virtue of which either party can invite the other party to take, on the
basis of the latter's legislation, appropriate measures regarding anti-competitive behaviour
implemented on its territory and which affects the important interests of the requesting party
(ArticleV).
In addition, the 1991 Agreement makes it clear that none of its provisions may be interpreted in a manner
which is inconsistent with legislation in force in the European Union and the United States of America
(Article IX). In particular, the competition authorities remain bound by their intemal rules regarding the
protection of the confidentiality of information gathered by them during their respective investigations
(Article VIII).
The 1998 Agreement clarifies both the mechanics of the positive comity cooperation instrument, and the
circumstances in which it can be availed of. In particular, it describes the conditions under which the
requesting party should normally suspend its own enforcement actions and make a referral.
1.2. EU-US cooperation during 2(X)1
During 2001, the Commission continued its close cooperation with the Antitrust Division of the US
Deparhnent of Justice (DoJ) and the US Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in an ever greater number of
cases. lndeed, contact between Commission offlcials and their counterparts at the two US agencies is
showing a marked increase in frequency. These contacts range from detailed case-related discussions to
more general, sometimes theoretical, competition policy-related matters. Case-related contacts usually
take the form of regular telephone calls, e-mails, exchanges of documents, and other contacts between
the case teams. High-level meetings and contacts also occur with reasonable frequency. The cooperation
continues to be of considerable mutual benefit to both sides, in terms of enhancing the respective
enforcernent activity, avoiding unnecessary conflicts or inconsistencies between those enforcement
activities, and in terms of better understanding each other's competition policy regimes.
7.2.7, Merger cases
The trend towards the globalisation of markets continued apace during the year, as most vividly
illustrated by the record number and scale of transnational mergers: the year 2001 saw a continued large
number of transactions notified to both the Commission and the US antitrust agencies. With regard to the
investigation of these proposed mergers, stafflevel contacts between the Competition DG's Merger Task
Force, on the one hand, and the US DoJ and FTC, on the other, take place virtually on a daily basis.
Cooperation is most effective where the parties involved agree to permit the EU and US authorities to
share the information they provide by means of a waiver. This now frequently occurs.
In the Metso/Svedala case, which concerned rock-crushing equipment, the Commission and the FTC
fully and intensely cooperated not only with respect to the substantive assessment of the case but also to
the suitability of the remedies. The operation was finally approved by both authorities subject to
undertakings. Likewise, in the Nestl4/Ralston Purina case, which concerned pet food, the Commission
and the FTC closely cooperated during the negotiations of remedies. In the CVC/Lenzing case, the
Commission and the FTC remained in close and mutually beneficial contact all along the procedure by
sharing information, and by discussing and developing consistent analysis of the main substantive issues.
After the Commission had prohibited the operation, the FTC closed its file. In the GE/Honeywell case,
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the operation was finally approved by the DoJ and prohibited by the Commission. Although the
Commission reached a divergent outcome from that of the US DoJ, this did not result from a lack of
transatlantic cooperation. Indeed, cooperation between the Commission and the DoJ was very intense
and started early in the process, that is well ahead of the actual notification of the transaction to the
Commission.
7.2,2. Non-merger cases
During the course of the year, there has been a notable increased level of contact between the
Commission and the US antitrust agencies in non-merger cases, in particular in cartel cases. About
1l cartel investigations that both the Commission and the US DoJ had been investigating were discussed
between the two agencies. Most contacts were established via telephone and e-mail. In certain cases,
visits took place. In the Fine Art Auaion Houses case, cooperation between the agencies was productive.
It led, amongst others, to a coordinated timing of the investigatory steps of both agencies. This had to do,
amongst others, with the criminal investigation and trial before the District Court of the Southern District
of New York, against former Sotheby's chairman Taubman. Also, one company involved provided a
waiver, which permitted the two agencies to exchange views regarding confidential evidence. The
Commission's investigation had not yet been concluded at the end of 2001. Also in other cases the DoJ
and the Commission were able to coordinate their investigations, for example the timing of surprise
inspections at the companies concerned.
1.3. Administrative arrangements on attendance (AAA)
The Commission adopted on 31 March 1999 atextsetting forth administrative arrangements between the
competition authorities of the European Communities and of the United States concerning reciprocal
attendance at certain stages of the procedures in individual cases involving the application of their
respective competition rules ('?a3). These arrangements were concluded in the framework of the
agteements between the European Communities and the Govemment of the United States conceming
enforcement of their competition rules, and in particular the provisions regarding coordination of
enforcement activities. In May of 2001, representatives from the US DoJ attended the oral hearing in the
GE/Honeywell case.
1.4. EU-US Mergers \ilorking GrouP
The work of the joint EUruS Mergers Working Group has continued. During the course of 2001, there
wete extensive tri-partite (Commission/DoJ/FTC) discussions, including a number of tele/video-
conferences. At the occasion ofthe bilateral meeting of 24 September 2001, it was decided to expand and
to intensify the activities of the working group.
1.5. High-level contacts
There were numerous highJevel bilateral contacts between the Commission and the relevant US
authorities during the course of 2001: Commissioner Monti paid a visit to Washington in March, and
used the occasion to meet inter alia with key members of the Administration. On 24 September,
Commissioner Mario Monti met in Washington the newly appointed heads of the US antitrust
agencies, Assistant Attorney-General Charles James of the Antitrust Division of the DoJ and Chairman
Timothy Muris of the FTC for the annual bilateral EU-US meeting. The meeting coincided with the
(,') Bulletin EU 3-199, Competition (1U43); 1999 Report COM(2000) 618 final' p' 5.
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10th anniversary of the EU-US bilateral agreement on competition policy. Meetings also took place
during the course of the year between the Commission and other US agencies, for example, the US
Department of Transportation (which has some responsibility for the management of competition
policy issues).
1.6. Statistical information
(a) Number of cases notified by the Commission and by the US authorities
There was a total of 84 formal notifications made by the Commission during the period between
1 January 2001 and 31 December 2001. The cases are divided into merger and non-merger cases and are
listed inAnnex 1.
The Commission received a total of 37 formal notiflcations from the US authorities during the same
period. A list of these cases is found in Annex2, agun broken down into merger and non-merger cases.
Merger cases made up the majority of all notifications in both directions. There were 7l merger
notifications made by the Commission and25 by the US authorities.
The figures given represent the number of cases in which one (or more) notifications took place and not
the total number of individual notifications. UnderArticle tr of the agreement, notifications may be made
::r"j"*t stages of the procedure and so more than one notification may be made concerning the same
(b) Notifications by the Commission to Member States
The text of the interpretative letter sent by the European Communities to the United States as well as
the Statement on Transparency made by the Commission to the Council on 10 April 1995, provides
that the Commission, after notice to the US competition authorities, will inform the Member State or
Member States, whose interests are affected, of the notifications sent to it by the US antitrust
authorities. Thus, when notifications are received from the US authorities, they are forwarded
immediately to the relevant sections in the Competition DG and at the same time copies are sent to the
Member States, if any, whose interests are affected. Equally, at the same time that the Competition DG
makes notifications to the US authorities, copies are sent to the Member State(s) whose interests are
affected.
1.7. Conclusions
The year 2001 witnessed a funher intensification of EU-US cooperation in all areas of competition law
enforcement. It also saw a record number of merger transactions notified both to the Commission and the
US authorities.. The increase of cooperation in 2001 with respect to the combating of global cartels is
noteworthy, also the authorities on the two sides of the Atlantic are taking increasingly convergent
approaches to the identification and implementation of remedies, and to post-merger remedy compliance
monitoring. The Commission, DoJ and FTC also continued to maintain an ongoing dialogue on general
competition policy/enforcement issues of common concern.
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2. Canada
2.1. Introduction
The EU-Canada Competition Cooperation Agreement (4) is designed to facilitate cooperation between
the European Communities and Canada with respect to the enforcement of their respective competition
rules. The agreement was signed at the EU-Canada Summit in Bonn on 17 June 1999 and entered into
force at signature.
The agreement provides for, among other things: (i) reciprocal notification of enforcement activities by
either Competition Authority, where such activities may affect the important interests of the other party;
(ii) one Competition Authority rendering assistance to the Competition Authority of the other party in its
enforcement activities; (iii) coordination by the two authorities of their enforcement activities;
(iv) requests by a party that the Competition Authority of the other party take enforcement action
(positive comity); (v) one party to take into account the important interests ofthe other party in the course
o1 its enforcement activities (traditional comity); and (vi) the exchange of information between the
parties, subject to applicable domestic laws to protect confidential information. The report on cooperation
b.t*"ro 17 June 1999 and 31 December 2001 was published together with the sixth report on
cooperation with the United States ('t). 'Ihe curent report concerns the calendar year from 1 January
2001 to 3l December 200-.
2.2. Cooperation
An increasing number of cases is being examined by the competition authorities on both sides resulting in
increased and enhanced cooperation. Contacts between the Commission and the Canadian Competition
Bureau have been frequent and fruitfrrl. Discussions have concerned both case-related issues, and more
general policy issues. Case-related contacts usually take the form oftelephone calls, e-mails, exchanges of
documents. and other contacts between the case teams. Case-related contacts comprised all areas of
competition law enforcement. Merger cases included GE/Honeywell and Nestl4/Ralston Puirn and Bayer
Aventis.There was a notable increase in cooperation in cartel cases, about eight cartel investigations that
both the Commission and the Canadian Competition Bureau were dealing with were discussed between the
two authorities.
policy-related issues were discussed at the occasion of visits and through video conferences. T\{o
bilateral meetings, as foreseen in the cooperation agreement, took place in February 2001 in Brussels and
September 2001 in Ottawa at which the heads of the respective competition authorities participated. In
"OAition, 
the merger and cartel units from the respective authorities met to discuss issues specific to their
areas of enforcement.
2.3. Statistical information
(a) Number of cases notifted by the Commission and by the Canadian Competition Bureau
There was a total of 8 formal notifications made by the Commission during the period between
I January 2000 and 3l December 2001 (Annex 3). The Commission received 10 fonnal notifications
from the Canadian Competition Bureau (CCB) in 2001 (Annex 4).
@ Communities and the Government of Canada regarding the application of the
competition laws Ol L 175, 10.7.1999, p. 50.
Cs) COM(2002) 45 final, see )Ofrrlr Repon on Competition Policy' pp' 291-307 '
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(b) Notifications by tha Commission to Member States
As foreseen in the agreement, the Commission has informed the Member State or Member States, whose
interests are affected, of the notifications sent to it by the Canadian Competition Bureau. Thus, when
notifications are received from the Competition Bureau, they are forwarded immediately to the relevant
sections in the Competition DG and, at the same time, copies are sent to the Member States, if any, whose
interests are affected. Equally, at the same time that the Competition DG makes notifications to the
Competition Bureau, copies are sent to the Member State(s) whose interests are affected.
2.4. Conclusion
The agreement has lead to'a closer relationship between the Commission and the Canadian Competition
Bureau, as well as to a greater understanding of each other's competition policy. An increasing number of
cases are being examined,by both competition authorities, and there is consequently a growing
recognition of the importance, on the one hand, of avoiding conflicting decisions and, on the other, of
coordinating enforcement activities to the extent that this is considered mutually beneficial by both
parties. The increase of cooperation in 2001 with respect to the combating of global cartels is also
noteworthy. The Commission ^and the Canadian Competition Bureau also continued to maintain an
ongoing dialogue on general competition policy/enforcement issues of common concem.
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ANNEX 1(',*)
NOTITICATION BY THE ET]ROPEAN COMMISSION TO TIIE US AUTHORITIES
1 JAI\UARY TO 31 DECEMBER 2OO1
Merger cases
01 Case No COMP/M.2291 Vl{U/ACNielsen
02 Case No COMP/tv1.2256 Philips/Agilent
03 case No COMP/1VI.2211 universal studio Networks/NTl-/Studio Channel
04 Case No COMP/M.2271 CargilUAgribrands
05 Case No COMP/M.2306 Berkshire Hathaway/Johns Manville
06 Case No COMP/M.2312 Abbott/BASF
07 Case No COMP/M.232 Sanmina Corp.
08 Case No COMP/M.2208 Chewon/Texaco
09 Case No COMP/M.2302 Heinz/CSM
10 case No coMP/M.2292 AEA Investors/DLIMB Funding IIVBF Goodrich
11 Case No COMP/lv{.2220 General Electric/floneywell
12 Case No COMP/M.2330 CargilVBanks
13 Case No COMP/M.1976 ShelVHalliburton/Welldynamics
14 Case No COMP/M.2079 Raytheon/Ihales
15 Case No COMP/1\rI.2227 Goldman Sachs/l{esser Griesheim
16 Case No COMP/M.2308 Norttrop G'nrmman/Litton Industries
17 Case No COMP/M.2275 PepsiCo/Quaker
18 Case No COMP/M.2365 Schlumberger/Sema
tg Case No COMP/IvI.2355 Dow Chemicals/Enichem Polyurethanes
20 Case No COMP/M.2350 Campbell/ECBB (Unilever)
2l case No coMP/M.2231 Huntsmann InternationavAlbright & wilson
22 Case No COMP/M.2375 PAI + UGVEIf Antargaz
23 Case No COMP/1V!.2328 Shell/Beacon/3ilTkister
U Case No COMP/M.2222 UGC/Liberty Media
25 Case No COMP/M.2394 SCI SysremsA{okiaNetworks
26 Case No COMP/M.2435 Electronic Data systems corp/systematics AG
(e) Due to confidentiality rcquirements or to protect the sececy of ongoing investigations, this list names only those
investigations or cases which have been made public.
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27 Case No COMPiM.2424 TYCO/CIT
28 Case No COMP/iVi.2405 Dow Chemical Company/Ascot plc
29 Case No COMP/M.2359 lntemational Fuel Cells/SOpC (Shell)
30 Case No COMP/M.2466 Sodexho/Abela flI)
3l Case No COMP/]VI.2I9O LSG/OFSI
32 Case No COMP/M.U2I ContinentaUTemic
33 Case No COMPA,I.2460 IBN{/Informix
34 Case No COMP/IVI.24I5 InterpubliclTrue Norrh
35 Case No COMP/M.2449 Goldman Sachs/SJpC/SCp
36 Case No COMP/M.2461 OM Group/DMC
37 Case No COMP/1VI.2439 Hitachi/STMicroelectronics/SuperFVJV
38 Case No COMP/I\iL2489 Borg WarnerAlitachi
39 Case No COMP/M.2337 Nestl6/Ralston purina
40 Case No COMPA,I.2480 ThomsoniCarltor/JV
4l Case No COMP/M.2531 Sara LEEiEarthgrains
42 Case No COMPA{.2534 SCI Systems/Nokia Networks
43 Case No COMPiM.2517 Bristol-Myers Squibb/Du pont
44 Case No COMP/M.2509 DodReichhold./JV
45 Case No COMPA{.2575 Liberty MutuaVGrupo RSA Espana
46 Case No COMPiM.2510 CendanVGalileo
47 Case No COMP/1VI.2510 Re-Notification 
- 
Cendant/Galileo
48 Case No COMP/M.2571 Johnson Controls/Sagem
49 Case No COMP/I\4.2549 Sanmina/SlC Systems
50 case No coMPlM.2560 APAX Europe v 
-A.L.p. Delaware (usA) MannesmannPlastics Machinery AG, Krauss-Maffei Corp., Van Dorn Demag
Corp., Krauss-Maffei France, Netstal Maschinen AG
51 Case No COMP|M.2526 GE Insurance HoldingsA.{ational Mutual Life
52 Case No COMP/I,I.2559 USG/Deutsche perlite
53 Case No COMPA4.2505 Tyco/CR Bard
54 Case No COMP/1\{.2584 Tyco/Sensormatic
55 Case No COMP/M.2566 Shell-Cinergy/EDA,iEpAlJV
56 Case No COMPi1VI.2507 Xchange/BAE Systems/procur
57 Case No COMP/1\,I.2572 Time UK publishing Holdings LtdltpC Group Ltd
58 Case No COMP/I{.2648 KPNeWEST/Global Telesystems
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59 Case No COMP/1\,I.2276 The Coca-Cola CompanylNestl6iJV
60 Case No COMP/1VI.2562 Bertelsmann/France Loisirs
61 Case No COMP/1\rI.2651 Af&T/Concert
62 CaseNoCOMP/M.266? Utilicorp/DBAustralia/MidlandsElectricity/JV
63 CaseNo COMPIM.2U3 Blackstone/CDPQ/DeTeKS BW
64 Case No CO\vPIM.2652 Blackstone/CDPQ/DeTeKS NRW
65 Case No COMP/\1I.2656 Cinven/Klirkner
66 Case No COMP/I\'I.2613 ALCOA/BHP/Billitor/JV
67 Case No COMP/IVI.2502 CargilVCerestar
68 Case No COMP/11v1.2627 Otto Versand/Sabre/Travelocity fV
69 Case No COMP/1VI.2642 BT/Concert
70 Case No COMP/M.2637 Nutricia/Baxter/2.HSC
7l Case No COMPA{.2666 Berkshire Hathawayffruit of the Loom
Non-merger cases
0l Request for information
02 Requestforinformation
03 Requestforinformation
04 Request for information
05 Case No COMP/38.102 POA{SI-VeriSign Registry
06 Case No COMP/38.064/F Covisint
07 Requestfor information
08 Request for information
09 Case No COlvlPt37.926 Sun MicrosystemVETSl
10 CaseNoCOMP/36.2131F2 GEAE+P&W
I I Request for information
12***
13***
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ANI\EX2
NOTIFICATION BY TIIE US ATITIIORITMS TO THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION
1 JANUARY TO 31 DECEMBER 2OO1
Merger cases
0l
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
(D
10
1l
t2
l3
14
l5
16
17
18
l9
20
21
22
z)
24
25
PhilipVAgilent
Svedala/lVletso
Quaker Oats/PepsiCo
Baker Holding/Lhoist
GlaxoSmithKline
Eastern Lime Holding/Blue Circle Ind
Ralston Purina/I.{estl6
Svedala/NIetso
France Telecom/Equant
Chewon/Iexaco
General Electriclloneywell
Phillips/Marconi
CargilVCerester
SeagramfPemod[Drageo
Stoess/Leiner Davis Gelatin
Weston/Unilever
National Dairy Holdings/iVlari gold
3D Systems Corporation
National Dairy Holdings/Crowley Foods, Inc.
Bl ue Circle Industries/Lafarge
Reuters Group/Bridge
Acordis/lrnzing/CVC European Eq. Partners II
DGF STOESS
Dow Chemical Company/Rechhold
Acordis/Lenzing/CVC European Eq. Paxtners II
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Non-merger cases ('t)
0l DeltaAirlines/AirFrance
02 Anchor (carbon cathode block)
03*
04 USAid watsrworks projects (criminal fine)
05*
06 (Monochloacetic) Akzo Nobel
M Powder River Basin Coal
08*
09+
l0*
11 *
12*
ffisoftoprotectthesecrecyofongoinginvestigations,thislistnamesonlythose
investigations or cases which have been made public'
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ANNEX 3 C')
NOTIFICATION BY TIIE EUROPEAN COMMISSION TO TIIE CANADIANAUTIIORITIF"S
l JAI\UARY TO 3l DECEMBER 2OO1
01 Case No COMP/ M.2268 Pernod Ricard./Diageo/Seagram Spirits
OZ Case No CO]|IIPI M.2279 NorteVMundinteractivos/Broad Media
03 requestforinformation
04 Case No COMP/ M.2493 Norske Skog/Abitibi/papco
05 Case No COMP/ M.2518 GfE/Shell Hydrogen/HeC
06 Case No COMP/ * *
O7 request for information
08 Case No COMP/ M.2643 Blackstone/CDpe/DeTeKS BW
09 Case No COIN4PI M.2652 Blackstone/CDpe/DeTeKS NRW
('o') Due to confidentiality requirements or to protect the secrecy of ongoing investigations, this list names only those
investigations or cases which have been made public.
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ANNEX4
NOTTACAIION BY TIIE CANADIANAUTHORITIES TO TIIE ET]ROPEAN COMMISSION
1 JANUARY TO 31 DECEMBER 2OOT
01 Graphite and carbon products
U Supply and service ofpost-lensionning systems to the llibemia Platform
03 Graphiteandcarbonproducts
04 GeneralElectric/lloneywell
05 Bulk vitamins and related products
06 Carbonandgraphiteproducts
07 Carbon and graPhite Products
08 Bulkvitaminsandrelatedproducts
09*
COMPETITION REPORT 2OO1

THE APPLICATION OF COMPETITION RULES IN THE MEMBER STATES 345
V _ TIIE APPLICATION OF COMPETITION RULES
IN TIIE MEMBER STATES
This chapter is based on contributions from Member States' competition authorities. Fuller details of
those authorities' activities are to be found in the national reports which most of them draw up.
A 
- 
Legislative developments
Austria
Following the amendment of the 1998 Electricity Sector and Organisation Act in 2000, full liberalisation
of the electricity market came into effect on 1 October. There are now three electricity authorities:
- 
The highest-ranking electricity authority is the Federal Minister for Economic Affairs and
Labour. Apart from exercising supervisory rights and administering the Federal Government's
shares in E-Control, his main task is to provide guidance to the latter authority.
- 
The newly established regulatory authority Elektrizitiits-Control GmbH, which was set up on
15 March, has had extensive tasks conferred on it as part of the firll liberalisation of the Austrian
electricity market. In addition to monitoring, supervisory and regulatory functions, it verifies
compliance with environmental objectives, organises the settlement of compensatory payments
between network operators, implements the provisions on stranded costs and compiles electricity
statistics. In the course of the year, network tariffs were investigated and, where they were
disproportionately high, reset; the import of electricity from third countries was regulated; and
unbundling was monitored.
- 
The likewise newly established Electricity Control Commission is a collegiate body of a judicial
nature which therefore does not take instructions from any other body. In addition to its function of
hearing appeals against decisions of E-Control, it above all determines the tariffs for using the
system, adjudicates on network access refusals, authorises the general terms and conditions of
network operators and settles disputes between market players.
Belgium
On 10 August, a royal decree was adopted which amended Section 53 of the Act on Safeguarding
Economic Competition, as coordinated on lJuly 1999 (Moniteur belge of 22September2001,
p. 31914). As previously worded, Section 53 conferred on the Competition Council the necessary powers
to apply Articles 81(1) and 82 of the EC Treaty. However, before the adoption of the above-mentioned
decree, the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty fell within the exclusive competence of the
European Commission.
The decree is intended to adapt the provisions of Section 53 with a view to enabling the Competition
Council to exercise the new powers which are conferred on it by Commission Regulation (EC)
No279011999 of 22December 1999 on the application of Article 8l(3) of the Treaty to categories of
vertical agreements and concerted practices, Article 7 of which henceforth allows the competent
authority of a Member State, in the same way as the European Commission, to withdraw the benefit of
the application of the regulation in certain cases. In view of the fact that this competence stems, not from
Articles 81(l) and 82, but fromArticle 81(3), an amendment of Section 53 of the act was necessary.
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Moreover, the current wording of Section 53 will permit an immediate implementation of the reform of
Regulation No 17, one of the purposes of which is to empower national competition authorities to apply
Article 81(3) of the EC Treaty.
Denmark
Danish competition law, which was last changed in 2000, did not undergo any further alterations during
the period under review.
Finland
Following the Act on the Market Cowt (28.12.200111527) and the act on procedure in the Market Court
(28.12.200111528), the new Market Court is to begin operating in March 2002.
The court will take over responsibility for matters that used to fall within the remit of the Competition
Council. Its task will be to rule on recommendations from the Competition Authority on eliminating
restrictions of competition and prohibiting mergers.
The court will be headed by a ChiefJustice and will have fourjudges. Four secretaries will be involved in
the drafting work and a further one to three part-time members will take part in competition proceedings
as experts. The court will operate in divisions.
Appeals against competition decisions by the court will continue to be lodged with the Supreme
Administrative Court. The creation of the new Market Court will not affect the powers of the
Competition Authority.
France
TheAct on New Economic Regulations was adopted by Parliament and entered partially into force in the
year under review. Its main provisions cover two broad areas:
l. Provisions aimed at strengthening the application of competition law
The maximum penalties are increased significantly from 5 Vo of turnover achieved in France to l0 Vo of
the highest worldwide turnove! excluding taxes, achieved during one of the financial years for which the
accounts have been closed since the financial year preceding that during which the practices were
implemented, and this tumover may be that of the group to which the firm being fined belongs. This will
make it possible to counter a practice consisting in substantially reducing, while the proceedings are
under way, the tumover of the legal entity that is being proceeded against.
The act also helps strengthen the investigatory powers of staff of the Di-rectorate-General for
Competition, Consumption and the Repression of Fraud within the Ministry of Economic Affairs,
Finance and Industry, with a view to facilitating the detection of infringements while they are being
committed, and confers on them a national territorial competence. Moreover, the Competition Council
may henceforth have investigators seconded to the general rapporteur to conduct specific enquiries, and
call on experts, either of its own motion or at the parties' request.
Respect for the rights of the defence has been enhanced by a clear separation of the investigation and
judgment phases in proceedings before the Competition Council. Incorporating the case-law of the Court
of Cassation, the act henceforth provides that the rapporteur and the general rapporteurs may no longer
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sit in on the judges' deliberations in disputed cases. Moreovet the various investigatory acts
(appointment of the rapporteur, transmission of investigation requests to the Minister for Economic
Affairs, notification of the statement of objections and of the report to the parties) will be entrusted to the
general rapporteur and not as before to the hesident of the Competition Council. The conditions under
which the Council may grant interim measures are made more flexible in that it may henceforth take
those measures which it considers necessary and not, as before, only those requested.
Lastly, along the lines of what has already been introduced into Community law and in the United States,
a clemency procedure is provided for for firms which help to establish the reality of prohibited practices
and to identify the authors thereof and which undertake to recti! their behaviour. These arrangements
are designed to gant total or partial exemption from penalties for firms which denounce a restrictive
practice and cooperate with the competition authorities.
The act recognises the need for closer cooperation between competition authorities and provides that the
obligation of professional secrecy must not prevent the communication by those authorities of the
information or documents which they have in their possession or which they receive, at their request,
from the Commission of the European Communities or the authorities in other States exercising similar
powers and subject to the same obligations of professional secrecy. It is provided, moreover, that the
competition authorities, within their respective remits, may use information or documents transmitted to
them under the same conditions by the Commission of the European Communities or the authorities in
other Member States exercising similar powers.
2. More systematic and transparent monitoring of mergers
The machinery has been overhauled to establish clear, homogeneous procedures and reflect
developments in the markets and laws of the other countries of the European Union' Procedures have
been amended: notification is now obligatory having to be effected prior to the operation, and suspensive
(with the possibility of derogation) beyond a threshold of a worldwide turnover of EUR 150 million for
all the en6rprises concemed and where at least two enterprises achieve in France a turnover in excess of
EUR 15 million.
The investigation periods are reduced from two months to five weeks during phase one. The second
phase, which involves consulting the Competition Council, must be completed within three months, after
which the minister has four weeks in which to take a final decision.
Non-fulfilment of the notification obligation and inaccurate or incomplete declarations are punishable by
a fine of up to 5 7a of tumover in the case of corporations and EUR 1.5 million in the case of individuals.
In the event of failure to fulfil commitments, the minister may, after consulting the Competition Council,
revoke any authorisation granted or order fulfilment of the commitments, subject to payment of a daily
penalty.
The reform will take effect once the implementing decree has been published, probably in ewly 2002.
A set of guidelines will then be drawn up.
Germany
Competition law in Germany remained largely unchanged during the report period. Only a few minor
amendments came into force. These mainly concerned improved access by the Monopolies Commission
to statistical data and the possibility for the Federal Cartel Ofnce to call on the services of experts in the
course of its investigations.
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The easing of access by the Monopolies Commission to statistical data was brought about by means of an
amendment to Section 47 of the Act Prohibiting Restraints of Competition (Gesetz gegen
Wettbewerbsbeschriinkungen 
- 
GWB) which took effect on 1 January. Whereas official statistics used to
be based on individual firms as the collection unit, henceforth corporate relationships in the form of
groups ofcompanies etc. will also be taken into account. The degree ofconcentration in an industry will
thus be easier to gauge.
As part of the changeover to the euro, the cartel authorities will henceforth be able pursuant to
Section 80(l) of the GWB to recover the full cost of expert reports from the party to whom the decision is
addressed. A ceiling of DEM 100 000 used to be laid down. This should make it easier in future for the
Federal Cartel Offlce to enforce claims for access to essential facilities in favour of competitors, it being
often only by means of expensive expert reports that it can be established that a flrm is unjustifiably
denying its competitors access to its own network or other infrastructure within the meaning of
Section l9(4) of the GWB.
Greece
During the period under review, no changes were made to the Greek legislation on competition
(Monopolies and Oligopolies (Control) and Free Competition (hotection) Act No 703/77).
Ireland
There were no new legislative developments in Ireland during the period under review.
However, in July, the Irish Govemment approved the drafting of a new Competition Bill and the bill was
subsequently published by the Minister for Enterprise, Trade and Employment on 21 December. The new
CompetitionAct will be adopted inApril 2002. The purpose of the new Competition Bill is to consolidate
and modernise the existing enactments relating to competition and mergers. The bill replaces the
Mergers, Takeovers and Monopolies (Control)Act 1978, the CompetitionAct l99l and the Competition
(Amendment) Act 1996. The bill also introduces significant changes to Ireland's competition and merger
law arrangements. These changes follow mainly from the work of the Competition and Mergers Review
Group, which carried out a major review of existing arrangements over the period September 1996 to
March 2000. The bill also takes account of other developments, particularly the proposed changes in EU
competition law which will have important implications for the implementation of Community
competition law within Member States.
Copies of the Bill are available from the Govemment Publications Sales Office, Dublin 2.
Italy
Law No 5712001 of 5 March 2001 on the opening and regulation of markets amends Article 8(2) of Law
No 28711990 (rules on the protection of competition and the market) by adding subparagraphs 2a to 2d.
The purpose of the new provisions concerns the activities of firms which, in accordance with a legal
provision, manage services of general economic interest or hold a market monopoly. Subparagraph 2a
requires such lirms to split up, at their own cost, if they intend to operate in separate markets.
Subparagraph 2b requires the Competition Authority to be notified in advance if a controlling share is
acquired in firms already operating in different markets or if a new company is set up. Subparagraph 2c
requires such firms not to discriminate when supplying to companies that operate in different markets and
in which they have a controlling or other interest goods or services, including information, to which they
have sole access through their activities within the meaning of subparagraph 2. Such firms are required to
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make accessible such goods or services on equivalent tems to immediate competitors. Lastly,
subparagraph 2d states that, with regard to subparagraphs 2a, 2b and 2c, the authority has the
investigative powers provided for in Article 14 of Law No 287190 and that, in the event of infringement
of Articles 2 and 3, firms are subject to the provisions and penalties in Article 15 of that law.
Subparagraph 2e provides that theAuthority may impose a fine not exceeding ITL 100 million only if the
requirement to give prior notification is not complied with.
Law No 5712001 also amended Article 15 of Law No 287190, introducing a new rule for the calculation
of the fine for infringing Articles 2 and 3 of the law. In particular, it abolished the minimum fine as well
as the limits relating to tumover in the products forming the subject of the restrictive practice or abuse of
a dominant position. Under the new rules, the authority is required, where appropriate, to impose a fine
not exceeding l0 Vo of the tumover achieved by the flrm in the last financial year ending before the
notification.
Lastly, Law No 5712001 amended Article 9(3) of Law No 19211998 ('rules governing subcontracting in
manufacturing industry'); the amended article, which prohibits abuse of financial dependency, allows the
authority to investigate, assess and fine any abuse of financial dependency by a firm in its commercial
relations with one or more firms, where such abuse affects competition and the market.
I-uxembourg
The Ministry of Economic Affairs finalised a bill completely overhauling the act of 17 June 1970, as
amended, on restrictive trade practices. The bill should be put before Parliament during the first half
of20O2.
Netherlands
During the period under review, the Competition Act itself, which entered into force on I January 1998,
was not further amended.
On the basis of secondary legislation (general
turnover threshold for purposes of national
(Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit 
- 
NMa)
NLG 30 million to EUR 30 million.
administrative rules), on 28 September, the national
supervision by the Dutch Competition Authority
of mergers in the Netherlands was increased from
The Passenger Transport Act was adopted by Parliament. The act confers on the NMa the task of
supervising at local and regional level competition in the passenger transport field in the Netherlands.
The government laid a bill before Parliament providing for a greater separation of powers between the
NMa and the Ministry of Economic Affairs. The political influence exercised by the Minister in
individual NMa cases will thus be reduced. The bill also provides for the integration of the Energy
Supervision and Administration Service (Dienst Toezicht en Uitvoering energie) as an organisational unit
within the independent competition regulatory authority. Moreover, on the basis of the bill, the NMa will
be transformed from an administrative service with a director-general within the Ministry of Economic
Affairs into an independent administrative board with three members, including a chairman.
Lastly, the govemment decided that the posts and telecommunications regulator should be integrated into
the NMa from 2005.
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Portugal
Portuguese competition law has remained unchanged since the entry into force of Decree-Law
No 371193 of 29 October 1993.
Spain
Three major pieces of legislation were adopted in the competition policy field during the period under
review:
l. Act 912001 of 4 June 2001 amending the sixth transitional provision of Act 5411997 of
27 November 1997 on the electricity sector, certain sections of Act 16/1989 of 17 July 1989 on the
protection of competition and certain sections of Act 4611998 of 17 December 1998 on the introduction
of the euro. (The act incorporates the operative provisions of Royal Decree-Law 212001 of
2 February 2001.)
The changes introduced by the act chiefly affect merger control. More specifically:
- 
sectoral legislation may be temporarily suspended where necessary for the purpose of compliance
with the conditions imposed on parties to a merger hansaction (for example the obligation to hive off
certain businesses or assets or the imposition of limits on holdings) and only until such transactions
have been completed;
- 
new sanctions are introduced, as a means of enforcement, for failure to comply with the conditions
subject to which mergers are cleared. The government is thus entitled to impose periodic penalty
payments of up to EUR 12 020 per day as well as fines representing up to 10 Vo of the relevant
tumover in the event of non-compliance.
Other changes comprise the following:
- 
the categories of agreement which the govemment can authorise by means of exemption regulations
are extended to include agreements between two or more firms which impose restrictions on the
distribution and/or supply of certain services for sale or resale. The purpose of this change is to
transpose into Spanish law the provisions of the new Community exemption regulation on vertical
restraints:
the terms of office of the President and Members of the Competition Tribunal are reduced to five
years, renewable once only.
Act24l200l of 27 December 2001 on tax. administrative and social measures.
This act amends certain sections ofAct 1611989 of 17 July 1989 on the protection of competition in order
to change the legal status of the Competition Tribunal. While remaining fully independent and subject to
the law, the tribunal becomes an autonomous entity with separate legal personality and complete
operational independence.
The tribunal's new legal status not only gives it greater flexibility and independence in terms of its
handling of cases and internal management, something which is more in harmony with its role and tasks,
but also increases the resources at its disposal by allocating to its new budget half ofthe revenue from the
fees charged for vetting mergers.
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3. Royal Decree 144312001 of 21 December 2001 implementing Act 16/1989 of 17 July 1989 on
the protection of competition with regard to merger control.
The new instrument replaces Royal Decree 1080/1992 ot ll September 1992, which is repealed.
It reflects the need to modemise the regulatory framework in the merger control fleld and adapt it to the
legislative changes that have been taking place in recent years (already commented on in Spain's
contributions to previous Competition Reports).
To that end, the royal decree modifies material aspects of the procedure in the interests of greater
flexibility, transparency and legal certainty, incorporates improvements prompted by experience and
attempts to reflect changes in the economy that have in recent years brought about an increase in the
number, size and complexity of mergers examined by the competition authorities.
The following changes are worth stressing:
- 
with a view to enhancing legal certainty, the definition of a merger now includes the acquisition of
de facto control and the calculation of turnover is modelled on the clearer and simpler Community
criterion. Issues to do with suspension of the merger, particularly in the case of takeover bids, have
also been clarified and detailed provisions on prior consultation and termination of the procedure by
agreement have been added;
- 
to make the system more transparent, it is explicitly stipulated that reports drawn up by the
Competition Service are to be published;
- 
certain provisions of the royal decree laying down the rules governing takeover bids are amended to
include the procedure before the Spanish competition authorities;
- 
a new form is adopted for notifying mergers.
Sweden
Since I January, the Swedish CompetitionAuthority (Konkurrensverket) has been empowered to directly
apply Articles 8l(1) and 82 of the EC Treaty on the prohibition of restrictive practices and abuses of
dominant positions. It has also been empowered to grant negative clearance underArticles 81 and 82 in
cases of particular relevance to Sweden.
The government decided this year on two new block exemptions, one for specialisation agreements and
the other for agleements between two or more firms concerning the conditions governing joint research
and development. The block exemptions, which broadly correspond to those applicable under EC law,
replace the earlier exemptions for specialisation and research and development agreements. They took
effect on I July and will remain in force until the end of December 2010.
A govemment commission of inquiry was set up in 2000 to consider a tightening-up of competition law.
It presented its report (SOU, 2001) in the autumn and proposed among other things rules on the reduction
or remission of fines in cartel cases (leniency) and on confidentiality for notifying parties and informants
in connection with the investigation of breaches of prohibitions. The commission of inquiry considers
that the exchange of information between national competition authorities promotes the effective
monitoring of competition. It proposes that the Konkurrensverket should be allowed to help its
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counterparts in other countries to obtain information and conduct investigations. It does not, however,
suggest that infringements of competition law should be criminalised.
United Kingdom
In July, the govemment published a White Paper entitled 'Productivity and enterprise: a world class
competition regime' (CM 5233,ISBN 010 152332), which described wide-ranging proposals to reform
the competition regime including mergers and monopoly investigations. The White Paper was followed
by an 'Enterprise Bill'which will be introduced into Parliament in early 2002. One proposal it contains is
for responsibility for most decisions on mergers and monopolies to be taken by the independent
competition authorities (Offlce of Fair Trading and Competition Commission) rather than as now by the
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry. A small minority of cases, which raise defined exceptional
public interest issues, will still be decided by ministers. The Secretary of State for Trade and Industry
announced that in advance of new legislation his policy would be 
- 
save in exceptional circumstances
- 
to accept advice from the Director-General of Fair Trading on whether or not to refer merger cases to
the Competition Commission.
The bill also contains proposals for the introduction ofcriminal sanctions against individuals engaged in
hardcore cartel activity.
B 
- 
Application of the Community competition rules
by national authorities ('o')
Finland
1. MetsdliittoNapo
In December 2000, Metsiiliitto Osuuskunta notified the European Commission of a merger whereby
MetsAliitto bought a third of the shares in Vapo Oy from the Finnish State. tn January 2001, the
Competition Authority made a request to the Commission in accordance with Article 9 of the merger
regulation for the matter to be partially referred to the Competition Authority for examination. The
Commission took its decision on the request in February and referred the matter to the Competition
Authority for examination of the parts relating to the markets for wood-based fuels and peat (see
Commission press release IP/01/183). In March, the Competition Authority approved the
Metsliliitto/Vapo deal, subject to conditions.
2. Telia/Sonera/Radiolinja
In December, the Competition Council issued a decision in a case concerning charges for mobile
roaming. Telia Finland Oy, a company operating in Finland, considered that its competitors Sonera Oy
and Radiolinja Oy had offered it roaming services on worse terms than, for example, they had offered
foreign telecommunications service companies or their own internal telecommunications service
companies. It was Telia's view that Sonera, either alone or in collaboration with Radiolinja, had a
dominant market position in the market for nationwide mobile network access.
('n') See annex for the national competition authorities responsible for applying Articles 8l and 82 of the EC Treaty. This
section also covers judgments of courts with jurisdiction to rule on the larfirlness of decisions of national competition
authorities.
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The Competition Council considered that, in applying the provisions of the Finnish Restrictive Practices
Act regarding the abuse of a dominant market position, consideration should also be given to Article 82
case-law, and it sought an opinion on the matter from the Commission's Competition DG. In the end, the
Competition Council found that Sonera did not have a dominant position in the market for nationwide
mobile network access either alone or in collaboration with Radiolinja. It none the less referred the
matter back to the Competition Authority to establish the extent to which Sonera's pricing for its roaming
services might otherwise be preventing or holding back sector entry by competitors.
3. Ajasto
The Supreme Administrative Court considered an appeal lodged by Ajasto Oy, which operates in the
market for calendars. The appeal concerned a fine of about EUR 337 000 imposed on the company by the
Competition Council for abuse of a dominant market position.
Ajasto called for the Competition Council's decision to be annulled on the ground that it was based on
the wrong legislation, since, according to the company, the case should have been dealt with under the
EC competition rules, not a national act. It maintained that the company's business would have been
judged more leniently than in the Competition Council decision if the EC competition rules alone had
been applied to the case. It further asked for the Supreme Administrative Court to seek a preliminary
ruling from the Court of Justice as provided for in Article 234 of the EC Treaty.
The Supreme Administrative Court gave judgment in August. It held that it had been permissible for
national competition legislation to be applied to the case, since the application of the national act did not
compromise the uniform application of EC competition law. It further held that the case did not involve
any question of interpretation such as to warrant seeking a preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice. It
therefore dismissed Ajasto's appeal and upheld the flne imposed on the company'
4. Theforestry cartel
In December, the Supreme Administrative Court gave judgment in a case conceming a forestry cartel. In
2000, the CompetitionAuthority had recommended fining the country's three largest forestry companies,
Mets:iliitto, Stora Enso and UPM-Kymmene. According to the Competition Authority, the companies had
been engaging in price cooperation and sharing supply sources in the roundwood market in breach of the
Finnish Restrictive Practices Act. One of the ways in which the companies had been operating
restrictively was by sharing information with each other. The Competition Authority recommended that
each company should be fined EUR 3.36 million.
The Competition Council ratified the Competition Authority's position as regards the prohibited price
competition and carve-up of supply sources, although it reduced the fine per company to
EUR 1.68 million.
The companies appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court, which further reduced the fine per
company to EUR 504 000, which is about one seventh of what the Competition Authority had originally
recommended. Under the Finnish Restrictive Practices Act, the maximum fine for a restrictive practice is
EUR 673 000. A larger flne may be imposed, if justifled by the nature of the restrictive practice or other
circumstances. Even so, the fine may not exceed l0 Vo of the turnover of each party or cartel involved in
the restrictive practice.
The Supreme Administrative Court found that in the case in question there were no grounds for
exceeding the normal upper limit of EUR 673 000 and that the fine should be reduced. It justified
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reducing the fine on the ground that the prohibited exchange of information between the forestry
companies purchasing the roundwood had largely occurred at the instigation and in the presence of the
opposite side, namely the sellers ofthe roundwood. The practice was also found to have been regionally
restricted and to display traits that, in the view of the Supreme Administrative Court, had beneficial
effects on the roundwood trade as well.
France
I. Restrictive practices and abuses of dominant positions
With regard to restrictive practices, the Competition Council applied Community law in only two cases.
In a case concerning a referral and an application for interim measures submitted by the company
Pharmadex TMC, this wholesaler which exports pharmaceutical products to the United Kingdom and
Scandinavia had met with refusals to sell on the part of Lilly France and Pfizer. In its decision on the
application for interim measures, the Competition Council found that Article 81 of the EC Treaty could
not be applied inasmuch as no proof had been provided as to the existence of an agreement between Lilly
France or Pfizer and their wholesalers aimed at refusing to supply the applicant with medicinal products.
It could not be ruled out, however, that Pharmadex may have been the victim of an abuse of a dominant
position. This point will be considered when the substantive issues are dealt with, the application for
interim measures having been dismissed.
In a case conceming practices on the market for anaesthetics, the Competition Council found that the
company Abbott had infringed ArticleL 420-2 of the Commercial Code and Article 82 of the EC Treaty
by introducing, upon the arrival of a competitor on the market, fidelity rebates in order to dissuade buyers
from turning to this new supplier.
A Spanish tour operator had challenged, before the Competition Council, the practices of FIFA
(F6d6ration Internationale de Football) and the CFO (Comit6 d'Organisation de la Coupe du Monde de
Football) in relation to the sale of tickets for the football World Cup. The Competition Council had found
that it was not established that these organisations had infringed Article 82 of the EC Treaty and
Article L 420-2 of the Commercial Code. By judgment of 30 October, the Paris Court of Appeal upheld
this decision, finding that, although FIFA and the CFO held a dominant position on the market for the
sale of tickets for the football World Cup within the framework of the putting together of package tours,
it had not been proved that there had been an abuse.
2. Mergers
A request for the application of Article 9 of the Community regulation was made at the end of the year by
the French authorities in respect of the SEB/Ivloulinex merger. The Commission referred back the French
part of the case and in January 2002 authorised the operation subject to conditions.
Germany
t. |;:lt the report period, the Federal Cartel Office applied the EU competition provisions in ttuee
(a) At the end of 2000, the federations of statutory health insurance funds decided to adjust the fixed
amounts for certain active substances. The Federal Cartel Office issued a prohibition on the basis of
Article 81 of the EC Treaty in case the federations made the amounts binding. The proceeding was
subsequently suspended because the federations dispensed with an adjustment after the federal
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government announced that, for a transitional period, it would be setting the flxed amounts by
regulation. (See also the reference decision of the Federal Court of Justice of 3 July 2001.)
In response to a complaint from an authorised dealer, the Federal Cartel Ofnce is currently
considering whether the territorial protection clauses agreed between a manufacturer of cleaning
apparatus and its dealers infringe Article 81 of the EC Treaty or are covered by block exemption
Regulation No 2790199.
A further proceeding examining the compatibility of vertical supply agreements with Article 81 of
the EC Treaty or block exemption Regulation No 2790199 was initiated following a complaint about
the duration of the supply provision agreed between certain breweries and landlords in beer supply
agreements.
During the report period, the following decisions were handed down by the Federal Court of Justice
or the Berlin Court of Appeal in connection with the EU competition rules:
In proceedings brought against Scandlines Deutschland GmbH, on 8 May the Federal Court of
Justice allowed the appeal lodged by the Federal Cartel Offtce against the refusal to grant it leave to
appeal to a higher court. The Federal Cartel Office thereupon lodged ajudicial review application.
By decision of 21 December 1999, Scandlines had been prohibited under Section 19(4) (4) of the
Act prohibiting Restraints of Competition and Article 82 of the EC Treaty from refusing to grant two
competing ferry companies the right also to use Puttgarden port infrastructures for a reasonable
consideration. The Diisseldorf Higher Regional Court had set aside the decision on 2 August 2000
on grounds of imprecision.
The prohibition decision of the Federal Cartel Ofnce conceming the cooperation between
NordzuckerAG and Union Zucker Siidhannover GmbH was set aside by the Berlin Court of Appeal
by judgment of l0 October. The Federal Cartel Office will not lodge an appeal. The cooperation,
over the joint marketing of beet sugar, had been prohibited on 18 March 1999 on grounds of the
dominant market position of the joint venture Nordzucker GmbH & Co. KG on the basis of
Article 85(1) ofthe EC Treaty and Section 1, in conjunction with Section 28(1), f,rst sentence, and
Section 28(4), in conjunction with Section 12(1), of the Act prohibiting Restraints of Competition.
Greece
In August, in accordance with Section 2 of Act 703177 as it applies in conjunction with Article 82(c) of
the EC Treaty, the Greek Competition Commission issued a decision on the complaints seeking an
injunction lodged by 16 associations of pharmacists agalnst GlaxoWellcome AEBE (decision
193rrnz0or).
The facts of the case were that, between 6 November 2000 and 22 February 2001, GlaxoWellcomeAEBE
had unilaterally decided to stop supplying all associations of pharmacists and pharmaceutical
wholesalers with the patent medicines Imigran (anti-migraine), Lamictal (anti-epileptic) and Serevent
(anti-asthmatic) and at the same time started direct sales of the products to Greek pharmacies.
The company marntained that it had reached its decision because of a cutback in the quantities of the
medicines in question available from its parent company GlaxoWellcome plc (now GlaxoSmithKline)
and because ofpersistent and ever-greater shortages of the medicines on the domestic market, which had
come to the company's notice (and about which it had received complaints). The problem was caused by
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large-scale parallel exports by certain pharmaceutical wholesalers, which resulted in the domestic market
requirements not being satisfied.
In the grounds for its decision, the Competition Commission found that the company did have a
dominant position in the domestic market on account of (a) the large proportion of the medicines in
question accounted for by the company, with some of the medicines not considered not to have any
substitute, at least for certain categories ofpatient; (b) the fact that the company was the sole supplier of
the medicines on the domestic market; (c) the company's flnancial robustness; and (d) the strong demand
for the products on the European market.
The Competition Commission decision further considers the accused company and its parent company to
be a single economic unit and finds that their joint conduct constitutes an abuse liable to affect
intra-Community trade. Specifically, the refusal of the company and its parent company to execute the
orders placed by the associations of pharmacists and pharmaceutical wholesalers constitutes an
infringement of Article 82(b) of the EC Treaty and Section 2 of ActTO3[77, since it limits availability to
the detriment of consumers both in Greece, where, because of the refusal to sell to the above associations,
it was assumed that the supply of the medicines was taking considerably longer than under the previous
arrangements, and in the Member States to which the medicines were being exported from Greece, where
consumers would be able to buy the parallel imports at a lower price than the normal price on the local
market.
In any event, in addition to the fact that the company failed to produce any evidence of the parent
company cutting back its research and development budget on account of parallel exports and that the
alleged problems on the domestic market were not substantiated, the decision finds that the company's
conduct described above clearly goes beyond what is necessary to protect its own legitimate interests and
those of its parent company.
Under the operative part of the Competition Commission decision, the company is required 
- 
for the
time being and pending the final decision 
- 
to execute all orders for the three medicines from the
associations that lodged the complaint, without any limitation on quantities. The injunction extends
automatically to all associations of pharmacists and pharmaceutical enterprises (wholesalers) of whatever
type, also without any quantity restriction. It further stipulates that the company will face a fine of
GRD I million for each day that it fails to comply with the decision.
Italy
1. During the period under review, the Competition Authority concluded its investigation under
Article 82 of the EC Treaty in the Assoviaggi/Alitalia case. The authority concluded that Alitalia had
infringed Article 82 by abusing, through the application of loyalty incentive schemes with regard to travel
agencies, its dominant position on the market for air transport agency services. More specifically, the
investigation concerned Alitalia's practice of granting incentives to travel agencies to distribute its own
air tickets calculated on the basis of sales targets reached by the agencies and not on the basis of an
agency's total sales. The authority concluded from its investigation thatAlitalia's conduct constituted an
infringement of Article 82(1Xb) and (c) of the EC Treaty. It considered that, as the infringement
restricted the benefits of the liberalisation of the air transport sector taking place in the Community, the
infringement was serious and it imposed a fine of ITL 51 998 000 000 (or 1.3 7o of Alitalia's turnover in
the transport by air of passengers to and from ltaly). It also ordered Alitalia to put an end to the practices
that were distorting competition and to submit a report on the measures taken to remove the
infringements identifi ed.
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2. This year, the authority also initiated two proceedings under the Community competition rules
which are still under way.The Blugas Snam case concerns possible infringements of Article 82 of the EC
Treaty in the gas transport and sales sectorby Snam SpA and Snam Rete Gas SpA. The possible abuses
by Snam, which holds 87 lo of the relevant market, and by Snam Rete Gas, which holds abottt 97 Vo of
the national transport networks, relate to conduct concerning the allocation of transport capacity on the
national gas network at the point of import, in particular, customer operators (Snam and firms purchasing
gas from Snam) being given priority access to the network to the detriment of independent operators
acquiring gas supplies from third parties.
The investigation in Internationnl Mail Express ltaly/Poste Italiane concerns an alleged abuse of a
dominant position under Article 82 of the EC Treaty by Poste Italiane. The case concems the interception
by Poste Italiane of mail from abroad and the suspension of its forwarding service, as well as its
requirement that the Italian intermediaries or customers, who have already paid for the service to the Post
Offlce in the country of posting, pay a particularly large fee for delivery to the addressee. Similar
complaints are based on the fact that, under the international agreements in force, public postal operators
in the different countries may, for large quantities of mail from abroad, charge a fee based on criteria
established by international agreement, but may not under any circumstances hold up mail from abroad.
In addition, under international agreements signed by Poste Italiane, the public postal operator of the
country of destination of the mail must claim payment of the forwarding and delivery fee from the postal
operator in the country of importation rather than direct from customers.
3. In its Judgment No 743312001, the Lazio Regional Administrative Court rejected the application
by Telepii SpA for annulment of decision No 8386/2000 of the Competition Authority which, in the
Stream/Telepitt case, found that Telepii had infringed Article 82 of the EC Treaty.
Luxembourg
During the period under review, the Restrictive Trade hactices Commission (CPCR) delivered an
opinion in a case concerning practices, allegedly in breach of the act of 17 June 1970, as amended, on the
market in expert inspections of motor vehicles. In its opinion, the CPCR recommended that the minister
should close the file on the case given that no infringement had been established. Another case
concerning an alleged abuse of a dominant position by a Luxembourg firm with regard to charges for
bank cards is still pending before the CPCR.
Netherlands
1. The Ruhrkohle-Hoogovens case concerned an application for exemption for an agreement
between Ruhrkohle and Hoogovens. It was decided that the agreement did not infringe Section 6 of the
Competition Act or Article 8l(1) of the EC Treaty. Ruhrkohle lodged an objection to the decision with
the Director-General of the Dutch Competition Authority. The director-general ruled that the effects of
the agreement in question did not so much 'principally arise on' as 'have a close connection with' Dutch
territory. He therefore came to the conclusion that in the present case it was not obvious that he was the
proper authority to apply Article 8l(1) of the Treaty. He expressed the prima facie view, however, that
there was no question of an infringement of that article.
2. Under the Dutch Competition Act, European block exemptions take effect directly. Consequently,
agreements which do not (adversely) affect trade between Member States of the European Union beneflt
from a European block exemption. Where the director-general of the Dutch Competition Authority is
however ofthe opinion that the applicability of such an exemption to national agreements has a negative
impact on domestic competition, he may refrain from giving effect to the relevant regulation. In
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December, the director-general announced his intention to withdraw the benefit of Regulation (EC)
No2790/1999 on vertical agreements from the 'aid systems' of the five leading chemical companies in
the Netherlands.
3. Rotterdam District Court, 21 June 2001, Essent NV v The Director-General of the Dutch
Competition Authority
This case concerned a competition-law assessment of a merger that had taken place in the Dutch market
for the composting of vegetable waste and of the requirements relating to the authorisation. With regard
to the view taken by Essent NV that the director-general of the Dutch Competition Authority had
wrongly omitted to establish whether there might also be an appreciable restriction of competition, the
court remarked that neither Community practice nor the literature provided an unequivocal answer to the
question how far independent significance could be attributed to the requirement of an appreciable
restriction of competition compared with that of economic dominance. It was clear from this that in
principle an integrated approach must be taken when carrying out an assessment. A finding of a
strengthening or creation of a dominant position should then as a rule be sufficient to justify a finding that
Article 2 of Regulation (EEC) No 4064189 was satisfied. Only in the case of special circumstances, such
as a very minimal or very temporary negative impact on competition, could the position be any different.
Such special circumstances had not arisen, however, in the present case.
4. President of the Rotterdam District Court, 12 October 2001, Vereniging Belangen Behartiging
Schildersbedrijven cs (VBBS) v The Director-General of the Dutch Competition Authority
The President held that, having regard among other things to what the European Commission had found
in its SPO decision (OJ L 92, 7 .4.1992), the rules, in so far as they sought to prevent peddling, tended to
restrict competition. In the light of the judgment of the Court of First Instance of 18September200l
(Case T-ll2l99 Mdtropole), the President held that the balancing of positive and negative effects on
competition must take place within the framework of Article 81(3) of the EC Treaty or Section 17 of the
CompetitionAct.
5. Rotterdam District Cosrt, 23 October 2001, Vereniging Centale Organisatie voor de
Vleesgroothandel (COV) v The Director-General of the Dutch Competition Authority
The court held that the rules tended to restrict competition inasmuch as both the COV advisory discount
rules on slaughtered pig weight discounts and the COV advisory discount rules on boar discounts
involved a form ofhorizontal price maintenance. Collectively recommended prices, whether or not they
are actually adhered to by all members of an association of undertakings, make it possible for
undertakings to predict with a reasonable degree of certainty what competitors' price policy will be and
thus to align their market behaviour thereon. Price competition is reduced as a result. In the light of the
judgment of the Court of First Instance of 18 September 2OOl (CaseT-ll2l99 Mdtropole), the court held
that the balancing of positive and negative effects on competition must take place within the framework
of Article 81(3) of the EC Treaty or Section l7 of the Competition Act.
The competition authorities in Austria, Belgium, Denma* Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the
United Kingdom did not report any enforcement of Articles 8 I ( I ) and 82 of the EC Treaty.
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Application of the Gommunity competition rules by courts
in the EU Member States ('uo)
Austria
A number of proceedings involved drinks supply agreements between beer or coffee producers,
following the conclusion of which the restaurant company concemed could not meet sales forecasts and
the drinks producer claimed back a proportion of its 'promotion payments'.
In proceeding 7ob2lll99, the Supreme Court was asked to rule on an exclusive coffee purchasing
agreement and the related 'promotion payments'. A restaurant company had concluded with the market
leader in the coffee trade in Austria an agreement concerning several thousand kilograms of coffee.
After sales forecasts proved to be wildly optimistic and one of the defendants went bankrupt, the coffee
producer sued for pro rata repayment of the 'promotion payment'. The defendant argted inter alia that
the exclusive purchasing agreement infringed Article 8l of the EC Treaty. The court made several
references for a preliminary ruling, asking whether the agreement in the present case was an agreement
falling underArticle 81(1), whether it was covered by the block exemption, whether the agreement's
duration had to be clearly deflned under Regulation (EEC) No 1984/83, and whether the possible nullity
of the agreement would also affect a claim for repayment. The agreement was signed in 1993, i.e. before
Austria acceded to the EEA and the EU, and was terminated in January 1995 (after Austria acceded to
the EU).
Proceeding 3Ob296199 concemed a beer supply agreement concluded for l0 years between a leading
brewery and the operators of a discotheque, the substantial promotion payments offered in retum, and the
provision of stocks. After the sales premises were vacated in 1997, two years after the purchasing
agreement was concluded, the brewery claimed both pro rata repayment of the promotion payments and
the value of the stocks. The discotheque operators argued that the purchasing agreement was not covered
by the relevant block exemption and was therefore void. On the question of the nullity of the agreement,
the Supreme Court held that only those parts of the agreement which fell under the prohibition were void.
If, however, the supply and services agreements were void under Article 8l of the EC Treaty, then the
transfer of money or goods under circumstances not approved by Community law was unlawful. The
brewery would then be unable to base its claim for repayment on such Treaty provisions. The case was
referred back to the trial court to establish whether all the conditions ofArticle 81 were in fact fulfilled.
In the similar proceeding 6Ob290199 (with the same brewery as plaintiffl, the matter was also referred
back to the trial court to establish whether the criteria of Article 8l of the EC Treatv were met.
France
1. The Council ofState
The Council of State upheld its case-law on the inclusion of the competition rules in the body of law
guaranteed by the administrative courts.
("0) This section does not contain judgments delivered by couds with jurisdiction over decisions by national competition
authorities. These judgments were mentioned in the previous section on the application of the Community competition
rules by national authorities.
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Following an application for the annulment of decree No2000-893 of l3September2oO0 on the
condition-s undei wfrich public establishments of a scientific or technological nature and higher-education
establishments may provide enterprises or individuals with operating resources' the Council of State
(Judgment NoZZiqiZ of 5September260l) held that the legislator had wished to afford such
establishments the opportunity to provide services without granting them an exclusive right 
- 
something
that was not prohibitiO by Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty. The different operating conditions as
between public and prlvate establishments had neither as their object nor as their effect the placing of
public esiablishments in a privileged position or the distorting of competition- The Council of State
considered that these legislative provisions were not incompatible with Articles 81 and 82 of the EC
Treaty and dismissed the application.
The council of State (Judgment No 221767 222315 of 16 May 2001) dismissed an application for the
annulment of an order reliting to the rules and regulations of branch offices of the Mutualit6 Sociale
Agricole. It held that the tax aJvantages provided for in Articles 1027 and 1085 of the General Tax Code
were linked to the nature of branch offices of the Mutualit6 Sociale Agricole as bodies administering
basic social security schemes. Even if such branch offices could be regarded as being in a dominant
position in respect of their activity of managing supplementary insurance schemes, the exemptions in
qu"rtion *"r" not likely, in view of their very limited character, to enable them to abuse that position'
The Council of State (Judgment No 218078 of 30 March 2001) refused to annul the order implementing
Article Lg61-3 of the Social Security Code, finding that it was not incompatible with Articles 81 and 82
of the EC Treaty. It had not been established that, by providing for the covering of various types of care
or equipment, the article in question would have enabled compulsory health-insurance schemes to distort
.omp"tition on the market for supplementary health insurance or to abuse a dominant position on that
market.
The Council of State (Judgment No218067 of 27 July 2001) annulled Article25 of the decree of
30 July 1985, which exempts from the obligation to put out to tender contracts by which local authorities
purchase supplies from the Union des Groupements d'Achats Publics (UGAP), finding that it did not
compty *ith iuropean Directive g3/36lEEC.The Council held, however, that it had not been proved that
UGAp was abusing a dominant position on the market for the management of tendering procedures and
that the presence, on UGAP's board, of representatives of authorities that were potential purchasers was
not evidence of a restrictive practice'
In a case concerning champagne wine, the Council of State (Judgment No 193369 of 16 February 2001)
held that the taxes introduceJby the decree at issue, which did not have as their object the financing of a
body whose activities were incompatible with Article 85 of the EC Treaty, were not incompatible with
that article.
2. Ordinary courts
Following a judgment of the Pau Court of Appeal discharging defendants who had pursued the business
of artificial insemination without having been allocated an area of activity and without being licensed
inseminators, the Court of Cassation held that Article 82 of the EC Treaty did not prevent a Member State
from conferring on approved bovine insemination centres certain exclusive rights in a given area'
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Germany
l. Cologne Regional Court, 17.1.2001, 28 O (Kafi.) 622199,P-4llO0
Mannesmann o.tel.o GmbH, Cologne v Deutsche Telekom AG, Bonn
No action for damages or restitution lies for the charging of excessive end-user tariffs for
interconnection by the defendant as the consideration had been authorised ($ 823(2) of the Civil
Code, in conjuncrion withArt. 82 of the EC Treaty; $$ 40, 39, 29(1) of the Telecommunications Act).
Cologne Regional Court, 17.1.2001, 28 O (Kart.) 537199,P-69100
Mannesmann Arcor AG & Co., Eschborn v Deutsche Telekom AG, Bonn
No action for damages or restitution lies for allegedly excessive interconnection charges as they
were approved by the government (Art. 82 of the EC Treaty; $ 823(2\, in conjunction with $$ 40, 39
and}9(l\, of the TelecommunicationsAct; $ 812(l), first sentence, of the Civil Code).
Munich Higher Regional Court, 18.1.2001, U (K) 5630199,P-235199
McDonnld's Immobilien GmbH, Munich v Riegele KG, Augsburg
No infringement of Art. 8l(1) of the EC Treaty by the drinks supply agreement between the parties,
which contains an exclusivity clause (COM notice C l2ll2; block exemption Regulation (EEC)
No 1984/83).
Leipzig Regional Cowt,'X.1.200 1, 02HK O 10319 199, P -47 I 00
ESAG Energieversorgung Sachsen Ost AG, Dresden v Stadtwerke Gdrlitz AG, Giirlitz
A long-term electriciry supply agreement with a70 Eo proarement obligation is not void ($$ 1, 20
of the Act Prohibiting Restraints of Competition, Arl 8l of the EC Treaty; $ 9 of the Civil Code
Implementation Act).
Cologne Regional Cotvt,21.2.2001, 28 O (Kart) 409/99, P-200199
Dr Clemens Kiinzer, Cologne, and. Others v AoK-Bundesverband, Bonn, and Others
The plaintiff is not entitled to a judgment ordering termination of the agreement, concluded on the
basis of the Medicinal Products Prices Regulation, between the defendant and Deutscher-Apotheker-
Verband eV conceming the price at which pharmacists purchase cytostatic drugs ($ 5(4) and (5) of
the Medicinal Products Prices Regulation, Arl 8l(1) of the EC Treaty; $ I of the Act Prohibiting
Unfair Competition).
Federal Court of Justice, 6.3.2001, KyZ 2O|OO, P-734OO
CardioClinik Hamburg Krankenhausgesellschaft mbH, Hamburg v Federal Cartel Office
No action lies for decentralised application of European competition law by the Federal Cartel
Offlce (gg 32,50 of the Act hohibiting Restraints of Competition; Art. 3(1) of Regulation 17162;
Art. l0 of the EC Treaty).
Diisseldorf Regional Court, 22.3.2001,4 O 65/00, P-168/01
New York Blood Center Inc., New York, USA v Octopharma AG, Ziegelbriicke, Switzerland, and.
Others
No action lies under either Swiss law or the law of New York State for the renewed conclusion of a
licensing agreement which is void under German law on account of a procedural defect, as its
applicability follows from the competitionJaw effects principle and not from the principles of
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private international law ($ 34(l), first sentence, et seq. of the Act Prohibiting Restraints of
Competition).
8. Celle Higher Regional Court, 29.3.2001,13 U 53/00 (Kart.)' P-248198
Auto Schneider GmbH, Ottweiler v Volkswagen AG, Wolfsburg
Notice of termination of a car dealership agreement due to a reorganisation of the defendant's
distribution system in the relevant market area is effective; no action lies for a continuation of
supplies, although the plaintiff is entitled to damages under $ 89 of the Commercial Code ($ 20 of
the Act Prohibiting Restraints of Competition; Community Regulation (EC) No 1475195).
9. Diisseldorf Regional Court, 30.4.2001,34 O (Kart.) 143199,P-195199
Byk Gutden Lomberg Chemische Fabrik GmbH, Konstanzv AOK Bundesverband, Bonn, and Others
As direct price fixing, the fixing of flat-rate equipment cost and price recommendations in relation to
x-ray contrast media infringes Art. 8l(1) of the EC Treaty ($$ 823, 1004 of the Civil Code (mutatis
mutandis) , in conjunction with Art . 8 1 EC ; $ 242 of the Civil Code) .
I 0. Diisseldorf Regional Court, 9.5.200 l, 34 O (Kart.) 192199, P-54l00
l. Byk GuWen Lomberg, Konstanz2. Schwarz Pharma, Monheimv AOK Bundesverband, Bonn, and
Others
Pharmaceutical product manufacturers are entitled to an injunction to prevent the setting of fixed
amounts as these infringe Art. 81 of the EC Treaty; in particular, health insurance funds and the
Federal Committee of Medical Practitioners and Health Insurance Funds are to be deemed to be
undertakings ($$ 1004, 823 of the Civil Code, Art. 81 of the EC Treafy).
11. Dtisseldorf HigherRegional Court, 18.5.2001, U (Kart) 28lO0,P-166/98
Ichthyol-Gesellschart Cordes, Hermani & Co., Hamburg v AOK Bundesverband, Bonn, and Others
Reference to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling on the following questions:
(a) When setting fixed amounts, are statutory health insurance funds to be considered undertakings
within the meaning of Art. 81(1) of the EC Treaty?
(b) Is the setting of fixed amounts to be considered a restriction of competition within the meaning
of Art. 8 I ( 1 ) (in particular para. (a) of the EC Treaty ?
(c) Under what conditions might the application of Art. 8 1 ( 1 ) of the EC Treaty to the setting of fixed
amounts be excluded pursuant toArt. 86(2), first sentence, ofthe EC Treaty?
12. Niirnberg-Fiirth Regional Co*,23.5.2001, 3 O 2257101, P-55/01
natGAS AG, Berlin v Ferngas Nordbayem GmbH, Nilrnberg
The joint use of a supply network is unreasonable on grounds of a lack of reciprocity of access
opportunities in different Member States only if a national reciprocity clause exists; the EC single
market gas directive does not itself govern this case ($ 19(4) No 4 of the Act Prohibiting Restraints
of Competition, Arl 19 of Directive 98/30/EC).
13. Diisseldorf Regional Court, 30.5.2001,34 O (Kart) 199/99, P-263199
B. Braun Melsungen AG, Melsungen v AOK Rheinland, Dilsseldorf, and Others
Application for an injunction and damages in respect of the maintenance in force and application of
overall appropriations for the implementation of non-hospital LDL elimination treatments ($$ 823,
1004 of the Civil Code (mutatis mutandis\, in conjunction with Art. 81(1) of the EC Treaty).
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Diisseldorf Regional Court, 30.5.2001, 34 O (Kart) 195199,P-260199
BayerVtal GmbH & Co. KG, I*verkusenv AOK Bun^desverband, Bonn, and Others
Application for cessation of involvement in the setting of fixed amounts for quinones ($$ 823(2),
1004 (mutatis mutandis) of the Civil Code, in conjunction with Art. 81(1) of the EC Treaty).
Diisseldorf Regional Court, 20.6.2001,34 O (Kart) 36l0l,P-75101
Flughafen Diisseldorf GmbH, Diisseldorf v Hapag-Lloyd Fluggesellschafi mbH, Langenhagen
Effectiveness of increase in airport charges by the plaintiff, as the charges are not substantially
higher than in the case of comparable airports in Germany, which, like the plaintiff, are dominant on
the market (g 315 of the Civil Code; $ 19(4) No 2 of the Act Prohibiting Restraints of Competition;
Art. 82, second paragraph, subparagraph (a) of the EC Treaty).
Frankturt am Main Regional Cotnt,27.6.2001, 3-08 O rc400,P-162100
e.dis Energie Nord AG, Fiirstenwalde/Spree v DBEnergie GmbH, Franlcfurt am Main
Electricity supply agreements with a l5-year duration and a total requirements coverage clause do
not, despite g 103b of the Act kohibiting Restraints of Competition, infringe $ 1 of the act for lack
of a competitive relationship; no appreciable restriction of competition or abuse of a dominant
position as, instead of purchasing elecricity, the defendant could have developed its own electricify-
transmission grid (Art. 8l of the EC Treaty; $$ l, 19, 20 of the Act Prohibiting Restraints of
Competition (new version); $g 103a, 103b of the Act Prohibiting Restraints of Competition (old
version)).
Federal Court of Justic e, 3.7 .2001, KZR 3 | | 99, P -97 197
Gddecke AG, Berlin v AOK Bundesverband, Bonn, and other federations of statutory health
insurance fund.s
Reference to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling on the question whether Arts 81 and 82, in conjunction
with Art. 86, of the EC Treaty preclude a national provision under which the federations of statutory
health-insurance funds jointly set fixed amounts for certain categories of pharmaceutical product,
and whether this might not constitute grounds for bringing an action for damages against the
federations concerned.
Federal Court of Justic e, 3.7 .2001, KZR 32199, P -108 197
Intersan, Institut f. phnrm. u. klin. Forschung GmbH, Ettlingen v AOK Bundesverband., Bonn, and
other federations of statutory health insurance funds
Reference to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling on the question whetherArts 8l and 82, in conjunction
with Art. 86, of the EC Treaty preclude a national provision under which federations of statutory
health insurance funds jointly set fixed amounts for certain categories of pharmaceutical product,
and whether this might not constitute grounds for bringing an action for damages against the
federations concemed.
Dtisseldorf Higher Regional Cowt, 11.7.2001, U (Kart) 44l0O,P-43199
Mundipharma GmbH, Limburg an der ltthn v AOK BU Bonn, and other fed.erations of statutory
health insurance funls
Reference to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling on the question whether the setting by federations of
statutory health insurance funds of fixed amounts for pharmaceutrcal products is to be considered an
agreement between undertakings which may restrict competition within the meaning of Art. 81 of
t6.
17.
18.
t9.
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the EC Treaty, and whether such an agreement may be exempted underArt. 86(2), first sentence, of
the Treaty from the application of Art. 8 I .
Schleswig Higher Regional Court, 17.7.2001,6 U Kart 67100'P-29101
ESSO Deutschland GmbH, Hamburg v Klaus Schomann, Liibeck
Art. 81 of the EC Treaty is not applicable to a supply provision registered as an easement as it
concerns, not trade in goods, but the exercise of ownership, and the abstraction principle would
otherwise be infringed. Agency agreements fall neither under Art. 81(1) of the EC Treaty nor under
g$ 15, lS or 34 of the Act Prohibiting Restraints of Competition (old version) (tut. 81(l) of the EC
Treaty, $$ 15, 18,34 of the Act Prohibiting Restraints of competition (old version)).
Cologne Regional Court, 2.8.2001, 83 O (Kart) 85/00, P-7l01
Der Griine Punkt-Duales System AG, Cologne v Interseroh AG, Cologne
Action brought by the plaintiff against the defendant, which operates as a marketing guarantor, for
payment of a flat fee for the disposal of sales packaging which is supplied to the defendant by waste
disposal partners of the plaintiff (kl 81 of the EC Treaty; $ l9(l), (4) No 3 of the Act Prohibiting
Restraints of Competition).
Cologne Regional Court, 5.9.2001, 28 O (Kart.) 166/00, P-97100
RWE Energie AG, Essenv STAWAG Stadtwerke Aachen AG, Aachen
Electricity supply agreement with a 20-yex duration and a total requirements coverage clause
infringes g I of the Act hohibiting Restraints of Competition following the repeal of $ 103a of the
act; the duration must be reduced to the period permitted under Regulation No 1984/83 of five years
from the conclusion of the contract.
Kiel Regional Court, 12.9.2001, 14 O Kart. 176/98,P-197198
Auto Discount Hiirup GmbH, Hiirup/Flensburg v Volkswagen AG, Wolfsburg
The ban on sales to resellers outside the distribution network, imposed by the defendant on its
dealers, does not infringe kt. 81 of the EC Treaty as it is exempted under Art. 1(3) of block
exemption Regulation (EC) No 1475195; no removal of the exemption under the Commission's
decision imposing a fine as the established violations by the defendant have since been terminated
and further hindering of the plaintiff has not been substantiated.
Cologne Regional Court, 12.9.2001, 9l O 72l0O,P-232100
Telegate AG, Miinchen-Martinsried v Deutsche Telekom AG, Bonn
Effective set-off of the defendant with claims arising from the use of the NDIS data bank against
claims by the plaintiff for payment of remuneration for future services received by the defendant for
the plaintiff from its ultimate customers ; remuneration demanded by the defendant of DEM 0 . 1 2 per
transaction is not excessive as the plaintiff provides no voice communication services to the public
and therefore the criterion of the costs of the efficient provision of services within the meaning
of g 12(1) does not apply to the plaintiff ($ 12 of the Telecommunications Act; $ l9(4) of the Act
Prohibiting Restraints of Competition; Art. 82 of the EC Treaty).
21.
22.
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Frankfurt am Main Regional Court, 19.9.2001, 3-08 O 8l/01, P-ll4l0l
Giinter and Rosemnrie Morloch Pforzheimv Totaffina Deutschland GmbH, Diisseldorf
The service station agreement concluded between the parties is not void on grounds of infringement
of the written form requirement ($ 34 of the Act Prohibiting Restraints of Competition (old version)
and Art. 8 I ( I ) of the EC Treaty) .
Dtsseldorf Regional Court, 26.9.2001,34 O (Kart) 54l0l,P-l33l0l
Autohaus Haimerl GmbH, Dreieichv Nissan Motor GmbH, Neuss
The plaintiff is entitled to cessation of the defendant's sales promotion measures (discounts, etc.) by
which the plaintiff as authorised agent of the defendant is without its consent financially affected to
the tune of 50 Vo or more (right to cessation based on contractual duty of good faith, S 242 of tbe
Civil Code); no right to cessation based on direct/indirect price fixing in view of the unilateral nature
of the measures ($ 823(2) of the Civil Code, Arl 8l(1) of the EC Treaty; $$ 14, 33 of the Act
Prohibiting Restraints of Competition).
Diisseldorf Regional Court, 26.9.2001,34 O (Kart) 200199,P-262199
Dr Schwalbe GmbH & Co. KG, Karlsruhe v Kasseniirztliche Bundesvereinigung, Cologne, and
Others
Injunction granted to prevent the inclusion of the applicant's pharmaceutical products in a list of
'controversial' products in the defendant's 'Recommendations for the economical use of
pharmaceutical and medicinal products' (Art. 81(l) ofthe EC Treaty).
Frankfurt am Main HigherRegional Court, 2.10.2001, l1 U (Kart) 70/00,P-l56l0O
Gutenberg Buchhandlung; Inh.Jiirgen Hollack, Brussels v S. Fischer Verlag GnbH, Franlgfurt am
Main
In the absence of any domestic effect ($ 130(2) of the Act Prohibiting Restraints of Competition) or
appreciable effect on the market structure (Art. 82 of the EC Treaty), the plaintiff Belgian book
dealer has no right to be supplied direct with the defendant's publications.
Diisseldorf Regional Court, 24.10.2001,34 O (Kart) 55l0l,P-9410I
Flughnfen Diisseldorf GmbH, Diisseldorf v Deutsche Lufthansa AG, Cologne
The plaintiff is entitled to payment of the standard fees laid down in its fees schedule for use of its
airport by the defendant; fees increase on 1 April 2000 does not constitute an abuse by the plaintiff
of its dominant position ($ 315 of the Civil Code; $ 19(4) No 2 of the Act Prohibiting Restraints of
Competition; Art. 82 of the EC Treaty, in conjunction with $ 134 of the Civil Code).
Dortmund Regional Coutt,25.10.2001, 13 O 90/01, P-128/01
MEDIAN Tblecom GmbH & Co.KG, Bochumv OMARTraders GmbH, Dreieich
The exclusivity clause in the franchise agreement between the parties is valid ($ $ I , 19( 1) of the Act
hohibiting Restraints of Competition, Arts 81, 82 of the EC Treaty).
Munich Higher Regional Court,15.11.2001, U (K) 3825/01, P-55/01
natGAS AG, Berlin v Femgas Nordbayem GmbH, Niimberg
Thejoint use ofa supply network is unreasonable for lack ofreciprocity of access opportunities in
different Member States only if a national reciprocity clause exists; the EC single market gas
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directive does not itself govem this case ($ 19(4) No 4 of the Act prohibiting Restraints of
Competition, Art. 19 of Directive 98/30/EC).
32. Diisseldorf Regional Corlult,7.l2.200l, 4 O 506199,p-l37l0l
Mauser Werke GmbH, Brilhl v Marmor Deutschland Kunststoffierstellung GmbH, Erkelenz
The plaintiffis entitled to accounts, information and damages from the defendant for unlawful use of
the idea behind a patent owned by the plaintiff; there has been no abuse of a dominant position of theplaintiffas a result ofits refusal to grant the defendant a licence because the defendant has made no
specific contractual offer ($$ 139(2), l4ob of the Patents Act; 5 242 of the Civil Code; S 20 of theAct Prohibiting Restraints of competition; Arts g1, g2 of the EC Treatv).
Italy
1. Decisions by notional courts
Employment division of the Court of Cassation, Judgment No6307 of 4May 2001. The Court
repeals, in accordance with the Court of Justice's ruling in Case 55/96, the provisions in Article 25
of Law No 223 of l99l conceming employment services. Although the provision allows employers
to recruit unemployed persons by name, it provides for public veriflcation of the private and
preventive identification ofthe workers to be employed, which is regarded as an abuse of a dominant
position by the employment offrces;
Court of Cassation, Judgment No 8887 of 30 June 2001. The Court found that Article gl of the EC
Treaty has not been infringed by the uniform banking rules agreed by member establishments of
Associazione Bancaria Italiana with regard to comprehensive guarantee agreements.
References for preliminary rulings
In examining the appeal by Consorzio Industrie Fiammiferi against rhe decision by the CompetitionAuthority of 13 July 2000 (Consorzio Industrie Fiammiferi) that Article 8l of the Treaty had been
infringed, the Regional Administrative Court of Lazio, by order of 4 April 2001, referred two cases underArlicle 234 of the EC Treaty for a preliminary ruling by the Court oi Justice. The following questions
were asked:
'1. Where an agreement between undertakings adversely affects Community trade, and where that
agreement is required or facilitated by national legislation which legitimises or reinforces those
effects, specifically with regard to the determination of prices or markei-sharing arrangements, doesArticle 81 [EC] require or permit the official antitrust authority to disapply that measure and topenalise the anti-competitive conduct of the undertakings or, in uny 
"*nt, to prohibit it for thefuture, and if so, with what legal consequences?
For the purposes of applying Article 8l(l) EC, is it possible to regard national legislation under
which competence to fix the selling prices of a product is delegated to a rninistry and power to
allocate production between undertakings is entrusted to a consortium to which the relevant
2.
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producers are obliged to belong, as leaving room for competition which is open to hindrance,
restriction or distortion by the autonomous conduct of those undertakings?'
Netherhnds
The Dutch courts applied Community competition law in the following decisions. It should be noted that,
even where they apply the Dutch Competition Act, the Dutch courts are in fact interpreting Articles 81
and 82, since the act is modelled on the Community competition rules.
1. Supreme Court of the Netherlands, 16 February 2001, BV Maatschappij Drijvende Bokken v
Stichting Pensioenfonds yoor de Vervoer- en Havenbedrijven
Judgment of the Supreme Court following the answering by the Court of Justice (udgment of
21 September 1999 in Case C-219197 [1999] ECR I-6121) of the questions referred by the Supreme
Court for a preliminary ruling: a pension fund may be considered an undertaking within the meaning of
Article 81(l) of the EC Treaty, and Articles 82 and 86 of the EC Treaty do not preclude the public
authorities from conferring on a pension fund the exclusive right to manage a supplementary pension
scheme in a given sector.
2. Utrecht District Court, 14 March 2001, V&S Groothandel BV v Jacobus Klop
The court held that the exemption condition in Article 3(1) of Regulation (EEC) No 4087/88 on the
application of Article 81(3) of the Tleafy to categories of franchise agreements was not satisfied.
Moreover, the situation appeared to be covered by Article 5 of the regulation, as a result of which the
exemption provided for in Article 1(1) of the regulation did not apply.
3. 's-Gravenhage District Cowt, 22 March 2001, Vereniging Centaal Bareau voor de Rijn- en
binnenvaart en Intemationale Tankscheepvaartvereniging v the Dutch State
The pipeline network intended for the transport of flrel for military use was, on some routes, for example
Pemis-Schiphol, the only pipeline for transporting fuels. The State was thus in an economic power
position in that it alone could conclude shipment agreements for use of the pipeline. It did not follow
from this, however, that the competition rules as laid down in Articles 8l et seq. of the EC Treaty and the
Dutch Competition Act were infringed. There was no evidence of prohibited State aid to undertakings
within the meaning of Article 87 of the EC Treaty. The answer to the question whether the State was
infringing the competition rules owing to the competition-distorting effect of the conditions under which
it concluded agreements for the civil use of the pipeline network depended on whether the costs
connected with such use were fully passed on in the price.
4. 's-Gravenhage District Court, 31 May 2001, Koninklijke Ned.erlandse Voetbalbond (KNVB) v
Feyenoord
In these proceedings concerning the ownership of various types of right relating to football competitions,
the court confirmed the judgment of the Rotterdam District Court of 9 September 1999.It followed from
the relevant provisions of the KtWB's articles of association that that body operated as a 'central agency'
which, on behalf of its members and to the exclusion thereof, f,xed the selling price for broadcasting
rights in order that it might exploit them itself. What was involved was therefore a competition-restricting
agreement between undertakings or a decision of an association of undertakings within the meaning of
Section 6(1) of the Competition Act and Article 81(1) of the EC Treaty.
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5. College van Beroep voor het Bedrijfsleven, 5 June 2001, Apotheek Neptunus v College tarieven
gezondheidszorg
ln these proceedings concerning the Healthcare Charges Act, the tribunal observed that, in accordance
with the established case-law of the European Court of Justice, a Member State infringed Article 10, readin conjunction with Article 81, of the EC Treaty if it required or favoured the adoption of competition
provisions contrary to Article 81 or reinforced their effects, or where it divested its own rules of the
character of legislation by delegating to private economic operators responsibility for taking decisions
affecting the economic sphere. The tribunal held that it could not be diduced from the argiments put
forward that this might have been the case.
6. Rotterdam District court, 14 June 2001, Galerie y v Mondriann stichting
The court held that no undertaking existed in a competition-law sense where what was involved was agovemment body acting in the capacity of an aid-awarding authority. The appeal based on Section 6 of
the Competition Act and Article 81 of the EC Treaty was therefore dismissio. The court also held that
there was no conflict with Article 86(1), read in conjunction with Article 82, of the EC Treaty because
neither the regulations on art dealing nor the decisions on the authorisation of galeries taken on the basis
thereof related to public undertakings or to undertakings to which special or exclusive rights had been or
were granted by (an organ o0 the Dutch State.
7 - 's-Gravenhage District court, 25 July 2001, Dutchtone NV v the Dutch state
The cancellation of a supplementary levy could not be considered a measure in respect of a public
undertaking or an undertaking to which special or exclusive rights were granted. There was therefore no
conflict with Article 86(1), read in conjunction with Article 82, of the EC-Treaty. The court also held that
no State aid within the meaning of Article 87 of the EC Treaty was involved in this case as there was nodistortion or threat of distortion of competition.
Sweden
The Swedish Civil Aviation Administration was fined SKR 400 million by the G6ta court of appeal for
abuse of a dominant position vis-d-vis SAS, in infringement of EC and Swedish competition law. Thejudgment also implies for the Civil Aviation Administration the loss of revenues amounting to a furtherSKR 400 million. The abuse in question concerns price differentiation. For a number of years, SAS hadpaid special fees to the Civil Aviation Administration for the purpose of financing Terminal 2, in additionto the normal fees paid by other airlines for the use of Arlanda airport. The court held that bothSection 19 of the CompetitionAct andArticle 82 of the EC Treaty were applicable. An appeal against thejudgment has been lodged with the Supreme Court.
Uniled Kingdom
In Hendry & others and World Professiornl Billiards antl Snooker Association Ltd (Case No HC0l00g l3),
the High Court found that a rule of a sports association which required association consent fbr members to
be able to enter toumaments was void under Articles g l and g2 of ttre EC Treaty.
The competition authorities in Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, portugal and
spain did not report any decisions by their courts applying the Community competition rules or referying
a question to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling.
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D 
- 
Application of the 1993 notice on cooperation
between the Commission and nationalcourts
In 2001, the Commission's Directorate-General for Competition replied to 10 requests from courts in the
Member States pursuant to the 1993 notice. Eight of these requests came from Spanish courts and related
to disputes between oil companies and service-station operators. The questions put were often similar.
The ninth request came from a German court and related to the validity of a service agreement. The
10th came from an Ausfiian court and concemed the V/SA case.
The Stuttgart Regional Court informed the Commission in December 2000 that the validity of the service
agreement between DSD and recycling companies was ofrelevance to the outcome of a pending dispute.
The court asked whether the validity of the service agreement depended on a Commission decision and
whether the Commission had taken such a decision. In January, the Commission answered that it was
examining the service agreements and that it intended to take an exemption decision. It also pointed to
the notice on cooperation between national courts and the Commission, according to which the national
court should suspend the proceedings while awaiting the Commission's decision if it took the view that
an individual exemption was possible (paragraph 30).
On 26 January, the competent director replied to a request from Court of First Instance No 48 in Madrid
dated I December 2000 and received by the directorate-general on 3 January. The court's questions
centred on whether a service-station operator was to be classed as a commercial agent or as an
independent reseller given the clauses in the contract relating to commercial risk, and on the applicability
of Regulations (EEC) No 1984/83 and (EC) No 279011999 on vertical restraints to the basic relationship
between the parties to the case. The Commission's answer concerning the distinction between an agent
and a reseller under Community competition law was based extensively on the guidelines on vertical
restraints which it adopted ot 24May 200A('). The Commission also explained to the court the
demarcation ratione temporis between Regulations (EEC) No 1984/83 and (EC) No 279011999 and the
latter's applicabllity ratione materiae.
On 9 February, the competent director replied to a request from Court of First Instance No 73 in Madrid
dated l2December2000 and received by the directorate-general on 1l Janumy. The court's questions
were similar to those asked in the previous case, as was the Commission's answer.
On 3 April, the competent director replied to two requests from Court of First lnstance No I in Lucena
(C6rdoba) dated 8 December 2000 and received by the directorate-general on 25 January and
22February respectively. One of the court's questions concemed the concept of agency in Community
competition law. The Commission's answer was similar to those in the previous cases. The court also
wanted to know whether the oil company had notified the agreement at issue to the Commission in the
context of Case IV/33.503 ("'), from what point the l0-year contract term could begin to count for the
purpose of block exemption under Regulation (EEC) No 1984/83, and whether the agreement's
exclusivity clause could extend to other products such as lubricants with a view to qualifying for block
exemption under the same regulation. [n his answer, the director informed the court that the oil company
had notified standard contracts similar to the one the court was examining in the context of Case
rV/33.503. As to the duration of the agreement, the director replied that the llth and 18th recitals of
Regulation (EEC) No 1984/83 referred to the duration of the exclusive purchasing obligation and that the
(") oI c 29t,13.10.2000.
C") See 1993 Competition Report, point 226,1994 Competition Report, p.361, and Commission press release 1P1941596,
30.6.1994.
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point from which the l0 years should be calculated should therefore be that of the entry into force of that
clause. Lastly, the director reminded the court of the conditions which must be met under Article l l of
the regulation if the block exemption is to cover the exclusive purchase of lubricants, namely the supplier
must have made available, or financed, a lubrication bay or other lubrication equipment.
On 4 April' the Vienna Higher Regional Court, referring to the Commission's notice on cooperation
between national courts and the Commission, queried the Directorate-General for Competition alout the
state of play in the V/SA case. In the court's opinion, the issues arising in that case were similar to the
issues arising in a domestic cartel case. On 6 April, the Commission answered that it was investigating
VISAs 'multilateral interchange fees', which were part of an agreement notified to the Commission. A
Commission press release concerning the case and the issues involved as well as the name of the
responsible case handler for further questions were enclosed.
On 3 May, the competent dfuector replied to a request from Court of First Instance No I in Torrox(M6laga) dated 9 January and received by the directorate-general on 26 March. The court's questions
were similar to the first three questions put by Court of First Instance No 1 in Lucena lsee above). They
centred on the concept of agency in Community competition law, the question whether the oil company
had notified the contract at issue to the Commission in the context of Case M33.503, and the point irom
which the l0-year contract term could begin to count for the purpose of block exemption under
Regulation (EEC) No 1984183. The Commission's reply was accordingly similar to that given on 3 April(see above).
on 26 June and 20 July, the competent director replied to two requests from Court of First Instance No 3
in La Bisbal d'Empordi (Girona) dated 14 May and 12 June and received by the Directorate-General on2l May and 13 July respectively. First of all, the director made some general remarks about the
applicability of Regulations (EEC) No 1984/83 and (EC) No 2790/1999 on vJrtical restraints to the basic
relationship between the parties to the case. These remarks were similar to the answers given to Courts of
First Instance Nos 48 and 73 in Madrid referred to above. The court wanted to know from what point thel0-year contract term could begin to count for the purpose of block exemption under Regulatlon 6nC;No 1984/83. This question was similar to those put by the Lucena and Torrox courts ret-erred to above.
The Commission's reply was also similar, except with regard to the point when the exclusive purchasing
obligation started, as the supplier in this case was not one of ihe companie, 
"on""11"i by Cas!IV/33'503. Another question put by the court concemed the existence oi otherwise of resale price
maintenance where there were prices recommended by the supplier combined with a minimum marginfor the retailer together with the possibility for the latter to modify the resale price. The director's reily
outlined the various circumstances and situations in which such cases would iall underArticle gl(li;f
the EC Treaty, while inviting the court to take account of paragraph 47 of the Commission's guidelines
on vertical restraints. The court also asked whether, if resale price maintenance were found to exist in this
case, this would constitute a serious restriction of the type described in Article 4(a) of Regulation (EC)
No2790/1999. The Commission's reply was that, if the court were to find that the flxing of margins
amounted to an imposing of the resale price, the exemption provided for in the regulation could-not
apply' The court was invited to read paragraphs 46 and 66 of the Commission's guidelines on vertical
restraints. Lastly' the court asked whether the Commission disapproved of decisions taken by national
competition authorities or whether, on the contrary, it agreed with them. The Commission replied that
those authorities' decisions could be appealed against before the national courts in accordance with each
national legal system, but that the Commission did not act as an appeal tribunal for that type of decision.In a proceeding of this nature, the Commission could be called upon to express its opinion on howCommunity law should be interpreted 
- 
something which it could do withouifor all thai evaluating the
decisions of national competition authorities as such. The Commission also reminded the national court
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of its right to refer questions to the Court of Justice of the Communities for a preliminary ruling. Lastly, it
replied that, at all events, it was not bound by earlier decisions of national competition authorities.
On 9 July, the competent director replied to a request from Court of First Instance No 40 in Madrid dated
23 February and received by the directorate-general on 19 April. The court's fust two questions centred
on whether a service-station operator was to be classed as a commercial agent or as an independent
reseller given the clauses in the contract relating to commercial risk, and on the applicability of
Regulations (EEC) No 1984183 and (EC) No 279011999 on vertical restraints to the basic relationship
between the parties to the case. These questions were similar to those put by Court of First Instance
No 48 in Madrid referred to above, as was the Commission's answer. The third question concerned the
maximum duration of exclusive purchasing agreements for fuel if they were to qualify for block
exemption. The Commission reminded the court of its strict interpretation of the conditions laid down in
Article l2(2) of Regulation (EEC) No 1983184, which provides for a maximum 1O-year exemption for
this type of clause. It drew attention to the possibility of legal fictions being resorted to, with reciprocal
contacts being entered into between suppliers and resellers involving the temporary transfer of ownership
or the creation of property rights and the leasing back of business premises so as to circumvent the
10-year rule. It also drew attention to the conditions laid down in Article 5(a) of Regulation (EC)
No 2790/1999 and in paragraph 59 of the guidelines on vertical restraints, limiting the duration of this
type of clause to five years.
On 17 July, the competent director replied to a request from Court of First Instance No 8 in Madrid dated
11 June and received by the directorate-general on 29 June. The court wanted to know whether the oil
company had notified the agreement at issue to the Commission in the context of Case IV/33.503. This
question was similar to that put by the Lucena court referred to above. The Commission's reply was also
similar.
On 19 July, the competent director replied to a request from Court of First Instance No 19 in Madrid
dated 15 March and received by the Directorate-General on l0 May. The court's first two questions
centred on whether a service-station operator was to be classed as a commercial agent or as an
independent reseller given the clauses in the contract relating to commercial risk, and on the applicability
of Regulations (EEC) No 1984183 and (EC) No2'79011999 on vertical restraints to the basic relationship
between the parties to the case. These questions were similar to those put by Court of First Instance
No 48 in Madrid referred to above, as was the Commission's answer. The third question concemed the
maximum duration of exclusive purchasing agreements for fuel if they were to qualify for block
exemption. It was similar to the question put by Court of First Instance No 40 in Madrid, referred to
above. The Commission's reply was also similar.
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ANNEX
POSSIBILITY FOR NATIONAL COMPETITIONAUTHORITIES
TO APPLY EC COMPETITION RT]LES
Introductory remarks
1' This summary relates only to the enforcement of Articles 8l and 82 of the EC Treaty by the
administrative authorities of the Member States, not by the judiciary, as those articles are directly
applicable and are therefore enforceable by the courts of each Member state without exception.
2' Their application by the administrative authorities is subject to the limitations provided for, in favour
of the Commission, by Article 9(3) of Regulation No 17.
Legal provision and/or comments
Reform is being considered in the ror- o@
national Competition Authority and modifying the existing cartel law so as to
empower the national enforcers to apply Articles g1 and g2 of the EC Treaty.
This new law is expected to take effect from I Jalv 20O2.
Act of 5 August 1991, Section 53: when the netgian autfrorities narre to Oecide,
underArticle 84 ofthe EC Treaty, on the admissibility ofagreements and on the
abuse of a dominant position.in the common markei, the?ecision is taken bythe authorities stipulated in that act pursuant to Articles g1(1) and g2 of the
Treaty, according to the procedure and the penalties provided for in that act.
Act No4l6 of 31May2000 amending act No:S+ of l0June1997 on
competition gives the Danish Competition Authority (Konkurrencestl,relsen)
theriglt to enforce directly the prohibirions raid down in Arricles 8l(rj and 8i
ofthe EC Treaty.
Order of I December 1986, Article 56 bis (n.@
Under the order, the Minister for Economic Affain and Mnistry officials, on the
9n1 fan!, and the Competition Council, on the other, have the powers to applyArticles 81 and 82 that they normally have to apply French competition law.
section50 of the Act prohibiting ne"tui@
conferred on the authorities of the Member States by Arricles g4 and gj of theEC Treaty, and by the regulations based on Artic[ g3 of the Treaty, where
appropnate in conjunction with other Treaty provisions, are exercised by theFederal Cartel Office.
Act 703/7977 on the protection of Free Co-petition, as amended by 4st2296/1995, Section 13b (3): the Competition Commisslon and its ,""ritu.iutperform the tasks which have been asiigned to the national authorities of theMember States by Articles 84 and g5 of the Treaty establishing the European
Economic Community, and by regulations adopted iursuant to Article g3 of theTreaty in conjunction with other enabling provisions thereof. To perform these
tasks, the Competition Commission and its secretariat have the powers granted
to them under the act.
section 13(2) ofthe new competition B@
the Irish Competition Authority .[...] in respect of an agreement, decision or
concerted practice or an abuse which is prohibited t...1 by Article g1 or g2 of
the Treaty'. The Competition Bill 2001 is to be adopiedin April 2002.
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Community Act 1994, Section 54(5): the Competition Authority (Autoriti
garante della conconenza) applies Articles 81(l) and 82, using the powers
conferred upon it by Italian competition law (Law No 287 of 10 October 1990).
But, the new competition bill currently being finalised provides for the
ion Authority to apply Anicles 81 and 82.
Competition Act of 22May1997, Section88: the director-general of the
Competition Authority (Mededingingsautoiteit) is empowered under the
regulations based on Article 83 ofthe EC Treaty to apply Articles 81(1) and 82
of the Treaty.
Decree-Law 371193 of 29 October 1993, Article l2(2)): the Directorate-General
for Competition and Prices is empowered to carry out the tasks for which the
authorities of the Member States ue responsible under the regulations based on
Article 83 of the EC Treaty.
Royal Decree 29511998 of2l February 1998 regarding the application in Spain
of EU competition law:
Article 1: the Competition Tribunal (Tribunal de Defensa de la Competencia) is
the competent authority for the application in Spain ofArticles 81(1) and 82 of
the EC Treaty;
Article 3: the Competition Service (Servicio de Defensa de la CompeteDcia) is
the body entrusted with carrying out the procedures for implementing
Articles 81(1) and 82 ofthe EC
The Competition Authority (Konkurrensverket) is empowered as from
I January 2001 to apply Articles 81 and 82 directly (Act 1994: 1845, as
amended by Act 20ffi:. 1A23, Section 2).
In the 'Enterprise Bill' which is to be introduced into Parliament in early 2002,
provision is made for giving the UK's competition authorities the power to
apply Articles 81 and 82 ofthe EC Treaty directly.
Conclusions
In 10 of the 15 Member States, the administrative authorities can apply Articles 81 and 82 directly. The
Member States in which they cannot do so are Austria, Finland, keland, Luxembourg and the United
Kingdom.
The Swedish Competition Authority was given the power to apply Articles 8l and 82 directly in 2001.
TheAustrian, Irish and United Kingdom competition authorities will be given such powers in2002.
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VI- STATISTICS
A 
- 
Articles 81,82 and 86 of the ECTreaty + Article 65
of the ECSGTreaty
1. Activities in 2001
1.1. New cases opened in 2001
1.2. Cases closed in 2fi)l
2. Four-yearoverview
2.1. Evolution of stock of cases
("') An ex oficio case is one opened on the Commission's own initiative.
(,.a) Following one decision providing partly for negative clearance and partly for exemption (DSD), 16 cases were closed.
f") One of these two closures in 2001 concerns a decision taken at the very end of 2000 (Consorzio Riposta).
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TYpe Number Vo
Nofifications 94 JJ
Complaints 116 41
Ex fficio (t"\ 74 26
Total 2U 100
By informal procedureBy formal decision
Comfort letter 8l/l
In{rinsement of Article 82 with fine
Infrineement of Article 65 ECSC
Cases open at the end of the calendar year
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New cases registered during the year
2.2. Evolution of input
2.3. Evolution of output
B 
- 
council Regutation (EEC) No 4064/89 of 21 December 1989
on the control of concentrations between undertakings f'.)
l. Notifications receiyed 199G.2001
Explanation: in afew cases, two final decisions are taken: one panial referral to a Member state and one d.ecision concemingthe unreferred rest of the case.
("u) AsamendedbycouncilRegulation(EC)No 1310/97of 30Juner99i (oJLr80,9.i.7997,.
Cases closed during the year
Notifications withdrawn in phase I
Notifications withdrawn in phase II
Total cases closed by final decision
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2. Article 6 decisions 1998-2001
Article 6(1)(a)
Article 6( 1 )O) without undertakings
Article 6(1Xc)
Cases in which undertakings were accepted
during phase I
3. Article 8 decisions 1998-2001
Article 8(2) decisions with conditions and
oblieations
Article 8(2) decisions without conditions
and obligations
Article 8(4) divestiture orders
4. Referral decisions 1998r2AAl
1998 1999 2000 200l
Article 9 (request by a Member State) A l0 6 t0
Article 9 (total or partial referral to a Member State) 4 5 6 7
Artlcle22(3't 0 0 0 0
5. Articte 7 decisions (suspension ofconcentrations) 1998-2001
Article 7(4) derogation from suspension
Explanation: since March 1998, Article 7(2) is no longer applicable.
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C 
- 
State aid
1. New cases registered in 2001
2. Cases being examined as at 3l December 2001
3. cases deatt with in 2001 according to the register in which they were recorded
3.1. Cases forming the subject-matter of a decision in 2fi)l
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3.2. Cases closed in 2fi)l
4. Decisions taken by the Commission in 2001
Decisions as part
of the formal scrutiny
procedure
5. Evolution over the period 199l-2001
Decisions as part of
the formal scrutiny
procedure
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6. Decisions broken down by Member State
D A B DK E FIN F EL IRL I L NL P UK s EU
No objection 77 t9 14 l1 M ) 30 9 5 LJ 28 o 25 I 301
Decisions as
part of the
formal scrutiny
procedure
Initiation 25 0 4 0 l-l 3 I 2 4 2 4 3 4 0 66
Positive l3 I 0 3 1 0 0 6 0 4 0 3 0 33
Negative l0 0 z 0 12 0 2 0 0 3 0 2 0 0 0 3I
Conditional 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Appropriate measures 2 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10
Other decisions 2 0 I 0 2 0 0 I 0 2 0 2 0 tl
Total 129 2l 25 t2 A_a lrl j1_i
_aru_l]l9lA 34 t 456
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VII 
- 
STUDIES
The Directorate-General for Competition commissioned 21 studies in 2001, of which 15 have been
completed. Of the completed studies, 13 are confidential and will not be covered in this report.
One study commissioned in 2000, was flnalised in 2001; as this study was confidential, it will not be
covered in this report.
The other two studies completed in2oAl are summarised below:
Lademann study 
- 
Customer preferences for existing and potential sales
and servicing alternatives in automotive distribution ('u')
The aim of this study was to research consumer acceptance of altemative formats for sales and servicing,
including those which already exist, and those which may exist under any future regulatory regime. Herr
Lademann carried out consumer surveys in five European countries. In each countrt, approximately
100 consumers were selected at random and were interviewed about their preferences regarding car
purchase and servicing. Those interviewed were asked about a series of factors which might have a
bearing on their choice of retail outlet:
format of the retailer selling the vehicle;
type of servicing facility offered by the retailer (including subcontracted servicing);
price levels (including discounts);
availability of advice ftom salespeople;
distance to the servicing outlet;
whether the retailer could mrange a test-drive;
range of optional equipment available;
personal contact with the dealer;
- 
delivery time.
The type of after-sales servicing alternative offered by a car retailer proved to be the most important
factor ior consumers, followed by the availability of advice from sales personnel and the format of the
sales point. Then came, in order of importance, the ability to test drive the vehicle, the distance to the
workshop, the delivery time and the freedom to select equipment. The granting ofdiscounts by dealers
was considered to be self-evident, whereas personal contact with the dealer was found to be only of
secondary importance.
(I') Study by Dr Lademann & Partner, available on the Competition DG's web site
(http://europa.eu. int/ comml competition/car-sector/distribution).
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Andersen study on the impact of tegislative scenarios
for future car distribution ("uB)
l' Andersen was asked to analyse five scenarios: (l) a 'free for all' system whereby independent
retailers have a right to purchase new cars from the manufacturers and/or their official networks,(2) an exclusive distribution system in which new cars are sold only by one dealer in each tenitory,(3) a system of selective distribution based on qualitative criteria, 14; selective distribution based onqualitative and quantitative criteria, but without teritory allocation and (5) selective distribution
based on qualitative and quantitative criteria, coupled with limited territorial exclusivity.
2' Andersen also analysed certain specific issues including multi-branding, the effects of breaking the
mandatory link between sales of new vehicles and repairs/servicing, mass-rebates and quota-
allocation schemes' and third-party access to technical information. An-dersen measured the impact
on various players, on inter- and intra-brand competition, market integration in the EC, and ovirall
consumer satisfaclion.
Andersen concluded that there were three possible basic outcomes. All systems which combine territorial
exclusivity with qualitative and quantitative selectivity lead to a 'status quo' type of market outcome,
where the inter-relationship between manufacturers and official dealers-hips and the manufacturers,
control over their official networks is not significantly reduced. Scenarios based on quantitative andqualitative selection criteria without territorial exclusivity may lead to a ,multi-channel,-type of market
outcome, where different distribution formats and business models coexist within the same official
network' Scenarios based solely on qualitative selection, which remove territorial protection and do notprovide for differentiated criteria adapted to different distribution models within the official network leadto a 'Mass-selling' type of market outcome. This implies that sales are dominated by mass-retailers
which focus on selling high volumes of a few best-selling models and which have a high degree ofbargaining power vls-ri-uls manufacturers.
("3) The study may be consulted on the Competition DG's web site
(http ://europa. eu. int/comm/competition/car_sector/distribution )
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VIII _ REACTIONS TO THE XXXTH REPORT
A 
- 
European Parliament
European Parliament resolution on the Commission's XXXth Report
on competition Policy 2000 (sEc(2001) 694 
- 
C5-0312J2001 
- 
2001./2130(COS))
and reply by the Commission
1. Rapporteur: Alejandro Agag Longo
2. EP No: A5-029912001
3. Date ofadoption ofthe report: 4 October 2001
4. Subject: European Parliament Resolution on the Commission's X)A{th Report on Competition
Policy 2000
Competent Parliamentary Committee: Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs
Background of the resolution: Own initiative report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary
Affairs
Analysis of the text and of Parliament's requests: Parliament generally welcomes the annual
report and supports the policy outlined therein. It suggests some Commission action in the field of
antitrust, mergers and State aid.
Reply to these requests and outlook regarding the action that the Commission has taken or
intends to take:
The requests and the Commission's relevant position are indicated in the table below:
6.
7.
8.
Commission's positionParagraphs ofthe EP resolution
The Commission initiated in July 2001 11 formal State
aid investigations conceming tax regimes in eight
Member States and invited four firrther Member States
to bring their legislation in conformity with Treaty
rules.
2. Regrets that the Commission has not followed up,
or will not be following up, its threat to initiate pro-
ceedings in respect of unfair competition in the
form of tax concessions or exemptions, and calls
for the investigation of distortions of competition
caused by tax policy in the EU, which are not in
accordance either with the principle of the internal
mmket or with the spirit of the Community;
The Commission welcomes the Parliament's opinion as
to the necessity of the proposed modernisation of Regu-
lation 17 and shares its concerns to the effect that the
reform must not lead to renationalisation of Community
competition policy. The Commission is confident that
any technical difficulties related to the reform can be
overcome in a manner fully consistent with its effective
implementation.
4. Welcomes as a necessary step the proposed mod-
emisation of Regulation No 17 of 1962 implement-
ing Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, provided that
this does not involve any renationalisation of com-
petition policy, but draws attention to the technical
difhculties involved, on the basis of which it
expresses doubts regarding its practical implemen-
tauon;
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5. Welcomes the spirit of decentralisation tt at
informs Article 3 of the abovementioned proposal
for a Council regulation on the implemenLtion ot
the rules on competition laid down in Articles gl
ard 82 of the Treaty and amending Regulations(EEC) No 1017168, (EEC) No 2998/74, (EEC)
No 4056/86, and (EEC) No 3975/87, but stresses
that there is a need to further define and put in
objective terms the criterion of .affect (ingj trade
between Member States' since, given its impor_
tance, the current lack of precision could give rise
to uncertainty and undermine the obiective of
uniform implementation of Communitv rules:
The Commission welcomes the parliament's support
for the proposed Article 3. It agrees that the concept of
by the Court of Justice in its interpretation of the Treaty.
effect on trade between Member States containei in
Articles 8 1 and 82 of the Treaty will take on greater sig_
nificance in a new enforcement system based on decei_
tralised application. This concept has been substantially
developed by rhe Court ofJustice in its case-law, whicL
is based on a qualitative assessment of the nature of the
agreement or abusive practice at hand and a quantitative
assessment of the position of the parties. The Commis_
sion accepts that there may be a need for it to provide
guidance on the application of the principles developed
Considers excessive the Commission', po*o,
under the reform proposal as regulator. judge and
executor of Community rules, and expresses doubts
as to the gains for firms in terms of legal certainty
under the proposal in its current form;
The Commission's modernisation proposal is basei-in
decentralised application of Community competition
law and thus on the involvement of many moie deci_
sion-makers in the application of the law. The panicular
powers foreseen for the Commission in its proposal
serve the aim of ensuring an efficient and consiJtent
application ofArticles 8l and 82.
All powers possessed by the Commission continue to
be subject to a number of checks and balances, includ_
ing judicial control by the Court of Justice. These
checks and balances are untouched by the proposal.
The Commission is confident that its proposal will
provide an adequate level of legal certainty io compa_
nies. Companies will be able to rely on the direct effict
of Article 81(3) and on Commission block exemption
regulations and guidelines. The Commission has also
undertaken to introduce a new system of written opin_
ions, based on a notice, allowing it to provide guidance
to companies in real doubt as to the application of the
Comrnunity competition rules.7. Emphasises the importance of eff""ti*-intern*
tional cooperation between competition authorities
owing to the inherently global nature of the new
economy, and welcomes the proposed creation of
an international competition forum, but points out
that effective cooperation begins at home, and thus
urges the Commission, in the context of the mod_
ernisation of competition rules, to ensure that cooD_
eration between European competition authorities
functions correctly and efficiently;
The Commission welcomes the parliament,s emphasis
on effective cooperation between competition a;thori_
ties in the Community and on a global level. Close and
effecfive cooperation between all enforcers in the Com_
munity constitutes a central pillar of the Commission,s
proposal. This cooperation aims at promoting effective
enforcement of the Community competition law and at
ensuring its consistent application.
8. Calls once again for an internationatior"petition
system in the framework of the WTO, since ln view
of the growing number of world-wide mergers,
regional and price cartels and oligopolies, distor_
tions of competition and abuse of the market can
only be counteracted by worldwide minimum
standards governing competition, particularly for
mergers and cartels, and by minimum standaras for
supervrsory authorities in all wTo Member states:
The Commission will continue it, 
"ffo.trG*-diiiltilateral competition rules in the WTO. A first encour_
aging step was taken at the fourth WTO Ministerial
Conferelce in Doha/QATAR. The declaration adopted
by ]VTO Ministers recognises the case for negotiaiing
ry:h - agreement. Negotiations should open at thlfifth WTO Minisrerial in 2003.
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Believes that the Commission should pay particular
attention to attempts to restrict access to the Inter-
net, and welcomes its commitnent to ensuring that
the Intemet remains an open medium, which is
essential to the development ofthe economy;
The lack of competition in the local access markets in
all Member States, in particular for broadband access,
remains a major impediment to the deployment of the
Internet and Internet services in Europe. The second
phase of its sector inquiry on local loop unbundling
should enable the Commission to have by 2002 a com-
prehensive assessment of the situation in all Member
States and of problems encountered by new entrants in
obtaining access to key inputs for Internet access provi-
sion at fair and competitive conditions. Notably, the
Commission is already investigating complaints under
Article 82 ofthe EC Treaty against incumbent operators
and their subsidiaries allegedly impeding the possibility
of competitors to provide broadband Internet access to
their customers.
10. Regrets, however, the Commission's lack of fore-
sight and its delay in drawing attention to the
potential risks of the third generation of mobile tel-
ephones (UMTS technology), despite calls to do so
bv Parliament:
Council recommendation of 12 July 1999 on the limita-
tion of exposure of the general public to electromag-
netic files lists in its Annex II the basic resffictions to be
implemented to avoid potential risks to human health.
This recommendation covers the frequencies in wbich
the third-generation mobile systems will operate.
13. Stresses the utmost importance of services of
general interest; calls therefore for strong and legal
certainty in the application of competition rules
towards services of general interest to be main-
tained and developed in order to secure supply
requirements and universal access to services of
general interest;
In its recent report to the Laeken European Council on
services of general interest, the Commission undertook
to act quicldy to prepare a Community framework for
State aids in the form of compensation for fulfilling
public-service tasks. This fiamework would meet the
demand for greater legal certainty. The Commission
also stated that in a second stage it could, if necessary,
table an exemption regulation with the same aim of
increasing legal certainty.
14. Urges the Commission to act on conclusion 17 of
the Stockholm European Council, which states that
the Commission shall 'ensure that those enterprises
which still benefit fiom a monopoly situation on
their national market will not unduly benefit from
that situation';
The Commission is closely observing the behaviour of
these enterprises for the purpose cited by the Parlia-
ment.
15. Urges the Commission to investigate the acquisi-
tion activities of firms in the electricity sectot and
the setting of electricity tariffs with respect to
Community rules on illegal State aid;
In connection with the liberalisation of the electricity
market, the Commission will make use of all Commu-
nity competition policy instruments (State aid, mergers
and antitrust) to ensure and promote genuine competi-
tion in this sector. It will pay particular attention to
mergers and illegal aid.
19. Calls on the Commission to publish a table of
objective indicators on privatisation in the Member
States, and stresses that the purpose of such a table
would not be to pass judgment on ownership pat-
terns in the Member States but. rather. to act as a
valuable source of information providing the requi-
site transparency;
Pursuant to Commission Directive 8O/723/EEC on the
transparency of financial relations between Member
States and public undertakings (OJ L 195,29.7.1980,
amended in 2000, OJ L 193,29.7.2ffi0) Member States
are already obliged to supply relevant infotmation. The
issue of public or private ownership of enterprises as
such is the responsibility of Member States and is not
prejudiced by the competition rules (Article 295 EC).
The Commission therefore does not see added value in
the proposed table.
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20. Regrets the report's lack of reference to the phar-
maceutical industry, a key sector currently experi-
encing specific competition-related problems, but
welcomes the fact that the European Competition
Day held during the Belgian Presidency is to be
devoted to this area:
The Commission recognises the importance of clarify-
ing its competition policy in this sector. The annual
report covering 2001 will contain a section concerning
the Commission's actions in this sector. A11 these
actions were under preparation in the course of 2000
but adopted during the present year. They could there-
fore not be reported yet.
21. Stresses that in order to maximise the benefits of
the single market, consumers must be able to buy
products where they are available at the lowest
price within the single market, and urges the Com-
mission to continue fighting attempts to restrict
parallel imports in sectors where prices are not reg-
ulated by the State;
The Commission agrees with this objective and is
taking the appropriate action.
22. Calls on the Commission to continue to work to
ensure that the citizens of Europe become fully
aware of the real advantages of an effective compe-
tition policy, which will lead to increased under-
standing and public support;
The Commission shares this view entirely. In its infor-
mation of the public it is expressly pointing to the bene-
fits of its action to citizens. Also, the bi-annual
European Competition Day serves the purpose to create
public awareness.
Calls on the Commission to review the content of
its communication of 18 July 1996 on favourable
treatment, which was applied for the first time in
2000, focusing in particular, inter alia, on its exces-
sive inflexibility and its non-legislative status;
After five years of implementation of the 1996 notice
on the non-imposition or reduction of fines in cartel
cases. the Comrnission has the experience necessary to
modify its policy in this matter. The first formal deci-
sion was adopted in 1998 and since then, more than a
dozen formal decisions have applied it. This experience
is being invested in a substantial revision of the current
notice and a new reflection on the most suitable leeal
instrument for this purpose. in line with the remarkiof
the European Parliament. A draft Commission notice on
immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel
cases was published for consultation on 2l July 2001. It
reflects a more flexible approach to leniency as a resulr
of the introduction of new features. The Commission
has made a conscious choice to review its previous
notice by way of a new notice. Any other instrument
would reduce the discretion granted to the Commission
by Regulation No 17 and would not be proportionate to
the aim and content of the envisaged measure, which
are the factors to be retained according to the relevant
case-law. A notice is an appropriate instrument to make
publicly known how the Commission intends to use its
discretion to impose fines under Article 15 of Council
Regulation No l7 to companies disclosing the existence
of a cartel and terminating their involvem-ent in it.
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1A Eagerly awaits the Commission's proposal on the
future of vehicle distribution, which must take due
account of the interests of consumers, and stresses
that the question of whether a further exemption
from implementing Cornrnunity rules in this sector
is really justified must be studied carefully;
The Commission has frequently expressed its concem
that consumers are not deriving sufficient benefit from
the exemption granted to the car industry in 1995. The
recent decisions imposing fines on major car manufac-
turers for various breaches of the competition rules also
illustrate that the industry is too often willing to abuse
the current distribution system to the detriment of con-
sumers. The Commission is determined that the future
regime for car distribution must give more considera-
tion to consumer benefits and therefore shares the views
expressed by the Parliament.
Before beginning its deliberations on the future regula-
tory regime, the Commission first carried out a thor-
ough analysis of the way in which cars are currently
distributed in Europe, and on the effects of the current
block exemption. This process began with the elabora-
tion and adoption of an evaluation report, and continued
with a series of studies by extemal independent
consultants €n).
The Commission is carefully considering all material at
its disposal. A draft for the future regime should be
adopted by the beginning of2002.
27. Welcomes the Commission's proposal to start
during 2001 a formal consultation process on the
abovementioned Regulation (EEC) No 4064189
setting out recommendations and amendments for
change; underlines the interest of the European
Parliament to be consulted from the very beginning
of this consultation process in the form of a code of
good conduct between European institutions con-
cerned before any concrete recommendations are
proposed;
The Commission will adopt before the end of 2001 a
Green Paper launching the debate on a number of
amendments in the merger regulation. On some issues,
notablyjurisdictional ones, the Green Paper will outline
first Commission proposals. The Green Paper does not
include any concrete recommendations. Once adopted,
it will be immediately transmitted to the Parliament and
also made available for wide public consultation until
the end of March 2002. On the basis of the outcome of
this consultation, the Commission will proceed with the
elaboration of concrete proposals. The Parliament will
be duly associated to this process.
30. Believes that public spending and investments pro-
viding high-quality infrastructures might be impor-
tant in order to create a competitive and dynamic
knowledge-based economy; calls therefore for
detailed information and monitoring on the use,
quality and necessary redirection of public spend-
ing and the corresponding European and national
budgets;
The Commission continues to monitor public spending
and to control State aid in Member States. The redirec-
tion of public spending towards objectives that may
create a competitive and dynamic knowledge-based
economy will be scrutinised in the context of the State
aid scoreboard.
31. Applauds the creation, in response to requests by
Parliament, of a public register of State aid and
scoreboard as imporlant tools for promoting trans-
parency and democratic control, but regrets the
continuing willingness to accept situations of
blatant inequality in this respect;
The Commission acknowledges the different level of
State aid volume in the different Member States. This
inequality is acceptable as long as the aid is ganted in
line with the State aid rules.
F) Alt of the publicly available information regarding these studies is available on the Commission's web site
(http://europa.eu.int/conun/competition/car-sector/distribution/). Information on the decisions imposing fines on
carmakers is also available at the same address.
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32. Calls on the Commission to retain the annual
reports on State aid in the European Union, even
after the table of results has beenlntroduced;
The Commission is examining tle possiUitity to create
a comprehensive State aid reference document on the
situation, development and trends in the Eurooean
Union.
33. Regrets that the Commission has b""n unubl" !o
provide reliable data and statistics on the number of
cases where illegal State aid has been repaid, and
calls on the Commission to investigate this matter
and publish its findings as soon as possible, and
calls upon the Commission to prepare common EU
rules on the reimbursement of unduly paid State
aid;
The Commission has always 
-onito."d th*""o*rv of
unlawful State aid. A detailed list of the pending recov_
ery cases. with a short descripdon of the Commission's
acfions ln these cases is regularly published in pan ll of
the Annual Report on Competition policy.
The recovery of unlawful aid is carried out by the
Member States, according to their own tegislation. Jt
should be recalled that in a significanr numblr of cases.
the companies from whom aid should be recovered arein insolvency or bankruptcy procedures. Given the
variety and complexity of the national laws involved(company law, administrative law, insolvency law, etc.),
devising common EU rules on the reimbursement ;i
unlawful State aid is not contemplated by the Comrnis-
sion for the immediate future.
34. Seeks to bring aboui an improvement in the lesal
position of the undenakings affected: the Comnr]s_
sion and the Member States should work toward
greater involvement of third partiesi it will be bene_
ficial to introduce proper competition studies and
public hearings in conjunction with the Comrnis_
sion's treatment of individual cases:
Third parties showing a sufficient iot"r"rt atr"aAv tru*
the right to be heard in Commission proceedings.-More_
over, the Commission is considering how to piotect the
interests of third parties when adopiing in the proposed
new enforcement system non-infringement decisions or
decisions accepting commitments.
35. Welcomes the progress muO" Uy tfr" 
"unaiaut"countries in matters of competition policy, and the
fact that competition authorities have been estab_
Iished and begun their work; calls for greater disci_
pline in connection with State aiO, wiih onlv short
transitional periods if any.
The Commission recognises th" p.og.-rr-"tG*d ty
the candidate countries in establishing u prop"r rornp"-_
tition discipline, and considers that iiis now important
for- the competition authorities to concentrate, tn their
enforcement of the competition rules, on practices that
are important for the market structure. In the State aid
field, in particular, more work is still required in most
countries, and the Commission considers ihat no transi_
tional periods in this area should be necessarv.
B 
- 
Economic and Social Committee
Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on thexxxth Report on competitionPolicy 2000 (SEC(2001) 694 final) and reply by the Commission
on 10 May 2001, the commission decided to consult the Economic and social committee, underArticle262 of the Treaty establishing the European community, on the xxxth Report on competitionPolicy 2000 (SEC(2001) 694finat).
The section for the Single Market, Production and consumption, which was responsible for preparingthe committee's work on the subject, adopted its opinion on 2l November 2lol.The rapporteur wasMr Sepi.
At its 386th plenary session on 28 November 2001the Economic and Social committee adopted the itsopinion by 108 votes to one, with one abstention. The following document contains the essential parts ofthis opinion and the Commissions position thereto.
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XXXth Report on Competition Policy 2000 SEC(2001) 694 final 
- 
November
Main points of the ESC opinion Commission position
The Committee generally welcomes the report. Favourable opinion taken into account.
3.4.1. In the project to modemise the antitrust proce-
dure, uniform application of competition policy is
demanded of bodies which differ in terms of powers,
institutional position and membership criteria: this
could lead to diversent decisions and conduct.
The Commission acknowledges this concern and will
not only consider it within the ongoing debate with the
Council. but will also issue relevant guidelines.
3.7.3. A problem raised by the Honeywell case is the
need to internationalise competition principles. The
Commission's proposal to work on this area within the
WTO seems to be extremely well timed. The Commit-
tee has raised this issue time and again in its previous
opinions over the last four or five years. The forum pro-
posed by the Commission, however, can be considered
only a first step in this direction. At the same time, bilar
eral cooperation with the leading industrial nations
should continue.
The Commission is aware of the need to continue its
efforts to enhance bilateral cooperation with its trading
partners to solve intemational competition policy
issues. Beyond bilateral cooperation, the Commission
will intensify its action towards multilateral competi-
tion rules in the WTO. A first encouraging step was
taken at the fourth WTO Ministerial in Doha/Q41Ap.
The declaration adopted by WTO Ministers recognises
the case for negotiating such an agreement. Negotia-
tions should open at the fifth WTO Ministerial in 2003.
3.10. The Competition DG's communication policy
must be improved. Although the official report could
not be produced any faster, the Commissioner's intro-
duction and a brief summary of the Competition DG's
legislative and 'legal' activities could be issued on their
own earlier.
The Commission is stepping up efforts to improve
information to the public. The annual report as a Com-
mission document requires endorsement by the full
Commission. This would equally apply to any sum-
mary. In any case, it is adopted usually in April of each
year. The Commission therefore does not see a need for
an additional document to be published just a few
weeks earlier.
3. I I . The publication of online information on State aid
should be extended to other subjects and accompanied
at regular intervals by paper summaries.
The Commission is increasing the amount of informa-
tion it provides on State aid. Two good examples are the
recently launched online State aid register and the State
aid scoreboard, published in paper form.
3.15.1. The Committee feels that if social aspects are
sacrificed, the accession of these societies into the
Community could generate major disappointment and a
backlash. The process must tlerefore be accompanied
by robust, targeted economic and social policy meas-
ures, including an improved climate for enterprise
development potential, particularly for SMEs. To this
end, the Committee believes the European Union must
provide far greater resources than those presently avail-
able.
The Commission takes note of tlis view.
3.16. Certain full-blown international cartels that domi-
nate the world economy, for instance in the oil and
natural gas markets, must be confronted. The cartel
policy conducted by OPEC, and also by the oil compa-
nies, clearly runs counter to competition policS and
should be confronted with the appropriate instruments
and the necessary level of political determination. In a
global economy, even economic actions directly con-
ducted by national governments must obey the rules of
economic propriety and competition policy.
The Commission shares the Committee's concems and
is in favour of developing international forums for dis-
cussing and coordinating the competition laws applica-
ble in the main trading areas of the world. In the
absence of any global coordination authority, the Com-
mission can only apply the Treaty. Article 8l EC, pro-
hibiting cartels, covers only the behaviour of
undertakings. It does not apply to the actions of sover-
eign Sta[es, even if the Community market is thereby
affected.
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3.17. The continued existence in individual countries of
professional sectors benefiting fiom contractual, admin-
isEative or legislative protection represents an unac-
ceptable breach of the principles of European
competition policy. At a time when public-service
monopolies are being liberalised, multinational busi-
nesses are being punished, and all sectors are being
urged to step up their competitiveness, these occupa-
tional cartels 
- 
which are a legacy of the past 
- 
must
be brought into line with the new situation. The Com-
mission must take on this task, and not only with words,
but with practical steps designed in part to encourage
national authorities to take the appropriate action.
In the context of liberalisation, the Commission will use
all the tools of Community competition policy (State
aid, merger control, antitrust and abuse of dominant
position) to safeguard and develop effective competi-
tion in the markets concerned. It will focus particularly
on illegal aid.
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